中觀論疏 3.38

3.38

長行為三：初釋偈、二結無增上緣、三釋佛立有四緣之意。初又三：前牒下半；「何以故」下，以上半釋破之。「有相無故」已下，還取下半呵之。「是故無增上緣」，第二結也。問：何故就十二明無增上緣？答：細論十二相生，實具四緣。一往麁論十二相生正是增上緣，故就十二破增上緣也。又此論破四緣，意欲顯十二無生。上以破十二中三緣，故今破十二中增上緣也。「佛隨凡夫分別有無故說」者，此釋破立之意。論主破之，經不應明有；經若明有而須破者，即是破經。故今明若據理則無，但隨凡夫分別故說有耳。佛說有無則明不二，汝但見二，故是愚人；論主了達無二，名為智者。汝見因緣能所二，不信不二，即是破經；論主知佛意說二為令悟不二，即是申經也。問：此中云何名分別有無耶？答：若通約四緣，則攝有為無為之體，故名有無。若偏據增上緣明有無者，有即是上是事有故是事有，無即是事無故是事無，蓋是隨凡夫分別十二是有無耳。十二本不生故不有，今亦不滅故不無也。「略廣眾緣中」此，第三一偈結破，上半結、下半呵責。青目意以前三偈總破為略，後四偈別破為廣。古三論師不用青目注，而四偈破因緣、三偈破三緣，此七偈破四緣名之為廣；此下四偈結破四緣，名之為略。什公云：「會指無捲為略，散指亦無為廣。」河西道朗師破四緣為略，破六因為廣。曇影云：「破四緣合生法為略，四緣各生法為廣。」依毘曇，心法具從四緣生；色法從二緣生，除緣緣及次第；非色非心法有二分：若無想定、滅盡定從三緣生，除緣緣；餘非色不相應行，如色說也。下半呵云「因緣中若無」者，此是四緣中求果不可得言無，非是因中無果之無也。今且依青目意結上總別破者，發生下非緣決破意也。以廣略就緣中求果不可得，當知緣中無果。以緣中無果，非緣亦無。若二俱是無，則不應俱生果，是以結破也。又所以結廣略者，欲生下半呵責故也。上雖破而未呵，夫欲呵者必須先騰其失方得呵失，故上半騰失、下半呵失也。又有廣略者，望《十二門論》意，上總別破並是廣，今略廣則是略，以攝上總別為今略廣，今略廣為上總別故也。

The prose has three parts: first, explaining the gāthā; second, concluding that there is no predominant condition; third, explaining the Buddha's intent in establishing the four conditions. The first part also has three: first, citing the second half; from "Why?" onward, explaining and refuting it with the first half; from "Because the characterized being does not exist" onward, returning to the second half to reproach it. "Therefore there is no predominant condition" is the second, the conclusion. Question: Why is the absence of the predominant condition explained in terms of the twelve [links of dependent origination]? Answer: Detailed analysis of the mutual origination of the twelve shows that it actually possesses all four conditions. Speaking broadly for the moment, the mutual origination of the twelve is precisely the predominant condition; therefore the predominant condition is refuted in terms of the twelve. Moreover, this treatise's refutation of the four conditions is intended to reveal the non-arising of the twelve. Since the above has refuted three of the conditions among the twelve, it now refutes the predominant condition among the twelve. "The Buddha spoke according to ordinary beings' differentiation of existence and non-existence": this explains the intent of refuting and establishing. If the treatise master refutes it, the sūtras should not state that it exists; if the sūtras state that it exists and yet it must be refuted, this would be refuting the sūtras. Therefore it is now made clear that according to the principle it does not exist, but is only spoken of as existing according to ordinary beings' differentiation. The Buddha's speech about existence and non-existence illuminates non-duality; you merely see duality, and so you are a foolish person. The treatise master thoroughly comprehends non-duality and is called a wise person. You see the duality of conditions and causes, agent and object, and do not believe in non-duality—this is refuting the sūtras. The treatise master knows that the Buddha's intent in speaking of duality was to lead to the realization of non-duality; this is elucidating the sūtras. Question: What is meant here by "differentiating existence and non-existence"? Answer: If taken generally regarding the four conditions, they encompass the substances of the conditioned and unconditioned, and so are called existence and non-existence. If taken specifically regarding the predominant condition to explain existence and non-existence: "existence" is the aforementioned "because this exists, that exists"; "non-existence" is "because this does not exist, that does not exist." It is simply following ordinary beings' differentiation of the twelve as existing or not existing. The twelve originally do not arise, hence they are not existent; now they also do not cease, hence they are not non-existent. "In the conditions, whether brief or extensive": this third gāthā concludes the refutation. The first half concludes, and the second half reproaches. Piṅgala's view takes the previous three gāthās as a general refutation that is "brief," and the subsequent four gāthās as specific refutations that are "extensive." The ancient Sanlun masters did not use Piṅgala's commentary; rather, four gāthās refute the cause-condition and three gāthās refute the [other] three conditions, these seven gāthās refuting the four conditions being called "extensive"; the four gāthās below concluding the refutation of the four conditions are called "brief." Master Kumārajīva said: "Gathering fingers without a fist is 'brief'; dispersing fingers which are also non-existent is 'extensive.'" Master Daolang of Hexi took the refutation of the four conditions as "brief," and the refutation of the six causes as "extensive." Tanying said: "Refuting the four conditions collectively producing phenomena is 'brief'; the four conditions each separately producing phenomena is 'extensive.'" According to the Abhidharma, mental phenomena arise fully from the four conditions; physical phenomena arise from two conditions, excluding the objective condition and the contiguous [condition]; phenomena that are neither physical nor mental fall into two categories: the non-conceptual absorption and the absorption of cessation arise from three conditions, excluding the objective condition; the remaining non-physical associated formations are as explained for physical phenomena. The second half reproaches, saying "If it does not exist in the causes and conditions": this means that seeking the effect within the four conditions cannot be found, which is called "non-existence"; it is not the non-existence of the effect in the cause. Now, provisionally following Piṅgala's intent to conclude the general and specific refutations above, it brings forth the intent of the subsequent decisive refutation through non-conditions below. Because seeking the effect within conditions, whether extensively or briefly, cannot be found, one should know there is no effect within conditions. Since there is no effect within conditions, there is also none in non-conditions. If it does not exist in both, then both should not produce the effect; hence the concluding refutation. Furthermore, the reason for concluding the extensive and brief is to give rise to the reproach in the second half. Although refuted above, they were not yet reproached; whoever wishes to reproach must first present their fault before being able to reproach it. Hence the first half presents the fault, and the second half reproaches the fault. Moreover, as for there being extensive and brief, looking at the intent of the *Dvādaśamukha-śāstra*, the general and specific refutations above are all "extensive," while the present "brief and extensive" is "brief"; this is because the above general and specific are subsumed into the present brief and extensive, and the present brief and extensive constitute the above general and specific.