中觀論疏 6.23

6.23

「復次如是應常燃」下，第二偏破異。以燃可燃喻之人法，以多謂五陰是實、人是假，故偏破異也。又開三別：初破、次救、後破救。就初又四：一四失破；次二失破；三一失破，亦云取意破；四伏宗破。言四失者：一常燃、二失因、三失緣、四無作。常燃者，若因薪有火，則薪盡火滅，故不常燃。汝既火與薪異，在薪雖盡，火終不滅，是故常燃。二失因者，既有火體異薪，則火不因薪。失緣者，緣謂人功將護令火得燃，今火既離薪常燃，何假將護？無作者，作謂用也，火以燒薪為用，今既常燃則無燒薪之用，故無作也。「如是常應燃」，從前偈下半生。既其相離，如是常應燃也。第二句舉無因釋常燃。又初句火自住火體、次句火不因於他。下半初句明人於火無功、次句火於薪無用。無緣釋於常義，如世間物不從因緣是故為常。第四句明火無用。所以作此分者，青目釋第四句別作復次，故知異上三句。青目所以分為二意者，欲明火有二義：一者火體、二者火用。上三句明火體是常、後一句明無火用。既有體用不同，故開為二意也。長行云「是功現有」者，事火之徒即事可撿。「問曰」下，生第二明二失破。此偈釋前四失，前雖有四失，但由失二事：一失因、二失緣，是故有常燃及以無作之咎。故今但釋二失，則具釋上義也。偈上半明失因、下半明失緣。上半云既異薪自有火體，何須因薪？是故無因。下半云既不因薪火則常燃，何假將護？長行「復次」下，此釋下半明不須緣義。又發起後偈，所以有何以故之言也。「若汝謂燃時」下，第三取意破。上二偈標四失、釋四失，其過已成。但外人意云：無此四失。所以然者，異有二種：一相因異、二不相因異，不相因異則有四失、相因之異無四失也。「燃時名可燃」者，此句有其反順。反者，若未燃之時已是可燃，即可燃不因燃、燃亦不因可燃，則是不相因異，故有四失也。今燃時方是可燃，故可燃因燃，則知燃因可燃。既有因則有緣，若有因緣，因緣盡則滅，故不常燃。以假因緣有火故，火則燒薪，無無用過，故勉四失也。問：上來二偈顯燃有四失，今何故不救燃而救可燃？答：舉可燃以救燃。可燃不因燃尚不成，況燃不因可燃而得成耶？問：上明四失，今何故不備救耶？答：今但舉因義成，三失自勉也。「爾時但有薪」，下半破也。縱燒時還只應名薪，不應名可燃，以燒不燒俱異故也。明燒與不燒終異，則但是薪耳。此正破也。「何物燃可燃」者，燒與不燒終異，但有薪，何得言燃時方名可燃？故上句是破、下句為呵。又燒與不燒終異，但有薪，爾時有何物燃及可燃耶？即是覓二物也。又釋：爾時但有薪者，此是牒外義。外人云：燃燒時薪名可燃，未燒之時此但有於薪，故今牒之。何物燃可燃者，此始是破也。舉其未燒之薪，破其燒時名可燃。汝義未燃，爾時既但有薪，以何物來燃名為可燃？此明無有離薪之火以燒離火之薪名為可燃。若遂有離薪之火以燒離火之薪名可燃者，火則離薪、薪亦離火，便不相因。既不相因，則不須人功，故是釋人功空義。還具上四難也。後解為正。長行還徵異宗。汝既離燃別有可燃，云何言燃時始名可燃？若燃時方名可燃則不得異，若異不得言燃時名可燃也。「復次若異則不至」下，第四伏宗難。上雖云燃時名可燃，終是異義。若終是異則不相因，還伏四失也，只說不相因為不至耳。「問曰」下，第二外人救義。外謂：以其異故，得有相至。如其不異，何有至耶？問：薪火異義，誰所立耶？答：內外二家並言體異。外道兩家，一者遍造、二者偏造，並云薪火異體。毘曇云：火是熱觸，薪具四微。成實云：色觸二法名之為火，火是假名；薪是假名，而具四微，是故為異。以其異故，火則燒薪，名火至薪；薪則傳火，謂薪至火。「答曰」下，第三破救。汝男女前有、不至，許後有至；薪火無、不至，云何至耶？汝若前令薪火相離不至，燃後許汝至也。

From "Furthermore, it would thus burn constantly" onward is the second [section], which specifically refutes difference. Taking fire and fuel as an analogy for person and phenomena (dharma), because most people claim that the five aggregates are real and the person is provisional, [the text] therefore specifically refutes difference. Furthermore, this opens into three distinctions: first, the refutation; next, the defense; finally, the refutation of the defense. Under the first, there are again four parts: 1. refutation via four faults; next, 2. refutation via two faults; 3. refutation via one fault, also called refuting the underlying intention; 4. refuting the underlying thesis (dharmī). Regarding the four faults: first, burning constantly; second, loss of cause; third, loss of conditions; fourth, absence of action. As for "burning constantly": if fire exists dependent on fuel, then when the fuel is exhausted the fire is extinguished, and thus it does not burn constantly. Since you hold that fire is different from fuel, even though it is in the fuel and the fuel is exhausted, the fire will never be extinguished; therefore it would burn constantly. Second, as for "loss of cause": since there is a substance of fire distinct from fuel, fire does not depend on fuel. As for "loss of conditions": "condition" refers to human effort in tending and maintaining it to make the fire burn; now since the fire burns constantly apart from fuel, why rely on tending and maintaining it? As for "absence of action": "action" refers to function; fire takes the burning of fuel as its function; now since it burns constantly, it lacks the function of burning fuel, and hence has no action. "It would thus burn constantly" arises from the second half of the preceding verse. Since they are separated from one another, it would thus burn constantly. The second line adduces causelessness to explain "burning constantly." Furthermore, the first line means fire abides in its own fire-substance; the next line means fire does not depend on anything else. The first line of the second half explains that human effort has no efficacy with respect to fire; the next line explains that fire has no function with respect to fuel. "Lacking conditions" explains the sense of permanence, just as worldly things that do not arise from causes and conditions are therefore permanent. The fourth line explains that fire has no function. The reason for making this division is that Piṅgala, in commenting on the fourth line, creates a separate "furthermore," from which we know it differs from the preceding three lines. The reason Piṅgala divided this into two meanings is that he wished to clarify that fire has two meanings: first, the substance of fire; second, the function of fire. The preceding three lines clarify that the substance of fire is permanent; the latter line clarifies that it lacks the function of fire. Since there is a difference between substance and function, he opened them into two meanings. The prose states, "This effort visibly exists," which means those who tend fire can verify it directly from facts. From "Question:" onward introduces the second part, clarifying the refutation via two faults. This verse explains the preceding four faults. Although previously there were four faults, they stem only from the loss of two things: first, the loss of cause; second, the loss of conditions; hence there are the errors of burning constantly and absence of action. Therefore, now merely explaining the two faults completely explains the above meanings. The first half of the verse explains the loss of cause; the second half explains the loss of conditions. The first half states that since it is different from fuel and has its own fire-substance, why should it depend on fuel? Therefore it is causeless. The second half states that since it does not depend on fuel, fire burns constantly, so why rely on tending and maintaining it? The prose from "Furthermore" onward comments on the second half to explain the meaning of not requiring conditions. It also introduces the subsequent verse, which is why there is the phrase "for what reason?" From "If you maintain that when burning" onward is the third part, refuting the underlying intention. The above two verses stated the four faults and explained the four faults, and their errors are already established. But the opponent's intention is to say: these four faults do not exist. Why so? Because there are two kinds of difference: first, mutually dependent difference; second, non-mutually dependent difference. Non-mutually dependent difference has the four faults, whereas mutually dependent difference does not have the four faults. As for "when burning, it is called the combustible": this line has both contrary and conformable [senses]. The contrary: if before it burned it were already the combustible, then the combustible would not depend on the burning, nor would the burning depend on the combustible; that would be non-mutually dependent difference, and thus there would be the four faults. Now, only when burning is it the combustible; hence the combustible depends on the burning, from which we know that burning depends on the combustible. Since there is a cause, there is a condition; if there are causes and conditions, when causes and conditions are exhausted it is extinguished, and therefore it does not burn constantly. Because fire exists based on causes and conditions, fire burns fuel, without the fault of lacking function; therefore it escapes the four faults. Question: The previous two verses showed that burning has four faults; why does he now not defend burning, but defend the combustible? Answer: He adduces the combustible to defend burning. If the combustible not depending on burning is not even established, how much less could burning not depending on the combustible be established? Question: Previously four faults were clarified; why does he not defend all of them now? Answer: Now, merely by establishing the meaning of cause, the [other] three faults are naturally escaped. "At that time there is only fuel": the second half is the refutation. Even during the burning, it should still only be called fuel, not the combustible, because burning and non-burning are both different. Clarifying that burning and non-burning are ultimately different, it is merely fuel. This is the direct refutation. As for "What entity burns the combustible?": burning and non-burning are ultimately different and there is only fuel, so how could one say that only when burning is it called the combustible? Thus the upper line is the refutation, and the lower line is the reprimand. Furthermore, burning and non-burning are ultimately different, and there is only fuel; at that time what entity is burning, and what is combustible? This is to search for the two entities. Another explanation: "At that time there is only fuel" repeats the opponent's thesis. The opponent says: when burning, fuel is called the combustible; before burning, there is only fuel; hence this is now repeated. "What entity burns the combustible?": this is the start of the refutation. Adducing the fuel that is not yet burning, it refutes its being called the combustible when burning. According to your doctrine, when not burning, since there is at that time only fuel, with what entity coming to burn it is it called the combustible? This clarifies that there is no fire apart from fuel to burn fuel apart from fire so that it is called the combustible. If there were indeed fire apart from fuel to burn fuel apart from fire and call it combustible, then fire would be apart from fuel, and fuel would also be apart from fire, and they would not be mutually dependent. Since they are not mutually dependent, human effort would not be required; thus this explains the meaning of human effort being empty. It still fully incurs the four objections above. The latter interpretation is correct. The prose also interrogates their doctrine of difference: Since you have a combustible separate from burning, how can you say that only when burning is it called the combustible? If only when burning is it called the combustible, it cannot be different; if it is different, you cannot say that only when burning is it called the combustible. From "Furthermore, if different, they would not reach each other" onward is the fourth part, refuting the underlying thesis. Although above it was said that when burning it is called the combustible, this is ultimately a doctrine of difference. If it is ultimately different, then they are not mutually dependent, which reverts to the four faults; it simply expresses non-mutual dependence as not reaching each other. From "Question:" onward is the second part, the opponent's defense. The opponent maintains: precisely because they are different can there be mutual reaching. If they were not different, how could there be reaching? Question: Who established this doctrine of the difference between fuel and fire? Answer: Both Buddhist and non-Buddhist traditions assert difference in substance. The two non-Buddhist schools—first, universal creation; second, partial creation—both say fuel and fire are of different substances. The Abhidharma says: fire is the tactile sensation of heat; fuel is endowed with the four subtle elements (paramāṇus). The Tattvasiddhi says: the two dharmas of form and touch are named fire, fire being a provisional designation; fuel is also a provisional designation, yet endowed with the four subtle elements; therefore they are different. Because they are different, fire burns fuel, which is called fire reaching fuel; and fuel transmits fire, which is called fuel reaching fire. From "Answer:" onward is the third part, refuting the defense. For your man and woman, both exist beforehand without reaching each other, and you grant that afterwards there is reaching; fuel and fire do not exist beforehand without reaching each other, so how could they reach each other? If you first had fuel and fire apart without reaching each other, then after burning we would grant that they reach each other.