中觀論疏 5.38

5.38

From "Furthermore, what you hold..." downwards is the fifth: a reiterated refutation of self-arising and arising from other. There are four reasons for this refutation: First, above we only refuted self-arising, and had not yet refuted arising from other. Among the verses refuting self-arising: first, self[-arising] was refuted via the gate of 'already' and 'not yet'; not accepting 'already' and 'not yet', [the opponent] claimed that it arises at the time of arising, so it was refuted in terms of the gate of the three times. When the refutation of the gate of the three times left it unable to stand, he then brought forward causes and conditions to rescue it; grasping causes and conditions unable to stand, he again grasped the doctrine of the intrinsic nature of the three times to rescue it. Refuting his three times up to this point is only just completing the refutation of the doctrine of self-arising; hence, we now next refute his arising from other. Second, self-arising and arising from other is the doctrine of the Mahāsāṃghika school; hence the *Vibhāṣā* says: "The Mahāsāṃghikas explain: just as a lamp illuminates itself and illuminates other things, and the mental substance knows itself and knows other things, the characteristic of arising gives rise to itself and gives rise to other things." Therefore, it must now be refuted again. Third, the Tattvasiddhi masters say: the characteristic of arising does not further rely on [another] characteristic, so it arises of itself; yet it can give rise to the substance of the dharma, so it gives rise to other. Hence it must be refuted again. Fourth, to show that perverse views arise chaotically, they are refuted chaotically. The two verses are divided into two: the first verse takes up [the thesis] and censures it; the second verse presents a dilemma. The first half takes up [the thesis], and the second half directly censures the characteristic of arising. Since the characteristic of arising can give rise to the substance of the dharma, what further gives rise to the characteristic of arising? In the first half of the second verse, if the characteristic is assimilated to the dharma, the characteristic falls into infinite regress; in the second half, if the dharma is assimilated to the characteristic, the dharma falls into spontaneous arising without cause. The reason for making this dilemma refutation is precisely that the opponent's doctrine is internally contradictory: the characteristic of arising can give rise to itself, but the dharma cannot give rise to itself; hence it incurs these two faults. "Furthermore, an existent dharma should not arise" is the sixth gate. This refutation via the gate of existence and non-existence universally refutes everything, and reiteratedly refutes self-arising and arising from other. From "Furthermore..." downwards is the seventh: refutation via the gate of cessation and non-cessation. Up to this point, arising has been refuted from the perspective of the gate of arising; now arising is refuted from the perspective of the gate of cessation, and this also reiteratedly refutes self-arising and arising from other. The first half refutes the Sarvāstivādins' simultaneity of the four characteristics in terms of there being no arising in the sense of cessation; the second half refutes arising with non-cessation, which refutes the four characteristics being at different times, which is the doctrine of the Dārṣṭāntikas. Moreover, the first half refutes the Sarvāstivādins' simultaneity of substance, and the second half refutes their function being sequential. If one says that at the time of the function of arising there is not yet the function of cessation, then at the time of arising there is not yet the characteristic of cessation; if at the time of arising there is already the characteristic of cessation, then at the time of arising there is already the function of cessation. You say that cessation supports the characteristic of arising and acts as an aid to arising; yet now we see that the characteristic of cessation is actually an adversary of arising, because it harms arising. Thus, when you say that there is no phenomenon that does not cease, when the substance of your phenomenon arises it is constantly accompanied by the characteristic of cessation—how could there be an unceasing phenomenon?