中觀論疏 3.33

3.33

「次第緣者」，第二破次第緣，初立、次破。釋次第緣有三家。第一成論師云：四心次第，如識滅想生，識滅為緣、想生為果。第二毘曇人云：心王心數俱起俱滅，以俱滅為緣、俱起為次第也。第三異部人云：善心滅還生善心，餘心亦爾，故名次第緣。評家不許此說。若不善心還生不善，即無解脫也。但用前滅後生三世次第，不言三性次第也。問：色法亦前滅後生，何故不立次第緣耶？答：有三義故不立色也。一者心是神靈之法、有相開避義，色是無知、無有此能，故不立也。二者色得善惡並起，其起即亂，心即不爾。三者眾生多計心神是常，故今明心念念生滅無有常也。問：云何名次第緣耶？答：五部雖異，同以前滅為緣、後生為次第。次第是後果，以前滅心與後生次第果作緣，故名次第緣。後心非越次而生，即次第而生，故名次第也。問：叵有是心非次第緣不？答：小乘義已如上釋。大乘中常住佛果，及地論人自性清淨心本來有義，非從前滅而後生，故是心而非次第。若作始有義，佛果因金剛滅而生者，亦是次第緣家果，而非復次第緣也。「果若未生時」下，第二正破。今先敘破次第緣意。《涅槃》云「諸行無常，是生滅法。生滅滅已，寂滅為樂。」此偈名全如意珠。諸行生滅故無常，無常故苦，苦故空，空故無我不淨，此談生死義周也。生滅滅已即名為常，常即有我樂與淨，此說涅槃究竟。故此一偈明義具足，稱全如意珠。今此偈破次第緣，正令悟生滅滅已，以求此心生滅不可得，故生滅便息。故知此心本性不生不滅，名無生滅觀，稱之為常，以常故即我樂淨。羅睺釋八不為四對，深有其意也。此偈為二：上之三句破次第緣、下一句結破也。就前破緣，有離合兩破。合破者，正以前心滅為緣、後心生為果。難意云：後心未生，即前不得滅，前則非緣。假使前滅，滅名無所有，何得為緣？是以二門俱無前滅為緣。既無前滅為緣，豈有後生為果？言離破者，上半就果門破緣、下半就緣門破緣。果門破緣有三，謂果已生、未生、生時並不得成緣。緣門破緣亦三，謂緣已滅、未滅、滅時亦不成緣。今文相兼。果中舉未緣即舉已，已未相兼。緣果既有已未，即兼第三時。所言果已起不須緣者，果若未生可得須緣辨之，今果已起，何用緣為？所言後果未起前心不名緣者，前滅本為後果作緣，後果未起，與誰作緣？生時還同已未，不須破也。「滅法何能緣」，此句就緣門破緣。亦三：所言已滅不能為緣者，已滅是無，無所有，不能為後作緣。婆藪盤豆破薩婆多云：「已滅之法能為緣者，已死之鷄應能伺晨，而不爾也。」所言未滅不能為緣者，本以前滅為緣，前既未滅，何能為緣？又且有為之法無有未滅，故不名緣。若未滅名緣，亦應未生名果；未生不名果，未滅豈名緣？滅時還同已未，不須破也。問：前心滅後心生即是緣義。所以然者，前心礙後心，後心不得生。前心亦滅，即後心無礙，故後心是果、前心為緣。答：前心自滅，非後心緣。後心自生，非前心果。此乃自滅自生，豈關前引於後、後詶於前耶？

[Second,] "Concerning the immediate condition"—this is the second [section], refuting the immediate condition (samanantara-pratyaya), first presenting it and then refuting it. There are three schools explaining the immediate condition. The first is that of the Tattvasiddhi masters, who say: four minds occur in sequence, as when consciousness ceases and ideation arises; the cessation of consciousness is the condition, and the arising of ideation is the effect. The second is that of the Abhidharma adherents, who say: the primary mind and mental factors arise together and cease together; their joint cessation is the condition, and their joint arising is the immediate succession. The third is that of other schools, who say: a wholesome mind ceases and in turn produces a wholesome mind, and so on for other minds, which is why it is called the immediate condition. Critics do not accept this account: if an unwholesome mind were only to give rise to an unwholesome mind in turn, there could never be liberation. They only employ the sequence of the three times in which the prior ceases and the posterior arises; they do not speak of a sequence of the three moral natures. Question: Physical form (rūpa) also ceases prior and arises posterior; why is it not established as an immediate condition? Answer: For three reasons, it is not established for physical form. First, the mind is a spiritual entity, possessing the property of yielding place to make way; physical form is insentient and lacks this capacity, so it is not established. Second, physical form allows wholesome and unwholesome to arise concurrently, and when they arise they are disorderly; the mind is not like this. Third, sentient beings mostly reckon the mental spirit to be permanent; thus here it is explained that mind arises and ceases from thought-moment to thought-moment, without permanence. Question: Why is it called the immediate condition? Answer: Although the five schools differ, they agree in taking the prior cessation as the condition and the posterior arising as the immediate succession. The immediate succession is the posterior effect; because the prior ceased mind serves as the condition for the posterior arising immediate effect, it is called the immediate condition. The posterior mind does not arise skipping over the sequence, but arises immediately in sequence; hence it is called immediate. Question: Can there be a mind that is not an immediate condition? Answer: The Hīnayāna doctrine has already been explained above. In the Mahāyāna, the permanently abiding Buddha-fruit and the doctrine of the Dilun masters that the intrinsically pure mind is originally existent do not arise from a prior cessation followed by a posterior arising; therefore, it is mind and yet not an immediate [condition]. If one maintains the doctrine of an initial emergence, [such that] the Buddha-fruit arises due to the cessation of the vajra[-like concentration], then it is also an effect of the immediate condition, yet no longer an immediate condition [itself]. From "When the effect has not yet arisen" downward is the second [part], the refutation proper. Now we first state the intention behind refuting the immediate condition. The Nirvāṇa Sūtra says: "All conditioned phenomena are impermanent; they are dharmas subject to arising and ceasing. Arising and ceasing having been extinguished, quiescent extinction is bliss." This verse is called the Complete Wish-Fulfilling Jewel. Conditioned phenomena arise and cease, hence they are impermanent; being impermanent, they are suffering; being suffering, they are empty; being empty, they are non-self and impure—this thoroughly articulates the meaning of life-and-death (saṃsāra). "Arising and ceasing having been extinguished" is termed permanence; permanence entails self, bliss, and purity—this expresses ultimate nirvāṇa. Therefore this single verse articulates the doctrine completely and is called the Complete Wish-Fulfilling Jewel. Now, this verse refuting the immediate condition precisely leads one to realize that arising and ceasing have been extinguished: because, when sought, this arising and ceasing of the mind cannot be found, arising and ceasing cease altogether. Thus one knows that the original nature of this mind is neither arisen nor ceased, which is called the contemplation of non-arising and non-ceasing, designated as permanence; and because of permanence, it is self, bliss, and purity. Rāhula's explanation of the eight negations as four pairs has profound import. This verse has two parts: the first three lines refute the immediate condition; the final line concludes the refutation. Regarding the preceding refutation of the condition, there are two refutations: separate and combined. The combined refutation directly addresses taking the prior mind's cessation as the condition and the posterior mind's arising as the effect. The intent of the objection is: if the posterior mind has not yet arisen, the prior cannot cease, and the prior is then not a condition. Even if the prior ceases, cessation means having nothing at all—how can it serve as a condition? Therefore, in both approaches, there is no prior cessation to serve as a condition. Since there is no prior cessation serving as a condition, how could there be a posterior arising serving as an effect? As for the separate refutation: the first half refutes the condition from the standpoint of the effect, and the second half refutes the condition from the standpoint of the condition. Refuting the condition from the standpoint of the effect has three [aspects]: namely, whether the effect has already arisen, has not yet arisen, or is currently arising, in none of these cases can a condition be established. Refuting the condition from the standpoint of the condition also has three [aspects]: namely, whether the condition has already ceased, has not yet ceased, or is currently ceasing, neither can it be established as a condition. The present text combines them. In [speaking of] the effect, mentioning "not yet" implies "already"; "already" and "not yet" encompass each other. Since both condition and effect have "already" and "not yet", this also encompasses the third time [i.e., currently occurring]. What is meant by "the effect having already arisen does not need a condition" is: if the effect has not yet arisen, it might need a condition to produce it; now that the effect has already arisen, what use is a condition? What is meant by "when the posterior effect has not yet arisen, the prior mind is not called a condition" is: the prior cessation originally serves as a condition for the posterior effect; if the posterior effect has not yet arisen, for whom does it serve as a condition? The time of arising is identical to already and not yet, so it need not be refuted. "How can a ceased dharma be a condition?"—this line refutes the condition from the standpoint of the condition. It also has three [aspects]: what is meant by "what has already ceased cannot serve as a condition" is that what has already ceased is non-existent, has nothing at all, and cannot serve as a condition for what follows. Vasubandhu, refuting the Sarvāstivādins, said: "If a dharma that has already ceased could serve as a condition, a rooster that has already died should be able to announce the dawn—yet it cannot." What is meant by "what has not yet ceased cannot serve as a condition" is: originally one took prior cessation as the condition; since the prior has not yet ceased, how could it be a condition? Furthermore, among conditioned dharmas there is none that has not yet ceased, so it is not called a condition. If what has not yet ceased were called a condition, what has not yet arisen should also be called an effect; if what has not yet arisen is not called an effect, how could what has not yet ceased be called a condition? The time of ceasing is identical to already and not yet, so it need not be refuted. Question: The prior mind's cessation and the posterior mind's arising constitutes the very definition of a condition. Why is this? The prior mind obstructs the posterior mind so that the posterior mind cannot arise. When the prior mind also ceases, the posterior mind is without obstruction; hence the posterior mind is the effect and the prior mind is the condition. Answer: The prior mind ceases of itself; it is not the condition for the posterior mind. The posterior mind arises of itself; it is not the effect of the prior mind. This is mere self-cessation and self-arising; how does it involve the prior leading the posterior, or the posterior responding to the prior?