中觀論疏 4.24

4.24

「復次見若未見時」下，依偈數之，此是第三重破。重破者，上三雙已周，初偈舉自破他、次偈正破他，即自他一雙。二者初偈就法說破、次偈喻說破，謂法譬一雙。三初偈正破、次偈指前破，即三周破竟。今復破之，故名重破也。就三義破眼見者，初偈舉不自見況破見他、次舉三時門正破見他，此二是就眼破眼也；今第三就色破眼見。眼未對色不名見，因對色方名見，即見義在色不在於眼。二者云眼即是見、見即是眼，既見未見常名為眼，即應見未見常名為見；今有時見有時不見，即有時是眼有時是非眼。三者若見未見常是眼，亦應眼未眼常見。四者難云：若眼是見，眼遂有時見不見，亦應見是眼，見遂有時眼不眼；若無有見而非眼，亦應無有眼而非見。五者難云：若眼有時見有時不見，即知眼未必是見義，汝不應言眼定是見義也。六者〈顛倒品〉云「色等未與心和合時空無所有，如色未與眼合時即無色，既無色亦無眼。」未合既畢竟無，云何將無可令有耶？又何得因緣未合時無？只因緣合時亦無，如眼因色故有見，見乃屬色；色因眼故可見，可見乃屬眼。若爾，豈得言見但屬眼、可見屬色？見既不屬眼，豈復屬色？可見既不屬色，寧復屬眼？故知眼色無自性，無自性故空。所以《華嚴》云「觀眼無生無自性，說空寂滅無所有」也。七者依文難云：眼既是見義，未對色時能見可名見耳；未對色時畢竟不見，後對色云何得見？《成論》文云「同性不依時，是眼而不見。」同性者，未見眼與見時眼同是眼性，識未依時即不見。若爾，識依故見、不依即不見，即見無自體。又眼是見義，不見亦名眼；色是礙義，不礙應是色。

From "Furthermore, when seeing has not yet seen" downward: counting by verses, this is the third [verse], the repeated refutation. As for the repeated refutation: the previous three pairs were already complete. The first verse raised oneself to refute the other, and the subsequent verse directly refuted the other; this is the single pair of oneself and the other. Second, the first verse stated the refutation in terms of phenomena (dharma), and the subsequent verse stated the refutation by way of analogy; this is called the pair of phenomena and analogy. Third, the first verse was a direct refutation, and the subsequent verse was a refutation pointing to what came before; thus the three rounds of refutation were finished. Now it refutes it once again; hence it is called a repeated refutation. As for refuting the seeing of the eye in terms of three meanings: the first verse raised its not seeing itself to refute by comparison its seeing other things; the next verse raised the gate of the three times to directly refute its seeing other things—these two refute the eye in terms of the eye itself. Now this third one refutes the eye's seeing in terms of visible form. When the eye does not yet confront visible form, it is not called seeing; only because it confronts visible form is it called seeing. Thus the meaning of seeing lies in visible form and not in the eye. Second: [an opponent] says that the eye is seeing itself and seeing is the eye itself. Since whether it sees or has not yet seen it is always called "the eye," then whether it sees or has not yet seen it should always be called "seeing." Now, since at times it sees and at times it does not see, it would follow that at times it is the eye and at times it is not the eye. Third: if seeing or not seeing it is always the eye, then also whether it is the eye or not yet the eye it should always see. Fourth, the objection states: if the eye is seeing, and yet the eye at times sees and at times does not see, then seeing should also be the eye, and seeing would at times be the eye and at times not the eye; if there is no seeing that is not the eye, then there should also be no eye that is not seeing. Fifth, the objection states: if the eye at times sees and at times does not see, one knows that the eye is not necessarily defined by seeing; you should not say that the eye is definitely defined by seeing. Sixth, the Chapter on Inversions says: "When visible form and the rest have not yet combined with the mind, they are empty and non-existent; just as when visible form has not yet combined with the eye, there is no visible form, and since there is no visible form, there is also no eye." Since prior to combining they are completely non-existent, how could one bring what is non-existent to become existent? Furthermore, how could it be non-existent only when causes and conditions have not yet combined? Even when causes and conditions combine, it is also non-existent: as the eye has seeing because of visible form, seeing belongs to visible form; visible form can be seen because of the eye, so being visible belongs to the eye. If so, how can one say that seeing belongs solely to the eye, and being visible belongs to visible form? Since seeing does not belong to the eye, how could it belong to visible form? Since being visible does not belong to visible form, how could it belong to the eye? Therefore, we know that the eye and visible form have no intrinsic nature, and having no intrinsic nature, they are empty. For this reason the Avataṃsaka-sūtra says: "Observe that the eye is unproduced and without intrinsic nature; it is explained as empty, quiescent, and non-existent." Seventh, objecting according to the text: since the eye is defined by seeing, before it confronts visible form, if it were capable of seeing it could be called seeing; but before it confronts visible form it does not see at all—how then could it come to see when subsequently confronting visible form? The text of the Tattvasiddhi says: "When [the consciousness] of identical nature does not rely [on it], it is the eye yet does not see." "Identical nature" means that the eye that does not yet see and the eye at the time of seeing are identical in eye-nature; when consciousness does not yet rely upon it, it does not see. If so, it sees because consciousness relies upon it, and does not see when it does not rely upon it; thus seeing has no self-substance. Furthermore, if the eye is defined by seeing and yet is called "the eye" even when not seeing, then visible form is defined by obstruction, and what is not obstructed should also be visible form.