中觀論疏 7.19

7.19

「問曰破是破異」下，品第二章次破空義。所以須破空者，凡有二義：一者論主上申佛經說虛妄，此欲示空。外人即云：若爾，應有空也。第二外人自起此迷，我本立有實法，汝既破云無有定實人法，但是顛倒虛妄耳。次又破我虛妄人法，明無人法。若爾，有虛有實可言是有，無虛無實則應是空。故生此問也。所言「破是破異」者，是名是法，異名異法。此是上「是法則無異，異法亦無異」之言耳。又解云：是名為性實人法，異即是虛妄人法。既具破實之與虛，故知應有空也。「答曰若有不空法」下，一偈直作相待破之。若有不空，可待之說空；不空既無，何有空耶？如空內名內空，內本不有，何有空耶？又前破性故說異，而性無即異無；今亦破異故言空，異無空即無。又汝上既知實無故虛即無，今何得猶言有無故空不無耶？他問論主：既自云佛說欲示空，今何得言無空？答：佛一往對有，故今言空耳。一往有去空亦去，故不相違也。亦應云：若有於二我，可有二無我；竟無有二我，何有二無我？若有於三性，可有三無性亦爾。

From "The question states: refuting identity and refuting difference" below, the second section of the chapter next refutes the meaning of emptiness. As for why emptiness must be refuted, there are altogether two meanings: first, the author of the treatise above elucidated the Buddha's sūtras as speaking of the delusive and false, which was intended to demonstrate emptiness. The opponent immediately says: if so, there should be emptiness. Second, the opponent himself gives rise to this delusion: "Originally, I established that there are real phenomena; you already refuted this, saying that there are no definitely real persons or phenomena, and that they are merely inverted, delusive, and false. Next you also refute my delusive and false persons and phenomena, clarifying that there are no persons or phenomena. If so, when there is the false and the real, one may speak of existence; when there is neither the false nor the real, there should be emptiness." Hence this question arises. What is meant by "refuting identity and refuting difference": "identity" refers to identical phenomena, and "difference" refers to different phenomena. This is just the above statement, "A phenomenon itself has no difference, / and a different phenomenon also has no difference." Another interpretation says: "identity" refers to persons and phenomena that are real in nature, while "difference" refers to persons and phenomena that are delusive and false. Since both the real and the false are completely refuted, one knows there should be emptiness. From "The reply states: if there were an unempty phenomenon" below, a single verse directly uses mutual dependence to refute it. If there were the unempty, one could depend upon it to speak of emptiness; since the unempty is already nonexistent, how could there be emptiness? Just as when the internal is empty it is called internal emptiness; since the internal does not fundamentally exist, how could there be emptiness? Furthermore, previously to refute intrinsic nature one spoke of difference, but when intrinsic nature is nonexistent, difference is nonexistent; now too, to refute difference one speaks of emptiness, and when difference is nonexistent, emptiness is nonexistent. Furthermore, since you already knew above that because the real is nonexistent the false is nonexistent, how can you now still say that because existence is nonexistent emptiness is not nonexistent? The opponent asks the author of the treatise: since you yourself say that the Buddha spoke [thus] wishing to demonstrate emptiness, how can you now say there is no emptiness? Answer: the Buddha provisionally countered existence, and therefore spoke of emptiness. Once existence is provisionally removed, emptiness is also removed, so there is no contradiction. One should also say: if there were the two selves, there could be the two selflessnesses; since ultimately there are no two selves, how could there be the two selflessnesses? If there were the three natures, there could be the three non-natures, and it is the same in that case.