中觀論疏 3.39

3.39

「若謂緣無果」下，自上來是第一破四緣生果竟，今第二舉非緣決之。問：何故舉非緣決之？答：四意。一者明非有非無義。四緣中求果不可得，故不可言有；又不從非緣出故，則果不可無。破有無二見，顯示中道故也。二者欲斷執生之心。雖破四緣生，而意終謂果從四緣生。此心不去，故舉非緣決之，令計生心畢竟盡。三者欲防外人起邪見心。聞求四緣生果不得，便謂非四緣能生果，是故今明非緣亦不生。四欲令外人悟緣非緣不二，故俱破緣非緣生也。上半取意，意云：雖略廣求，四緣中果無，而果終從四緣生。若果不從四緣生，離四緣外更無復法，當從何處生耶？又眼見果從四緣中出，是故四緣必定生果。又緣非緣終有異，非緣既不生，緣則應生。下半舉非緣決者，四緣中無果，非緣亦無，則應等生；不爾，應等不生。若等無而緣生、非緣不生者，亦應非緣生而四緣不生也。問：此舉何處非緣以決之耶？答：從初至略廣偈已來，破外立四緣偈上三句竟，今此一偈破外人更無第五緣。彼謂世性等為第五緣，故非緣中無果。所以今舉非緣決之，令知緣與非緣一切不生。又難其四緣，生成非緣，此非緣亦不生果。又就四緣中互論緣非緣也。「若果從緣生」，此是破四緣中第三結破。開為二別：初一行半結無所生之果、次半偈結無能生緣非緣。一行半為二：初五句結破果不從緣生、次一句結破果不從非緣生。五句為二：初四句列果不從緣生、次一句結果不從緣生。初四句為三門：第一句列所破門、第二句列能破門、下半列呵責門。若果從緣生，即是上四緣生諸法，果即所生、緣是能生，總舉一切能所也。「是緣無自性」，列能破也。彼計以緣有生果自性、果有從緣自性。上總別二門求緣無能生之性、求果無所生之性，故云無性。又緣由果有，緣無自性；果由緣有，果無自性。又緣復賴緣，緣無性也。又果生緣壞，緣則改變，故無性也。下半呵云「從無自性生」者，此意非是奪其自性，計其無自生。乃明都無能生所生性，云何乃於無生法中計有生耶？餘並如文。影師釋此二偈二意：初偈列品、次偈結品。二云：初偈緣無故果無，後偈果無故緣無。觀長行，如吾釋也。長行「破緣故說非緣實無非緣法」者，一意云：外人四緣攝一切法盡，四緣以外無復非緣；而言有者，蓋是橫計有耳。二意云：以破汝緣故緣成非緣，何處別有非緣而能生耶？問：何以故緣非緣並破，但破果不破非果？答：內外同見一果，故果則無異。而內計從四緣生、外執從世性等生，故有緣非緣也。

From "If one says conditions have no effect" downward: from the beginning up to here was the first part, concluding the refutation of the four conditions producing effects; now the second part adduces non-conditions to settle it. Question: Why adduce non-conditions to settle it? Answer: There are four intentions. First, to illuminate the meaning of neither existence nor non-existence. Seeking the effect within the four conditions cannot be found, so it cannot be called existent; nor does it emerge from non-conditions, so the effect cannot be non-existent. This refutes the two views of existence and non-existence and reveals the middle way. Second, to cut off the mind clinging to production. Although production from the four conditions has been refuted, the mind ultimately thinks that the effect is produced from the four conditions. Because this thought does not depart, non-conditions are adduced to settle it, causing the thought calculating production to be exhausted once and for all. Third, to prevent the opponent from giving rise to wrong views. Hearing that seeking the production of an effect from the four conditions cannot be found, they would then claim that non-four-conditions can produce the effect; therefore it is now shown that non-conditions also do not produce. Fourth, to cause the opponent to realize the non-duality of conditions and non-conditions; hence production from both conditions and non-conditions is refuted. The first half conveys the sense, meaning: although sought extensively and briefly, there is no effect within the four conditions, yet the effect ultimately arises from the four conditions. If the effect does not arise from the four conditions, apart from the four conditions there are no further phenomena—whence would it arise? Moreover, the eye sees the effect emerge from within the four conditions, and therefore the four conditions must certainly produce the effect. Furthermore, conditions and non-conditions are ultimately different; since non-conditions do not produce, conditions should produce. The second half adduces non-conditions to settle it: there is no effect in the four conditions, and there is also none in non-conditions, so they should equally produce; if not, they should equally not produce. If both are equally non-existent yet conditions produce while non-conditions do not produce, then non-conditions should also produce while the four conditions do not produce. Question: Where are these non-conditions adduced from to settle it? Answer: From the beginning up to the "brief and extensive" gāthā, the first three lines of the opponent's gāthā establishing the four conditions have been refuted; now this single gāthā refutes the opponent's having no further fifth condition. They consider the primordial nature (prakṛti) and so on to be a fifth condition, and therefore there is no effect in non-conditions. Thus non-conditions are now adduced to settle it, making them realize that conditions and non-conditions entirely do not produce. Moreover, pressing them that their four conditions produce what turns out to be non-conditions, these non-conditions also do not produce an effect. Furthermore, within the four conditions themselves, conditions and non-conditions are mutually discussed. "If the effect arises from conditions": this is the third concluding refutation within the four conditions. It is divided into two parts: first, a verse and a half concluding that there is no produced effect; next, half a gāthā concluding that there are no producing conditions or non-conditions. The verse and a half has two parts: first, five lines concluding the refutation that the effect does not arise from conditions; next, one line concluding the refutation that the effect does not arise from non-conditions. The five lines have two parts: first, four lines setting forth that the effect does not arise from conditions; next, one line concluding that the effect does not arise from conditions. The first four lines form three approaches: the first line sets forth what is refuted; the second line sets forth what refutes; the second half sets forth the reproach. "If the effect arises from conditions" refers to the above four conditions producing all phenomena; the effect is what is produced, and the conditions are what produces, generally citing all agents and objects. "These conditions have no intrinsic nature" sets forth what refutes. They calculate that conditions have an intrinsic nature of producing effects, and effects have an intrinsic nature of coming from conditions. The two approaches above, general and specific, seek in conditions no nature of being able to produce, and seek in effects no nature of being produced; hence they are said to "lack intrinsic nature." Moreover, conditions exist because of effects, so conditions lack intrinsic nature; effects exist because of conditions, so effects lack intrinsic nature. Furthermore, conditions again depend on conditions, so conditions lack intrinsic nature. Also, when the effect arises, the conditions are destroyed; the conditions then undergo change, and thus lack intrinsic nature. The second half reproaches, saying "Arising from what lacks intrinsic nature": this meaning is not taking away their intrinsic nature and calculating that they arise without self-nature. Rather, it makes clear that there is entirely no nature of what can produce or what is produced; how then can one calculate that there is arising within unarisen phenomena? The rest is as in the text. Master Ying explains these two gāthās with two meanings: the first gāthā lists the chapter, and the second gāthā concludes the chapter. Secondly, he says: in the first gāthā, because conditions are non-existent, effects are non-existent; in the latter gāthā, because effects are non-existent, conditions are non-existent. Examining the prose, it is as I have explained. As for the prose saying "Because conditions are refuted, non-conditions are spoken of; in reality there is no phenomenon of non-conditions": one meaning says that the opponent's four conditions encompass all phenomena completely; outside the four conditions there are no further non-conditions. That they speak of their existence is merely an arbitrary calculation of existence. A second meaning says: because your conditions are refuted, conditions become non-conditions; where would there be separate non-conditions that could produce? Question: Why are conditions and non-conditions both refuted, but only effects are refuted and not non-effects? Answer: Insiders and outsiders both perceive the same effect, so the effect does not differ. But insiders calculate production from the four conditions, while outsiders cling to production from the primordial nature and so on; therefore there are conditions and non-conditions.