中觀論疏 5.31

5.31

「問曰如燈能自照」下，前第一破展轉相生竟，今第二破不展轉相生。又前就法說門破生，今就譬說門破生，即一切生盡矣。又初但破於生，後門兼破明暗及解惑等。就文為二：初偈立、後四偈破。立中，上半譬、下半合。有此立者，可具二義：一者改宗。上破云：小既從大生，即不能生大；如其生大，即不從大。今明小不由大而能生大，是故應有相生義也。二者此人不復立大小相生，但明法體由生相而生，生相不更從他而有。此是即法沙門、僧祇、成論義，復是外道所立。如《百論》云「吉能自吉復能使他吉，如燈自照亦能照他。」答中但破譬說，而法說自亡。又法說在後破之。又破燈即得遍破世間外道大乘小乘，破自生生他但偏破一家耳。所以破燈遍破眾師者，一切人見有燈即是有見，有見起著於燈上招於業苦；今令悟燈畢竟空，即愛見斷得解脫也。又即令見佛性，如經云「明與無明，愚者謂二；智者了達，其性無二。」無二之性即是實性。今悟明暗不二故見實性，實性即中道，因中發觀也。四偈為兩：初二偈破明到暗而能破暗、次兩偈破明不到暗而能破暗。二門各兩。初門二者，一破已成燈不見暗，不見暗故不破暗。次破初生燈不見暗，故不破暗。又初偈總破明不見暗故不破暗，次別破初明不見暗故不破暗。就初偈為二：上半明自他兩處無所破之暗、下半結無能破之明。此中炎內為自、炎外為他，此之二處並皆無暗，無暗則無明也。前展轉家得從生即失能生、得能生即失從生，此不展轉家自他俱失也。「問曰」下，第二立初生燈有照義。問有二意：初非已未兩關。未生即有所照暗、無能照明，已生即有能照明、無所照暗，此二並無照義也。但生明能自照照彼者，立初生燈也。初生燈之時明體未足，故炎內有暗、炎外亦昧，故自他處有暗。既有兩處之暗為所破，即有兩處之明為能破，故自照照他義還立也。而外人立初生燈二義俱成，以初生明能破自他兩處重暗，後大明能破自他兩處輕暗，即是上上智斷下下惑、下下智斷上上惑。未有小明時有自他兩處重暗，即是有暗義；小明若起，自他兩處重暗即無，此是有自他兩處照義也。大明未生時有自他兩處輕暗，大明若生則破兩處輕暗，此是有照義。故立初生燈兩義俱成：一者已能破重暗；二者猶有輕暗，待後明破之。又直救前者汝言何故無暗耶，正以明生暗滅，此是破故無耳，非無暗可破也。答中上半總非、下半正破釋非。依《智度論》作有無門破初生燈，即破其兩義。初燈無重暗，故無所破；與輕暗共住，復不能破，故二義壞矣。今偈偏明不見重暗，故無所破也。

From "The objection says: just as a lamp can illuminate itself..." onward: the first [part] refuting mutual production is finished above; now the second [part] refutes non-mutual production. Furthermore, earlier it refuted production in terms of literal doctrinal exposition, whereas now it refutes production in terms of analogy; thus all production is exhausted. Furthermore, the former only refuted production, while the latter approach additionally refutes light and darkness, understanding and delusion, and so forth. In the text there are two parts: first one verse asserts, and then four verses refute. In the assertion, the first half-verse gives the analogy and the second half-verse applies it. For this assertion to be made, it may have two meanings: First, changing the thesis. The earlier refutation said: since the minor is born from the major, it cannot produce the major; if it produces the major, it is not born from the major. Now he clarifies that the minor can produce the major without depending on the major, and therefore the meaning of production should hold. Second, this opponent no longer asserts mutual production between major and minor, but merely clarifies that the substance of a phenomenon is produced by the characteristic of birth, while the characteristic of birth does not further depend on another to exist. This is the doctrine of the Jīva-vāda Śramaṇas, the Mahāsāṃghika, and the Tattvasiddhi[-śāstra], and it is also what non-Buddhists assert. As the Śata-śāstra says: "The auspicious can make itself auspicious and can also make others auspicious, just as a lamp illuminates itself and also illuminates others." In the reply, he merely refutes the analogy, and the literal doctrinal exposition collapses of itself. Moreover, the literal doctrinal exposition is refuted later. Furthermore, by refuting the lamp, one can comprehensively refute the worldly, non-Buddhists, the Mahāyāna, and the Hīnayāna; refuting producing itself and producing another only refutes one particular school. Why does refuting the lamp comprehensively refute the various masters? All people, seeing that there is a lamp, hold the view of existence; holding the view of existence, they give rise to attachment to the lamp, which incurs karmic suffering. Now, causing them to realize the ultimate emptiness of the lamp cuts off attachment and views, obtaining liberation. Furthermore, it directly causes them to see the Buddha-nature, as the sūtra says: "Light and darkness: the foolish regard them as two, but the wise understand that their nature is not two." The non-dual nature is the true nature. Now, realizing that light and darkness are non-dual, one sees the true nature; the true nature is the middle way, and contemplation is aroused on the basis of the middle. The four verses comprise two pairs: the first two verses refute light reaching darkness and being able to destroy darkness; the next two verses refute light not reaching darkness and being able to destroy darkness. Each of the two approaches has two [verses]. In the first approach, the two are: first, refuting that the already-formed lamp does not encounter darkness, and because it does not encounter darkness it does not destroy darkness; next, refuting that the newly born lamp does not encounter darkness, and therefore does not destroy darkness. Alternatively, the first verse generally refutes that light does not destroy darkness because it does not encounter darkness, and the next specifically refutes that initial light does not destroy darkness because it does not encounter darkness. The first verse has two parts: the first half explains that in both places, self and other, there is no darkness to be destroyed; the second half concludes that there is no light that can destroy it. Here, inside the flame is the self, and outside the flame is the other; in neither of these two places is there darkness, and where there is no darkness, there is no light. Earlier, the proponent of mutual [production] obtained dependent production but lost capable production, or obtained capable production but lost dependent production; here, the proponent of non-mutual [production] loses both self and other. From "The objection says:" onward is the second [part], asserting that the newly born lamp has the function of illuminating. The objection has two points: First, it negates the two dilemmas of the already[-born] and the not-yet[-born]. When not yet born, there is darkness to be illuminated but no light that can illuminate; when already born, there is light that can illuminate but no darkness to be illuminated; neither of these has the function of illuminating. But light that is being born can illuminate itself and illuminate that: this establishes the newly born lamp. When the lamp is first born, the substance of light is not yet complete; therefore inside the flame there is darkness, and outside the flame it is also dim; hence there is darkness in both places, self and other. Since there is darkness in both places to be destroyed, there is light in both places that can destroy it; therefore the meaning of illuminating itself and illuminating others is re-established. And the non-Buddhist establishes that both meanings of the newly born lamp are accomplished: because the initial light can destroy heavy darkness in both places, self and other, while the subsequent great light can destroy subtle darkness in both places, self and other. This is like the highest-of-high wisdom severing the lowest-of-low delusion, and the lowest-of-low wisdom severing the highest-of-high delusion. When the minor light does not yet exist, there is heavy darkness in both places, self and other; this is the meaning of having darkness. When the minor light arises, the heavy darkness in both places, self and other, is gone; this is the meaning of having illumination in both places, self and other. When the great light has not yet arisen, there is subtle darkness in both places, self and other; when the great light is born, it destroys the subtle darkness in both places; this is the meaning of having illumination. Therefore, establishing the newly born lamp accomplishes both meanings: first, it has already been able to destroy heavy darkness; second, there is still subtle darkness awaiting the subsequent light to destroy it. Alternatively, this directly defends the former point: why do you say there is no darkness? Precisely because when light arises darkness ceases; it is non-existent because it is destroyed, not that there is no darkness to be destroyed. In the reply, the first half generally negates it, and the second half directly refutes and explains the negation. Relying on the Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa to make the approach of existence and non-existence to refute the newly born lamp refutes both of its meanings: the initial lamp has no heavy darkness, and thus has nothing to destroy; it coexists with subtle darkness, and furthermore cannot destroy it; thus both meanings collapse. The present verse specifically explains that it does not encounter heavy darkness, and therefore has nothing to destroy.