中觀論疏 3.34

3.34

長行為二：初釋立、次釋破。「諸心心數法於三世中次第生」者，初簡三聚法是次第緣，故偏明心法也。而言心數法者，簡無別心數部，故明心心數法也。諸部有二：一明有心數、二明無心數。無心數是成實佛陀提婆之義。若以前生為王、後起為數者，成實亦得有之，今文正是立有心數義也。「三世中」者，正取三世次第，簡非三性次第。問：諸部無量，何故偏明此計？答：此部盛行，故偏破也。「未來法未生」下，第二釋破，前釋三句正破、次釋第四句結破。釋三句為二：前釋上半舉果破緣、次釋緣門破緣。釋舉果破緣二門：一就未生門破、二就已生門破。可具二義：一者以二關責一家。果既未生，現在與誰為緣？果若已生，即不須緣。次二關破二部義：未生破二世無義。未生是無，與太虛不異，與誰為緣？若已有即是生，破二世有義。異大虛即是有，異無生即是已生，何用緣耶？「現在心心數法無有住時」下，釋第三句緣門破緣。此可有二義：一者是破現在心不得為未來作緣，但上就果門破，今就緣門破耳。二者前長行云「心心數法於三世法中次第生」，上破現在心不得為未來作緣，今破過去不得與現在為緣。不破未來與誰為緣者，數人未來法亂，無次第緣，故不破也。就文為三：第一就未門難、二就已門、三就滅時門。就未門難，有縱奪二意。奪意云：現在法若有一念未滅，可許未滅為緣；既無一念未滅，何得以未滅為緣？問：諸部亦有明心法是不滅耶？答：上座部中，有一師云：色法亦生即滅，心法經十五剎那不滅。今破此義也。「若有住即非有為」，此第二縱破也。縱有一念未滅，即一念是常、一念非有為。汝義無有一念常，是云何一念未滅？「若滅已」此第二就已滅義破。亦兩：一正釋、二取意。正釋云：滅是無所有，無有力能引起後，故非緣也。此句正順偈文，又正是破過去不得為現在作緣也。「若言滅法猶有」，此取意也。彼意云：前心雖滅而有引後之力存，此是數人過去冥伏有義。又是迦葉鞞義，作因不滅住過去，待果起方謝。訶梨破之云：此是失已復失。又是成實人成就過去義。破云：若前心引後之力不滅者即是常，如前罪心不滅，即常是罪心，便無有福；福常是福，即無有罪。故云「無罪福」也。又汝有此力附在何處。若附心體即心體已滅。引後之力何所附耶？又若引後力不滅，即力常、心體自無常，即分一心為二，半常半無常也。又若續來不滅，不滅是一，一那是次第緣？又大論不出二意：若念念滅不自固，則何能生後耶？若不滅則常，如《地論》真識義，則無次第緣也。「若謂滅時能與作次第緣」，此第三破滅時。文亦二：初取意、次破。彼意云：滅時為緣，非已滅未滅，故二難壞矣。生時為果，非已生未生，故兩難不成也。問：彼家云何立滅時？答：前心欲滅、後心欲生，欲滅能動欲生、欲生為欲滅所動，故欲滅為緣、欲生為果。「滅時名半滅半未滅」，此第二破。文有三義：一點同破、二徵經破、三防退破。點同破者，雖立滅時，還同已未，故半滅為已、半不滅同未。前乃是麁已未，今為細已未也。又欲滅已滅即屬已分、欲滅未滅屬前未分，欲生已生屬前已分、欲生未生還屬未分。又欲滅未滅後果不得生，欲滅已滅無前為後緣後亦不得生。欲生未生，前為誰緣？欲生已生，何用前緣？成實義云：識滅時想生、想生時識滅，只是一時。今問：若生滅兩時同是一時，亦生滅兩法同是一法，即識想同是一識、同是一想。若兩法不可同一法，亦兩時不可同一時。若同時而有兩法，即離法別有時。又常云：識滅即想生，中間若空，便是無心人，是故識想一時。今問：識滅則想不得生、想生則識不得滅，以一時故，若一滅一生便是二時。常又云：心是體，善惡是心上用。今問：心非善惡，亦應心非能緣；心是能緣，心是善惡。彼答：心有時起善、有時起惡，不當善惡。今並之，心亦有時能緣、有時不能緣，如小乘入滅定及入無餘即不緣，大乘冥真即真即不緣也。汝若言心是善惡者，既斷善惡，亦應斷心。心畢竟不可斷，即心非惡，惡自惡。若爾，解自解，心非解。若爾，緣自緣，心非緣。「又如佛說」下，第二徵經破。向作兩關破，之彼必不受，故引佛經明一切有為法念念滅，豈有欲滅未欲滅名第三滅時？問：此引何經破？答：《淨名》云「汝今即時亦生亦老亦死。」《無量義經》云「又復觀察一切諸法，即時生住異滅也。」「汝謂一念中無是欲滅」者，此第三防退破。恐彼聞引佛經明亦生即滅便改義宗，是故還捉彼義，防其退也。山中云：「此是長行第三涅槃破四相也。」今明此乃破滅時中第三防退，非涅槃破四相也。所言「欲滅未欲滅」者，山中云：「滅是滅相，不滅是生相，欲滅是異相，不欲滅是住相。」又解云：滅是滅相，不滅是生住兩相，欲滅是滅相所相法，不欲滅是生住所相法也。今依文並不如此，所言欲滅不欲滅者，明有為之法一念生時便有二義：一者始生、二者將滅。將滅之分名為欲滅，始生之分名不欲滅。但不欲滅語通，故汎論四法，謂過去、未來、現在、無為也。所以但釋欲滅不欲滅者，外人聞引經破便欲避之，故釋以示之。但釋此二法而汎論餘二，故不釋餘二也。又四法釋四、二法釋四。四法釋四者，欲滅者，現在將滅分也；不欲滅，現在始生分也；滅者，過去法也；不滅，未來及無為也。二法釋四法者如文，但取現在將滅為欲滅，除此以外皆是不欲滅也。「是故無次第緣」下，第二結也。

The prose has two parts: first, explaining the thesis; second, explaining the refutation. Regarding 'the mental dharmas and mental concomitants arise sequentially across the three times': first, this distinguishes mental dharmas from among the three aggregates of dharmas as being immediate conditions, so it specifically elucidates mental dharmas. As for mentioning 'mental concomitants', this distinguishes from schools that assert there are no separate mental concomitants; hence it states 'mental dharmas and mental concomitants'. The various schools are twofold: first, those explaining that there are mental concomitants; second, those explaining that there are no mental concomitants. The absence of mental concomitants is the thesis of the Tattvasiddhi and Buddhadeva. If taking what arose earlier as the primary mind and what arose later as the concomitant, the Tattvasiddhi can also accept this; the present text properly establishes the thesis that there are mental concomitants. Regarding 'across the three times': it properly adopts the sequence across the three times to distinguish it from the sequence of the three natures. Question: The various schools are limitless; why specifically explain this doctrine? Answer: Because this school is widely prevalent, it is specifically refuted. Regarding 'future dharmas have not yet arisen' and below: this is the second part, explaining the refutation. First, it explains the three lines of verse that directly refute; next, it explains the fourth line of verse that concludes the refutation. Explaining the three lines has two parts: first, explaining the first half by adducing the effect to refute the condition; next, explaining from the perspective of the condition to refute the condition. Explaining the adducing of the effect to refute the condition has two approaches: first, refuting in terms of not yet arisen; second, refuting in terms of already arisen. Two meanings may be fully present: first, challenging a single school with a dilemma: if the effect has not yet arisen, with what does the present act as a condition? If the effect has already arisen, then no condition is needed. Second, refuting the theses of two schools through the dilemma: 'not yet arisen' refutes the thesis that the two times do not exist—not yet arisen is non-existence, no different from space; with what could it act as a condition? If it already exists, then it is arisen, which refutes the thesis that the two times exist—being different from space means it exists, and being different from unarisen means it is already arisen, so what need is there for a condition? Regarding 'the present mental dharmas and mental concomitants have no abiding duration' and below: this explains the third line, refuting the condition from the perspective of the condition. This can have two meanings: first, it refutes that the present mind cannot act as a condition for the future, but whereas above it was refuted from the perspective of the effect, here it is refuted from the perspective of the condition. Second, the preceding prose stated that 'mental dharmas and mental concomitants arise sequentially across the three times'; above refuted that the present mind cannot act as a condition for the future, while here it refutes that the past cannot act as a condition for the present. As for not refuting with what the future acts as a condition: for the Sarvāstivādins, future dharmas are in disarray and have no immediate condition, hence it is not refuted. In the text there are three parts: first, challenging in terms of not yet [perished]; second, in terms of already [perished]; third, in terms of the time of perishing. The challenge in terms of not yet [perished] has two intentions: conceding and eliminating. The intention of eliminating says: if a present dharma had a single thought-moment not yet perished, one could grant that the unperished acts as a condition; since there is not a single thought-moment unperished, how could the unperished act as a condition? Question: Do any of the various schools also state that mental dharmas do not perish? Answer: Among the Sthaviravāda, one master says that while material dharmas perish immediately upon arising, mental dharmas endure without perishing for fifteen kṣaṇas. This thesis is refuted here. 'If it abides, it is not conditioned' is the second, refutation by concession. Even granting that there is a single thought-moment not yet perished, that single thought-moment would be permanent, and that single thought-moment would not be conditioned. In your doctrine, there is not a single permanent thought-moment; how then could a single thought-moment not yet have perished? 'If it has already perished': this is the second part, refuting in terms of the meaning of already perished. This also has two parts: first, direct explanation; second, taking the intent. The direct explanation says: perishing is non-existence; it has no power or capacity to induce what follows, hence it is not a condition. This line directly accords with the verse text, and it also directly refutes that the past cannot act as a condition for the present. 'If it is said that the perished dharma still exists': this takes the intent. Their intent says: although the preceding mind has perished, the power to induce what follows still persists. This is the Sarvāstivādins' doctrine of latent existence in the past. It is also the Kāśyapīya doctrine that a cause does not perish and abides in the past, awaiting the arising of the effect before it fades away. Harivarman refutes this, saying: this is perishing again after having already perished. It is also the Tattvasiddhi position on possession in the past. The refutation says: if the preceding mind's power to induce what follows does not perish, it would be permanent; just as if a preceding unwholesome mind did not perish, it would permanently be an unwholesome mind, and there would be no merit; and merit would permanently be merit, and there would be no demerit. Hence it says 'there would be neither demerit nor merit.' Furthermore, to what is this power of yours attached? If it is attached to the essence of the mind, then the essence of the mind has already perished; to what could the power to induce what follows be attached? Furthermore, if the power to induce what follows does not perish, then the power is permanent while the essence of the mind is impermanent; this would divide one mind into two, half permanent and half impermanent. Furthermore, if it continues without perishing, non-perishing is a unity; how could a unity be an immediate condition? Furthermore, the Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa does not go beyond two meanings: if it perishes thought-moment by thought-moment and is not steadfast in itself, how could it produce what follows? If it does not perish, then it is permanent, like the true consciousness doctrine of the Dilun masters, and there would be no immediate condition. 'If it is claimed that at the time of perishing it can act as an immediate condition for it': this is the third part, refuting the time of perishing. The text also has two parts: first, taking the intent; next, the refutation. Their intent says: the time of perishing serves as the condition, which is neither already perished nor not yet perished, so the two challenges are dismantled; the time of arising serves as the effect, which is neither already arisen nor not yet arisen, so the two challenges do not hold. Question: How does that school establish the time of perishing? Answer: When the preceding mind is about to perish, the subsequent mind is about to arise; being about to perish can activate what is about to arise, and what is about to arise is activated by what is about to perish; therefore, being about to perish is the condition, and being about to arise is the effect. 'The time of perishing is termed half-perished and half-not-perished': this is the second part, the refutation. The text contains three points: first, refutation by pointing out identity; second, refutation by adducing sūtras; third, refutation by guarding against regression. Refutation by pointing out identity means: although they establish a time of perishing, it still amounts to already and not yet; hence half-perished is 'already' and half-unperished is the same as 'not yet'. The former was coarse already and not yet, while the present is subtle already and not yet. Furthermore, being about to perish that has already perished belongs to the portion of 'already', while being about to perish that has not yet perished belongs to the preceding portion of 'not yet'; being about to arise that has already arisen belongs to the preceding portion of 'already', while being about to arise that has not yet arisen still belongs to the portion of 'not yet'. Furthermore, if being about to perish has not yet perished, the subsequent effect cannot arise; if being about to perish has already perished, there is no preceding [factor] to act as a condition for the subsequent, so the subsequent also cannot arise. If being about to arise has not yet arisen, for what does the preceding act as a condition? If being about to arise has already arisen, what need is there for the preceding condition? The Tattvasiddhi holds: when consciousness perishes, ideation arises; when ideation arises, consciousness perishes; they are merely simultaneous. We now ask: if the two times of arising and perishing are identical to a single time, then the two dharmas of arising and perishing are also identical to a single dharma; then consciousness and ideation would be identically one consciousness and identically one ideation. If two dharmas cannot be identically one dharma, neither can two times be identically one time. If there are two dharmas at the same time, then apart from dharmas there would separately be time. Furthermore, it is commonly said: when consciousness perishes, ideation immediately arises; if there were a void between them, one would be a person without a mind; therefore consciousness and ideation are simultaneous. We now ask: if consciousness perishes, ideation cannot arise; if ideation arises, consciousness cannot perish; because they are simultaneous, if one perishes and one arises, there are two times. It is also commonly said: the mind is the substance, and good and evil are functions upon the mind. We now ask: if the mind is not good or evil, the mind should also not be the cognizing subject; if the mind is the cognizing subject, the mind is good and evil. They answer: the mind at times gives rise to good and at times gives rise to evil, so it does not equal good or evil. We now press them: the mind also at times can cognize and at times cannot cognize, as when Hīnayāna enters the cessation attainment or enters the remainderless [nirvāṇa] it does not cognize, and when Mahāyāna merges with the real, being the real it does not cognize. If you say that the mind is good and evil, since good and evil are severed, the mind should also be severed. Since the mind can ultimately not be severed, the mind is not evil, and evil is itself evil. If so, understanding is itself understanding, and the mind is not understanding. If so, cognizing is itself cognizing, and the mind is not cognizing. Regarding 'Moreover, as the Buddha said' and below: this is the second part, refutation by adducing sūtras. Having presented the dilemma earlier to refute them, they will surely not accept it; therefore sūtras of the Buddha are cited to show that all conditioned dharmas perish thought-moment by thought-moment—how could there be a third time of perishing called about to perish and not about to perish? Question: Which sūtras are cited to refute this? Answer: The Vimalakīrtinirdeśa says: 'You, right now, are both born, aging, and dying.' The Anantanirdeśa-sūtra says: 'Moreover, he observes all dharmas, which instantly arise, abide, change, and perish.' Regarding 'You claim that in a single thought-moment there is no such being about to perish': this is the third part, refutation by guarding against regression. Fearing that upon hearing the sūtras cited showing that arising is immediately perishing they might alter their doctrine, their thesis is held fast to guard against their retreat. The mountain master says: 'This is the third part of the prose, the refutation of the four characteristics via Nirvāṇa.' We now clarify that this is the third part within the refutation of the time of perishing, guarding against regression, not the refutation of the four characteristics via Nirvāṇa. Regarding 'about to perish and not about to perish': the mountain master says, 'Perishing is the characteristic of cessation; non-perishing is the characteristic of arising; about to perish is the characteristic of change; not about to perish is the characteristic of abiding.' Another explanation says: 'Perishing is the characteristic of cessation; non-perishing represents the two characteristics of arising and abiding; about to perish is the dharma characterized by the characteristic of cessation; not about to perish is the dharma characterized by the characteristics of arising and abiding.' We now maintain according to the text that it is neither of these. As for 'about to perish and not about to perish', it explains that when a conditioned dharma arises in a single thought-moment, it has two meanings: first, having just arisen; second, being about to perish. The portion that is about to perish is called 'about to perish'; the portion that has just arisen is called 'not about to perish'. However, the phrase 'not about to perish' is general, so it broadly discusses four dharmas, namely the past, the future, the present, and the unconditioned. The reason it only explains about to perish and not about to perish is that when outsiders hear the sūtra cited in refutation, they wish to evade it, so it explains this to demonstrate it to them. It only explains these two dharmas while broadly treating the other two, hence it does not explain the other two. Furthermore, four dharmas explain four, and two dharmas explain four. Four dharmas explaining four: 'about to perish' is the present portion that is about to perish; 'not about to perish' is the present portion that has just arisen; 'perished' is past dharmas; 'unperished' is future and unconditioned dharmas. Two dharmas explaining four dharmas is as in the text: it merely takes the present portion about to perish as 'about to perish', and everything besides this is 'not about to perish'. Regarding 'Therefore there is no immediate condition' and below: this is the second part, the conclusion.