中觀論疏 7.29

7.29

「復次異法當有合」者，第二破無有異。前借異破合，是故今次辨無異。又合由異生，異為合本，今既無異，何所合耶？又例如上品，上品明以後異破性，外還捉異救性；今以異明不合，外還執異救合，是以二品俱有破異。五偈為二：初二偈總標無異、第二三偈別釋無異。初又二：前偈明三法無異，還對上三法無合；第二偈明一切法無異，對上一切法無合。文易知也。問：何故唱萬法無異？答：世間外道小乘大乘皆言眼與色異，故眼見色生三毒及業苦；今求異不得則三毒不生，此是大益也。「問曰何故無異」下，生起第二三偈釋無異。此中三偈其文甚易知，而講者多有異釋，遂瞖其文；今直讀之，使煥然易領。次三偈為二：初兩偈明無捲異、次一偈辨無指異。明無捲異，謂無總異；辨無指異，即無別異。夫論有異不出總別，總別無異則一切異空。又無捲異明無果，次無指異明無因異，因果攝一切法也。又無捲異明無內學所計異，次無指異明無外道所計異，內外總攝一切。又前亦是無因緣異，次明無非因緣異，亦攝一切。約成實義者，前明無假異，謂假人假柱；次明無實異，謂五陰四微，以假實總攝一切。初二偈又二：第一偈明捲不與指異，即是果不與因異，亦是假不與實異也。第二偈明捲不與瓶柱等異，亦是果不與非因異。夫論捲異不出斯二，斯二既無則異義盡矣。「異因異有異」者，異，即是捲異也。因異者，因五指異也。有異者，有捲異也。所以然者，見指五知捲一，見指散知捲合。見指是因，知捲是果，故云異因異有異也。「異辭異無異」者，異，即捲異也。離異者，離五指異。無異者，無捲異也。「若法所因出是法不異因」者，上半為外作因果義，今下半破之。若果從因出，則果不異因。所以然者，若因壞果存，果可異因；今因有則果有、因無則果無，寧得捲果於因？就捲指作既爾，人望五陰、柱與四微萬義皆類。問：上明眼等三法無異，今亦得舉眼等三法作之以不？答：可具二義。若望成實，眼是果、四大為因，同捲指破。若望毘曇，眼亦是果、四大造之此亦是因，雖非假實，既是因果，亦同捲指。二者以眼望色異，因色異故有眼異，離色異無眼異。若眼異從色異生，從色生則眼不異色，以眼是能見、色是所見，既無所見亦無能見。能所之法有則俱有、無則俱無，不得言所見雖無、能見猶有，故所壞能即壞，當知能不異所。又問：眼色本來未曾同，云何得說異耶？又問：眼異因色異、色異因眼異，若皆異即皆眼皆色。彼答：良由眼異色、色異眼，故有眼色耳，云何作此難耶？問：汝眼異為因色異生、為因色異不生？若異因異生，則異還待異、長還待長；若因不異生，既稱眼色，云何不異耶？又問：異為有別體、為無有別體？若異無別體，還指色為體，亦眼無別體，還指色為體。若眼自以眼為體、不以色為體，則異自以異為體、不以色為體。又色有體可名異，色竟無體，云何有異？又異指色為體，色復以誰為體？體復有體即無窮，無窮則無體。又異以色為體，只色是異，見色應見異。異是法塵，眼云何見？若不見，則色非是異，應離色別有異，異應自有體。又眼異在眼、為在色、若在眼，眼何所從異？若在色，此是色異，何關眼異？又眼異不自異，則一不一。於瓶然一，還一於瓶，不一於柱。則眼異還異於眼，何得在色？又破若法所因出。如因木生火，火不得還木；若火還木從木出者，火亦還水，何不從水出？如因柱成舍、不因空成舍，故知空異舍、柱不異舍；若俱異，應俱成。又生死涅槃、凡聖等異，皆作此破之。如因涅槃異故有生死異，離涅槃異無生死異；真妄等亦爾。「問曰若有定異法有何咎」，第二偈破果不與非因異。前問、次答。外云：捲由指有，捲可不異指；捲不由柱有，捲應與柱異，故名定異法也。答中上半縱之、下半奪破。所言縱者，若離五指異有於捲異，可將捲與瓶柱等異也。下半奪者，今離五指異既無捲異，將何物與瓶柱為異；如是五陰成人、四微成柱悉作是破。長行二周釋。前總就一切法釋，後別寄捲指事釋。「問曰我經說」下，第二次破五指異。具如前數條目之。初問、次答。問意為兩：初總出其所是、次別明其所是。「異相不從眾緣生」者，總出所是也。前二偈並是從因緣生義：初偈捲由指有，捲不異指；次偈捲從指有，即無捲可異瓶。此並從因緣生，故無有異。今外人云：我經說異相都不從因緣生，此應當有定異法，無上破也。「分別總相」下，第二別出其所是。總相者，捲也。別相者，五指長短相也。異法者，五指體也。由分別總捲，故有五指長短別異。由指長短異相，故有五指之法。則是由指長短知長短指，故用指長短為異相，長短指名異法。問：外既云從總相有別相、從異相有異法，云何名不從因緣生？「答曰」下，自作此破之。但外人義云：從五指生捲，由別成總，故總從因緣生，以指別既壞，總捲亦壞故也。不由總捲生於別指，以捲雖壞而指猶存，故知不從總相成於別相，故知別相成於總相，故知別相不從因緣生。此義與成實等假實義大同，人柱從微陰成，微陰壞人柱即壞；微陰不從人柱成，人柱雖壞猶有四微五陰也。偈上半破無異相、下半明無異法。上半開二關責之。汝以指長短為異相、長短指為異法，故以指長短為長短指作相者，為長短指本異，須異相相之？為長短指本不異，以異相相之？若長短指本異，竟何須異相相之？又若本異竟更須異相相者，則有重異之過，又有無窮之失。若長短指本不異將異相相者，是亦不然。若本無兩指異，則無二指相，何所相？又汝以異相相不異法令異，亦應以不異法不異汝異相，異相成不異也。又問：汝異為異異、為異不異？若異異者，異已是異，何須異耶？若異不異者，則無復不異，云何得有異？如火為熱，於熱為熱、熱不熱？若熱於熱，已是熱，竟何須熱？若熱不熱，則無不熱，云何有熱？下半云因有長短異相，故有此指彼指異法；既無異相，云何有此彼異法耶？長行為二：第一前逈破外人立義、次釋偈文。初文二：一者牒外義；「若爾者」下，第二破也。既言分別總相故有異相，當知異相從總緣而生，云何言異相不從緣而生？成論人云：本有色心然後論其總別，如本有兩柱，在中然後論其東西。今問：汝別為別別、為別總？若別別，別已是別，何須別耶？若別總，則別從總生。又別既別，總則失總；總亦爾也。「是異相離異法不可得故」者，前明別從總生，故別是因緣義；今明異相從異法生，異相是因緣義。如指長短，要從長短指生，是故異相即是因緣，故一切皆是因緣。若是因緣，已入前二偈破之。「今異法中無異相」下，第二釋偈本，文易見也。「若異相在不異法中不名不異法」者，破意不許其異在不異中，若異相在不異中則無不異法，尚無不異法，云何言不異中有異相耶？此意須翻取之。

"Furthermore, different things would combine": second is refuting [the view that] there is difference. Previously, difference was borrowed to refute combination; therefore, next, non-difference is explained. Moreover, combination arises from difference, and difference is the basis of combination; now that there is no difference, what would combine? Furthermore, it is like the preceding chapter: the preceding chapter explained that subsequent difference refutes inherent nature, but the outsider seized upon difference again to rescue inherent nature; now, difference is used to explain non-combination, but the outsider grasps difference again to rescue combination; therefore, both chapters refute difference.

The five verses have two [parts]: first, two verses generally mark non-difference; second, three verses separately explain non-difference. The first also has two: the former verse explains that the three phenomena have no difference, responding back to the three phenomena not combining above; the second verse explains that all phenomena have no difference, responding to all phenomena not combining above. The text is easy to understand.

Question: Why state that the myriad phenomena have no difference?
Answer: The worldly, outsiders, the Hīnayāna, and the Mahāyāna all say that the eye and visible forms are different; therefore, seeing forms with the eye produces the three poisons, karma, and suffering. Now, when seeking difference and not finding it, the three poisons do not arise; this is of great benefit.

From "Question: Why is there no difference?" onward introduces the second [part]: three verses explaining non-difference. The text of these three verses is very easy to understand, yet lecturers often have diverging explanations, ultimately obscuring the text; now we read it directly so that it is bright and easily grasped.

The next three verses have two [parts]: first, two verses explain that there is no difference [in the case of] a fist; next, one verse distinguishes that there is no difference [in the case of] fingers. Explaining that there is no difference [in the case of] a fist means there is no difference of the general; distinguishing that there is no difference [in the case of] fingers means there is no difference of the particular. In discussing difference, it does not go beyond the general and the particular; if the general and particular have no difference, then all differences are empty. Furthermore, no difference of the fist explains that there is no effect; next, no difference of the fingers explains that there is no difference of cause; cause and effect encompass all phenomena. Furthermore, no difference of the fist explains that there is no difference posited by internal disciples; next, no difference of the fingers explains that there is no difference posited by outsiders; internal and external comprehensively encompass everything. Furthermore, the former also is that there is no difference of causes and conditions; next, it explains that there is no difference of what is not causes and conditions, which also encompasses everything. In terms of the meaning in the Tattvasiddhi: the former explains that there is no difference of the provisional, namely provisional persons and provisional pillars; next, it explains that there is no difference of the real, namely the five aggregates and four subtle particles, for provisional and real comprehensively encompass everything.

The first two verses also have two [parts]: the first verse explains that the fist is not different from the fingers, which is that the effect is not different from the cause, and also that the provisional is not different from the real. The second verse explains that the fist is not different from vases, pillars, and the like, which is that the effect is not different from non-causes. In discussing the difference of the fist, it does not go beyond these two; since these two are absent, the meaning of difference is exhausted.

"Difference exists depending on difference": "difference" is the difference of the fist. "Depending on difference" is depending on the difference of the five fingers. "Exists [as] difference" is having the difference of the fist. Why is this? Seeing the five fingers, one knows the one fist; seeing the fingers spread out, one knows the fist is closed. Seeing the fingers is the cause; knowing the fist is the effect; hence it says "difference exists depending on difference."

"Apart from difference, there is no difference": "difference" is the difference of the fist. "Apart from difference" is apart from the difference of the five fingers. "There is no difference" is having no difference of the fist.

"If a phenomenon arises depending on that, that phenomenon is not different from the cause": the upper half constructed the meaning of cause and effect for the outsider; now the lower half refutes it. If an effect arises from a cause, then the effect is not different from the cause. Why is this? If when the cause is destroyed the effect remained, the effect could be different from the cause; now, when the cause exists the effect exists, and when the cause is absent the effect is absent; how could the effect of the fist be [different] from the cause? This being so when treating the fist and fingers, the person with respect to the five aggregates, the pillar with respect to the four subtle particles, and the myriad meanings are all analogous.

Question: Above, it was explained that the three phenomena of the eye and so forth have no difference; now can one also take the three phenomena of the eye and so forth to do this, or not?
Answer: Two meanings may be included. If viewed from the Tattvasiddhi, the eye is an effect, and the four great elements are the cause, refuted in the same way as the fist and fingers. If viewed from the Abhidharma, the eye is also an effect, and the four great elements create it, which is also the cause; although not provisional and real, since they are cause and effect, they are also the same as the fist and fingers. Second, viewing the eye with respect to the difference of visible forms: depending on the difference of forms, the difference of the eye exists; apart from the difference of forms, there is no difference of the eye. If the difference of the eye arises from the difference of forms, then arising from forms, the eye is not different from forms; because the eye is that which sees and form is what is seen, since there is no what is seen, neither is there that which sees. As for phenomena of subject and object, if they exist they both exist, and if they are absent they are both absent; one cannot say that although what is seen is absent, that which sees still exists; therefore, when what is [seen] is destroyed, that which [sees] is also destroyed; one should know that the subject is not different from the object.

Another question: The eye and form have never been identical originally; how can one speak of difference?
Another question: The difference of the eye depends on the difference of form, and the difference of form depends on the difference of the eye; if they are both difference, then they are both eye and both form.
They reply: Precisely because the eye is different from form and form is different from the eye, there are eye and form; why raise this objection?
Question: Does your difference of the eye arise depending on the difference of form, or does it not arise depending on the difference of form? If difference arises depending on difference, then difference again relies on difference, and long again relies on long; if it arises depending on non-difference, since they are called eye and form, how could they not be different?
Another question: Does difference have a distinct substance, or does it not have a distinct substance? If difference has no distinct substance, it points back to form as its substance, and also the eye would have no distinct substance, pointing back to form as its substance. If the eye naturally takes the eye as its substance and does not take form as its substance, then difference naturally takes difference as its substance and does not take form as its substance. Furthermore, if form had a substance it could be called different; if form ultimately has no substance, how could there be difference? Furthermore, if difference points to form as substance, what does form in turn take as substance? If substance again has a substance, that is infinite regress, and infinite regress means no substance. Furthermore, if difference takes form as substance, and form itself is difference, seeing form one should see difference. Difference is a mental object (dharmāyatana); how could the eye see it? If it does not see it, then form is not difference; apart from form there should separately be difference, and difference should naturally have its own substance. Furthermore, does the difference of the eye reside in the eye or in form? If it resides in the eye, from what does the eye differ? If it resides in form, this is the difference of form; what does it have to do with the difference of the eye? Furthermore, if the difference of the eye is not different in itself, then unity is not unity. In a vase, being one, it is one in the vase, but not one in the pillar. Then the difference of the eye would return to being different in the eye; how could it reside in form?

Furthermore, refuting "if a phenomenon arises depending on that": as fire arises depending on wood, fire cannot return to wood; if fire returned to wood and arose from wood, fire would also return to water, so why does it not arise from water? As a house is completed depending on pillars, not depending on empty space, we know empty space is different from the house, while pillars are not different from the house; if both were different, both should accomplish it. Furthermore, difference between saṃsāra and nirvāṇa, ordinary beings and noble ones, is all refuted like this: as the difference of saṃsāra exists depending on the difference of nirvāṇa, apart from the difference of nirvāṇa there is no difference of saṃsāra; true and false and so forth are also like this.

"Question: If there are definitively different phenomena, what fault is there?": the second verse refutes that the effect is not different from non-causes. First is the question, next the answer. The outsider says: A fist exists due to fingers, so the fist may not be different from fingers; a fist does not exist due to pillars, so the fist should be different from pillars; hence they are called definitively different phenomena. In the answer, the upper half concedes it, and the lower half deprives and refutes it. What is called conceding: if apart from the difference of the five fingers there were the difference of the fist, one could take the fist as different from vases, pillars, and the like. The lower half deprives: now, since apart from the difference of the five fingers there is no difference of the fist, what thing would be taken as different from vases and pillars? In this way, the five aggregates completing a person, and the four subtle particles completing a pillar, are all refuted like this. The prose explains in two cycles: first, it explains generally with respect to all phenomena; later, it explains separately borrowing the case of the fist and fingers.

From "Question: Our sūtra says" onward, second, it refutes the difference of the five fingers. It is fully itemized as before. First is the question, next the answer. The intent of the question has two parts: first, generally putting forward what is affirmed; next, separately explaining what is affirmed.

"The characteristic of difference does not arise from many conditions": generally putting forward what is affirmed. The previous two verses were both the meaning of arising from causes and conditions: in the first verse, the fist exists due to the fingers, so the fist is not different from the fingers; in the next verse, the fist arises from the fingers, so there is no fist that could be different from a vase. These both arise from causes and conditions, so there is no difference. Now the outsider says: "Our sūtra says the characteristic of difference does not arise from causes and conditions at all; here there should be definitively different phenomena, without the above refutation."

From "discriminating the general characteristic" onward, second, separately puts forward what is affirmed. The general characteristic is the fist. The particular characteristic is the characteristics of long and short of the five fingers. The different phenomena are the substances of the five fingers. Because of discriminating the general fist, there are the specific differences of long and short of the five fingers. Because of the different characteristics of long and short of the fingers, there are the phenomena of the five fingers. That is, by the long and short of fingers, one knows long and short fingers; hence, one uses the long and short of fingers as the characteristic of difference, and long and short fingers are called different phenomena.

Question: Since the outsider says that from the general characteristic there are particular characteristics, and from the characteristic of difference there are different phenomena, how can it be called not arising from causes and conditions?
From "Answer:" onward, it refutes this on its own terms. But the outsider's meaning is: from the five fingers the fist arises; because the particulars form the general, the general arises from causes and conditions, for when the particular fingers are destroyed, the general fist is also destroyed. The particular fingers do not arise from the general fist, for though the fist is destroyed, the fingers still remain; thus we know particular characteristics are not formed from the general characteristic, but that the general characteristic is formed from particular characteristics; thus we know particular characteristics do not arise from causes and conditions. This meaning is largely identical to the provisional and real in the Tattvasiddhi and so forth: a person or pillar is formed from subtle particles and aggregates; when subtle particles and aggregates are destroyed, the person or pillar is destroyed; subtle particles and aggregates are not formed from a person or pillar; though the person or pillar is destroyed, there are still the four subtle particles and five aggregates.

The upper half of the verse refutes that there is no characteristic of difference; the lower half explains that there are no different phenomena. The upper half opens two checkpoints to reprimand them: You take the long and short of fingers as the characteristic of difference, and long and short fingers as different phenomena, thus using the long and short of fingers to make the characteristic for the long and short fingers. Are the long and short fingers originally different, requiring the characteristic of difference to characterize them? Or are the long and short fingers originally not different, using the characteristic of difference to characterize them? If the long and short fingers are originally different, why would they ever require the characteristic of difference to characterize them? Furthermore, if being originally different they still required the characteristic of difference to characterize them, there would be the error of doubled difference, and the flaw of infinite regress. If the long and short fingers are originally not different and one takes the characteristic of difference to characterize them, this too is not so. If originally there is no difference between the two fingers, then there is no characteristic of two fingers; what is there to characterize? Furthermore, if you use the characteristic of difference to characterize non-different phenomena to make them different, one should also use non-different phenomena to make your characteristic of difference non-different, so that the characteristic of difference becomes non-different.

Another question: Is your difference different from difference, or different from non-difference? If it is different from difference, difference is already different; why would it need difference? If it is different from non-difference, then there is no longer non-difference; how could there be difference? As fire is hot: with respect to hot, is it hot, or does it heat the not hot? If it is hot with respect to hot, it is already hot; why would it ever need heat? If it heats the not hot, then there is no not hot; how could there be heat?

The lower half says that because there are the different characteristics of long and short, there are the different phenomena of this finger and that finger; since there is no characteristic of difference, how could there be the different phenomena of this and that?

The prose has two [parts]: first, it fundamentally refutes the outsider's proposition; next, it explains the verse text. The first text has two: first, it cites the outsider's position; from "If so" onward, second, it refutes it. Since they say that by discriminating the general characteristic there are different characteristics, one should know that different characteristics arise from the condition of the general; how could they say that different characteristics do not arise from conditions? Master(s) of the Tattvasiddhi say: Originally there are form and mind, and thereafter one discusses their general and particular; just as originally there are two pillars, and being between them, one thereafter discusses their east and west. Now we ask: Is your particular particular to the particular, or particular to the general? If it is particular to the particular, the particular is already particular; why would it need the particular? If it is particular to the general, then the particular arises from the general. Furthermore, since the particular is particular, the general loses the general; the general is also like this.

"Because this characteristic of difference, apart from different phenomena, cannot be found": previously it explained that the particular arises from the general, so the particular is the meaning of causes and conditions; now it explains that the characteristic of difference arises from different phenomena, so the characteristic of difference is the meaning of causes and conditions. Just as the long and short of fingers must arise from long and short fingers, therefore the characteristic of difference is just causes and conditions, so all are causes and conditions. If they are causes and conditions, they are already included in the refutation of the previous two verses.

From "Now in different phenomena there is no characteristic of difference" onward, second, it explains the verse itself; the text is easy to see.

"If the characteristic of difference is in non-different phenomena, it is not called non-different phenomena": the point of the refutation is not to permit difference to be in non-difference; if the characteristic of difference is in non-difference, then there are no non-different phenomena; while there are not even non-different phenomena, how could one say that within non-difference there is a characteristic of difference? This sense must be taken conversely.