中觀論疏 6.32

6.32

品開為二：前問、次答。問有二意：初引經、次問論主。問：品稱破本際，云何乃引《無本際經》？答：有二義。一云外人初立有本際，佛說《無本際經》破之，以不受此言，故問論主。二者外人疑於佛經言無本際，云何既說有生及以死，應有本際。今申經無本際，破外人謂有本際，故云破本際品也。「是中說有眾生有生死」，第二外人引佛經難論主：經說有眾生者，有人也；有生死者，有法也。「以何因緣而作是說」者，疑經有眾生、有生死，何故無本際？二難論主上品末呵責之言，經既說有人法，何得呵云計有人法不得佛法味耶？若見有人法不得佛法味者，何因緣故經說有八法耶？「答曰」，為二：初破無生死本際、第二末後兩偈例破無一切法本際。初為二：一破無生死始終中間；「是故於此中」下，第二破無生死。就初又二：前偈明無始終、次半偈辨無中間。上半明無始、下半辨無終。此則是申佛經明無始，以破外人計生死有始，即是破本際。問：小乘人亦言生死無始，破於有始與論主何異？答：論主解說無始，有四意：一者小乘人言有生死，長遠始不可知。論主申佛意，佛經說無始者，非是有生死長遠故無始，明生死始不可得，即是生死無有根本。二者佛意明無始者，即是兩捨。明其無始者，辨其無有始，非謂有無始，故始與無始五句不行，即令悟入實相。三者佛經明無始，即無有終亦無中間，如樹無根亦無枝葉。以無始及中間故無生死，亦無終故無涅槃，即顯六道本不生、今不滅，不生死、不涅槃，而大小乘人不解此意。四者復得說生死長遠，令大小乘起厭離、懃習觀行，斷諸煩惱也。問：云何是始終？答：大乘人云無明初品為生死之始，金剛心為生死之終。然復有生死之始是涅槃之終、涅槃之始為生死之終，生死之終為大涅槃之始、涅槃之始為生死之終。生死之始為涅槃之終者，據迷情辨之。載起一念有所得心則是生死之始，而正觀不現，故是涅槃終。若得一念正觀，則是涅槃之始，為生死之終。今總問之：為待終故言始、為不待耶？若待終為始者，無明初念未有金剛心，何所待耶？若初念有金剛心，則始終便並，云何成始終耶？又金剛心無復無明初品，何所待耶？若有初品則無金剛心，令誰待耶？是故當知無有始終也。第二半偈破中間易知，即是破中義。本對偏病，是故有中；若無二邊，何中可得？如是生死涅槃、真之與妄義皆例然。然佛直唱無始一言，約今論文乃破四執，既言無始即破始也。二既言無始，始無故言無始，非謂有無始，即破無始見。三者既始無，而無始亦無，即無終，破於終見。四者二分既無，亦無中間往來，破中間見。既破四見，即令人悟入實相，得解脫生死也。龍樹申佛說無始意如此，而今大小乘學人並不識佛說無始意，豈可與論主諍耶？《像法決疑經》云「末世法師如文取義，違背實相。」即其事也。「是故於此中」下，第二段破生死。所以破生死，凡有二意：一總釋無始終中間義。若有生死，可有始終中間；竟無生死，何有始終？二正為釋無中間義。《涅槃經》云「生死本際凡有二種：一者無明、二者有愛。是二中間則有生老病死。」故今三門求生死不得，釋無中間也。

The chapter is divided into two parts: first the question, and next the answer. The question has two points: first, citing the sūtra; next, questioning the author of the treatise. Question: The chapter is titled "Refuting the Prior Limit"; why does it cite the Sūtra on Having No Prior Limit? Answer: There are two meanings. First, the outsider initially posited that there is a prior limit, and the Buddha preached the Sūtra on Having No Prior Limit to refute it; because [the outsider] does not accept this statement, he questions the author of the treatise. Second, the outsider doubts the Buddha's sūtra saying there is no prior limit, [thinking:] how is it that having already stated that there are birth and death, there must be a prior limit? Now, [the author] elucidates the sūtra's [teaching of] no prior limit to refute the outsider's claim that there is a prior limit; hence it is called the chapter on "Refuting the Prior Limit." "In this it is said that there are sentient beings and there is birth-and-death": in the second part, the outsider cites the Buddha's sūtra to challenge the author of the treatise: when the sūtra says there are sentient beings, there are persons; when it says there is birth-and-death, there are dharmas. "For what reason was this spoken?": this doubts the sūtra—if there are sentient beings and there is birth-and-death, why is there no prior limit? Second, it challenges the author of the treatise regarding his words of rebuke at the end of the previous chapter: since the sūtra has already spoken of persons and dharmas, how can you rebuke [others], saying that positing persons and dharmas fails to attain the flavor of the Buddha's Dharma? If seeing persons and dharmas means failing to attain the flavor of the Buddha's Dharma, for what reason did the sūtra speak of the eight dharmas? "Answer:", divided into two: first, refuting [the view] that there is a prior limit to birth-and-death; second, the final two verses analogously refute [the view] that there is a prior limit to all dharmas. The first has two parts: one refutes [the existence of] a beginning, an end, or a middle of birth-and-death; from "Therefore, herein" onward, the second refutes [the existence of] birth-and-death itself. Within the first, there are again two: the preceding verse clarifies that there is neither beginning nor end; the subsequent half-verse explains that there is no middle. The first half clarifies that there is no beginning; the second half explains that there is no end. This then elucidates the Buddha's sūtra clarifying that there is no beginning in order to refute the outsider's positing that birth-and-death has a beginning; that is, it refutes the prior limit. Question: Hīnayāna adherents also say that birth-and-death has no beginning; how does their refutation of having a beginning differ from that of the author of the treatise? Answer: The author of the treatise explains "having no beginning" with four meanings: First, Hīnayāna adherents say that birth-and-death exists, and its vast and remote beginning cannot be known. The author of the treatise elucidates the Buddha's intention: when the Buddha's sūtras speak of "having no beginning," it is not because birth-and-death is vast and remote that it has no beginning; it clarifies that a beginning to birth-and-death is unfindable, which means birth-and-death has no root or basis. Second, the Buddha's intention in clarifying "having no beginning" is twofold abandonment. Clarifying that it has no beginning explains that it has no beginning, not that there is an existent "beginninglessness"; thus neither beginning nor beginninglessness can function across the five propositions, thereby causing one to awaken to and enter the real mark. Third, when the Buddha's sūtra clarifies having no beginning, there is neither an end nor a middle, just as a tree without roots also has no branches or leaves. Because there is neither beginning nor middle, there is no birth-and-death; and because there is no end, there is no nirvāṇa. This reveals that the six destinies originally do not arise and at present do not perish, neither birth-and-death nor nirvāṇa; yet practitioners of the Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna fail to understand this intention. Fourth, one may also speak of birth-and-death as vast and remote to cause followers of the Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna to give rise to revulsion, diligently cultivate contemplative practice, and sever all afflictions. Question: What are the beginning and the end? Answer: Mahāyāna adherents say that the initial grade of ignorance is the beginning of birth-and-death, and the diamond-like mind (vajracitta) is the end of birth-and-death. However, there is also the case where the beginning of birth-and-death is the end of nirvāṇa, the beginning of nirvāṇa is the end of birth-and-death, the end of birth-and-death is the beginning of great nirvāṇa, and the beginning of nirvāṇa is the end of birth-and-death. That the beginning of birth-and-death is the end of nirvāṇa is explained based on deluded sentiments: as soon as a single thought of a grasping mind arises, that is the beginning of birth-and-death, and correct contemplation does not manifest, which is therefore the end of nirvāṇa. If one attains a single thought of correct contemplation, that is the beginning of nirvāṇa and the end of birth-and-death. Now we generally examine it: is "beginning" spoken in dependence on "end", or without dependence? If it is a beginning in dependence on an end, at the first thought of ignorance the diamond-like mind does not yet exist; what does it depend upon? If at the first thought there is the diamond-like mind, then the beginning and the end would be simultaneous; how could beginning and end be established? Furthermore, in the diamond-like mind there is no longer an initial grade of ignorance; what does it depend upon? If there is the initial grade, there is no diamond-like mind; who is made to depend on whom? Therefore, one should know that there is neither beginning nor end. The second half-verse refuting the middle is easy to understand; that is, it refutes the meaning of the "middle." Originally, the middle exists in opposition to biased errors; if there are no two extremes, what middle could be found? The same applies by analogy to birth-and-death and nirvāṇa, truth and delusion. When the Buddha simply uttered the single phrase "having no beginning," according to the present treatise's text it refutes four attachments: since he says "no beginning," it refutes a beginning. Second, since he says "no beginning," because a beginning does not exist he says "no beginning," not that there is an existent beginninglessness; this refutes the view of beginninglessness. Third, since a beginning does not exist and beginninglessness also does not exist, then there is no end; this refutes the view of an end. Fourth, since neither of the two parts exists, there is also no coming and going in between; this refutes the view of a middle. Having refuted these four views, it causes one to awaken to and enter the real mark and attain liberation from birth-and-death. Nāgārjuna's elucidation of the Buddha's intention in speaking of having no beginning is like this; yet nowadays students of the Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna do not recognize the Buddha's intention in speaking of having no beginning. How could they argue with the author of the treatise? The Sūtra on Resolving Doubts in the Semblance Dharma says: "Dharma masters in the final age grasp meanings according to the letter, contrary to the real mark." This is precisely the case. From "Therefore, herein" onward is the second section, refuting birth-and-death. The refutation of birth-and-death has two purposes in all: first, to summarize and explain the meaning of having no beginning, end, or middle. If there were birth-and-death, there could be a beginning, an end, and a middle; but ultimately there is no birth-and-death, so how could there be a beginning or an end? Second, it specifically explains the meaning of having no middle. The Nirvāṇa Sūtra says: "The prior limits of birth-and-death are two in all: first, ignorance; second, craving for existence. Between these two, there are birth, aging, illness, and death." Therefore, now seeking birth-and-death through the three gates fails to find it, explaining that there is no middle.