中觀論疏 6.11

6.11

品十二偈，為三：第一破本住，明眾生空義；第二破諸根，明法空義；第三呵責外人橫計人法。初二門檢有非有，次一門呵非有謂有。就初又三：第一就六根之前檢無本住，亦云六根之外；第二就六根之內檢無本住；第三就四大之中檢無本住。即是一切處求無我，小乘根性聞之得初果、大乘人聞得十住。就初又二：前立、次破。就立為二：第一以法證人、第二以人證法。二門各兩。初文二者，三句舉法為問；「是則名本住」，此一句即是答也。第二上半偈為問；「以是故當知」，下半即是答也。所以作此問答者，並不受上論主破無作者作法，是故今舉人法有難論主無，即顯己宗明有義也。問：論主何故不分明立義，而但秤有人言？答：若別出部計則不得通破眾家，今欲遍破眾家故秤有人言也。問：何以得知此是真神佛性？答：計真神佛性必是本有，生死虛妄名為始有；若俱是本有則俱真，俱是始有則俱妄。今文亦計本住是本有、諸根為始有，故知是真神佛性義也。長行云「命等根」者，若數人別有非色非心法為命根，成論以業為命根也。「答曰」下，第二破。開為三門：一責相破、二並決破、三徵宗破，生起三破。初偈逈責相、次偈竝體、三徵宗。既立離陰之神，故責覓離陰之相；責相不得，空立神體，故次竝體；外滯並既急，則便漫倒，故以徵宗也。又初一以相責體、次將法並人、次舉不離破離。偈為二：上三句責之。既未有六根先以有神者，以何相而知耶？以未有六根，故不得用六根證有也。二問依根已後用何相知耶？苦樂等是心相、見聞等是身相，除此二外以何為神相？若猶取此二相，則猶是六根所得，不得別有本性，應別有相也。又終以陰為相，終不離陰，陰外無神也。又陰外無別相，亦陰外無別體。若有神體異陰體，亦有神相異陰相。《涅槃經》云「是諸外道雖復種種說我，終不離陰界入也。」又若無神相，指陰為神相，牛指馬為相、火指水為相。又並無相故無神，汝前以有法證人是有，我今以相無證人無。問：舊云眾生本有得佛理者，得佛理既本有，則眾生亦本有。若眾生始有而得佛理本有者，此理屬誰也？長行初三：一標責相；「如外法」下，第二出責相；「如經說」下，第三結責相。「問曰」下，第二救。出入息是身相、苦樂等是心相，還以身心二相證有於神也。問：此乃是外道優樓迦義，云何言破真神佛性耶？答：計真神佛性與優樓迦義同。真神是常、妄是無常，優樓迦亦然。又今明外道出救義，即是破內人，以外人作此救，即是明內義同於外道，故是破內也。「答曰」下，第三破救。又四：一責處破；「若謂」下，第二取意破；「復次若言身大」下，第三無常門破；「復次如風狂病」下，第四不自在破。四破顯四義：初責處以空門破無我、次取意以苦義顯無我、三無常門顯無我、四不自在顯無我。外道不達生死苦空無常，故以四義破之。「如是種種」下，第四總結也。「若必謂離眼」已下，第二決破。偈為二：上半牒、下半並之。一將人例法。汝人法相離則不相依，人離於法在法先有者，法亦離人在人先有也。人前法後，人常法無常；法前人後，法常人無常。又俱前則應俱常，俱後則俱無常。又汝言人前法後，亦應法前人後。二以法例人。法必定須依人，人亦必定須依法也。問：既離法有人，理然離人有法，此乃是他義，何謂是並決破？答：麁心觀文似如此耳。此意令離人前有法也，必須安先字，不爾非破。所以作此難者，以人是法人、法是人法，事如薪火。外道救云：如地前草木後者。此則不然，現見有地，實不見神也。又法前不見人而言人在前，亦人前不見法應言法在前。又未有法而前有人事，如未有牛而前有角。即時有所得大乘人立真神佛性義亦大同。何以知之？彼謂佛性本有、妄想非本有，則知未有妄眾生時前有佛性。若妄與真俱本有，則應俱常俱無常。今更問：既本有佛性未有妄眾生者，此佛性屬誰耶？是誰佛性耶？若言有眾生方有佛性，眾生既始有，佛性亦應始有；佛性既本有，眾生亦本有。若言佛不說眾生始者，然佛雖不說眾生始，佛說眾生是無常，無常則非本有。而佛性本有，則未有眾生前有佛性，佛性屬何人耶？「問曰二事相離可爾」下，生第三徵宗。外人無以通並，遂難而迴，故生此問也。答中上半牒宗、下半徵宗。「以法知有人」，牒其初偈，舉法證人也。「以人知有法」，牒第二偈，以人證有法也。下半雙徵者，「離法何有人」，徵第一宗也。「離人何有法」，徵第二宗也。有異三論師謂此是人法相待破，蓋是不看長行文耳。所以作此破者，上明俱離、今明俱不離。前明其俱離者，離破其離義；今合離者，不離破其離義，故進退屈也。

The chapter has twelve verses, divided into three parts: first, refuting the prior entity, explaining the meaning of the emptiness of sentient beings; second, refuting the sense faculties, explaining the meaning of the emptiness of dharmas; third, rebuking the non-Buddhists for falsely positing person and dharmas. The first two sections examine existence and show it is non-existent; the next section rebukes taking non-existence as existence. The first part is further divided into three: first, examining the non-existence of a prior entity prior to the six sense faculties, also called outside the six sense faculties; second, examining the non-existence of a prior entity within the six sense faculties; third, examining the non-existence of a prior entity amidst the four great elements. This is seeking selflessness in all places: when people of Hīnayāna capacity hear it, they attain the first fruit; when people of Mahāyāna hear it, they attain the ten abodes. The first of these has two parts: first, establishing [the opponent's position]; next, refuting it. The establishing has two parts: first, using dharmas to prove the person; second, using the person to prove dharmas. Each of the two sections has two parts. As for the first text having two parts: three lines present dharmas as a question; 'that is then named the prior entity'—this single line is the answer. In the second, the first half of the verse is the question; 'therefore one should know'—the latter half is the answer. The reason for posing this question and answer is that neither accepts the treatise master's refutation above of no agent and no action; therefore, they now raise the existence of person and dharmas to challenge the treatise master's assertion of non-existence, thereby manifesting their own tenet and explaining the meaning of existence. Question: Why does the treatise master not explicitly name their school, but only say 'someone says'? Answer: If he singled out a particular sectarian doctrine, he could not universally refute all schools; now, wishing to universally refute all schools, he says 'someone says.' Question: How is it known that this is the true ātman / Buddha-nature? Answer: The conception of a true ātman / Buddha-nature necessarily holds it to be fundamentally existent, whereas birth-and-death is illusory and called newly arisen; if both were fundamentally existent, then both would be real; if both were newly arisen, then both would be illusory. The present text also posits that the prior entity is fundamentally existent and the sense faculties are newly arisen, so we know it is the doctrine of a true ātman / Buddha-nature. The prose says 'life-faculty and so forth': according to the Sarvāstivādins, there is separately a dharma neither form nor mind that is the life-faculty; the Tattvasiddhi takes karma as the life-faculty. From 'The reply is' below is the second, the refutation. It opens into three sections: first, refutation by demanding the characteristic; second, refutation by reductio ad absurdum; third, refutation by interrogating the thesis. These introduce the three refutations: the first verse directly demands the characteristic; the next verse parallels the substances; the third interrogates the thesis. Having posited an ātman separate from the aggregates, [Nāgārjuna] therefore demands to find a characteristic separate from the aggregates; failing to obtain a characteristic, an ātman-substance is established in vain, hence he next parallels the substances; when the outsider's clinging is pressed hard by the reductio, they become confused and overturned, hence he interrogates their thesis. Furthermore, the first uses the characteristic to interrogate the substance; the next parallels dharmas with the person; the next adduces non-separation to refute separation. The verse has two parts: the upper three lines demand it. Since before the six sense faculties exist the ātman already exists, by what characteristic is it known? Because the six sense faculties do not yet exist, one cannot use the six sense faculties to prove its existence. Second, [one] asks: after depending on the sense faculties, by what characteristic is it known? Pain, pleasure, and so forth are mental characteristics; seeing, hearing, and so forth are bodily characteristics. Aside from these two, what is taken as the characteristic of the ātman? If one still takes these two characteristics, then they are still what is obtained through the six sense faculties, and cannot be a separate intrinsic nature; there ought to be a separate characteristic. Moreover, ultimately taking the aggregates as the characteristic, it is never separate from the aggregates, and outside the aggregates there is no ātman. Furthermore, outside the aggregates there is no separate characteristic, nor is there a separate substance outside the aggregates. If there were an ātman-substance distinct from the substance of the aggregates, there would also be an ātman-characteristic distinct from the characteristics of the aggregates. The Nirvāṇa Sūtra says: 'Although these non-Buddhists speak of a self in various ways, it is never separate from the aggregates, realms, and bases.' Furthermore, if there is no characteristic of the ātman and one points to the aggregates as the characteristic of the ātman, that is like pointing to a horse as the characteristic of an ox, or pointing to water as the characteristic of fire. Moreover, since it lacks any characteristic, there is no ātman; previously you used the existence of dharmas to prove that the person exists, but I now use the absence of a characteristic to prove that the person does not exist. Question: The old theory says that sentient beings fundamentally possess the principle of attaining Buddhahood; since the principle of attaining Buddhahood is fundamentally existent, sentient beings must also be fundamentally existent. If sentient beings are newly arisen while the principle of attaining Buddhahood is fundamentally existent, to whom does this principle belong? In the prose, the first part has three aspects: first, identifying the demand for the characteristic; from 'Like external dharmas' down is the second, presenting the demand for the characteristic; from 'As the sūtra says' down is the third, concluding the demand for the characteristic. From 'Question' down is the second, the rescue. Inhalation and exhalation are bodily characteristics; pain, pleasure, and so forth are mental characteristics; they again use the two characteristics of body and mind to prove the existence of the ātman. Question: This is the doctrine of the non-Buddhist Ulūka; how can it be said to refute the true ātman / Buddha-nature? Answer: The conception of a true ātman / Buddha-nature is identical to Ulūka's doctrine. The true ātman is permanent and illusion is impermanent; Ulūka is also like this. Furthermore, now explaining that the non-Buddhist puts forward this rescue is precisely refuting the internal Buddhist: because the outsider makes this rescue, this makes clear that the internal doctrine is identical to the non-Buddhist, and thus it refutes the internal. From 'The reply is' down is the third, the refutation of the rescue. This again has four parts: first, refutation by demanding the locus; from 'If it is held' down is the second, refutation by grasping the intent; from 'Furthermore, if it is said that the body is large' down is the third, refutation via the approach of impermanence; from 'Furthermore, like a madness caused by wind disease' down is the fourth, refutation via lack of mastery. The four refutations reveal four meanings: first, demanding the locus refutes [the self] through the gateway of emptiness, showing selflessness; next, grasping the intent reveals selflessness through the meaning of suffering; third, the approach of impermanence reveals selflessness; fourth, lack of mastery reveals selflessness. Because non-Buddhists do not comprehend the suffering, emptiness, and impermanence of birth-and-death, he refutes them with these four meanings. From 'Thus in various ways' down is the fourth, the general conclusion. From 'If it is firmly held that separate from the eye' onward is the second, the refutation by reductio ad absurdum. The verse has two parts: the first half reiterates the premise; the second half parallels it. First, drawing an analogy from the person to dharmas: your person and dharmas are separate from each other, and so do not depend on each other; if the person is separate from dharmas and exists prior to dharmas, then dharmas must also be separate from the person and exist prior to the person. If the person is prior and dharmas are posterior, the person is permanent and dharmas are impermanent; if dharmas are prior and the person is posterior, dharmas are permanent and the person is impermanent. Moreover, if both were prior, both should be permanent; if both were posterior, both should be impermanent. Furthermore, you say the person is prior and dharmas posterior; it should also be that dharmas are prior and the person posterior. Second, drawing an analogy from dharmas to the person: dharmas must necessarily depend on the person, and the person must also necessarily depend on dharmas. Question: Since there is a person separate from dharmas, it is logically so that there are dharmas separate from the person; this is the other's own doctrine, so how is it a refutation by reductio? Answer: Looking at the text with a crude mind, it only appears to be so. The intention here is to make it so that dharmas exist prior to and separate from the person; one must include the word 'prior', otherwise it is not a refutation. The reason for posing this objection is that the person is the person of dharmas, and dharmas are the dharmas of the person, just like fuel and fire. The non-Buddhist rescues it by saying: 'Just as the earth is prior and grass and trees are posterior.' This is not so: we currently see that there is earth, but we truly do not see an ātman. Furthermore, prior to dharmas one does not see a person yet says the person is prior; likewise, prior to the person one does not see dharmas, so one should say dharmas are prior. Moreover, for a person to exist prior when dharmas do not yet exist is like having horns prior when an ox does not yet exist. The contemporary doctrine of a true ātman / Buddha-nature established by Mahāyāna practitioners who hold to attainment is largely identical. How is this known? They hold that Buddha-nature is fundamentally existent and deluded conceptualization is not fundamentally existent; thus we know that prior to the existence of deluded sentient beings, Buddha-nature exists beforehand. If both delusion and the real were fundamentally existent, then both should be permanent or both impermanent. Now we further ask: since Buddha-nature is fundamentally existent before deluded sentient beings exist, to whom does this Buddha-nature belong? Whose Buddha-nature is it? If one says that only when there are sentient beings is there Buddha-nature, since sentient beings are newly arisen, Buddha-nature should also be newly arisen; since Buddha-nature is fundamentally existent, sentient beings should also be fundamentally existent. If one says that the Buddha did not speak of a beginning for sentient beings: although the Buddha did not speak of a beginning for sentient beings, the Buddha said that sentient beings are impermanent, and what is impermanent is not fundamentally existent. Yet Buddha-nature is fundamentally existent; so prior to sentient beings, Buddha-nature exists—to what person does Buddha-nature belong? From 'Question: If the two things are separate, let it be so' down arises the third, interrogating the thesis. The outsider has no way to resolve the reductio, so they turn around in distress, hence this question arises. In the answer, the first half reiterates the thesis, and the second half interrogates the thesis. 'Through dharmas one knows there is a person' reiterates their first verse, adducing dharmas to prove the person. 'Through the person one knows there are dharmas' reiterates the second verse, using the person to prove there are dharmas. As for the second half's dual interrogation: 'Separate from dharmas, how is there a person?' interrogates the first thesis. 'Separate from the person, how are there dharmas?' interrogates the second thesis. There are differing Sanlun masters who claim this is a refutation based on the mutual dependence of person and dharmas; this is simply because they have not read the prose text. The reason for making this refutation is that above it explained that both are separate, while here it explains that both are not separate. Previously, explaining that both are separate used separation to refute their doctrine of separation; now, joining separation, it uses non-separation to refute their doctrine of separation, so they are cornered whether advancing or retreating.