中觀論疏 6.31

6.31

此品六義故生，因上呵責偈故起。外人云：《無本際經》佛親說有眾生往來生死，汝何得呵云說有眾生及以諸法不得佛法味耶？二者外人因此生疑：若呵云無人法，經何故說有人法，若經說有人法，汝何故呵責耶？故請會通也。此是以論疑經、以經疑論。又有以經疑經，經中既明無本際，云何有眾生及生死？若有眾生及生死，云何無本際耶？三者自論初已來直撿即事人法無從，此之一章窮推萬化根本不得，則本末俱息，故一切無遺。四者釋諸大乘明生死畢竟空義，故說此品。如小乘人自欲除生老病死，大乘人則兼除之義，今明若見有生死則不能除生死，知生死本畢竟空方能離生死。如《智度論》云「生死人有生死，不生死人則無生死。」問：云何是生死耶？答：小乘人但有一分段，大乘說者不同。依《勝鬘經》明二種生死：有漏業因，四住為緣，感分段生死；無漏業因，無明為緣，感界外變易生死。問：無漏業云何感生死耶？答：異釋云云，今明望凡夫界內為無漏耳，望法身實相猶是有漏。取其生心動念即名為業，不了了與實相相應故云無明，此二因緣，生死未息也。成實者言有四種生死：一分段；二變易；三中間，即七地所受生死；四流來生死。依《攝大乘論》七種生死：三即三界，四方便生死、五因緣生死、六有有生死、七無有生死。今此品破大乘小乘人謂有決定生死，不得脫生死。故下文云「若使初後共是皆不成者，何故而戲論謂有生老病死。」五者欲釋經三際空，如《大品．十無盡品》發旨即云「菩薩先際不可得、中際後際皆不可得，故無菩薩。」經直唱三際不可得，未廣釋不可得，今廣欲釋之故說此品。六者欲釋十八空中無始空義，故說此品。又《大品．四攝品》云「菩薩住二空攝取眾生，一畢竟空、二無始空。」上明畢竟空，今辨無始空，故說此品。問：生死定有始、為無始耶？答：內外計者不同。外道人謂冥初自在為萬物之本、為諸法始，稱為本際。復有外道窮推諸法邊不可得，故云世間無邊，名無本際。《老子》云「無名為萬物始，有名為萬物母」，亦是有始。佛法內小乘之人但明生死有終盡，在無餘涅槃，不說生死根本之初際，名無本際。問：何故爾耶？答：佛說生死長遠，本際不可知，令小乘人深生厭離，故不明始；令速滅煩惱早入無餘，故明生死之終。又上座、僧祇同不說生死有始。大乘人云：若總論六道則不可說其始終，不知何者最初生，亦不測其最後滅故，故無有始終。若就一人則有始終，始自無明初念託空而起，終斷五住得成法身也。問：云何破之？答：生死有始即世間有邊，無始即是無邊，有邊無邊是十四難耶，大小乘經明佛不答，以是義故不應定執有始無始也。又《智度論》云「若破有始，還說無始，譬如濟人以火還著深水，以是義故二俱有過。」問：佛是一切智人，何故不答十四難耶？答：如來出世本為拔眾生老病死苦，若答十四難則增諸結，故不答之。問：有始無始二俱有過，何故十八空內有無始空，不明有始空耶？答：龍樹云「有始無始俱為邪見，而佛多破有始，明於無始。今說無始尚空，何況有始？故但說無始空，即知有始亦空。」《智度論》明有始無始雖皆邪見，而佛多說無始。不應云小乘明無始、大乘明有始。問：《涅槃》云「十地菩薩見終不見始，諸佛如來見始見終。」云何言大乘不說生死始終耶？答：《涅槃經》雖有此言，亦不分明辨生死之始。河西道朗對曇無讖翻《涅槃經》，釋此語但據十二因緣明其始終，無明細故未觀其始，老死麁故以鑒其終，佛則麁細俱明則始終並見。問：本住與本際何異？答：本住是人名，本際為法秤。又本際都是人法始起處也。

This chapter arises on account of six meanings. First, it arises due to the preceding verse of reprimand. An opponent says: "In the *Sūtra on Having No Prior Limit* (Anamatagga-sūtra), the Buddha himself declared that there are sentient beings who transmigrate through birth and death. How can you reprimand [us] by saying that one who asserts sentient beings and conditioned phenomena does not grasp the flavour of the Buddha's teaching?" Second, the opponent conceives a doubt on this basis: If you reprimand [us] by saying that there is neither person nor phenomena, why do the sūtras speak of persons and phenomena? If the sūtras speak of persons and phenomena, why do you reprimand us? Thus they request a reconciliation. This is using the treatise to doubt the sūtras, and using the sūtras to doubt the treatise. Furthermore, there is using the sūtra to doubt the sūtra itself: since the sūtra explains that there is no prior limit, how can there be sentient beings and birth and death? If there are sentient beings and birth and death, how can there be no prior limit? Third, from the beginning of the treatise up to now, directly investigating immediate empirical persons and phenomena has revealed no basis; in this one chapter, exhaustively seeking out the foundation of the myriad transformations finds nothing, so that root and branch are both laid to rest, and nothing whatever remains. Fourth, to explain the meaning set forth in the Mahāyāna sūtras that birth and death are ultimately empty, this chapter is spoken. Just as Hīnayāna practitioners seek to eliminate birth, aging, illness, and death for themselves alone, whereas Mahāyāna practitioners also encompass the elimination of them [for others], it is now explained that if one sees birth and death as existent, one cannot eliminate birth and death; only by knowing that birth and death are originally ultimately empty can one leave birth and death behind. As the *Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa* says: "To one subject to birth and death there is birth and death; to one not subject to birth and death there is no birth and death." Question: What is birth and death? Answer: Hīnayāna practitioners have only the one [kind], [sāṃsāric] portioned [existence] (pariccheda-saṃsāra). Mahāyāna explanations differ. According to the *Śrīmālādevī-sūtra*, two kinds of birth and death are explained: contaminated karmic causes, with the four entrenchments (āsrava) as conditions, bring about portioned birth and death; uncontaminated karmic causes, with ignorance as condition, bring about transformation birth and death (pariṇāmikīcyuti) beyond the [three] realms. Question: How can uncontaminated karma bring about birth and death? Answer: Various explanations are offered; we now explain that it is uncontaminated only from the standpoint of the realm of ordinary worldlings within the three realms; from the standpoint of the true reality of the dharmakāya, it is still contaminated. Taking the arising of thought and movement of mind as karma, and not being clearly aligned with true reality, it is called ignorance; through these two causes and conditions, birth and death have not yet ceased. The *Tattvasiddhi-śāstra* states that there are four kinds of birth and death: (1) portioned; (2) transformation; (3) intermediate, namely the birth and death undergone on the seventh bhūmi; and (4) continuous-flux birth and death. According to the *Mahāyānasaṃgraha*, there are seven kinds of birth and death: three are those of the three realms, (4) expedient birth and death, (5) conditioned birth and death, (6) existent-existence birth and death, and (7) non-existent birth and death. Now, this chapter refutes both Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna practitioners who suppose that there is determinate birth and death, [showing that] they cannot thereby escape birth and death. Hence the text below states: "If the first and the last together are both unestablished, why engage in prapañca, asserting that there are birth, aging, illness, and death?" Fifth, to explain the emptiness of the three temporal periods (adhvan) in the sūtras: as the Chapter on the Ten Inexhaustibles in the *Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā-prajñāpāramitā-sūtra* states at the outset, "A bodhisattva's past limit cannot be apprehended; the middle limit and future limit likewise cannot be apprehended; therefore there is no bodhisattva." The sūtra merely proclaimed that the three limits cannot be apprehended, but did not broadly elucidate why they cannot be apprehended; now wishing to elucidate it broadly, this chapter is spoken. Sixth, to explain the meaning of the emptiness of that which is without beginning among the eighteen kinds of emptiness, this chapter is spoken. Furthermore, the Chapter on the Four Means of Embracing in the *Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā* states: "The bodhisattva abides in two emptinesses to embrace sentient beings: first, ultimate emptiness; second, beginningless emptiness." Above, ultimate emptiness was explained; now beginningless emptiness is examined; hence this chapter is spoken. Question: Does birth and death definitely have a beginning, or is it beginningless? Answer: Internal and external adherents assert differently. Non-Buddhists hold that primordial darkness (pradhāna) or Īśvara is the root of myriad things and the beginning of all phenomena, calling it the prior limit. Other non-Buddhists exhaustively investigate phenomena and find an edge to be unapprehendable, and so say that the world is limitless, calling it having no prior limit. *Laozi* says: "The nameless is the beginning of heaven and earth; the named is the mother of the myriad things"; this too posits a beginning. Within the Buddha's teaching, Hīnayāna practitioners only explain that birth and death have an end and cessation in nirvāṇa without remainder, but do not speak of the first limit at the root of birth and death, calling it without a prior limit. Question: Why is that so? Answer: The Buddha said that birth and death are long and vast, and that the prior limit is unknowable, to cause Hīnayāna practitioners to generate deep aversion and detachment; therefore he did not explain a beginning; and to cause them swiftly to extinguish afflictions and quickly enter [nirvāṇa] without remainder, he explained the end of birth and death. Furthermore, both the Sthavira and the Mahāsāṃghika agree in not asserting that birth and death have a beginning. Mahāyāna adherents say: If spoken of collectively regarding the six destinies, their beginning and end cannot be stated, because one cannot know which is born first, nor can one measure which is extinguished last; therefore there is no beginning or end. If considered in terms of a single person, there is a beginning and an end: beginning when the first thought of ignorance arises dependent on emptiness, and ending when the five entrenchments are severed and one attains the dharmakāya. Question: How is this refuted? Answer: If birth and death have a beginning, then the world has an end (antavān); if they have no beginning, then it has no end (anantavān). Are not "finite" and "infinite" among the fourteen unanswerable questions (avyākṛta)? Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna sūtras explain that the Buddha did not answer them; on account of this meaning, one should not determinately cling to having a beginning or having no beginning. Furthermore, the *Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa* says: "If, having refuted a beginning, one then asserts beginninglessness, it is like rescuing a person from fire only to throw them into deep water; therefore both are erroneous." Question: The Buddha is an omniscient person; why did he not answer the fourteen unanswerable questions? Answer: The Tathāgata appeared in the world originally to pull sentient beings out of the suffering of aging, illness, and death; if he had answered the fourteen unanswerable questions, it would only have increased their fetters; therefore he did not answer them. Question: If both having a beginning and being beginningless are erroneous, why is there the emptiness of that which is without beginning among the eighteen emptinesses, but no explanation of the emptiness of that which has a beginning? Answer: Nāgārjuna says: "Both having a beginning and being without beginning are wrong views; but the Buddha mostly refuted having a beginning and explained beginninglessness. Now, if it is explained that even beginninglessness is empty, how much more so having a beginning? Therefore, merely by stating the emptiness of beginninglessness, one knows that having a beginning is also empty." The *Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa* explains that although having a beginning and being without beginning are both wrong views, the Buddha mostly spoke of beginninglessness. One should not say that the Hīnayāna explains beginninglessness while the Mahāyāna explains having a beginning. Question: The *Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra* says: "Bodhisattvas on the tenth bhūmi see the end but do not see the beginning; the Buddhas, Tathāgatas, see both the beginning and the end." How can you say that the Mahāyāna does not speak of a beginning and end to birth and death? Answer: Although the *Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra* has this statement, it also does not clearly define a beginning of birth and death. When Daolang of Hexi worked with Dharmakṣema translating the *Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra*, he explained that this statement merely relies on the twelve links of dependent origination to elucidate their beginning and end: because ignorance is subtle, its beginning is not yet perceived; because aging and death are coarse, their end is contemplated; the Buddha clearly perceives both the coarse and the subtle, and so sees both beginning and end. Question: What is the difference between prior entity (pūrvam avasthita) and prior limit (pūrvakoṭi)? Answer: Prior entity is the name of a person; prior limit is the designation for phenomena. Furthermore, the prior limit refers in general to the point of initial arising of both persons and phenomena.