中觀論疏 5.38

5.38

「復次汝謂」下，第五重破自生生他。所以有此破者，有四義：一者上但破其自生，未破生他也。破自生中而有諸偈者，初以已未門破自，不受已未謂生時生，故就三時門破。三時門破不立，便舉因緣來救；捉因緣不立，復捉三世性義來救。至此破其三世，始是破自生義竟，故今次破其生他也。二者自生生他是大眾部義，故《婆沙》中云「僧祇明如燈自照照他，心體自知知他，生相自生生他。」是故今須重破也。三者成實師云：生相不復假相，故是自生；而能生法體，故是生他。所以須重破也。四者欲顯顛倒亂起，故亂破也。兩偈為二：初偈牒而責、第二偈設兩關難也。上半牒、下半正責生相也。生相既能生法體，誰復生生相耶？第二偈上半，以相從法，相即墮無窮；下半將法從相，即法墮自然。所以作此二關破者，正以外人義自相違，生相能自生、法不能自生，故招此二失。「復次有法不應生」，第六門。此有無門破，乃通破一切，還重破自生生他也。「復次」下，第七滅不滅門破。自上已來就生門破生，今就滅門破生也，亦還破自生生他也。上半就滅義無生，破數人四相同時；下半破不滅有生，破四相異時，即譬喻部義。又上半破數人體同時，下半破其用前後。若言當生用時未有滅用，即當生時未有滅相；若當生時已有滅相，即當生時已有滅用也。汝言滅扶生相與生作扶者，今見滅相乃是生家之力，以害生故而言無有不滅法者，汝法體起時常與滅相俱，何有不滅法耶？

From "Furthermore, what you hold..." downwards is the fifth: a reiterated refutation of self-arising and arising from other. There are four reasons for this refutation: First, above we only refuted self-arising, and had not yet refuted arising from other. Among the verses refuting self-arising: first, self[-arising] was refuted via the gate of 'already' and 'not yet'; not accepting 'already' and 'not yet', [the opponent] claimed that it arises at the time of arising, so it was refuted in terms of the gate of the three times. When the refutation of the gate of the three times left it unable to stand, he then brought forward causes and conditions to rescue it; grasping causes and conditions unable to stand, he again grasped the doctrine of the intrinsic nature of the three times to rescue it. Refuting his three times up to this point is only just completing the refutation of the doctrine of self-arising; hence, we now next refute his arising from other. Second, self-arising and arising from other is the doctrine of the Mahāsāṃghika school; hence the *Vibhāṣā* says: "The Mahāsāṃghikas explain: just as a lamp illuminates itself and illuminates other things, and the mental substance knows itself and knows other things, the characteristic of arising gives rise to itself and gives rise to other things." Therefore, it must now be refuted again. Third, the Tattvasiddhi masters say: the characteristic of arising does not further rely on [another] characteristic, so it arises of itself; yet it can give rise to the substance of the dharma, so it gives rise to other. Hence it must be refuted again. Fourth, to show that perverse views arise chaotically, they are refuted chaotically. The two verses are divided into two: the first verse takes up [the thesis] and censures it; the second verse presents a dilemma. The first half takes up [the thesis], and the second half directly censures the characteristic of arising. Since the characteristic of arising can give rise to the substance of the dharma, what further gives rise to the characteristic of arising? In the first half of the second verse, if the characteristic is assimilated to the dharma, the characteristic falls into infinite regress; in the second half, if the dharma is assimilated to the characteristic, the dharma falls into spontaneous arising without cause. The reason for making this dilemma refutation is precisely that the opponent's doctrine is internally contradictory: the characteristic of arising can give rise to itself, but the dharma cannot give rise to itself; hence it incurs these two faults. "Furthermore, an existent dharma should not arise" is the sixth gate. This refutation via the gate of existence and non-existence universally refutes everything, and reiteratedly refutes self-arising and arising from other. From "Furthermore..." downwards is the seventh: refutation via the gate of cessation and non-cessation. Up to this point, arising has been refuted from the perspective of the gate of arising; now arising is refuted from the perspective of the gate of cessation, and this also reiteratedly refutes self-arising and arising from other. The first half refutes the Sarvāstivādins' simultaneity of the four characteristics in terms of there being no arising in the sense of cessation; the second half refutes arising with non-cessation, which refutes the four characteristics being at different times, which is the doctrine of the Dārṣṭāntikas. Moreover, the first half refutes the Sarvāstivādins' simultaneity of substance, and the second half refutes their function being sequential. If one says that at the time of the function of arising there is not yet the function of cessation, then at the time of arising there is not yet the characteristic of cessation; if at the time of arising there is already the characteristic of cessation, then at the time of arising there is already the function of cessation. You say that cessation supports the characteristic of arising and acts as an aid to arising; yet now we see that the characteristic of cessation is actually an adversary of arising, because it harms arising. Thus, when you say that there is no phenomenon that does not cease, when the substance of your phenomenon arises it is constantly accompanied by the characteristic of cessation—how could there be an unceasing phenomenon?