中觀論疏 7.15

7.15

From "Consciousness conditioned by form..." onwards, the fourth part refutes the aggregate of consciousness. Within the text there are three parts: first, refuting through the gateway of lacking self-nature; next, refuting in terms of identity and difference; from "Therefore it should be known" onwards, the third is a general conclusion. The first is as in the text. From "Only arising to cognize dust..." onwards, the second part refutes in terms of identity and difference. "Is the consciousness that cognizes this person identical to the consciousness that cognizes that person, or is it different?" opens two gates to interrogate him. If the consciousness that cognizes this person is still the consciousness that cognizes that person, then it is a single consciousness from beginning to end, falling into the fault of permanence. If the consciousness that cognizes this person is not the consciousness that cognizes that person, then cognizing this person today, tomorrow one would not cognize him, because yesterday's consciousness no longer exists, which again falls into annihilation. "Some say identical, some say different": the bhikṣu Sāti said that the one transmigrating through the six destinies is permanent, being a single consciousness. The Sāṃkhya say that the intellect-principle (buddhitattva) is permanent, which is also a single consciousness. The Sarvāstivādins and others explain that when the preceding consciousness ceases, the subsequent consciousness arises, so they are different consciousnesses. The Tattvasiddhi incorporates both identity and difference: when real phenomena cease, they are different consciousnesses; through continuous transformation, they are called a single consciousness. Because real phenomena cease moment by moment, they avoid the fault of permanent identity; because continuity is one, they avoid the fault of not cognizing the prior person. Now we clarify that if the provisional and real doctrines were tenable, they might avoid the two faults; but now, since the provisional and real are not tenable, they incur both faults. If real phenomena cease, the provisional has nothing to continue; if the provisional continues, the real cannot cease. Thus, if the provisional is established, the real is destroyed; if the real is established, the provisional is destroyed. When the provisional is destroyed, there is also no real; when the real is destroyed, there is also no provisional. Nothing is established at all.