中觀論疏 6.4

6.4

The chapter has two parts: first, the prose introduction on the grounds for refuting and establishing; second, the root verses that directly explain the refutation. Within the first, there is first an objection and then a reply. The objection does not accept the earlier refutation and re-establishes [the position]; the reply articulates the earlier refutation and does not accept the later establishment. In the establishing, where it says "There are actually action, an agent, and the instruments of action,—" as the previous [chapters] have exhaustively and vertically refuted everything without omission, the outsider has no words with which to defend himself, and merely cites the things actually seen before one's eyes to ask: If everything is ultimately empty, there would be no actual things to be seen; since there are actual things to be seen, how can it be ultimately empty? Thus, not believing the earlier refutation, he re-establishes it. Furthermore, it is like a person whose power of practicing the contemplation of non-arising is shallow: the contemplation of non-arising never manifests, while inverted phenomena constantly manifest; hence he asks by citing actual things. "Action" is karma, with three aspects: first, it can produce future results; second, it is performed by a person; third, its substance is an arising activity; hence it is called "action." "Agent" also has three meanings: first, its substance is the phenomenon of initiating activity; second, it produces previous results; third, it can perform karma; hence it is called "agent." The "instruments of action" are of two kinds: first, internal phenomena, meaning that sense faculties such as hands and feet can perform actions, hence they are called "instruments"; second, external tools, as when a person writes by hand he must use a brush, so the brush is the phenomenon used as an instrument. These two are causes, and the written characters are the result. The reply articulates the earlier refutation and does not accept the later establishment: first, it intends to show that the first cycle of refutation was already finished; second, it intends to refute the latter by means of the earlier approach; third, it shows that the dull-witted establish existence where there is none. Within the reply there are two parts: first, deprivation; second, concession. Depriving action and agent of existence has already been subsumed under the refutations of the conditioned and unconditioned. The non-Buddhists' permanent, omnipresent self was refuted under the unconditioned; the impermanent self was refuted under the conditioned. Furthermore, non-Buddhists posit a permanent body and an acting body; the inner teaching posits a conditioned person of birth-and-death and unconditioned persons and phenomena on the Buddha-ground: both are subsumed and refuted under these two gates. From "Your attachment of mind is deep" onward is the second, refutation by concession. According to phenomena, they are already non-existent; regarding inverted passions, they are deemed to exist; therefore, they are refuted. The twelve verses have two parts: first, eleven verses refute action and agent, which is refuting the person and phenomena in the cause; next, one verse refutes the experience and experiencer, refuting the person and phenomena in the effect. Since the person and phenomena of cause and effect are non-existent, everything is empty. Furthermore, first refuting action and agent refutes the function of person and phenomena; later refuting experience and experiencer refutes the substance of person and phenomena. Below it says: "Experience is called the five aggregates"; the aggregates are the substance of phenomena. If substance and function both collapse, everything is empty. Within the refutation of action and agent, there are two parts: first, refuting the view that person and phenomena exist; next, refuting the view that person and phenomena do not exist. Within refuting [the view of] person and phenomena, there are five meanings and four textual divisions. The five meanings are: 1. person and phenomena both exist, having no mutually active meaning; 2. person and phenomena both do not exist, also having no mutually active meaning; 3. half-existent and half-non-existent also having no mutually active meaning; 4. one existent and one non-existent also having no mutually active meaning; 5. person being one and phenomena three, or person being three and phenomena one, also having no mutually active meaning. Examining and investigating everything exhaustively through these five gates, the meaning of purposeful activity is ultimately without concession, which explains the gate of non-action in the sūtras; moreover, it thoroughly refutes all the outsiders' notions of purposeful activity. The four textual divisions are: 1. the gate of real existence and real non-existence; 2. the gate of half-existence and half-non-existence; 3. the gate of one-existence and one-non-existence; 4. the gate of one and three. The first gate has six verses, which again open into two: first, one verse states the main thesis; next, five verses explain the main thesis. The first half of the first verse clarifies that person and phenomena both existing has no meaning of action; the second half clarifies that person and phenomena both not existing also has no meaning of action. The first line of the first half clarifies that there is definitely a person, which refers to the four non-Buddhist traditions such as the Sāṃkhya, and within the Buddha's Dharma, the provisional substance and provisional function of the Vātsīputrīyas, Sautrāntikas, and Tattvasiddhi masters; the second line sets out the refutation: since there is definitely a person, the person does not perform definite karma. Definite karma is shared across internal and external [teachings], but precisely refers to the Sarvāstivādins' inherently existing good and evil karma in the future, which ultimately does not require a person to produce it. Furthermore, not discussing the future now, it directly clarifies that a real person's substance and karma's substance have no meaning of action. In the second half, the first line mentions the absence of a person, and the next sets out the refutation. Question: Does this cling to there being no person, or does it posit an unconditioned person? Answer: It does not cling to there being no person, but only says that the substance of the person is non-existent, yet it can initiate and perform karma. Question: Who posits that the substance of the person is non-existent yet performs karma? Answer: If one clings to the person as conditioned, one calls it existent; if one posits the person as unconditioned, one weighs it as non-existent. Furthermore, provisional existence of substance is clinging to the person as existent; provisional non-existence of substance is positing the person as non-existent. Furthermore, the Vātsīputrīyas posit the person as existent; the Sarvāstivādins clarify that the person is non-existent, having only a provisional name, yet they state that the person performs karma. Furthermore, in the first half, the person is not dependent on karma and karma is not dependent on the person, hence there is no mutual action; in the second half, the person is dependent on karma and karma is dependent on the person, so person and karma are both without substance, and being without person and karma, there is no mutual action. Question: How do we know that positing existence is the person and positing non-existence is the person? Answer: The chapter "Errors" says: "Whether self and phenomena are existent or non-existent, this can never be established." Hence we know that positing a person is [positing] existence or non-existence. From the second verse onward is the second part, explaining the main thesis, which has three parts: first, one verse explains the main thesis; next, one verse reveals that person and phenomena both existing falls into the fault of causelessness; third, three verses successively explain the fault of causelessness. The first half of the first verse refutes definitely existent karma; the second half refutes a definitely existent person. A definitely existent substance of karma has two faults: if the substance of karma really exists, it already exists fundamentally, and one cannot say that originally unmade it is only now made, which would mean that in the world there is only old karma and no new karma; second, since it already exists fundamentally, it does not require a person to initiate it, hence there is also the fault of being separate from a person. The second half also has two faults: first, since an agent already exists fundamentally, there should not be further purposeful activity; second, since it already exists fundamentally, it does not require performing karma to complete the person. One must finely grasp the meaning of the text: if there is even a hair's breadth of karma-substance, then karma has two faults; if there is even a hair's breadth of person-substance, the person has two faults. Why? Because if there is a hair's breadth of person-substance, it already exists fundamentally, neither relying on the coming together of conditions to be formed, nor relying on the separation of conditions to be destroyed, hence this person is permanent. Then, being permanent and already completed, why would it need to act further? And why would it need to rely on karma to be formed? The two faults of karma are also like this.