中觀論疏 5.32

5.32

「若謂燈雖不到闇」下，第二兩偈破不到暗能破暗義。有此兩偈來者，論主上有二難：一明兩燈不見兩暗、二者不見故即不破。外人受不見之責，而不受不破之難，以明暗性隔理不相見，雖不相見而能相破。兩偈為二：初近遠相決破、次明暗比並破。就一一中各有四難。初四者，一以遠從近，不見近而能破近，亦不見遠應能破遠。二以近從遠，不見遠不破遠者，不見近亦不破近也。三顛倒責，不見義齊，而破近不破遠，亦應破遠不破近也。四者明違近暗亦違於遠，若俱違應俱破，若有破不破應有違不違。此中即兼破常人反照智及自覺覺他義。常人解反照義不同，一云：離出一智，能照於智，名反照智。若別出一智為反照智者，此是智別照於智，非謂反照智也。故如指端自觸指端名為反觸，如一刀自斫此刀名反斫刀，何得以兩刀相破名反斫刀耶？作反照智義不成也。又初智不能自知，何名一切智耶？次云：自知其體名反照智也。問：既言自知其體名反照智者，便應有能照所照，即成境智二體。若無能所二者，云何名反照智耶？故反照成即墮二體，免二體即無反照。又破常義云：若燈自照照彼，導亦應自導導彼，解亦應自斷斷彼，識應自識識彼。又毘曇人八微恒俱，雖復共俱，各自守性。今問：火不令餘物體成熱，亦應不能燒餘物。又若色不熱遂令熱者，色性非緣應令成緣。「復次燈不應自照照彼」，此生第二偈明暗並決破。亦有四難：一者云明不見暗而能懸破闇，亦應暗不見明而能懸破明。二者云暗不見明不能懸破明，亦明不見暗亦不能懸破暗。三顛倒難，不見義齊，而明能破闇、闇不破明，亦應暗能破明、明不破暗。四者有破不破，即有違不違也。此四偈文意多含，今更敘其大意。初偈辨後明不見細暗故不能破暗；次偈辨初明不見麁暗故不破麁暗；第三偈意若不及麁細遠暗不能破遠；亦不及麁細近暗亦不破近；第四偈以暗不見明不能破明，即明不見暗亦不破暗。即四偈都辨明不破暗、明不破暗，即無自照照他，故無自生生他義也。又初二偈奪破，以初後二明既不見暗，即不破暗也。第三一偈名為縱破，縱明能破暗，應破近遠一切暗。第四偈縱明能破暗，亦暗應破明。故初二奪其破，後二與其破也。又初三偈就明辨明不能破暗，後一偈舉暗顯明不破暗義也。又後二偈為二意：初偈縱，明破暗即應遍破一切暗。第二偈奪，暗既無破一毫明理，即明都無破一毫暗理。問：何故破外人明暗義？答：大小內外並言明能破暗，成明暗惑解二見；今欲息二令悟不二，故寄破生門以破明暗耳。破生因緣未盡者，第三雜破眾師計生，以執生者既多，故須更破。二者更開種種觀門破生令悟無生，以觀門未盡故名未盡。又上略破生，今廣破生，故云未盡。又病未盡故云未盡。又近接破燈生者，上但破譬猶未破法，云未盡也。

From "If you say that although the lamp does not reach darkness" onward, the second pair of verses refutes the notion that [the lamp] can destroy darkness without reaching darkness. These two verses follow because the treatise master previously posed two challenges above: first, explaining that the two lamps do not see the two darknesses; second, that because they do not see [it], they do not destroy [it]. The opponent accepted the charge of not seeing, but would not accept the challenge of not destroying, on the grounds that the natures of light and darkness are mutually separated so in principle they do not see each other, yet although they do not see each other, they are able to destroy each other. The two verses form two parts: first, a refutation through a mutual decision between the near and the far; second, a refutation through an equal comparison between light and darkness. Within each of these there are four challenges. The first four are: 1. assimilating the distant to the near—if without seeing the near it can destroy the near, then also without seeing the distant it should be able to destroy the distant; 2. assimilating the near to the distant—if not seeing the distant it does not destroy the distant, then not seeing the near it should also not destroy the near; 3. an inverted challenge—since the fact of not seeing is equal, yet it destroys the near and does not destroy the distant, it should also destroy the distant and not destroy the near; 4. light is contrary to near darkness and also contrary to distant [darkness]—if it is contrary to both, it should destroy both; if it destroys one and not the other, it should be contrary to one and not the other. In this, he simultaneously refutes the common persons' wisdom of self-reflection (prativīkṣaṇa) and the idea of being self-enlightened and enlightening others. Common persons interpret the meaning of self-reflection differently. One says: an additional cognition arises separately and is able to illuminate cognition—this is called the wisdom of self-reflection. If a separately arising cognition serves as the wisdom of self-reflection, this is a distinct cognition illuminating another cognition, and is not properly called the wisdom of self-reflection. Thus, just as the tip of a finger touching the tip of that very finger is called reflexively touching, and one sword cutting this very sword is called a reflexively cutting sword, how could two swords destroying each other be called a reflexively cutting sword? Constructing the meaning of the wisdom of self-reflection does not succeed. Furthermore, if the first cognition cannot know itself, how could it be called omniscient? The second says: knowing its own substance is called the wisdom of self-reflection. We ask: since you say that knowing its own substance is called the wisdom of self-reflection, there must be that which illuminates and that which is illuminated, which amounts to two substances—object and cognition. If these two—the active and passive—do not exist, how could it be called the wisdom of self-reflection? Therefore, if self-reflection is established, one falls into two substances; if one escapes two substances, there is no self-reflection. Furthermore, refuting the common thesis, [one might] say: if the lamp illuminates itself and illuminates the other, then a guide should also guide himself and guide the other; understanding should also cut off itself and cut off the other; consciousness should also cognize itself and cognize the other. Furthermore, for the Abhidharma theorists, the eight subtle atoms are always co-existent; although they are co-existent, each maintains its own nature. Now we ask: fire does not make the substance of other things become hot, so it should also be unable to burn other things. Furthermore, if form is not hot and it makes it become hot, then the nature of form, not being a condition, would be made to become a condition. "Furthermore, a lamp should not illuminate itself and illuminate the other"—this introduces the second verse, a mutual decisive refutation between light and darkness. It also has four challenges: 1. It says: if light does not see darkness and yet can destroy darkness from afar, darkness should also, without seeing light, be able to destroy light from afar. 2. It says: if darkness does not see light and cannot destroy light from afar, then light also, not seeing darkness, cannot destroy darkness from afar. 3. The inverted challenge: since the fact of not seeing is equal, yet light can destroy darkness while darkness does not destroy light, then darkness should also be able to destroy light while light does not destroy darkness. 4. If there is destroying and not destroying, then there is being contrary and not being contrary. The meaning of the text of these four verses contains much; now we again summarize its general purport. The first verse explains that the subsequent light does not see subtle darkness, so it cannot destroy darkness; the second verse explains that the initial light does not see coarse darkness, so it does not destroy coarse darkness; the intent of the third verse is that if it does not reach coarse or subtle distant darkness, it cannot destroy the distant, and if it also does not reach coarse or subtle near darkness, it also does not destroy the near; the fourth verse takes the fact that darkness does not see light and cannot destroy light, so light does not see darkness and also does not destroy darkness. Thus all four verses explain that light does not destroy darkness; if light does not destroy darkness, then there is no illuminating itself and illuminating other, and therefore there is no principle of producing itself and producing other. Furthermore, the first two verses are a destructive refutation (depriving refutation): since the two lights, initial and subsequent, do not see darkness, they do not destroy darkness. The third verse is called a concessive refutation: granting that light can destroy darkness, it should destroy all darkness, near and far. The fourth verse grants that light can destroy darkness, so darkness should also destroy light. Therefore the first two deprive it of destruction, and the last two concede it destruction. Furthermore, the first three verses, in terms of light, explain that light cannot destroy darkness; the last verse adduces darkness to reveal the principle that light does not destroy darkness. Furthermore, the last two verses have two purposes: the first verse concedes, explaining that if it destroys darkness, it should destroy all darkness universally; the second verse deprives: since darkness has no principle of destroying even a hair's breadth of light, light has no principle of destroying even a hair's breadth of darkness at all. Question: Why refute the opponent's view of light and darkness? Answer: Both Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna, internal and external, all say that light can destroy darkness, which constitutes the two views of light/darkness and delusion/understanding; now wishing to quiet the two and lead to the realization of non-duality, he lodges the refutation of light and darkness within the gate of refuting origination. As for "the causes and conditions of origination are not exhausted," the third [section] miscellaneously refutes the assertions of origination by various masters; since those who cling to origination are numerous, it is necessary to refute them further. Second, it further opens various gates of contemplation to refute origination and induce the realization of non-origination; because the gates of contemplation are not yet exhausted, it is called "not exhausted." Furthermore, above he briefly refuted origination, and now he extensively refutes origination, hence "not exhausted." Furthermore, because the errors are not yet exhausted, it says "not exhausted." Furthermore, immediately following upon the refutation of origination by the lamp, above he merely refuted the metaphor and had not yet refuted the doctrine, hence it says "not exhausted."