中觀論疏 4.32

4.32

「問曰若離色有色因」下，生第二釋離果無因章門。此義世間外道、小乘、大乘並言未有果時有因，即是離果有因也。答中上半正破、下半傳破。長行言指前〈破緣品〉中，是結破四緣中第二若謂緣無果偈也。「若已有色」下，第二兩偈就有因無因門破。所以有此破來者，前三偈明因果不相離，破其因果相離。外人便謂果必由因、因必由果，而有因果。是故今破其不相離也。就文為三：初就有因門破、次就無因門破、第三呵責。因者諸分也，果者總身也。若諸分之內已有總身，即不假諸分所成；若諸分之內無有總身，雖假諸分終不能生，故有因無因俱不生果。破毘曇四大中已有色，有色即不須造、無色不可造。《成論》四微中已有四大，本無四大，亦作此責。「問曰若二處俱不然」下，此生無因破也。外人既聞有無二門俱不由因，便墮無因之見。問：上長行已立三家無因，今何故復立？答：前立常法無因，今立無常法無因。問：上云離色因有色，亦是立無常無因。答：上云離耳，不言無也。外道計隣虛塵圓而是常，不從因生。阿毘曇云「七微生阿耨塵」，阿耨塵即是有因，七微極細是無因。與外道異者，一為四大所造，有所作因；二為四相所遷，是共有因；三從業起果報因生。但無十方分與外道同。成論師二解。一釋云：有中折之不盡，則細更復有細、因更從因。此同上有無二門破之。次釋云：拆之即盡，無復更細，故名隣虛，乃無四大所造，而為三相所遷。以其極細，不可分之為十方。而在物之東謂之為西、在物之西謂之為東，故名有十方分。此是無因而有色也。無明初念託空而起，兩家同是心無因義也。微塵以心為因，心無因即塵亦無因。「答曰」下，直總呵之。以佛法無有無因之義，故不須破之也。又有因尚可破，何況無因。又上已云「無因法世間所無」，故但總非而已。「是故有智者不應分別色」，第三呵責。分別者，即上因果相離不相離、有因無因等，乃至分別定有十一及與十四，今並呵之。長行云「分別名凡夫」者，雖有世間外道、小乘大乘，此之四人並立有色而分別之，皆是凡夫也。「以無明愛染」者，此明從癡起愛，即愛煩惱也。然後以邪見分別三世有無，於舊惑上起新煩惱也。如此之人不能畢故、更復造新，即為五旃陀羅之所害也。今觀五畢竟空，即新故二惑便斷，故得解脫也。

From "Question: If apart from matter there is a cause of matter" downward, the second [verse] arises, explaining the primary topic of there being no cause separate from the effect. Regarding this meaning, worldly non-Buddhists, the Hīnayāna, and the Mahāyāna all say that when the effect does not yet exist, the cause exists, which is having a cause separate from the effect. In the answer, the first half directly refutes it, and the second half sequentially refutes it. The prose points back to the previous chapter "Examination of Conditions," which is the concluding refutation among the four conditions, specifically the second verse: "If you say the condition has no effect." From "If matter already exists" downward, the second pair of verses refutes by way of the approach of being with a cause or without a cause. The reason this refutation comes about is that the previous three verses clarified that cause and effect are not separate in order to refute their separation of cause and effect. The opponent then thought that the effect necessarily depends on the cause and the cause necessarily depends on the effect, and thus cause and effect exist. Therefore, we now refute their non-separation. Regarding the text, there are three parts: first, refuting by way of the approach of having a cause; next, refuting by way of the approach of being without a cause; third, the rebuke. The cause is the various parts; the effect is the whole body. If within the parts the whole body already exists, it does not depend on being formed by the parts; if within the parts the whole body does not exist, then although it depends on the parts, it can never be produced. Therefore, neither with a cause nor without a cause can an effect be produced. This refutes the Abhidharma view that within the four great elements matter already exists: if matter exists, it does not need to be created; if matter does not exist, it cannot be created. In the *Tattvasiddhi*, whether the four great elements already exist or originally do not exist within the four subtle objects is also cross-examined in this way. From "Question: If both positions are incorrect" downward, this gives rise to the refutation of causelessness. Having heard that neither the approach of existence nor that of non-existence relies on a cause, the opponent falls into the view of causelessness. Question: In the prose above, three schools of causelessness were already established; why are they established again now? Answer: Previously, the causelessness of permanent dharmas was established; now, the causelessness of impermanent dharmas is established. Question: Above it was said that having matter separate from the cause of matter was also establishing an impermanent dharma without a cause. Answer: Above it merely said "separate"; it did not say "without." Non-Buddhists conceive of the atom adjacent to empty space (paramāṇu) as spherical and permanent, not born from causes. The Abhidharma says that "seven subtle atoms give rise to an aṇu atom"; the aṇu atom has a cause, but the seven subtle atoms, being extremely minute, are uncaused. How this differs from non-Buddhists is: first, they are created by the four great elements, thus having an active cause; second, they are transformed by the four characteristics [of conditioned phenomena], which is a co-existent cause; third, they arise from karma, being born from retributive causes. However, lacking parts in the ten directions is the same as the non-Buddhists. The *Tattvasiddhi* masters have two explanations. One explanation says: if within existence dissection is not exhausted, then what is fine still has what is finer, and causes still follow from causes. This is refuted in the same way as the two approaches of existence and non-existence above. The next explanation says: if broken down, it is exhausted, and there is nothing finer; therefore it is called 'adjacent to empty space' (paramāṇu). It is not created by the four great elements, yet it is transformed by the three characteristics. Because it is extremely minute, it cannot be divided into the ten directions. Yet when east of an object it is called west, and when west of an object it is called east; therefore it is said to have parts in the ten directions. This is having matter without a cause. The first thought of fundamental ignorance arises relying on emptiness; both schools agree on the meaning of the mind being uncaused. Subtle atoms take the mind as their cause; if the mind is uncaused, then atoms are also uncaused. From "Answer" downward, he directly and generally rebukes it. Because in the Buddhadharma there is no doctrine of causelessness, there is no need to refute it. Furthermore, even what has a cause can be refuted, how much more so what is uncaused! Moreover, above it was already said that "uncaused dharmas do not exist in the world"; therefore he merely dismisses it in general. "Therefore, one with wisdom should not conceptualise matter": this is the third part, the rebuke. "Conceptualise" refers to the above separation or non-separation of cause and effect, being with a cause or without a cause, and so forth, down to conceptualising that there definitely exist eleven [faculties] and fourteen [realms]; all of these are now rebuked. The prose states, "Conceptualisation is called an ordinary person": although there are worldly non-Buddhists, Hīnayāna, and Mahāyāna, these four kinds of persons all establish that matter exists and conceptualise it; they are all ordinary persons. "Through ignorance, craving, and attachment": this clarifies that from delusion craving arises, which is the affliction of craving. Thereafter, through wrong views one conceptualises the existence or non-existence of the three times, generating new afflictions upon old confusions. Such a person cannot bring an end to the old and further creates the new, thereby being harmed by the five caṇḍālas. Now, by examining the ultimate emptiness of the five [aggregates], both new and old confusions are immediately severed, and thus liberation is attained.