中觀論疏 4.16

4.16

「決定有去者」，第四有無破，亦云決定不決定破。夫論有去，人、去、法要須具三：一假時而去、二有人法之體、三有人法之用。三時門破其假時而去，一異門破其人法之體，因緣門洗其人法之用。此三若無，則一切盡矣。而汝意猶未已，今更以兩門領其大要：人法俱有則不成人法、人法俱無則不成人法，故有此門也。又初二門破性、因緣門破假，性假若空則一切都壞。若踟蹰道門、怏怏此旨，今更兩門令滯情永寂。若定有即常，常無有去；定無則斷，斷令誰去耶？又決定則不因法有人，人本實有；不決定即是因法有人，人本實無。此二即總該一切。不因法有人，人是常人；因法有人，人是無常人。又不因法有人，人是實人；因法有人，人是假人。破此二，即一切皆盡。又不因法有人，別有假體；因法有人，則無假體。此二亦收一切。二偈為三：初偈明定有人無人不能用法、次半偈明定有法無法人不能用、三半偈結人法能所一切都空。初偈為二：上半明定有人。「不能用三去」者，既決定有人，體即不因去法成人，此人是常，常即不動，云何用三去？又不因法有人，人獨自有，應獨自去，不須用法，復是不用三。又決定有者，者不因法成，者不因法成即無有此者，誰用三去？又既決定有者，則決定有法，法自能去，何須者用？又不因法有人，人應常去無有息期，以無去法可息故。下半若因法有人，則人無自體，無自體則無人，誰用法耶？又無自體，即同上不能用是去過也。此偈上下半進退破之，上半明有人即不因三去、下半若因三去即無有人，故上半有即不因、下半明因即不有。又上半破外義、下半破內義。上半破犢子及假有體、下半破假無體也。餘二段易知。長望論意不可思議，住而不靜、去而非動，履地而無處，豈非不可思議耶。長行釋三段即三。釋上半為二：初別釋三事，謂人法時，以立中要具此三故也。「若決定有去者」，此釋偈中不能用之辭，即是釋破也。夫因去有者，者息去而住。既不因去有者，者即無去可息，即者常應去都無住期，故云「不應有住」也。釋下半有二論本，今用一本云「因去法得名去者」，若先無去法，即無去者。此文為正，餘本煩也。「不得言定有不得言定無」者，若作破義，結破上定有定無俱不可得，故云不得言定有及定無也。若作立義，因緣義不可定有、不可定無也。又此即二諦義，真諦空故不得定有、世諦有故不得言定無，此用二諦互破其定有定無也。又世諦是因緣有，不可得言自性有；真諦是因緣無，不得言自性無。此破性有無，明因緣二諦也。又不得言定有、不得言定無，並就世諦，世諦是假有，假有不可言定有、假有不可言定無、假有不可言亦有亦無、假有不可言非有非無，此是世諦假有絕性有無四句也。而絕假有者乃是真諦。世諦假有既絕四，真諦假無亦絕四，故二諦並四絕也。然二諦意乃多具上來諸義也。「如幻如化」，幻為十喻之始、化為十喻之終，故舉初後也。幻去宛然，豈是定無？幻去非去，豈是定有？成上非定有無之言也。又求彼人法虛怳不能得，故名如幻化耳，不執虛破實也。

"If there is definitely a goer..." [marks] the fourth [refutation], refuting [in terms of] existence and non-existence, also called the refutation [in terms of] definitely determined and not definitely determined. Now, when discussing going as existing, person, going, and dharma must necessarily possess all three: first, going provisionally in time; second, having the substance of person and dharma; third, having the function of person and dharma. The gateway of the three times refuted its going provisionally in time; the gateway of identity and difference refuted the substance of person and dharma; the gateway of causes and conditions purged the function of person and dharma. If these three do not exist, then all is exhausted. Yet your inclination is still not satisfied, so now by two gates [the treatise] again grasps the essential points: if person and dharma both exist, they do not constitute person and dharma; if person and dharma both do not exist, they do not constitute person and dharma. Therefore there is this gate. Furthermore, the first two gates refuted intrinsic nature, and the gate of causes and conditions refuted provisionality; if intrinsic nature and provisionality are empty, then all is thoroughly dismantled. If one hesitates at the gate of the Way, feeling discontented with this purport, now there are two further gates to cause lingering attachments to be permanently stilled. If there definitely is [a goer], then it is permanent, and the permanent has no going; if there definitely is not [a goer], then it is annihilated, and in annihilation whom could one cause to go? Moreover, "definitely determined" means that the person does not depend on dharma to exist, the person being originally real; "not definitely determined" means that the person depends on dharma to exist, the person being originally non-existent. These two subsume everything. A person not depending on dharma to exist is a permanent person; a person depending on dharma to exist is an impermanent person. Again, a person not depending on dharma to exist is a real person; a person depending on dharma to exist is a provisional person. When these two are refuted, everything is exhausted. Again, if a person does not depend on dharma to exist, there is a separate provisional substance; if a person depends on dharma to exist, then there is no provisional substance. These two also cover everything. The two verses comprise three parts: the first verse clarifies that a definitely existing person or non-existing person cannot use the dharma; the next half-verse clarifies that with definitely existing dharma or non-existing dharma, the person cannot use it; the third half-verse concludes that the person, the dharma, the agent, and the object are all completely empty. The first verse has two parts: the first half clarifies that there is definitely a person. "Cannot use the three goings": since there is definitely a person, its substance does not depend on the dharma of going to constitute the person; this person is permanent, and the permanent is unmoving—how could it use the three goings? Furthermore, if the person does not depend on dharma to exist, the person exists on its own independently and should go on its own independently without needing to use dharma; this again is not using the three. Again, if there is definitely a goer, the goer is not constituted dependent on dharma; if the goer is not constituted dependent on dharma, then this goer does not exist—who uses the three goings? Moreover, since there is definitely a goer, there is definitely dharma; the dharma can go on its own, so why does it require the goer to use it? Furthermore, if the person does not depend on dharma to exist, the person should go permanently without any period of resting, because there is no dharma of going to rest from. In the second half: if the person depends on dharma to exist, then the person has no self-substance; if it has no self-substance, then there is no person—who uses the dharma? Furthermore, having no self-substance shares the same fault above of "cannot use this going". The first and second halves of this verse refute it forwards and backwards: the first half clarifies that if there is a person, it does not depend on the three goings; the second half clarifies that if it depends on the three goings, there is no person. Thus the first half shows existence without dependence, and the second half clarifies that dependence entails non-existence. Moreover, the first half refutes non-Buddhist doctrines, while the second half refutes inner Buddhist doctrines; the first half refutes the Vātsīputrīyas and [the view that] the provisional has a substance, while the second half refutes [the view that] the provisional lacks a substance. The remaining two sections are easy to know. Contemplating the treatise's purport extensively, it is inconceivable: resting without being still, going without moving, treading the earth without having a place—how is it not inconceivable? The prose commentary explains the three sections, hence three [parts]. Explaining the first half has two parts: first, separately explaining the three items, namely person, dharma, and time, because in establishing [going] one must necessarily possess these three. "If there is definitely a goer": this explains the phrase "cannot use" in the verse, which is to explain the refutation. Now, dependent on going there is a goer, and the goer rests from going and abides. Since the goer does not depend on going to exist, the goer has no going to rest from, which means the goer should go permanently with no period of abiding; hence it says "there should be no abiding". Explaining the second half involves two recensions of the treatise; we now follow one recension which says: "Dependent on the dharma of going, one obtains the name 'goer'"; if there were previously no dharma of going, there would be no goer. This text is correct; the other recensions are cumbersome. "One cannot say definitely exists, nor can one say definitely does not exist": if taken as refutation, it concludes the refutation that definitely existing and definitely not existing above are both inadmissible; hence it says one cannot say definitely exists or definitely does not exist. If taken as establishing doctrine, the meaning of causes and conditions cannot be definitely existing and cannot be definitely not existing. Furthermore, this is the meaning of the two truths: because the ultimate truth is empty, one cannot say definitely exists; because the conventional truth exists, one cannot say definitely does not exist. This uses the two truths mutually to refute its definite existence and definite non-existence. Furthermore, the conventional truth is existence through causes and conditions, so it cannot be said to exist with intrinsic nature; the ultimate truth is non-existence through causes and conditions, so it cannot be said to be non-existent with intrinsic nature. This refutes the existence and non-existence of intrinsic nature, clarifying the two truths of causes and conditions. Furthermore, that one cannot say definitely exists and cannot say definitely does not exist both pertain to conventional truth: conventional truth is provisional existence; provisional existence cannot be said to definitely exist, provisional existence cannot be said to definitely not exist, provisional existence cannot be said to both exist and not exist, and provisional existence cannot be said to neither exist nor not exist—this is conventional truth's provisional existence cutting off the four lemmas of intrinsic existence and non-existence. And that which cuts off provisional existence is the ultimate truth. Since the conventional truth's provisional existence cuts off the four, the ultimate truth's provisional non-existence also cuts off the four; thus both truths cut off the four. Yet the purport of the two truths comprehensively embodies all the meanings above. "Like an illusion, like an apparition": illusion is the first of the ten similes, and apparition is the last of the ten similes; hence the first and last are cited. Going like an illusion is apparent—how could it definitely not exist? Going like an illusion is not going—how could it definitely exist? This fulfills the statement above of not definitely existing or not existing. Furthermore, seeking that person and dharma, they are illusory and cannot be found; therefore they are named like illusions and apparitions, not that one grasps emptiness to refute reality.