中觀論疏 6.22

6.22

「答曰」下，第四論主答。外人前問所破、次問能破。問所破中，先問有、次問無。今但總答也。就答中為四：一隨俗答、二引例通、三反擲詶、四伏宗難。然此答之大意者唯有二門：一者雖破而無、二者雖無而破。答外人問，云「破故不無、無則不破」，故今明雖破而無、雖無而破。隨俗中五句，即為五轉：初云「隨俗語故無過」者，我懷中有於一異及燃可燃以破汝者，我則有過；以我懷中未曾有於一異及燃可燃，亦不言有、無、亦有亦無、非有非無四句內外，故《大品》明五不受，行亦不受乃至不受亦不受，是菩薩無受三昧廣大之用。而口中言一異以破汝燃可燃者，以名生於俗，隨而言之。此燃可燃及一異並是世俗之說，今隨俗說之，則我無過也。「燃可燃若說一異不名為受」者，第二句釋上隨俗言耳。我心無所受也，又懸取外心。外人即云：既云隨俗言，應隨俗受。故今答之，雖隨俗有言，而不隨俗有受，即是語言雖同其心則異。「若雜世俗言說則無所論」者，此第三句。外人云：汝心既不受，口何意言？口遂有言，則心有所受。是故答云：若心無所受則心行處滅，若口無所言則語言道斷，則賓主杜默，何所論耶？今諸佛菩薩出世，正欲為物論於正道；若不隨俗言者，則不得論道也。「若不說燃可燃云何能有所破」者，前句隨俗言為顯道，今隨俗言為破病。故統教意以開道為宗，考聖心以息病為本也。次理既無言，何故於無言而強有言，豈非乖理耶？是故釋云：我若秤理無言則理不可明，汝云何得解耶？或云第五句意云：若無所說，正合道理。何須言說？故云若無所說則義不可明。「如有論者」下，第二引例答。此是破有無之論者言有者欲明非有，言有而不受有。今亦然矣。「若口有言」下，第三反擲答。汝雖誦我破而不受我破，我口誦汝立豈受汝立耶？問：外人何處誦論主破耶？答：上云「若無燃可燃云何以一異相破」，即是誦也。「是故以一異」下，第四伏宗難。就偈為二：初偈雙破一異、第二六偈偏破異。初偈上半破一、下半破異。此偈意多有所含，上下半並是責。上半就法說門責：汝現有人法能所，云何一耶？下半就喻責：汝得今薪火相離，可許汝異也。又上下俱是並。初舉譬並法，薪火若一，人法便一；下半舉譬並譬，若火薪異應得相離，若不可離不可異。又上半是對緣假，借異破一；下半是就緣假，就異破異。又上半就一破一，下半借異破異。又俱是縱門。上半縱一，人法既一則天下無非一者，則便失異，失異亦無一。下半縱異，則一切皆異，便無有一。又若執火薪一則有四過：一者破因緣，本因火有薪、因人有法，一即無相因義便破因緣，破因緣即破假，破假即破中道。又若見因緣名見佛，見佛即見佛性涅槃，今破因緣即都無所見。又若一即火還燒火、薪還傳薪。又一呼火應得薪、喚薪應得火，喚瓶應得陶師、喚陶師應得瓶。又人法一，人常法無常，則俱常俱無常。若異亦有四過：一破因緣，因緣異無相因，無相因則非因緣，非因緣則非假，非假則非中，故如一中之過。又上下半凡破諸要義：一僧佉衛世一異、二真俗一體異體、三真妄一異、四心惑一異。又如問柱名與柱為一為異？若異者，柱名非但異柱，亦異一切物，既喚得柱，應得一切物，不爾應都不得物；若一者，柱應入口。問：真俗一異有何過？答：一有五過三節。五過者，以真從俗，俗無常，真亦無常。二以俗從真，真常，俗亦常。三真不從俗，即真與俗異。四俗不從真，俗與真異。五若言體一義異，即是亦一亦異，體一故亦一、義異故亦異。三節者，初二得一義、次兩是異義、三是亦一亦異。問：今人多執體一義異，有何過耶？答：俗義異真義者，為即真、為出真外？若即真，乃是體一義一。若異真則出真外，佛及弟子知法性外無法，云何出真外？真俗異體，一害經相即之言、二法性外應有法，佛及弟子便是妄談也。真妄水波一，亦作五難三節。水波若異，則波自動水不動、水自靜波不靜也。長行云「分別是燃是可燃」者，分為兩體別使東西也。長行云「處處離可燃應有燃」，所以有此一句來者，前舉離以並外人，恐外亦云：薪火相離，如猛風吹於絕炎，則是離薪之火。故今明處處皆離，一處為薪處、一處為火處，既得離薪亦應離火。又處處者，令其薪火各處東西之別也。

From "The answer is:" onward is the fourth [section], where the author of the treatise answers. The opponent previously questioned the object of refutation and next questioned the refuting agent. Regarding the object of refutation, he first questioned existence and next questioned non-existence. Here there is only a general reply. Within this reply there are four parts: first, answering in accordance with conventional convention; second, resolving it by citing an analogous case; third, responding by turning [the objection] back on him; fourth, subduing the core thesis by raising difficulties. However, the overarching meaning of this reply comprises only two approaches: first, that although there is refutation, there is non-existence; second, that although there is non-existence, there is refutation. In response to the opponent's question, which claimed that "because there is refutation, there is no non-existence; if there is non-existence, then there is no refutation," here it is explained that although there is refutation, there is non-existence, and although there is non-existence, there is refutation. The five lines in "in accordance with conventional convention" constitute five turns. First, as for "Because of speaking in accordance with worldly convention, there is no error," if within my own mind I held oneness and difference, or fire and fuel, in order to refute you, then I would be at fault; because within my own mind there has never been oneness and difference, nor fire and fuel, nor do I speak of existence, non-existence, both existence and non-existence, or neither existence nor non-existence, inside or outside the four alternatives. Therefore, the *Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā-prajñāpāramitā* explains the five non-grasps: conduct is not grasped, up to even non-grasping is not grasped—this is the vast function of the bodhisattva's samādhi of non-grasping. Yet speaking with the mouth of oneness and difference in order to refute your fire and fuel is because names arise from convention, and I speak following along with them. These—fire and fuel as well as oneness and difference—are all conventional parlance; now, speaking in accordance with convention, I commit no fault. "If one speaks of fire and fuel as one or different, it is not called grasping" is the second line, explaining the above "speaking in accordance with convention." My mind grasps nothing. Furthermore, it anticipates the opponent's thinking. The opponent would say: "Since you say you speak in accordance with convention, you should grasp in accordance with convention." Therefore he now answers that although there is speech in accordance with convention, there is no grasping in accordance with convention; that is, although the language is identical, the mind is different. "If one is mixed up with worldly conventional speech, there would be nothing to discuss" is the third line. The opponent says: "Since your mind grasps nothing, why does your mouth speak? Once the mouth speaks, the mind grasps something." Therefore he answers: if the mind grasps nothing, the sphere of mental activity ceases; if the mouth speaks nothing, the path of language is cut off. Then host and guest would both remain silent, and what would there be to discuss? Now, when the Buddhas and bodhisattvas appear in the world, their precise aim is to discuss the correct path for living beings; if they did not speak in accordance with convention, they could not discuss the path. "If one did not speak of fire and fuel, how could there be anything refuted?": the previous line spoke in accordance with convention to reveal the path; this line speaks in accordance with convention to refute errors. Therefore, unifying the intent of the teachings, opening the path is the principal purpose; examining the sacred mind, quelling errors is the root. Next, since the principle is fundamentally beyond words, why forcibly speak where there are no words? Would that not run contrary to the principle? Therefore he explains: if I kept silent in accordance with the principle, the principle could not be clarified, and how could you attain understanding? Or it is said that the meaning of the fifth line is: if there is nothing spoken, that directly accords with the principle. What need is there for speech? Hence it says: if there is nothing spoken, the meaning cannot be clarified. From "Just as there are theorists…" onward is the second part, answering by citing an analogous case. This refers to theorists who refute existence and non-existence: when they speak of existence, they wish to clarify non-existence; they speak of existence without grasping existence. Here it is also like this. From "If the mouth speaks…" onward is the third part, answering by turning [the objection] back on him. Although you recite my refutation, you do not accept my refutation; when my mouth recites your assertion, do I accept your assertion? Question: Where does the opponent recite the treatise master's refutation? Answer: Above, where he said "If there is no fire and fuel, how do you refute them by oneness and difference?"—that is the recitation. From "Therefore, by oneness and difference…" onward is the fourth part, subduing the core thesis by raising difficulties. Regarding the verses, there are two parts: the first verse refutes both oneness and difference; the second six verses specifically refute difference. In the first verse, the first half refutes oneness, and the second half refutes difference. The meaning of this verse contains much: both the first and second halves are reproaches. The first half reproaches from the approach of the doctrine itself: "You presently maintain person and dharma, agent and patient; how can they be one?" The second half reproaches by means of an analogy: "If you could now have fuel and fire separated, one might grant you difference." Moreover, both the first and second halves are parallel applications. First, citing the analogy to parallel the doctrine: if fuel and fire were one, person and dharma would be one. The second half cites the analogy to parallel the analogy: if fire and fuel were different, they should be able to be separated; if they cannot be separated, they cannot be different. Furthermore, the first half is provisionality relative to conditions, borrowing difference to refute oneness; the second half is provisionality resting on conditions, approaching difference to refute difference. Furthermore, the first half refutes oneness by means of oneness, and the second half borrows difference to refute difference. Moreover, both are approaches of provisional concession. The first half provisionally concedes oneness: since person and dharma are one, nothing under heaven would not be one, and one would then lose difference; if difference is lost, there is also no oneness. The second half provisionally concedes difference: then all things would be different, and there would be no oneness. Furthermore, if one grasps fire and fuel as one, there are four errors: first, it destroys dependent origination, for originally fuel exists because of fire, and dharma exists because of person; if they are one, there is no mutual dependence, which destroys dependent origination; destroying dependent origination destroys the provisional; destroying the provisional destroys the middle way. Furthermore, seeing dependent origination is called seeing the Buddha, and seeing the Buddha is seeing Buddha-nature and nirvāṇa; now, destroying dependent origination means seeing nothing at all. Furthermore, if they are one, fire would burn fire, and fuel would ignite fuel. Furthermore, if they are one, calling for fire should get fuel, and calling for fuel should get fire; calling for a pot should get the potter, and calling for the potter should get a pot. Furthermore, person and dharma would be one; if person is permanent and dharma is impermanent, then both would be permanent, or both would be impermanent. If they are different, there are also four errors: first, it destroys dependent origination, for if dependent causes and conditions are different, there is no mutual dependence; without mutual dependence, they are not dependent origination; if not dependent origination, they are not provisional; if not provisional, they are not the middle—hence it is like the error in oneness. Furthermore, the first and second halves generally refute various essential doctrines: first, the oneness and difference of Sāṃkhya and Vaiśeṣika; second, the single substance or distinct substances of the ultimate and conventional; third, the oneness and difference of the real and false; fourth, the oneness and difference of mind and defilement. Furthermore, it is like asking whether the name "pillar" and the pillar are one or different: if they are different, the name "pillar" is not only different from the pillar, but also different from all things; since calling it gets the pillar, it should get all things; if not, it should get nothing at all. If they are one, the pillar should enter the mouth. Question: What errors are there in the oneness and difference of the ultimate and conventional? Answer: Oneness has five errors and three steps. The five errors are: first, subordinating the ultimate to the conventional: the conventional being impermanent, the ultimate would also be impermanent. Second, subordinating the conventional to the ultimate: the ultimate being permanent, the conventional would also be permanent. Third, the ultimate does not subordinate to the conventional, so the ultimate and conventional are different. Fourth, the conventional does not subordinate to the ultimate, so the conventional and the ultimate are different. Fifth, if one says they are identical in substance but different in meaning, that is both one and different; being identical in substance they are one, and being different in meaning they are different. The three steps are: the first two obtain the meaning of oneness; the next two are the meaning of difference; the third is both one and different. Question: People nowadays mostly grasp identical substance and different meaning; what error is there? Answer: Does the conventional meaning being different from the ultimate meaning mean it is identical to the ultimate, or outside the ultimate? If it is identical to the ultimate, it is identical in substance and identical in meaning. If it is different from the ultimate, it is outside the ultimate. The Buddha and his disciples knew that outside the Dharma-nature there are no dharmas; how could it be outside the ultimate? If the ultimate and conventional have different substances: first, it harms the sūtras' statement that they are mutually identical; second, there would have to be dharmas outside the Dharma-nature, and the Buddha and his disciples would have spoken falsely. The oneness of real and false, water and waves, is also treated with five objections and three steps. If water and waves are different, then the waves would move on their own while the water does not move, and the water would be calm on its own while the waves are not calm. Where the prose says "distinguishing this as fire and that as fuel," it means dividing them into two substances and placing them separately in east and west. Where the prose says "everywhere apart from fuel there should be fire," the reason this sentence occurs is that the earlier mention of separation was to press the opponent; fearing the opponent might also say: "Fuel and fire are separated, like a fierce wind blowing a detached flame, which is fire separated from fuel." Therefore it is now clarified that they are separated everywhere: one place is the place of fuel, and one place is the place of fire; if one can be separated from fuel, one should also be separated from fire. Furthermore, "everywhere" means causing their fuel and fire each to be distinct in different places, east and west.