中觀論疏 4.15

4.15

「因去知去者」，第三因緣門破。有此門來凡有三意：一者前破一異破人法體，今因緣門破人法用，故二偈文並稱不能用則體用俱寂。二者上破一異，而犢子立人法不受此破，別有人體故不可言一、而因於陰故不可言異，如別有火體不可與薪一、而因託於薪不可言異。雖不可一異，而人能御法、法能成人，有人法用義，故今破之也。三者上來破性人法，今破因緣人法，則性空因緣空義也。二偈為二：初偈破者「不能用是去」，次偈破者「不能用異去」。是去者，是者所因，去者不能用；異去者，非者所因，去者亦不能用。而此二偈反覆相成。初偈免二去而墮無用，後偈若其有用便墮二法。又初偈破不得動第一步，第二偈破不得動第二步，尚不得動第二步，況千里行耶？故一切法無動轉者也。初偈上半明人不能用法、下半明法不能運人。「因去知去者」，此牒外人義。若端拱靜坐，此直是人耳，不知是去者。以其因動足，即知是去人，故云因去知去者。「不能用是去」者，論主破也。是去，即者所因去，而者不能用。若離去別有者體，者可能用去法。今因去知者，則者無自體，云何能用去法？又無自體即無者，誰用去法耶？如因色心成人，若未有色心，則本無有人。既因色心成人，離色心無人，人云何還能用色心耶？又不得色心成人，凡成必有能所，色心是能成、人是所成。今離色心無人，云何色心是能成、人為所成耶？「先無有去法」，下半有二義：一釋上半，若去者之前別有去法可因法知者，者能用法。今因者有法、者前無法，云何因法知者而言者能用法？此則上半破其者能用法。下半破其因法知者。次意上半破者能用法，下半破法能運者。去者之前別有去法，可言法能運者；今因者有法，則去者之前無有去法，云何言法能運者？長行云「是去法未有時無有去者」，此明因法有去者，者無自體，故不能用去法耳。「亦無已去未去去時」，未有去法，非但無者亦無三時，明因法有時耳。既因法有者，者無自體，云何者於三時中用得去耶？「如前有城」下，釋下半。初舉譬反釋。先有人、後有城，人可趣城。前有法、後有人，法可運人。而人法互相因，不得先後，云何言先有法而能運人？復何得言先有法因法知人耶？第二偈破異去，上半牒、下半破。外云：初動一步是者所因去，以去法成者體，者可不能用。今進第二步，異於成者之去，名為異去。此去既不成者體，則者應能用。是故破云「於一去者中不得二去故」。初去以成者體，次去為者所用，則是二去。二去則二動二身，如上無量過也。汝若言至第二步時初步已滅無有二法過者，則但有後步，則唯有成者之去，則者不能用，同初偈過，故免二去則墮無用、得有用則成二去。又初步成者體，者無自體，云何得運初步進至第二步？又縱將初步進至第二步，則至第二步時猶有初步，則一人有二去，無有是處。凡論有去，要初步滅進至第二步，無有將初步至第二步、第二步時猶有初步也。故偈云「於一去者中不得二去故」。又初步滅則者亦滅，不得至第二步；初步不滅，猶有初步，亦不得至第二步。故一切人無有動步之義也。又一去成者體，此是前時去；一去成者用，此是後時去。但當前時去，未有後時去；至後時去，無有前時去。恒是一去，只有成義，無有用義。故偈云「於一去者中不得二去故」。又若後時去，猶是前時去，當一人則有前後兩時去，亦一時中有前後兩法、前後兩時，何有此義？又當前時去，只有成者體，者用何物得至後時耶？如藉此五陰四微以成此人柱，即此人柱尚不能御此陰此微，云何能御後時之微陰耶？又前時之去成者體而未能去，則不名去法。若名去法，則應能去；若能去，何用後時去耶？又舉例，如前時之眼成者體，者不能見，後時之眼被者用方能見。何有此義耶？又後時之眼不成我體，則是他眼，何有此人用他眼耶？

"Because of going, the goer is known": third is the refutation through the gateway of causes and conditions. There are three meanings for the introduction of this gateway: First, the previous refutation of identity and difference refuted the essence of person and phenomenon, whereas now the gateway of causes and conditions refutes the function of person and phenomenon; hence the texts of both verses jointly state that they cannot be used, so that both essence and function are tranquilized. Second, above, identity and difference were refuted, yet the Vātsīputrīyas establish person and phenomenon without accepting this refutation, [holding that] because there is a distinct personal essence it cannot be called identical, yet because it is based on the aggregates it cannot be called different—just as a distinct essence of fire cannot be identical to the fuel, yet because it relies on fuel it cannot be called different; although they cannot be identical or different, the person can govern phenomena and phenomena can accomplish the person, so there is the meaning of function of person and phenomenon; hence it is refuted now. Third, hitherto intrinsic person and phenomenon were refuted; now causally conditioned person and phenomenon are refuted, which is the meaning of the emptiness of intrinsic nature and the emptiness of dependent origination. The two verses comprise two parts: the first verse refutes that the goer "cannot make use of this going"; the next verse refutes that the goer "cannot make use of a different going." "This going" is that on which the goer depends, and the goer cannot make use of it; "a different going" is not that on which the goer depends, and the goer also cannot make use of it. Moreover, these two verses reciprocally complement each other: the first verse avoids two goings yet falls into absence of function; the latter verse, if there were function, then falls into two phenomena. Furthermore, the first verse refutes that one cannot make the first step; the second verse refutes that one cannot make the second step; if one cannot even make a second step, how much less could one travel a thousand li? Thus in all phenomena there is no motion or transference. In the first verse, the first half explains that the person cannot make use of the phenomenon; the second half explains that the phenomenon cannot move the person. "Because of going, the goer is known": this cites the opponent's doctrine. If one sits quietly with hands folded, this is merely a person, and one does not know him to be a goer; because he moves his feet, one immediately knows him to be a goer, hence it says, "Because of going, the goer is known." "Cannot make use of this going": the author of the treatise refutes this. "This going" is the going on which the goer depends, and the goer cannot make use of it. If there were a distinct essence of a goer apart from going, the goer might be able to make use of the phenomenon of going. Now, because of going the goer is known, so the goer lacks self-essence; how could he make use of the phenomenon of going? Furthermore, lacking self-essence, there is no goer; who would make use of the phenomenon of going? Just as a person is accomplished dependent on form and mind: if form and mind do not yet exist, there is originally no person; once a person is accomplished dependent on form and mind, apart from form and mind there is no person—how could the person in turn make use of form and mind? Moreover, form and mind cannot accomplish a person: in any accomplishment there must be the accomplishing and the accomplished; form and mind would be the accomplishing, and the person would be the accomplished; now, apart from form and mind there is no person, so how could form and mind be the accomplishing and the person be the accomplished? "Previously there is no phenomenon of going": the second half has two meanings. First, it explains the first half: if prior to the goer there were a separate phenomenon of going so that the goer could be known dependent on the phenomenon, the goer could make use of the phenomenon; now, dependent on the goer there is the phenomenon, and prior to the goer there is no phenomenon, so how could the goer be known dependent on the phenomenon and yet it be said that the goer can make use of the phenomenon? Thus the first half refutes that the goer can make use of the phenomenon, and the second half refutes that he is known dependent on the phenomenon. The second meaning: the first half refutes that the goer can make use of the phenomenon, and the second half refutes that the phenomenon can move the goer. If prior to the goer there were a separate phenomenon of going, it could be said that the phenomenon can move the goer; now, dependent on the goer there is the phenomenon, so prior to the goer there is no phenomenon of going—how could it be said that the phenomenon can move the goer? The prose states: "When this phenomenon of going does not yet exist, there is no goer." This explains that because the goer exists dependent on the phenomenon, the goer has no self-essence, and therefore cannot make use of the phenomenon of going. "Nor is there [a goer] in the already-gone, the not-yet-gone, or the present going": when there is not yet a phenomenon of going, not only is there no goer, there are also not the three times; this explains that the times exist dependent on the phenomenon. Since the goer exists dependent on the phenomenon and the goer lacks self-essence, how could the goer make use of going in the three times? "As previously there is a city" and so forth explains the second half. First an analogy is presented as an inverse explanation: first there is a person and afterward a city, so the person can proceed toward the city; [if] first there were a phenomenon and afterward a person, the phenomenon could move the person; but person and phenomenon are mutually dependent and cannot be prior and posterior—how could it be said that first there is a phenomenon that can move the person? And how could it be said that first there is a phenomenon and dependent on the phenomenon the person is known? The second verse refutes a different going: the first half cites [the objection], and the second half refutes it. The opponent says: The first taking of a step is the going on which the goer depends; since the phenomenon of going accomplishes the goer's essence, the goer may not be able to make use of it. Now advancing a second step is different from the going that accomplishes the goer, and is termed a "different going"; since this going does not accomplish the goer's essence, the goer should be able to make use of it. Therefore, it is refuted by saying: "Because in one goer, two goings cannot be obtained." The first going accomplishes the goer's essence, and the second going is used by the goer; then there are two goings. Two goings entails two motions and two bodies, with countless faults as shown above. If you say that upon reaching the second step the first step has already ceased so there is no fault of two phenomena, then there is only the subsequent step, and thus there is only the going that accomplishes the goer, so that the goer cannot make use of it—the same fault as in the first verse; thus, avoiding two goings one falls into absence of function, while obtaining function one incurs two goings. Furthermore, the first step accomplishes the goer's essence, and the goer has no self-essence; how could he move the first step to advance to the second step? Moreover, even granting that he takes the first step and advances to the second step, upon reaching the second step the first step would still exist, so that one person would have two goings, which is impossible. Whenever going is asserted, it requires that the first step cease and one advance to the second step; there is no taking the first step to the second step while at the time of the second step the first step still exists. Hence the verse states: "Because in one goer, two goings cannot be obtained." Furthermore, if the first step ceases, then the goer also ceases and cannot reach the second step; if the first step does not cease, the first step still remains, and he likewise cannot reach the second step. Therefore, for all persons there is no such meaning as taking a step. Moreover, one going accomplishes the goer's essence—this is the going of the prior time; one going accomplishes the goer's function—this is the going of the posterior time. When it is only the going of the prior time, there is not yet the going of the posterior time; upon reaching the going of the posterior time, there is no going of the prior time. It is constantly a single going, possessing only the meaning of accomplishment and lacking the meaning of function. Hence the verse states: "Because in one goer, two goings cannot be obtained." Furthermore, if the going of the posterior time were still the going of the prior time, for a single person there would be goings of both prior and posterior times, and within one time there would also be both prior and posterior phenomena and prior and posterior times—how could there be such a meaning? Moreover, at the time of the prior going there is only the accomplishment of the goer's essence; by using what could the goer reach the posterior time? Just as relying on these five aggregates and four subtle elements to accomplish this person or pillar, this very person or pillar cannot even govern these aggregates or these subtle elements—how could they govern the subtle elements and aggregates of a posterior time? Furthermore, if the going of the prior time accomplishes the goer's essence but cannot yet go, it is not called a phenomenon of going; if it is called a phenomenon of going, it should be able to go; if it were able to go, what use would there be for a going of the posterior time? Moreover, to draw an analogy: just as the eye of the prior time accomplishes the person's essence, yet the person cannot see, and only when the eye of the posterior time is used by the person can he see—how could there be such a meaning? Furthermore, if the eye of the posterior time does not accomplish my essence, it would be another's eye; how could this person use another's eye?