中觀論疏 7.18

7.18

「復次」下，前釋第一偈申經意竟，此下生起第二次明破立。就偈為兩：上半借異相破性、下半借性破無性。「諸法後時變異故知無性」，上偈以妄取故知無相，無相故空；今以無常故知無性，無性故空。若有性者，有性是本有，體即是常，不應變異。下半借性破無性者，本有於性，可有無性；尚無有性，何有無性？此偈意多含。上半破外道，如僧佉二十五諦，從細至麁、從麁至細而體常有，體即是性；下半斥內學。又上半破毘曇之性，下半斥成實之假。又上半破有所得攝大乘師三性義，下半破三無性理也。「無性法亦無」者，以此橫類萬義。如破相故說無相，相既無，何有無相理耶？乃至破生死故說涅槃、破妄說真，妄既不立，何有真耶？若復言有一中道，非真非妄、非生死非涅槃，此亦是未悟耳。如其了悟，則藥病俱去，則知無去所去。鈍根之流觸處皆著，如前破外道著邪常故說無常，三修比丘更執無常，復以常樂破之。若悟者即悟，不悟者依常樂教更復保著，故二處皆禁，前禁於常、後禁無常。前有斷首之令、後有舌落之言，故不應有所取著。問：《攝論》親明有三無性，今云何破之？答：天親一往對破性故言無性耳；而學人不體其意，故執三無性。二者彼云無性者，明其無有性，非謂有無性。學人雖知無有性，而謂有無性，故不解無性語也。又如明世諦虛假無性，亦不解此語。一者佛明無性，即無有體無有物；而人謂無有性，實有於假體。二者佛對破性故言無性，此是對治說，非究竟語；而人執為究竟。三者明無有性，非謂有無性，五句不依；而人但住一句。「問曰」下，第三外人一偈救。上論主借變異破其性義，外人今捉破作立反難論主。「若其無性，不應有異；今既有異，則應有性。」外人所以作此計者，其明性有二種：一者不異之性、二者體性是異。今雖無不異之性，而有體性之異也。「答曰」下，第四三偈破救。破救大意但破其異。上以虛妄顯空，而變著虛妄；今以後異顯無，復著於異。以彼執異救性，故今明無異則無性也。三偈為二：第一偈就有性無性門以破於異、次兩偈就老壯一異門明無異性。有性無性門破異者，前偈借異破性，今還借性無性而破於異。諸法有性則定住無移，不可令異。又本有性，即本有體，不從緣合而有，亦不假緣離而無，故是常，常不可變異。無性則無法體，以何為異？「復次」下，第二就老壯一異門破無有異。前是奪門明無異，今是縱門，故開二關責之。兩偈為二：初偈就二門破無異、第二偈偏破其即異。初偈上半開二門總非、下半釋二門。問：何故云是法即無異？答：上言後異，老時即是異，故名是法即無異也。「壯不作老」，釋異法無異。「老不作老」，釋是法無異。所以壯不與老異者，壯時無老，與誰為異？老時無壯，復與誰異？是故壯老不得有異。此偈猶是〈三相品〉中「是法於是時，不於是時滅；是法於異時，不於異時滅。」亦應云：是法於是時，不於是時異；是法於異時，不於異時異。又如〈因緣品〉不自生等四句，今亦不自異、不從他異。「問曰若法即異」下，此生起第二偈，釋上二門無異。前問、次答。救意云：眼見少年經日月即便變異，豈非是法即異？此云即異，非上即異。上即異云老不即與老異，今明少經時即變異。「答曰」，上半明即少無異、下半明離少無異。汝若言是法即異者，乳應即是酪、米應即是飯也。下半云「離乳有何法」者，汝若乳不即是酪者，離乳外唯有於酪，可言酪作酪耶？又離乳外語通，亦得是酪，亦得言餘物，但使非乳即以對是也。少既不作老者，離少之外，唯只有老，可言老作老耶？他問年少經時故便成老，何故言無老？答：少經時者，為猶是少、為非復少？若猶是少，少應即是老；若非復少者，便應老還作老也。不爾，用餘物作老。不爾，用虛空作老。又問少滅故作老、不滅作老？滅則無少，誰作老；不滅則少在，云何作老？

From "Furthermore" below, the preceding explanation of the first verse to elucidate the intention of the sūtra is completed; below this, it introduces the second section, which next explains refutation and establishment. As for the verse, it has two parts: the first half utilizes the mark of difference to refute intrinsic nature; the second half utilizes intrinsic nature to refute the lack of intrinsic nature. Regarding "Because all phenomena undergo change and alteration at a later time, one knows there is no intrinsic nature": the preceding verse, because of false grasping, showed that one knows there is no mark, and because there is no mark, they are empty; now, because of impermanence, one knows there is no intrinsic nature, and because there is no intrinsic nature, they are empty. If there were an intrinsic nature, that intrinsic nature would be fundamentally existent, its substance would be permanent, and it ought not undergo change and alteration. Regarding the second half, which utilizes intrinsic nature to refute the lack of intrinsic nature: if there were fundamentally an intrinsic nature, there could be a lack of intrinsic nature; since there is not even an intrinsic nature, how could there be a lack of intrinsic nature? The intent of this verse contains much. The first half refutes the non-Buddhists, such as the Sāṃkhya's twenty-five principles, which from subtle to gross and from gross to subtle always have a permanent substance, and that substance is intrinsic nature; the second half rebukes internal Buddhist scholars. Furthermore, the first half refutes the intrinsic nature of the Abhidharma, and the second half rebukes the provisionality of the Tattvasiddhi. Furthermore, the first half refutes the three natures doctrine of the masters of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha who grasp at attainments, and the second half refutes their principle of the three non-natures. Regarding "The phenomenon that lacks intrinsic nature is also nonexistent": by means of this, ten thousand meanings are universally analogized. For instance, because of refuting marks one speaks of marklessness; since marks are already nonexistent, how could there be a principle of marklessness? Up to: because of refuting saṃsāra one speaks of nirvāṇa, and because of refuting the false one speaks of the true; since the false is already not established, how could there be the true? If one were further to say that there is a middle way that is neither true nor false, neither saṃsāra nor nirvāṇa, this also is simply a failure to awaken. If one fully awakens, then both the medicine and the illness are eliminated, and one knows that there is neither departure nor a place to depart to. Those of dull faculties become attached at every turn; just as previously, to refute the non-Buddhists' attachment to perverse permanence, impermanence was taught, yet the monks who practiced the three cultivations further clung to impermanence, so one again refuted it with permanence and bliss. If they are awakened, they awaken immediately; those who are not awakened cling to and preserve [attachments] based on the teaching of permanence and bliss, so both positions are prohibited: previously permanence was prohibited, and later impermanence was prohibited. Previously there was the command of severing the head; later there were the words of the tongue falling out; therefore, one ought not to have any grasping or attachment. Question: The Mahāyānasaṃgraha explicitly clarifies that there are three non-natures; how can it be refuted now? Answer: Vasubandhu merely spoke of non-nature provisionally to counter and refute intrinsic nature; but students do not grasp his intention, so they cling to the three non-natures. Second, when they say "non-nature", it clarifies that there is no intrinsic nature, not that there is an entity called "non-nature". Although students know there is no intrinsic nature, they hold that there is an entity called "non-nature", and therefore they do not understand the words "lack of intrinsic nature". Furthermore, it is just like clarifying that conventional truth is illusory and provisional and lacks intrinsic nature, and they also do not understand these words. First, when the Buddha clarifies lack of intrinsic nature, it means there is no substance and no thing; yet people think that although there is no intrinsic nature, there is really a provisional substance. Second, the Buddha spoke of lack of intrinsic nature to counter and refute intrinsic nature; this was an antidotal teaching, not the definitive word; yet people cling to it as definitive. Third, it clarifies that there is no intrinsic nature, not that there is an entity called "non-nature", relying on none of the five propositions; yet people abide in only one proposition. From "The question states" below, the third part is a single verse in which the opponent rescues his position. Above, the author of the treatise utilized change and alteration to refute his doctrine of intrinsic nature; the opponent now takes the refutation as an establishment and poses a counter-challenge to the author: "If there is no intrinsic nature, there should be no difference; now since there is difference, there should be intrinsic nature." The reason the opponent makes this calculation is that he explains intrinsic nature as having two kinds: first, an unchanging intrinsic nature; second, an intrinsic nature whose substance is itself difference. Now, although there is no unchanging intrinsic nature, there is an intrinsic nature whose substance is difference. From "The reply states" below, the fourth part consists of three verses refuting the rescue. The main point of refuting the rescue is simply to refute his "difference". Above, emptiness was revealed by means of delusion, yet he changed and became attached to delusion; now, nonexistence is revealed by means of subsequent difference, and he again becomes attached to difference. Because he clung to difference to rescue intrinsic nature, it is now clarified that without difference there is no intrinsic nature. The three verses form two parts: the first verse refutes difference from the approach of existent nature and non-existent nature; the following two verses clarify the absence of a distinct nature from the approach of the oneness or difference of youth and old age. Regarding refuting difference through the approach of existent nature and non-existent nature: the previous verse utilized difference to refute intrinsic nature, and now it turns back to utilize intrinsic nature and lack of intrinsic nature to refute difference. If phenomena had an intrinsic nature, they would permanently abide without moving, and could not be made different. Furthermore, if there were fundamentally an intrinsic nature, that would be a fundamentally existent substance, which does not come into being through the combination of conditions, nor does it become nonexistent by relying on the separation of conditions; therefore it is permanent, and the permanent cannot undergo change and alteration. If there is no intrinsic nature, there is no entity of phenomena; by means of what could there be difference? From "Furthermore" below, the second part refutes the existence of difference from the approach of the oneness or difference of youth and old age. The previous was the approach of negation clarifying the absence of difference; this is the approach of concession, so it opens two barriers to interrogate him. The two verses form two parts: the first verse refutes difference based on the two approaches; the second verse specifically refutes identity and difference. In the first verse, the first half opens the two approaches for a general rejection; the second half explains the two approaches. Question: Why does it say "a phenomenon itself does not have difference"? Answer: Above it spoke of subsequent difference; the time of old age is itself the difference, hence it is called "a phenomenon itself does not have difference". "Youth does not become old age" explains that a different phenomenon has no difference. "Old age does not become old age" explains that the phenomenon itself has no difference. The reason youth is not different from old age is that at the time of youth there is no old age, so from what would it be different? At the time of old age there is no youth, so again from what would it be different? Therefore, youth and old age cannot have difference. This verse is like that in the "Examination of the Three Marks": "A phenomenon at this time / does not cease at this time; / a phenomenon at a different time / does not cease at a different time." It should also be said: a phenomenon at this time does not differ at this time; a phenomenon at a different time does not differ at a different time. Moreover, it is like the four propositions of not arising from itself, etc., in the "Examination of Conditions"; now too, it is not different from itself, nor is it different from another. From "The question states: if a phenomenon is itself different" below, this introduces the second verse, which explains the absence of difference in the above two approaches. First is the question, next the reply. The opponent's intent in rescuing is: we visibly see that a youth, passing through months and days, undergoes change and alteration; how is that not the phenomenon itself being different? Here, saying "itself being different" is not the "itself being different" above. Above, "itself being different" meant that old age is not itself different from old age; now he clarifies that youth, passing through time, undergoes change and alteration. "The reply states": the first half clarifies that there is no difference identical with youth; the second half clarifies that there is no difference apart from youth. If you say that the phenomenon itself is different, milk should itself be curds, and rice should itself be cooked rice. The second half says "What phenomenon is there apart from milk?": if milk is not itself curds, then apart from milk there are only curds; can one say that curds become curds? Furthermore, speaking of "apart from milk" is general: it could be curds, or it could be other things; as long as it is not milk, it is contrasted with it. Since youth does not become old age, apart from youth there is only old age; can one say that old age becomes old age? The other asks: a youth passes through time and thereby becomes old; why do you say there is no old age? Answer: as for the youth passing through time, is it still youth, or is it no longer youth? If it is still youth, youth should itself be old age; if it is no longer youth, then old age would turn back and become old age. If not that, then some other thing is used to become old age. If not that, then empty space is used to become old age. Furthermore, it is asked: does it become old age because youth ceases, or does it become old age without ceasing? If it ceases, there is no youth, so what becomes old age? If it does not cease, youth remains, so how could it become old age?