中觀論疏 7.28

7.28

長行為五：初釋偈本。「我或在內或在外」者，佛法學人計我在身內，如樹神依樹，無的別處。「復次」下，第二開二關責之。所以開二關責者，上明三事異故無合，外人不受此難，若三事無異是則無合，正以三事異故是則有合，故重開二關責之。又關為五：一牒、二定、三總非、四正難、五總結，文易知。問：汝眼到方見火，見火應燒眼。又應見淵中魚石，又應水漬眼也。又數論云眼是離中知，於他何必爾？如魚等夜不因明得見。又大士眼根入正受、耳中三昧起，有何定離合耶？又持《法華經》人鼻遙聞香，三根何必定到方知？又汝言遙合，則應遙到；不可遙到，亦不可遙聞也。又數論六識了六塵者，汝若六根一識，則一根具六用，六根六識則有竝用。「問曰」下，第三外人救義明四合生知，已有知生則驗我情塵意合，故舉果證因。「答曰」下，第四破救。就文為二：初指前破。〈六情品〉中明三法無見，一眼不能見、二色不能見、三人不能見，以無見故是則無合，既其無合知則不生，故云識等四法無。此則具破因果，云何更以果證因？又〈根品〉中無見、無見者及以可見法，今不應言有四合以生知也。「今當更說」下，第二縱破。又開五別：一唱重說；次牒外義；次開二關定之；第四作難；「知無故」下，第五總結也。「如是諸法中幻」下，長行第五舉喻曉之。「染與於可染」下，第二偈明萬法異是故無合。上半明染等三法無合。所以偏破染等無合者，由眼見色故起貪心。前明眼見色尚無有合，貪從何生？故次破染。又上明眼色無合，則五根無合義；今染等無合，則意根無合義。下半更類破兩法。「餘入」者，謂耳等五入。「餘煩惱」者，瞋癡之流。

The prose has five parts: first, explaining the verse text. Regarding "The self is either inside or outside": students of the Buddha's teaching posit that the self is inside the body, like a tree spirit relying on a tree, having no distinct location. From "Furthermore" onward, the second part sets up two dilemmas to challenge them. The reason for setting up two dilemmas to challenge them is: above, it was explained that because the three items are different, there is no conjunction. The opponent does not accept this objection, [arguing]: "If the three items were not different, then there would be no conjunction; it is precisely because the three items are different that there is conjunction." Therefore, [the treatise] again sets up two dilemmas to challenge them. Furthermore, the dilemmas have five [steps]: 1. restating [the thesis], 2. defining [the alternatives], 3. general negation, 4. the main objection, and 5. the general conclusion; the text is easy to understand. One might object: "If your eye must reach [the object] before it sees fire, then seeing fire ought to burn the eye. Furthermore, [if the eye reaches it], it ought to see fish and stones in the depths of an abyss, and water ought to soak the eye as well." Furthermore, the Sāṃkhya claims that the eye perceives at a distance; why must it be so for others? For instance, fish and the like can see at night without relying on light. Furthermore, when a great being enters meditative absorption with the eye faculty and arises from samādhi in the ear, what fixed separation or conjunction is there? Furthermore, for a person who upholds the Lotus Sūtra, whose nose smells fragrance from afar, why must the three faculties necessarily reach [their objects] before perceiving them? Furthermore, if you speak of distant conjunction, then it ought to reach across a distance; if it cannot reach across a distance, it also cannot smell from afar. Furthermore, regarding the Sāṃkhya's view that six consciousnesses discern six sense objects: if in your view the six faculties have only one consciousness, then one faculty would possess all six functions; if there are six faculties and six consciousnesses, then there would be simultaneous functioning. From "The opponent asks" onward, the third part is the opponent defending their position by explaining that the conjunction of the four produces knowledge; since knowledge has already arisen, this proves the conjunction of the self, sense faculty, sense object, and mind; thus, they cite the effect to prove the cause. From "The reply is" onward, the fourth part refutes this defense. In the text there are two parts: first, pointing to the prior refutation. In the "Chapter on the Six Sense Faculties," it was explained that the three items lack seeing: first, the eye cannot see; second, form cannot see; third, the person cannot see. Because there is no seeing, there is no conjunction. Since there is no conjunction, knowledge is not produced; therefore it says that the four items—consciousness and the rest—do not exist. This completely refutes both cause and effect; how can they again cite the effect to prove the cause? Furthermore, in the "Chapter on the Faculties," there is neither seeing, nor a seer, nor an object of seeing; now one should not say that there is a conjunction of the four to produce knowledge. From "Now it shall be further explained" onward, the second part grants [their premise] to refute it. This also opens into five distinct points: first, announcing a further explanation; next, restating the opponent's position; next, setting up two dilemmas to define it; fourth, raising the objection; from "Because there is no knowledge" onward, fifth, the general conclusion. From "Like an illusion among all these dharmas" onward, the fifth part of the prose cites an analogy to make it clear. From "Passion and that which is subject to passion" onward, the second verse explains that the myriad dharmas are different, and therefore there is no conjunction. The first half explains that the three dharmas—passion and the rest—have no conjunction. The reason for specifically refuting the conjunction of passion and the rest is: because the eye sees form, a mind of greed arises. Previously it was explained that even the eye seeing form has no conjunction; from where could greed arise? Therefore [the text] next refutes passion. Furthermore, above it was explained that the eye and form have no conjunction, meaning that the five faculties have no conjunction; now passion and the rest have no conjunction, meaning that the mind faculty has no conjunction. The second half further refutes two dharmas by analogy. "The other sense fields" refers to the five sense fields, such as the ear and the rest. "The other afflictions" refers to the categories of anger, delusion, and the like.