中觀論疏 6.33

6.33

就文為三：初半偈總標三種無、次釋三無、後結三無呵外說有也。次三偈釋三無，為二：初二偈釋生死非前後義、次一偈釋生死非一時義。初偈破前生後死，上半牒、下半破。問：云何為生死？答：就四有明義，一本有、二死有、三中有、四生有。本有者，百年之陰也。死有，一剎那死陰也。中有者，中陰也。生有者，一剎那受正生也。二就十二因緣明生死者，識支一剎那為生，第二剎那便屬老死也。識支是實生，坐草初出胎是世俗生。所以初破前生後死者，蓋是物之常理。如成實者云：無明初念託空而起。此但是生，爾前未有死。《涅槃經》云「功德天喻生，生秤為姊，故生在前。黑闇女譬死，死喻於妹，死在後故也。」「不老死有生」者，法應先老死而後生，今不老死云何有生耶？「不生有老死」者，若老死不因生有，亦此生之後應無老死。又得是並，若不老死而有於生，亦應不生而有老死也。次偈上半牒、下半破。初句明「無因」者，生是死因故也。第二句直呵之，既本來不生，何有老死？第三偈破一時，上半牒而總非、下半作無因果義。無因有二：一無兩法可以為因，如生時有死，死時於生則無生可為死因；死亦爾。此是理奪明無因。二縱生死一時並，如牛二角不相因。長行具二無因，初文是兩無為無因；「從若一時」下，縱有，明有不須相因也。「若使初後共」下，第三一偈結三無，而呵外謂有。上半結無、下半呵有。問：大小乘經俱明有生老死，論主何故呵之耶？答：論主申佛意。佛意說生老死者，如〈三相品〉「諸賢聖欲止其顛倒故說，語言雖同其心則異。」佛是不言有生死故生死，令其因生死悟不生死。而惑者封執定有生死，故不識佛意，所以呵之。「復次」下，第二兩偈例破諸法，為二：初偈引法、次偈破法。破法二意：一明無始終中間、二例不得前後一時也。人謂因前果後，既未有果，前是誰因？人前法後等，亦作此破也。

Regarding the text, there are three parts: first, a half-verse generally indicating the three kinds of non-existence; next, explaining the three kinds of non-existence; and finally, concluding the three kinds of non-existence and rebuking the outsider for claiming they exist. The subsequent three verses explain the three kinds of non-existence, divided into two: the first two verses explain the meaning that birth-and-death are not sequential; the next verse explains the meaning that birth-and-death are not simultaneous. The first verse refutes birth being prior and death subsequent; the first half cites [the claim], and the second half refutes it. Question: What are birth and death? Answer: Explaining their meaning in terms of the four states of existence (caturbhava): first, basic existence (mūlabhava); second, death existence (maraṇabhava); third, intermediate existence (antarābhava); and fourth, birth existence (upapattibhava). Basic existence is the aggregates of a hundred years. Death existence is the aggregate of death in a single moment (kṣaṇa). Intermediate existence is the intermediate aggregate. Birth existence is taking up proper birth in a single moment. Second, explaining birth-and-death in terms of the twelve links of dependent origination: the consciousness link in a single moment is birth; in the second moment, it already belongs to aging-and-death. The consciousness link is real birth; sitting on the straw [mat] and first emerging from the womb is conventional birth. The reason birth is first refuted as prior and death as subsequent is that this is the ordinary principle of things. As the Tattvasiddhi-śāstra says: the first thought of ignorance arises dependent on emptiness. This is merely birth, and prior to it there was no death. The Nirvāṇa Sūtra says: "Śrī Mahādevī is an analogy for birth; birth weighs as the elder sister, so birth is in front. The Dark Maiden is an analogy for death; death is compared to the younger sister, because death is behind." "Without aging-and-death there is birth": the principle dictates that there should first be aging-and-death and afterward birth; now without aging-and-death, how can there be birth? "Without birth there is aging-and-death": if aging-and-death does not exist due to birth, then after this birth there should also be no aging-and-death. Furthermore, these can be set in parallel: if there is birth without aging-and-death, there should also be aging-and-death without birth. In the next verse, the first half cites [the claim] and the second half refutes it. The first line clarifies "without cause," because birth is the cause of death. The second line directly rebukes it: since originally there is no birth, how can there be aging-and-death? The third verse refutes simultaneity; the first half cites and generally negates it, while the second half takes the meaning of having no cause and effect. Having no cause has two aspects: first, there are not two dharmas that can serve as causes; if at the time of birth there is death, then at the time of death, regarding birth, there is no birth that can serve as the cause of death; death is also like this. This is clarifying causelessness through reasoned deduction. Second, even granting that birth and death occur simultaneously together, like the two horns of an ox, they do not cause one another. The prose contains both kinds of causelessness: the first passage shows causelessness through the non-existence of both; from "If they are simultaneous" onward, granting that they exist, it clarifies that existing [simultaneously] they do not need to cause each other. From "If earlier, later, and together" onward, the third verse concludes the three kinds of non-existence and rebukes the outsider for positing existence. The first half concludes non-existence; the second half rebukes positing existence. Question: Both Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna sūtras clearly state that there are birth, aging, and death; why does the author of the treatise rebuke this? Answer: The author of the treatise elucidates the Buddha's intention. The Buddha's intention in speaking of birth, aging, and death is as stated in the "Chapter on the Three Characteristics": "The worthy and noble ones, wishing to stop their inversions, therefore spoke; although the words are the same, their intention is different." The Buddha did not say that there is birth-and-death because birth-and-death exists; he caused them, through birth-and-death, to awaken to non-birth-and-death. Yet the confused stubbornly cling to the definitive existence of birth-and-death, failing to recognize the Buddha's intention; therefore, he rebukes them. From "Furthermore" onward, the second pair of verses analogously refutes all dharmas, divided into two: the first verse adduces the dharmas; the next verse refutes the dharmas. Refuting dharmas has two meanings: first, clarifying that there is no beginning, end, or middle; second, by analogy, they can neither be sequential nor simultaneous. People claim that the cause is prior and the effect is subsequent; but since the effect does not yet exist, of what is the prior a cause? The person being prior and dharmas subsequent, and so forth, are also refuted in this way.