中觀論疏 7.15

7.15

「識因色」下，第四次破識陰。就文為三：初作無自性門破；次就一異門破；「是故當知」下，第三總結。初如文。「但生以識塵」下，第二一異門破。「識此人識為即識彼人識為異」者，更開二關責之。若識此人識猶是識彼人識者，則始終一識，墮於常過。若識此人識非識彼人識，則今日識此人、明日便不識，以其無復昨日識故，復墮斷滅。「或言一或言異」者，莎提比丘言六道往還常，是一識。僧佉言覺諦是常，亦是一識。薩婆多等明前識滅後識生，則是異識。《成實》具一異義，實法滅則是異識，相續轉變名為一識。以實法念念滅，故勉常一過；相續一故，勉不識前人過。今明若假實義成可勉二過，今假實不成則俱二過也。實法若滅則假無所續，如其假續則實不得滅，故假成實壞、實成假壞，假壞亦無實、實壞亦無假，一切不立也。

From "Consciousness conditioned by form..." onwards, the fourth part refutes the aggregate of consciousness. Within the text there are three parts: first, refuting through the gateway of lacking self-nature; next, refuting in terms of identity and difference; from "Therefore it should be known" onwards, the third is a general conclusion. The first is as in the text. From "Only arising to cognize dust..." onwards, the second part refutes in terms of identity and difference. "Is the consciousness that cognizes this person identical to the consciousness that cognizes that person, or is it different?" opens two gates to interrogate him. If the consciousness that cognizes this person is still the consciousness that cognizes that person, then it is a single consciousness from beginning to end, falling into the fault of permanence. If the consciousness that cognizes this person is not the consciousness that cognizes that person, then cognizing this person today, tomorrow one would not cognize him, because yesterday's consciousness no longer exists, which again falls into annihilation. "Some say identical, some say different": the bhikṣu Sāti said that the one transmigrating through the six destinies is permanent, being a single consciousness. The Sāṃkhya say that the intellect-principle (buddhitattva) is permanent, which is also a single consciousness. The Sarvāstivādins and others explain that when the preceding consciousness ceases, the subsequent consciousness arises, so they are different consciousnesses. The Tattvasiddhi incorporates both identity and difference: when real phenomena cease, they are different consciousnesses; through continuous transformation, they are called a single consciousness. Because real phenomena cease moment by moment, they avoid the fault of permanent identity; because continuity is one, they avoid the fault of not cognizing the prior person. Now we clarify that if the provisional and real doctrines were tenable, they might avoid the two faults; but now, since the provisional and real are not tenable, they incur both faults. If real phenomena cease, the provisional has nothing to continue; if the provisional continues, the real cannot cease. Thus, if the provisional is established, the real is destroyed; if the real is established, the provisional is destroyed. When the provisional is destroyed, there is also no real; when the real is destroyed, there is also no provisional. Nothing is established at all.