中觀論疏 4.31

4.31

「問曰若離色因有色」下，生第二偈，故發問。若望數論報因因果，因滅於前、果生於後，即是離色因有色。若望毘曇，四大為能造、色為所造，其體既異亦名為離。成實四塵是實法，四大及五根皆是假名，假實為異亦是離義也。答中為二：上半明相離即墮無因、下半傳顯無因之過，文易見也。長行前釋上半無因。從「無因而有法」，次釋下半。開為六：一釋、二救、三破救、四重救、五重破、六總結。初如文。「問曰」下，第二救義。外道中識常者，有解云：識是神異名，統御為神。神了別名識，故神是無因常也。有解云：外道亦明識是常。如僧佉云：覺體是常，覺即是識也。《成論》文云「莎提比丘計有一識流轉五道，故識是常。」「答曰」下，第三破救。初總非之有言無義，故云「但」也。次開二關責之。有因無因者，因名所以也。若有所以說常，即是有因，不應云無因。若無所以，即無事可證，何以知有？既不可知有，即無此法。同我上明無因法世間所無。「問曰有二種因」者，第四重救。總明因義有二：一作因，即是生因；二言說因，謂了因。上明無因，無有作因，是故為常。有言說因，指示令前人知有此法，故有言說因。答上同我說之難也。然常法有二種了因：一總了因，即是言說；二別了因，如空以滅色為相，時假節氣華果等。今總證有無因法，故明有通了因也。「答曰」下，第五破救。六種品破無虛空，即是破無言說因。又求虛空不可得，言說與誰為因？餘事後當破，時如〈時品〉，涅槃如〈涅槃品〉，識如〈行品〉。此論無有破方文，但〈邪見品〉末炎及之耳。「復次現事尚可破」者，現事是去來六情也。所以偏破微塵者，內外二家同以微塵為色本，今正破色陰故別破其本。問：何故云微塵不可見？答：外道計塵無十方分不可見。如《百論．破塵品》，內道明非肉眼見，故言不可見耳。第六章，如文。

From "Question: If apart from the cause of matter there is matter" downward, the second verse is generated, hence the question is raised. If viewed according to the retributive cause and cause-and-effect of the Abhidharma and *Tattvasiddhi*, the cause perishes prior and the effect arises posterior; this is precisely having matter separate from the cause of matter. If viewed according to the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma, the four great elements are the producers and matter is that which is produced; their substances being different, it is also called "separate." In the *Tattvasiddhi*, the four subtle objects are real dharmas, while the four great elements and the five faculties are all provisional designations; difference between provisional and real is also the meaning of "separate." The answer has two parts: the first half clarifies that being mutually separate falls into being causeless; the second half sequentially reveals the fault of being causeless. The text is easy to see. The prose first explains the causelessness of the first half. From "a dharma existing without a cause," it next explains the second half. It is divided into six: first, the explanation; second, the defense; third, the refutation of the defense; fourth, the re-defense; fifth, the re-refutation; sixth, the general conclusion. The first is as in the text. From "Question" downward is the second part, the defense. Among non-Buddhists who hold that consciousness is permanent, some explain: consciousness is an alternative name for the spirit (ātman); that which presides and controls is the spirit. The spirit's distinguishing [of objects] is called consciousness; hence the spirit is uncaused and permanent. Some explain: non-Buddhists also clarify that consciousness is permanent. As the Sāṃkhya says: the substance of intellect (buddhi) is permanent, and intellect is consciousness itself. The text of the *Tattvasiddhi* says: "The monk Sāti conceived that a single consciousness transmigrates through the five destinies; therefore consciousness is permanent." From "Answer" downward is the third part, the refutation of the defense. First, it generally dismisses it as having words without meaning; hence it says "merely." Next, it opens two dilemmas to cross-examine it. "With a cause or without a cause": "cause" means the reason. If there is a reason to say it is permanent, then it has a cause, and one should not say it is uncaused. If there is no reason, then there is no fact that can prove it; how can one know it exists? Since it cannot be known to exist, this dharma does not exist. It coincides with what I explained above: uncaused dharmas do not exist in the world. "Question: There are two kinds of causes": this is the fourth part, the re-defense. It generally clarifies that the meaning of cause is twofold: first, the producing cause (kāraka-hetu), which is the generative cause (janaka-hetu); second, the verbal cause (abhilāpa-hetu), meaning the revealing cause (jñāpaka-hetu). Above it was explained as uncaused because it lacks a producing cause, and therefore is permanent. It has a verbal cause, which points it out and makes the other person know that this dharma exists; hence it has a verbal cause. This answers the previous difficulty of "coinciding with what I said." Now, permanent dharmas have two kinds of revealing causes: first, a general revealing cause, which is verbal expression; second, a specific revealing cause, as space takes the destruction of matter as its characteristic, and time relies on seasonal nodes, flowers, fruits, and the like. Now, generally proving the existence of uncaused dharmas, he therefore clarifies that there is a common revealing cause. From "Answer" downward is the fifth part, the refutation of the defense. In the chapter "Examination of the Six Elements," space is refuted and shown to be non-existent; that is to say, the verbal cause is refuted and shown to be non-existent. Furthermore, when space is sought it cannot be found; for whom could verbal expression serve as a cause? The remaining things will be refuted later: time as in the "Examination of Time"; nirvāṇa as in the "Examination of Nirvāṇa"; consciousness as in the "Examination of Formations." In this treatise there is no text explicitly refuting direction; it is only touched upon at the end of the "Examination of Wrong Views." "Furthermore, even present things can be refuted": "present things" refers to coming and going and the six sense-faculties. The reason for specifically refuting subtle atoms is that both Buddhist and non-Buddhist traditions alike take subtle atoms as the root of matter; now, properly refuting the aggregate of matter, their root is separately refuted. Question: Why is it said that subtle atoms cannot be seen? Answer: Non-Buddhists conceive of atoms as lacking parts in the ten directions and being invisible. As in the *Śata-śāstra*'s chapter "Refuting Atoms," the Buddhist tradition explains that they are not seen by the fleshy eye; hence it merely says they cannot be seen. The sixth section is as in the text.