中觀論疏 3.26

3.26

From “Question: The Abhidharmikas say that all phenomena arise from the four conditions” downward, secondly, the opponent adduces the four conditions to rescue their doctrine. This rescue arises from three sources: First, it arises from the eight negations. The author of the treatise cited sūtras to clarify that the eight negations mean non-arising; the opponent also cites sūtras to clarify that phenomena arise from the four conditions. Arising and non-arising are both taught by the Buddha; if one is refuted, both are refuted, and if one is elucidated, both are elucidated. If one refutes only arising to elucidate non-arising, one should likewise refute only non-arising to elucidate arising. Therefore the sūtra says: “Better to give rise to the view of self than to wrongly grasp emptiness; one does not fall into evil destinies on account of this view of self.” Furthermore, if arising is refuted, then conventional truth does not exist; if conventional truth does not exist, how could the ultimate truth exist? Second, it arises from the above statement that “the intrinsic nature of phenomena is not found within conditions.” The opponent says: because intrinsic nature exists within conditions, [phenomena] are able to arise by relying on conditions; if there were no intrinsic nature, then even though they rely on conditions, they could never arise. As the Nirvāṇa-sūtra says in answering the objection of Prabhāketu: “Conditioned phenomena, because they have the nature of arising, can be arisen by arising; unconditioned phenomena, because they lack the nature of arising, cannot be arisen by arising.” The Buddha's Mahāyāna sūtras directly teach that there is a nature and that [phenomena] arise relying on conditions; why do you say that nature is not found within conditions? Third, it arises from the end of the final prose section above. If you say that because arising cannot be found through the four alternatives there is no arising, now it is also clarified that all phenomena arise from the four conditions, so there must be arising. Question: Since this treatise claims to refute those confused about the Mahāyāna, the Mahāyāna practitioner should be the one to adduce the four conditions to rescue the doctrine; why does it instead cite the Abhidharma to establish it? Answer: Dharma Master [Tan]ying of Guannei said: “This verse as an objection was merely where Piṅgala misapplied his cleverness. Why so? The author of the treatise directly adduced the four conditions to comprehensively encompass all teachers, and refuting arising from the four conditions also comprehensively refutes all teachers. But Piṅgala's view was narrow, so he biasedly attributed it to the Abhidharma.” The fault lies with the commentator; one should not question [the treatise itself]. Now, to accommodate and resolve this on Piṅgala's behalf, there are altogether eight meanings: First, Abhidharma applies to both the Great and Small [Vehicles]. Just as the Āgamas apply to both the Great and Small—hence Kāśyapa spoke of the Vaipulya Āgamas—furthermore, the Mahāyānasaṃgraha says: “Analyzing the meaning of the Mahāyāna is the Mahāyāna Abhidharma.” Kumārajīva said: “If I were to compose a Mahāyāna Abhidharma, it would surpass Kātyāyanīputra.” Inferring from this, Abhidharma applies to both the Great and Small. Second, this is a refutation through pointing out identity. Just as in the preceding eight negations of “neither coming nor going,” it was shown that if an insider maintains this, they are identical to an outsider, so now it shows that if a Mahāyāna practitioner grasps the four conditions as having real arising, they are identical to the Hīnayāna. Hence, one who has apprehension in the Small [Vehicle] is still an outsider, and one who has apprehension in the Great [Vehicle] is still a Hīnayānist. Third, although there are twenty sects, five sects flourished widely in the world, and among the five sects, the Sarvāstivāda flourished exclusively in the world. Within the Hīnayāna Dharma there are the teachings of the Tripiṭaka: the Sammatīya school exclusively propagated the Vinaya, and the Vinaya is the foundation for sustaining the Buddha's Dharma. The Sthavira school exclusively propagated the Sūtras, and the Sūtras are the root of the Tripiṭaka. Two hundred years after the Buddha's nirvāṇa, from the Sthavira school emerged the Sarvāstivāda school, which exclusively propagated the Abhidharma; the Abhidharma is the real teaching. Hence, three hundred and fifty years after the Buddha's nirvāṇa, Kātyāyana understood the Buddha's Abhidharma and composed the Eight Skandhas; at six hundred years, explaining the Eight Skandhas, the Vibhāṣā was composed. At seven hundred years, because the Vibhāṣā was too broad, Dharmaśrī composed the Abhidharma[hṛdaya]. Because Dharmaśrī's work was too concise, around the thousandth year Dharmatrāta composed the Saṃyuktābhidharmahṛdaya. All of these are the Abhidharma doctrines of the Sarvāstivāda school; therefore the Abhidharma flourished. Question: Why did this school flourish so greatly? Answer: This school clarifies that the three times exist, and that seeing existence one attains the Path; because it accords with the minds of ordinary beings, many in the world believe in it. Moreover, the cyclical times necessitated it: in the first five hundred years, markless teachings were mostly spoken; in the second five hundred years, teachings with marks were mostly spoken. Thus there are the two periods of the true Dharma and the semblance Dharma. Now we are in the semblance Dharma, so many study the marked teachings of the Abhidharma. Fourth, this school only attains the emptiness of persons and does not attain the emptiness of dharmas; seeing that all dharmas have arising, they do not believe that all dharmas are without arising, and therefore they obstruct the Mahāyāna non-arising. Just as when the five hundred sects heard that the Mahāyāna teaches ultimate non-arising, it was like a knife wounding their hearts—these are all offshoots of the Sarvāstivāda school. Now, by refuting the Abhidharma's assertion of definite, real arising, one comprehensively refutes the five hundred sects. Question: How many meanings are there in this school's establishment of arising from the four conditions? Answer: There are two meanings. First, grasping Hīnayāna arising, they reject Mahāyāna non-arising, claiming that Mahāyāna non-arising was not spoken by the Buddha, but fabricated by Devadatta. I personally heard a certain monk say: “The Mahāyāna Vaipulya sūtras were fabricated by the monk Nāgārjuna, so I do not believe them.” Second, grasping the Hīnayāna four conditions, they doubt the Mahāyāna sūtras' clarification of non-arising: if you say there is no arising, why do the sūtras say [phenomena] arise from the four conditions? As said above, upon hearing the Mahāyāna Dharma speak of ultimate emptiness, they immediately gave rise to views and doubts. Fifth, this treatise's refutation of Hīnayāna arising to clarify that all dharmas are without arising is precisely the complete elucidation of both the Buddha's expedient and real teachings of the Great and Small Vehicles. Now, seeking arising and finding it unattainable, one knows that by original nature there is no arising; thus real arising is an expedient, and non-arising is the real. Non-arising being the real reveals the real characteristic; arising being an expedient opens the expedient gate. Hence the Lotus Sūtra says: “All dharmas from their origin / are ever characterized by quietude and cessation.” Thus we know that original nature's non-arising is the real meaning. “Although I speak of nirvāṇa, / this too is not true extinction.” Thus we know that arising and ceasing are expedients. Sixth, Question: Where in this treatise is there such a text? Answer: The chapter on the Condition as Object says: “The real and subtle Dharma— / this indeed can be trusted; / what was spoken according with expediency / cannot be taken as real.” This clearly explains the Lotus Sūtra. Seventh, it demonstrates that refutation has a sequence. Just as the Śata-śāstra first renounces demerit and next renounces merit, here it is also like this. Outsiders obstruct the Hīnayāna, so one refutes outsiders and elucidates the Hīnayāna; the Hīnayāna obstructs the Mahāyāna, so one refutes the Hīnayāna and elucidates the Mahāyāna. That is why it refutes the Abhidharma in particular. Question: Not attaining the emptiness of dharmas, the Hīnayāna does not believe in non-arising, so arising is refuted and non-arising is elucidated. But works like the Śāriputrābhidharma clarify both emptinesses, and the Tattvasiddhi-śāstra and others also clarify both emptinesses; should they not be exempt from refutation? Answer: There are two kinds of non-arising: first, refuting arising to clarify non-arising; second, non-arising by original nature. The Hīnayāna practitioner holds that there is first arising, and only by deconstructing it does one attain non-arising; it is not non-arising by original nature, and therefore it ought to be refuted. Hence the Pañcaviṃśati says: “If dharmas exist first and later become non-existent, the Buddhas and bodhisattvas would incur fault.” Question: The Abhidharma appeared earlier, so it can be purged; the Tattvasiddhi arose later, so should it not be exempt from refutation? Answer: As long as the error is the same, it is refuted; what does earlier or later matter? If an earlier treatise could not refute a present confusion, then an ancient prescription could not cure a present illness. Eighth, there are two kinds of Hīnayāna [practitioners]: first, those who cannot be converted to enter the Great [Vehicle]; second, those who can be converted to enter the Great [Vehicle]. Now, for the sake of those who can be converted, they are converted into Mahāyāna practitioners. Hence the Lotus Sūtra says: “Preaching the Mahāyāna for the voice-hearers (śrāvakas).” One should know that voice-hearers are those who turn from the Small to enter the Great. As for those who cannot be converted, there are altogether two kinds of persons: First, noble ones: meaning their afflictions are already exhausted and what they have attained is ultimate, so they cannot be converted. Second, ordinary beings: clinging to the Small, they do not accept the Great, and furthermore they fear losing a lifetime's learning and forfeiting fame and profit; such persons hate the Mahāyāna, yet it is best refuted by the Mahāyāna. Therefore Mahāyāna practitioners do not conflict with voice-hearers; constantly giving rise to compassion and attaining supernormal powers and wisdom, they should eliminate their small views. Question: Why did the Mahāyāna practitioner not come forward with a rescue? Answer: There are two kinds of Mahāyāna practitioners. First, those like the Fangguang school: upon hearing of non-arising, their clinging mind increases even more, so they do not rescue the doctrine. Second, the Mahāyāna practitioners of apprehension: if they hear of non-arising, they think it is ultimate truth; if they hear of arising from the four conditions, they say it is conventional truth; thus they give rise to the two views of arising and non-arising. Such kinds are entirely subsumed within the Hīnayāna rescue. Furthermore, there are Mahāyāna practitioners of non-empty provisional arising who say merely that real arising is empty of intrinsic nature, while provisional arising is not empty; they are also subsumed within the Hīnayāna rescue. Regarding the establishment, there are three parts: first, the prose; second, the verse root-text; third, the explanation. The prose has two parts: first, establishing arising from the four conditions; second, censuring non-arising. Question: The Abhidharma was spoken by the Buddha; why call them “Abhidharmikas”? These four conditions were not fabricated by the Abhidharmikas, so why make such a rescue? Answer: The Buddha spoke of the four conditions as like a mirage and like a dream, so the four conditions are non-conditions as conditions; though conditions, they are non-conditions, so they do not cite the Buddha's teaching. Now, hearing of the four conditions, they take them as definite, real conditions as conditions and grasp them; hence they are called Abhidharmikas. Just as Kātyāyana was rebuked: “Do not use an arising-and-ceasing mental activity to preach the Dharma of the real mark”—an arising-and-ceasing mind is still an annihilationist-and-eternal mind. Moreover, the Hīnayāna is called the “half-word” because it only grasps conditions and does not grasp non-conditions. Question: The Abhidharma texts first clarify the six causes and later analyze the four conditions; why does it now not mention the six causes but only mention the four conditions? Answer: In the Vibhāṣā there are various explanations. One explanation says: the four conditions were spoken by the Buddha, whereas the six causes were not spoken by the Buddha; Kātyāyanīputra merely formulated the six causes to explain the Buddha's meaning of the four conditions. Since the six causes were not spoken by the Buddha, they are not cited. Now he wishes to cite the Buddha's true words to challenge the author of the treatise. The next explanation says: the six causes were also spoken by the Buddha, but the text fell out, so they must have been taught in the numerical doctrinal section of sixes in the Ekottarika-āgama. The next explanation says: the six causes were indeed spoken by the Buddha, but the Buddha spoke them in scattered places, and Kātyāyana later compiled them. Tripiṭaka Master Paramārtha said: “The Buddha preached the Sūtra on the Six Causes in the heavens. The devas, seeing that Kātyāyana wished to compose the Abhidharma, brought and delivered it to him. Kātyāyana, through his wisdom of past lives, observed and knew it was the Buddha's teaching. Yet it was ultimately not definitive, so it was not cited here.” Second, the verse root-text has altogether three points: the first half enumerates the names of the four conditions; the second single line clarifies the function of the four conditions. The four conditions comprehensively encompass the conditioned and the unconditioned, but they only give rise to the conditioned. Hence the Saṃyuktābhidharmahṛdaya says: “From these six kinds of causes, / conditioned dharmas arise in succession.” “There is no fifth condition” is the third point, analyzing the essence of the four conditions. Because the four conditions encompass all conditions exhaustively, they take all dharmas as their essence; therefore it says there is no fifth condition. Thus this single verse establishes three meanings: namely, name, function, and essence. Furthermore, it is divided into two: three lines establish the meaning of arising; the fourth line clarifies the meaning of non-arising. The opponent says: I also have the meaning of non-arising. What is meant by non-arising is merely that there is no arising from a fifth condition; it does not mean there is no arising from the four conditions. Arising from a fifth condition refers to the eight fallacies at the beginning of the chapter. Furthermore, in saying “there is no fifth condition,” the author of the treatise wishes to comprehensively encompass all meanings of arising: all that arises falls within the four conditions; if the meaning of arising from the four conditions is unestablished, then all is ultimately without arising; hence it says there is no fifth condition. The prose explains starting from the end. In the preceding verse, first came the enumeration of names, next the function, and last the essence, proceeding from branch to root; in the prose, first is the essence, next the function, and last the names, proceeding from root to branch, each illustrating one aspect. Moreover, the verse directly adduces the four conditions to rescue the doctrine—first enumerating the names, next analyzing the function, and last clarifying the essence; the prose shows the interlinked arising, so it follows the final line of text and immediately explains it. “All existing conditions are subsumed within the four conditions”: this has two meanings: first, to clarify that there are no conditions conjectured by outsiders and the like; second, to clarify that although the Buddha's sūtras speak of various conditions, they are all within the four conditions. Moreover, just as the Śāriputrābhidharma clarifies ten conditions, they are also subsumed within the four conditions. The ten causes of the Bodhisattvabhūmi are also like this. “By these four conditions the myriad things are able to arise” explains the third line, analyzing the function of the four conditions. “The cause-condition refers to all conditioned dharmas” explains the first half, enumerating the names of the four conditions. Here it brings out the essence to explain the name, rather than explaining its name directly. Explaining the names of the four conditions has two patterns: first, explaining the names of the first two conditions separately; next, explaining the latter two conditions collectively. Explaining the first two conditions separately is because the essences of the first two conditions have breadth and narrowness. The cause-condition's condition and fruit both encompass the three categories [of dharmas: matter, mind, and neither-matter-nor-mind]. The immediate condition's fruit applies to two categories: if a mind ceases and a mind arises, then both condition and fruit are mind; if a mind ceases and the two attainments [of cessation and non-perception] succeed it, then the condition is mind while the fruit is neither-matter-nor-mind. Within the mind, there are exclusions and inclusions. As for what is excluded, it excludes the final mind of the arhat in the two times [of past and present]. Question: Why are these two minds not [immediate conditions]? Answer: Some say the past is an already-ceased mind, so it is not; the present is the arhat's final mind, the mind about to enter nirvāṇa, having no fruit to produce, so it is also not. Some, based on the Tattvasiddhi's doctrine, propose three propositions: first, a condition and not a fruit, which is the initial moment of past ignorance; second, a fruit and not a condition, which is the final mind of the arhat; third, both condition and fruit, from the second moment of ignorance onward up to the second-to-last mind of the arhat, all minds between these. Now I do not agree with these explanations. Now I clarify that since this text claims to be an Abhidharma rescue, we should also use the Abhidharma to explain it. In the text there are two parts: first, clarifying what is excluded, meaning eliminating what is not immediate; second, what is included, analyzing what is the immediate condition. As for what is excluded: the final mind of the arhat in the two times is merely the fruit of an immediate condition, having no subsequent mind to produce, so it is not a condition; it does not speak of the future arhat. For the Sarvāstivāda masters, the future time is disordered, and the minds of ordinary beings and noble ones have no sequence at all, so they do not speak of it. The Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa clarifies that the immediate condition has three propositions: first, what is an immediate sequence and also an immediate condition, excluding the final mind of the arhat in the past and present; second, what is an immediate sequence but not an immediate condition, which is the final mind of the arhat in the two times, and also the minds and mental factors about to arise in the future; third, what is neither an immediate sequence nor an immediate condition, which, excluding the minds and mental factors about to arise in the future, refers to the remaining future minds and mental factors. Question: The arhat in the two times has no subsequent fruit to produce; why is it called the mind sense-faculty (manas)? Answer: The mind sense-faculty receives its name from its intrinsic entity; although it has no subsequent fruit to produce, it still obtains the name of faculty. Just as the ground, though it grows no grass, still obtains the name of ground. The immediate condition receives its name from its fruit; having no fruit to produce, it is not named an immediate condition.