中觀論疏 4.25

4.25

「復次二處俱無見法」者，依偈是第四明法無故人無。就義破者，上三門破眼無見義竟，今第四破色無見義。所以破色無見者，承第三偈生，上云對色方見不對色不見，即見義在色、不在於眼；恐外人復云色應有見，故次破色無見也。今更騰前偈意。他問：無眼時不能見，云何屬色？答：無色時不見、對色方見，遂言眼見色不見。亦應今色對眼方見，應是色見眼不見。又眼對色而云眼見色，亦應色對眼色見眼也。他救云：雖復相因而從勝受名，如因水土穀子而牙得生，而名穀牙不名餘牙。今責云：汝無水土牙終不生，何故從勝受名耶？「二處俱無見」者，有三義：一是眼處、二是色處，二俱無見。眼是能見尚無有見，色體非見云何能見？二者見處非見處。上責見成非見，恐外人云見不能見即非見應能見，故名非見亦不見。同前緣尚不生，何況非緣。三者是眼處人處，上已責眼不能見，恐外人云：獨眼不能見，須人御眼方乃得見。故明人亦不見。若人能見，盲亦有人，應能見也。偈上半明法無、下半辨人無。「見不能有見」，指品初三偈破也。「非見亦不見」，即此偈直非之。既稱非見，云何能見？下半正明人無，即是第三破人見義。上破毘曇云眼見義，今破外道、犢子及《成論》假人能見義。問：云何是法無故人亦無耶？答：眼既不能見，即知人亦不能見，故是法無故人無也。若言人見，盲既有人，何不用耳見耶？破《成論》云：識既能見，識託耳何不能見？若要用眼方見、不用眼不見，此是眼見，何關人見？破識亦爾，識要託眼方見、託餘不見，即是眼見，何關識見？長行前釋上半、次釋下半。釋下半為三：初牒。「何以故」，釋有進退二難：初明人見，即盲人應見；次明眼見，即人墮盲；後舉偈結。易知也。

As for "Furthermore, in both places there is no dharma of seeing": according to the verses, this is the fourth, explaining that because phenomena (dharma) are non-existent, the person is non-existent. Refuting in terms of meaning: the refutation of the eye having no seeing through the three gates above is complete; now this fourth refutes visible form having no seeing. The reason visible form is refuted as having no seeing is that it arises following the third verse: above, it said that only upon confronting visible form does it see, and not confronting it, it does not see, which meant that seeing lies in visible form and not in the eye; fearing that the opponent might again say that visible form ought to possess seeing, it next refutes visible form having no seeing. Now we restate the intention of the preceding verse. The opponent asks: when there is no eye, one cannot see—how could it belong to visible form? Answer: when there is no visible form, one does not see; only upon confronting visible form does one see, yet you say that the eye sees and visible form does not see. It should also be that now when visible form confronts the eye and only then sees, visible form should see and the eye should not see. Furthermore, when the eye confronts visible form and one says the eye sees visible form, it should also be that when visible form confronts the eye, visible form sees the eye. The opponent rescues [his position] by saying: although they are mutually causal, the name is taken from what is primary—just as a sprout can be produced depending on water, earth, and a grain seed, yet it is called a grain sprout and not any other sprout. Now we rebuke him: without water and earth, your sprout would never be produced; why take the name from what is primary? "In both places there is no seeing" has three meanings: first, the eye-base (āyatana); second, the visible form-base. In both there is no seeing. The eye, which is the seer, does not yet possess seeing; how could the substance of visible form, not being seeing, be capable of seeing? Second, the locus of seeing and the locus of non-seeing. Above, seeing was rebuked as becoming non-seeing; fearing that the opponent might say that if seeing cannot see, then non-seeing should be capable of seeing, it is therefore said that non-seeing also does not see. This is the same as earlier: even conditions do not produce [it], how much less non-conditions. Third, the locus of the eye and the locus of the person. Above, the eye was already rebuked as being unable to see; fearing that the opponent might say that the eye alone cannot see and requires a person to direct the eye before it can see, it therefore clarifies that the person also does not see. If a person could see, a blind man also has a person, so he should be able to see. The first half of the verse explains that phenomena are non-existent; the second half discerns that the person is non-existent. "Seeing cannot possess seeing" points to the refutation of the first three verses of the chapter. "Non-seeing also does not see" is this verse directly negating it: since it is termed "non-seeing," how could it be capable of seeing? The second half directly explains that the person is non-existent, which is the third refutation of the doctrine that a person sees. Above, the Abhidharma view that the eye sees was refuted; now it refutes the non-Buddhists, the Vātsīputrīyas, and the Tattvasiddhi's view that a provisional person can see. Question: how is it that because phenomena are non-existent, the person is also non-existent? Answer: since the eye cannot see, one knows that the person also cannot see; thus because phenomena are non-existent, the person is non-existent. If one says the person sees, since a blind man has a person, why does he not see with his ears? Refuting the Tattvasiddhi: since consciousness can see, when consciousness relies on the ear, why can it not see? If it must use the eye to see and without using the eye it does not see, this is the eye seeing; what does it have to do with the person seeing? Refuting consciousness is also like this: consciousness must rely on the eye to see, and relying on other things it does not see, which means the eye sees; what does it have to do with consciousness seeing? The prose first explains the first half, and next explains the second half. Explaining the second half has three parts: first, restating the thesis. "Why is this?" explains with two progressive and regressive objections: first, it explains that if the person sees, a blind person should see; next, it explains that if the eye sees, the person falls into being blind; finally, it cites the verse to conclude. This is easily understood.