中觀論疏 6.4

6.4

品為二：第一長行序破立之由、第二偈本正明破也。初中前問、次答。問者是不受前破而更立，答即申前破不受後立。立中云「現有作有作者有所用作法」者，上來橫窮竪破事無不周，外人無辭可救，但舉眼現所見事以問：若都畢竟空者，無現事可見；既有現事可見，云何畢竟空？即不信前破，故更立也。又如人習無生觀力淺，無生觀恒不現前，而顛倒事恒現，故舉現事問也。作是業，三條：一能作來果、二為人所作、三體是起作，故名為作也。作者亦三義：一體是起作法、二作前果、三能作於業，故名作者。所用作法有二：一內法，謂手脚根能有所作，故名所用；二外校具，如人手書要須用筆，故筆是所用法也。此二是因，書字即是果。答申前破不受後立者，一欲顯前一周破已竟、二欲以前門破後、三顯鈍根無而立有。就答中有二：初奪、次縱。奪作作者，已入有為無為中破者。外道常遍我入無為中破，無常之我入有為中破。又外道具常身作身，內道有生死有為人、法佛地無為人法，並入此二門破也。「汝著心深」下，第二縱破。據法則已無、約倒情謂有，是故破之。十二偈為二：初十一偈破作作者，即是破因中人法；次一偈破受受者，破果中人法，因果人法既無則一切空矣。又初破作作者，破人法之用；後破受受者，破人法之體，下云「受名五陰」，陰是法體也，體用若傾則一切空矣。破作作者中有二：初破有人法見、次破無人法見。就破人法中，義五、文四。義五者，一人法俱有無相作義、二人法俱無亦無相作、三半有半無亦無相作、四一有一無亦無相作、五人一法三人三法一亦無相作。以此五門窮檢一切，造作義畢竟無縱，即釋經中無作門也；又是破外人一切造作義盡矣。文四者，初實有實無門、二半有半無門、三一有一無門、四一三門。初一門有六偈，又開為二：前有一偈標章門、次有五偈釋章門。初偈上半明人法俱有無作義、下半人法俱無亦無作義。上半初句明定有人，即僧佉等四外道，佛法犢子、譬喻、成實師假有體及假有用等也；次句標破，既決定有人，人不作決定業。定業內外通有，而正是薩婆多未來本有善惡等業，竟不復須人造作也。又今不論未來，直明實有人體業體無有作義。下半初句牒無人、次標破。問：此為是執無有人、為計無為人耶？答非是執無有人，但言人體是無，能起作業。問：誰計人體是無而作業耶？答：若執人是有為，名之為有；計人是無為，秤之為無。又假有體是執人有，假無體是計人無。又犢子計人有，薩婆多明人無，但有假名而秤人作於業也。又上半不因業有人、不因人有業，故無相作；下半因業有人、因人有業，則人業皆無體，則無人業故無相作。問：何以知計有是人、計無是人耶？答：〈顛倒品〉云「我法以有無，是事終不成。」故知計人是有無也。第二偈以去是第二釋章門，為三：初一偈釋章門、次一偈顯人法俱有則墮無因過、第三三偈傳釋無因過。初偈上半破定有業、下半破定有人。定有業體有二過：若實有業體，本來已有，不得言本未作今始作，則世間唯有故業無新業也；二者本來已有，不須人起，故復有離人過也。下半亦二：一者既本來有作者，不應更有造作；二既本來已有，不須作業成人。須精細取文意，有一豪業體則業有二過、有一豪人體人有二過。何者？為一豪人體，則本來已有，不假緣合而成，亦不假緣離而滅，故此人是常。則常已作竟，何須更作？復何須假業而成耶？業二過亦爾。

The chapter has two parts: first, the prose introduction on the grounds for refuting and establishing; second, the root verses that directly explain the refutation. Within the first, there is first an objection and then a reply. The objection does not accept the earlier refutation and re-establishes [the position]; the reply articulates the earlier refutation and does not accept the later establishment. In the establishing, where it says "There are actually action, an agent, and the instruments of action,—" as the previous [chapters] have exhaustively and vertically refuted everything without omission, the outsider has no words with which to defend himself, and merely cites the things actually seen before one's eyes to ask: If everything is ultimately empty, there would be no actual things to be seen; since there are actual things to be seen, how can it be ultimately empty? Thus, not believing the earlier refutation, he re-establishes it. Furthermore, it is like a person whose power of practicing the contemplation of non-arising is shallow: the contemplation of non-arising never manifests, while inverted phenomena constantly manifest; hence he asks by citing actual things. "Action" is karma, with three aspects: first, it can produce future results; second, it is performed by a person; third, its substance is an arising activity; hence it is called "action." "Agent" also has three meanings: first, its substance is the phenomenon of initiating activity; second, it produces previous results; third, it can perform karma; hence it is called "agent." The "instruments of action" are of two kinds: first, internal phenomena, meaning that sense faculties such as hands and feet can perform actions, hence they are called "instruments"; second, external tools, as when a person writes by hand he must use a brush, so the brush is the phenomenon used as an instrument. These two are causes, and the written characters are the result. The reply articulates the earlier refutation and does not accept the later establishment: first, it intends to show that the first cycle of refutation was already finished; second, it intends to refute the latter by means of the earlier approach; third, it shows that the dull-witted establish existence where there is none. Within the reply there are two parts: first, deprivation; second, concession. Depriving action and agent of existence has already been subsumed under the refutations of the conditioned and unconditioned. The non-Buddhists' permanent, omnipresent self was refuted under the unconditioned; the impermanent self was refuted under the conditioned. Furthermore, non-Buddhists posit a permanent body and an acting body; the inner teaching posits a conditioned person of birth-and-death and unconditioned persons and phenomena on the Buddha-ground: both are subsumed and refuted under these two gates. From "Your attachment of mind is deep" onward is the second, refutation by concession. According to phenomena, they are already non-existent; regarding inverted passions, they are deemed to exist; therefore, they are refuted. The twelve verses have two parts: first, eleven verses refute action and agent, which is refuting the person and phenomena in the cause; next, one verse refutes the experience and experiencer, refuting the person and phenomena in the effect. Since the person and phenomena of cause and effect are non-existent, everything is empty. Furthermore, first refuting action and agent refutes the function of person and phenomena; later refuting experience and experiencer refutes the substance of person and phenomena. Below it says: "Experience is called the five aggregates"; the aggregates are the substance of phenomena. If substance and function both collapse, everything is empty. Within the refutation of action and agent, there are two parts: first, refuting the view that person and phenomena exist; next, refuting the view that person and phenomena do not exist. Within refuting [the view of] person and phenomena, there are five meanings and four textual divisions. The five meanings are: 1. person and phenomena both exist, having no mutually active meaning; 2. person and phenomena both do not exist, also having no mutually active meaning; 3. half-existent and half-non-existent also having no mutually active meaning; 4. one existent and one non-existent also having no mutually active meaning; 5. person being one and phenomena three, or person being three and phenomena one, also having no mutually active meaning. Examining and investigating everything exhaustively through these five gates, the meaning of purposeful activity is ultimately without concession, which explains the gate of non-action in the sūtras; moreover, it thoroughly refutes all the outsiders' notions of purposeful activity. The four textual divisions are: 1. the gate of real existence and real non-existence; 2. the gate of half-existence and half-non-existence; 3. the gate of one-existence and one-non-existence; 4. the gate of one and three. The first gate has six verses, which again open into two: first, one verse states the main thesis; next, five verses explain the main thesis. The first half of the first verse clarifies that person and phenomena both existing has no meaning of action; the second half clarifies that person and phenomena both not existing also has no meaning of action. The first line of the first half clarifies that there is definitely a person, which refers to the four non-Buddhist traditions such as the Sāṃkhya, and within the Buddha's Dharma, the provisional substance and provisional function of the Vātsīputrīyas, Sautrāntikas, and Tattvasiddhi masters; the second line sets out the refutation: since there is definitely a person, the person does not perform definite karma. Definite karma is shared across internal and external [teachings], but precisely refers to the Sarvāstivādins' inherently existing good and evil karma in the future, which ultimately does not require a person to produce it. Furthermore, not discussing the future now, it directly clarifies that a real person's substance and karma's substance have no meaning of action. In the second half, the first line mentions the absence of a person, and the next sets out the refutation. Question: Does this cling to there being no person, or does it posit an unconditioned person? Answer: It does not cling to there being no person, but only says that the substance of the person is non-existent, yet it can initiate and perform karma. Question: Who posits that the substance of the person is non-existent yet performs karma? Answer: If one clings to the person as conditioned, one calls it existent; if one posits the person as unconditioned, one weighs it as non-existent. Furthermore, provisional existence of substance is clinging to the person as existent; provisional non-existence of substance is positing the person as non-existent. Furthermore, the Vātsīputrīyas posit the person as existent; the Sarvāstivādins clarify that the person is non-existent, having only a provisional name, yet they state that the person performs karma. Furthermore, in the first half, the person is not dependent on karma and karma is not dependent on the person, hence there is no mutual action; in the second half, the person is dependent on karma and karma is dependent on the person, so person and karma are both without substance, and being without person and karma, there is no mutual action. Question: How do we know that positing existence is the person and positing non-existence is the person? Answer: The chapter "Errors" says: "Whether self and phenomena are existent or non-existent, this can never be established." Hence we know that positing a person is [positing] existence or non-existence. From the second verse onward is the second part, explaining the main thesis, which has three parts: first, one verse explains the main thesis; next, one verse reveals that person and phenomena both existing falls into the fault of causelessness; third, three verses successively explain the fault of causelessness. The first half of the first verse refutes definitely existent karma; the second half refutes a definitely existent person. A definitely existent substance of karma has two faults: if the substance of karma really exists, it already exists fundamentally, and one cannot say that originally unmade it is only now made, which would mean that in the world there is only old karma and no new karma; second, since it already exists fundamentally, it does not require a person to initiate it, hence there is also the fault of being separate from a person. The second half also has two faults: first, since an agent already exists fundamentally, there should not be further purposeful activity; second, since it already exists fundamentally, it does not require performing karma to complete the person. One must finely grasp the meaning of the text: if there is even a hair's breadth of karma-substance, then karma has two faults; if there is even a hair's breadth of person-substance, the person has two faults. Why? Because if there is a hair's breadth of person-substance, it already exists fundamentally, neither relying on the coming together of conditions to be formed, nor relying on the separation of conditions to be destroyed, hence this person is permanent. Then, being permanent and already completed, why would it need to act further? And why would it need to rely on karma to be formed? The two faults of karma are also like this.