中觀論疏 6.10

6.10

此品所以來者，凡有八義：一者上破作作者，破人法用，今此品次破人法體。根本有神及以諸根，然後始有造作之用。上雖破其用，未除其根，故須破也。二者上別破即陰，今破離陰。三者上通破五種人法：一者人法俱有、二者人法俱無、三者人法半有半無、四者人有法無法有人無、五者人一法三法一人三，故遍破一切人法。今此一品重破初句，謂人法俱有，以有病難除、二空難信，故此一品廣破人法有也。四者上來通破即、離、亦即亦離、非即非離一切諸我，今此一品別破離陰計我。於即離中偏破離者，凡立人立法多言法異於人、人異於法，蓋是惑者之常情、內外之通計。又犢子云：五陰和合別有於人。成實師云：法則是實，人則是假，故是離法有人之義，所以須偏破也。五者此論正破於內、傍破於外，〈作作者〉已破內人法竟，今此一品次破外道人法。問：何以知此品破外道義耶？答：後長行文云「有論師云此出入息視眴等是神相」，即是優樓迦義，故知破外道也。六者自上已來破生死中假人造作義，此之一品的破大乘人謂世出世佛性依持，則是舉始終世出世也。如大乘人之言：本有如來藏為生死依持建立，生死則依如來藏名為本住。生死有於生滅，如來藏不生不滅，而如來藏離陰而有。故《涅槃》云「我者即是如來藏義」，故知神我、佛性、如來藏、阿摩識等，悉是本住之異名。數論師云：不有心神而已，有心神必有得佛之理。故心神為本，不同草木盡在一化。又云真諦為本，真諦即是無住，故從無住本立一切法。問：若爾，此品應破《涅槃經》耶？答：佛性實非有無、亦非即離、未曾始終，而惑者橫謂執之為有，即是戲論佛性。今破其戲論謂性實，不破佛性。故《涅槃》云「斷取著，不斷我見，我見者即佛性」也。七者因上接斷語來。上云：有假人假法，但無實人法。外云：假實雖殊，終有人法。汝言因法有人、因人有法，我亦明因本住故有眼耳法，由眼耳等法而有本住，亦是人法相因也。八者不受論主上破。汝不應言都無人法，今實有人名為本住，以有本住故有眼耳等根。若無本住，誰有此耶？所言本住者，凡有三義：一云本有於神，故稱為本；住在諸根之前，目之為住。此但是人名也。次云神為諸根作本，諸根依神得住，故云本住。此從本立名也。三云本有於神，故名為本；諸根後生依之得住，故稱為住。此人法通稱也。

There are eight reasons in all for the appearance of this chapter: First, the preceding refuted action and agent, which refuted the function of person and dharmas; this chapter next refutes the substance of person and dharmas. Fundamentally, there is a soul and the sense faculties, and only then is there the function of action. Although their function was refuted above, their root was not yet eradicated, so it must be refuted. Second, the preceding separately refuted [a self that is] identical to the aggregates; now it refutes [a self that is] separate from the aggregates. Third, the preceding comprehensively refuted five kinds of person and dharmas: 1. person and dharmas both existing; 2. person and dharmas both non-existing; 3. person and dharmas half-existing and half-non-existing; 4. person existing while dharmas do not, or dharmas existing while person does not; 5. one person with three dharmas, or one dharma with three persons. Thus it comprehensively refuted all persons and dharmas. Now this single chapter refutes the first proposition again—namely, that person and dharmas both exist—because the illness of existence is hard to eliminate and the two emptinesses are hard to believe; therefore this single chapter extensively refutes the existence of person and dharmas. Fourth, the preceding comprehensively refuted all selves—identical, separate, both identical and separate, neither identical nor separate; now this single chapter separately refutes the assertion of a self separate from the aggregates. In singling out the separate [self] for refutation among identical and separate: asserting a person and asserting dharmas mostly claims that dharmas are different from the person, and the person is different from dharmas; this is the common inclination of the deluded, a general view of both Buddhists and non-Buddhists. Moreover, the Vātsīputrīyas say: when the five aggregates assemble, there is a distinct person. The Tattvasiddhi masters say: dharmas are real, while the person is provisional; thus this is the sense that there is a person separate from dharmas, which is why it must be particularly refuted. Fifth, this treatise primarily refutes the internal [Buddhist schools] and secondarily refutes external [non-Buddhists]; the Chapter on Action and Agent already concluded refuting the internal person and dharmas, and now this single chapter next refutes the heterodox person and dharmas. Question: How is it known that this chapter refutes heterodox views? Answer: The later prose text states, “Some treatise masters say that this inhalation, exhalation, winking, and so forth are the characteristics of the soul”; this is Ulūka’s assertion, so we know it refutes the heterodox. Sixth, hitherto it has refuted the action of a provisional person in saṃsāra; this single chapter specifically refutes Mahāyāna practitioners who consider Buddha-nature to be the support of the mundane and supramundane, which encompasses the beginning and end, mundane and supramundane. As Mahāyāna practitioners say: the fundamentally existent tathāgatagarbha serves as the support and foundation of saṃsāra, and saṃsāra relies on the tathāgatagarbha, termed the “prior entity.” Saṃsāra has arising and ceasing, while the tathāgatagarbha neither arises nor ceases, and the tathāgatagarbha exists separate from the aggregates. Thus the Nirvāṇa [Sūtra] says: “The self is precisely the meaning of the tathāgatagarbha.” Hence we know that ātman, Buddha-nature, tathāgatagarbha, and amalavijñāna are all different names for the prior entity. The Abhidharma masters say: it is not merely that there is a mental soul; having a mental soul, there must be the principle of attaining Buddhahood. Therefore the mental soul is the basis, unlike grass and trees which are entirely confined to a single transformation. They also say that ultimate truth is the basis; ultimate truth is non-abiding, and thus all dharmas are established from the non-abiding basis. Question: If so, should this chapter refute the Nirvāṇa Sūtra? Answer: Buddha-nature is in truth neither existent nor non-existent, neither identical nor separate, never having beginning or end; yet the deluded arbitrarily cling to it as existent, which is Buddha-nature as prapañca. Now it refutes their prapañca regarding the nature as real; it does not refute Buddha-nature. Hence the Nirvāṇa [Sūtra] says: “Sever grasping and attachment, but do not sever the view of self; the view of self is Buddha-nature.” Seventh, it follows from the preceding statements on remedying annihilationism. The above stated: there are a provisional person and provisional dharmas, but no real person and dharmas. The opponent says: although provisional and real differ, in the end there are person and dharmas. You say that dependent on dharmas there is a person, and dependent on a person there are dharmas; I also explain that dependent on the prior entity there are the dharmas of eyes and ears, and due to the dharmas of eyes and ears there is a prior entity; this is also person and dharmas depending on each other. Eighth, not accepting the treatise master's refutation above: You should not say there is no person and no dharma at all; now there is truly a person named the “prior entity”; because there is a prior entity, there are the faculties such as eyes and ears. If there were no prior entity, who would have these? As for what is called “prior entity” (ben-zhu), it has three meanings in all: First, the soul is fundamentally (ben) existent, hence called “fundamental”; it abides (zhu) prior to the faculties, and is designated as “abiding.” This is merely the name of a person. Second, the soul serves as the basis (ben) for the faculties, and the faculties abide (zhu) relying on the soul, hence called “prior entity.” This derives its name from the basis. Third, the soul is fundamentally (ben) existent, hence called “fundamental”; the faculties arise later and abide (zhu) relying on it, hence called “abiding.” This is a general designation for person and dharmas.