中觀論疏 7.39

7.39

品為二：第一破縛解根本、二正破縛解。破根本中為二：前破縛本、次破解根。以眾生及五陰為生死繫縛本，滅此眾生及以五陰稱為解本。本者體也。《大品》云「生死邊如虛空，眾生性邊亦如虛空，是中無生死往來亦無解脫」者，即是明二本空。此是菩薩正憶念之大宗也。破縛本中為三：初作常無常破、二五求破、三者有身無身破。「問曰生死非都無根本」，此立正縛根。縛根者，經說眾生及五陰是也。問：此立與上來立何異？答：上直立有人法，今舉往來證有人法。上直破人法，今破無往來故無人法。問：何故立人法破人法？答：《楞伽》云「眾生妄想所見不出人法」，今破人法則明二無我，故得入初地乃至成佛也。又大小乘人常厭生死往來，欲求解脫；今明若見有往來不得息往來，悟往來無往來方得息往來耳。「答曰」下，第二正作常無常破。自上已來破五陰及眾生竟，今縱有之，故開二關責也。問：品破縛解，何故破往來？答：外人以往來即是縛，故破往來即破縛也。然往來之本不出人法，此二若實，要墮斷常。常則天人無交謝、靜然不變，何有往來？無常則體盡於一世，誰復往來耶？莎提比丘計有一識往來生死，自餘數論及大乘人並云無常往來。又外道計眾生是常故往來，內學執無常是故往來。今破此內外義也。第二偈五求破者，良以計眾生是諸行根本，故今偏破眾生，尚無眾生，誰往來耶？又惑者謂：五陰或捨或受，如受人陰則捨天陰，眾生是常無有取捨，是故別破眾生也。長行云「生死陰界入即是一義」者，亦名生死，亦名陰界入，故云一義。又同是眾生之一義。約能破門，同是五求不可得義。如就陰中五求不得，就界入亦然。第三有身無身破。所以有此破者，上明五種求無眾生，故無往來。外人云：經說眾生捨一身受一身輪轉六道，云何言無眾生往來耶？今縱有眾生，故以有身無身責之。上半云：若捨人身受天身，則往來之者便無身。如人捨東房入西房，則往來者無房。下半云：若無有身則無生死，何物往來？又既其無身則無往來者，以有五陰身可有眾生；既無五陰身則無眾生，若無眾生則無往來。若捨五陰身令眾生往來，亦應除五指將捲往來。又上半破有身往來，此破人與陰異義。下半破無身往來，此破人與陰一義。以謂無五陰亦有眾生，故是二義，謂有五陰身即有眾生名為一義。次問佛法內義：汝言從人身作天身者，為人滅故作天、為不滅而作天？若滅，則無有人，誰作天身？此則無身可往來。若不滅者，人身猶在，云何作天形耶？彼不受此責，云：人身有兩力，實法舉體滅，不得作天身；假名相續力，轉人作天。何得作此難耶？今問：實法滅義乃不作相續不滅邊而有作者，人形為猶在、為不在耶？若不在者，以何物轉作天身？若在者，人身猶在，云何作天？彼答：我人身轉作天。今問：為前受天身後方轉人、為前轉人竟後受天身？若受天身竟，何須更轉人身？若前轉，則非復人形，何得言從人身作天身耶？

The chapter has two parts: first, refuting the root of bondage and liberation; second, directly refuting bondage and liberation. Within refuting the root, there are two parts: first, refuting the root of bondage; next, refuting the root of liberation. Sentient beings and the five aggregates are taken as the root of the bondage of saṃsāra; the extinguishing of these sentient beings and the five aggregates is called the root of liberation. 'Root' means the substance. The Pañcaviṃśati-sāhasrikā-prajñāpāramitā-sūtra states: 'The limit of saṃsāra is like space; the limit of the nature of sentient beings is also like space; within this there is neither the coming and going of saṃsāra nor liberation.' This clarifies that both roots are empty. This is the overarching principle of the bodhisattva's right mindfulness. Within refuting the root of bondage, there are three parts: first, refuting through permanence and impermanence; second, refuting through the fivefold search; third, refuting through having a body and having no body. 'The question says: Saṃsāra is not entirely without a root' establishes the correct root of bondage. The root of bondage is what the sūtras explain as sentient beings and the five aggregates. Question: How does this establishment differ from the previous ones? Answer: Above, the person and dharmas were directly established; here, coming and going are cited to prove there are a person and dharmas. Above, the person and dharmas were directly refuted; here, it refutes [them] on the grounds that because there is no coming and going, there is no person or dharma. Question: Why establish person and dharmas and refute person and dharmas? Answer: The Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra says: 'What sentient beings perceive through false conceptualization does not go beyond person and dharmas.' Now, by refuting person and dharmas, the two kinds of selflessness are made clear, so that one enters the first bhūmi and even attains Buddhahood. Furthermore, followers of both the Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna constantly loathe the coming and going of saṃsāra and seek to attain liberation; now it is clarified that if one sees coming and going as existing, one cannot put coming and going to rest; only when one awakens to coming and going as being without coming and going can one put coming and going to rest. From 'The answer says' downward is the second [part], directly refuting through permanence and impermanence. From above up to this point, the refutation of the five aggregates and sentient beings has already been completed; now granting their existence, two passes are opened to press [the opponent]. Question: The chapter refutes bondage and liberation; why refute coming and going? Answer: The opponent considers coming and going to be bondage itself; hence refuting coming and going is refuting bondage. Moreover, the root of coming and going does not go beyond person and dharmas; if these two were real, they would necessarily fall into annihilation and permanence. If permanent, then gods and humans would have no mutual transition, being tranquil and unchanging; how could there be coming and going? If impermanent, their substance would be exhausted in a single lifetime; who would still come and go? The monk Sāti held that a single consciousness comes and goes in saṃsāra; the remaining Abhidharma commentators and Mahāyāna followers all say that there is impermanent coming and going. Furthermore, non-Buddhists hold that sentient beings are permanent and therefore come and go, while Buddhist scholars grasp at impermanence and therefore [hold that they] come and go. Now both of these internal and external positions are refuted. As for the second verse, refuting through the fivefold search: truly because sentient beings are assumed to be the root of all conditioned phenomena, we now specifically refute sentient beings; if there are not even sentient beings, who comes and goes? Furthermore, the deluded say: the five aggregates are either discarded or received—as when receiving a human aggregate, one discards a divine aggregate—while sentient beings are permanent and without taking up or discarding; therefore sentient beings are refuted separately. The prose states: 'Saṃsāra, aggregates, dhātus, and āyatanas are just one meaning'; they are called both saṃsāra and aggregates, dhātus, and āyatanas, which is why it is said to be 'one meaning'. Again, they are equally a single meaning of sentient beings. In terms of the refuting approach, they are equally the meaning of being unobtainable through the fivefold search. Just as within the aggregates they are unobtainable through the fivefold search, within the dhātus and āyatanas it is likewise. Third is the refutation through having a body and having no body. The reason for this refutation is that above it was clarified that through the fivefold search there are no sentient beings, and thus there is no coming and going. The opponent says: The sūtras state that sentient beings discard one body and take up another body, transmigrating through the six destinies; how can you say there is no coming and going of sentient beings? Now, even granting that there are sentient beings, we press them with having a body and having no body. The first half says: If discarding a human body and taking up a divine body, the one who comes and goes would then have no body. Just as when a person leaves the eastern room and enters the western room, the one who comes and goes has no room. The second half says: If there is no body, there is no saṃsāra; what thing comes and goes? Furthermore, since there is no body, there is no one who comes and goes, because it is only when there is a body of the five aggregates that there can be a sentient being; since there is no body of the five aggregates, there is no sentient being, and if there is no sentient being, there is no coming and going. If discarding the body of the five aggregates allows a sentient being to come and go, one should also be able to remove the five fingers and bring the fist back and forth. Furthermore, the first half refutes coming and going with a body; this refutes the view that the person is different from the aggregates. The second half refutes coming and going without a body; this refutes the view that the person is identical to the aggregates. Holding that even without the five aggregates there is still a sentient being is the view of difference; holding that where there is a body of the five aggregates there is a sentient being is called the view of identity. Next, questioning the internal tenets of the Buddha-Dharma: When you say that from a human body one becomes a divine body, does one become a god because the human ceases, or does one become a god without ceasing? If it ceases, then there is no human; who becomes the divine body? This means there is no body that can come and go. If it does not cease, the human body is still present; how could it assume a divine form? They do not accept this criticism, saying: 'The human body has two forces: the real dharma ceases entirely in its substance and cannot become a divine body; the force of continuity of the provisional designation transforms the human into a god. How can you raise this objection?' Now we ask: If in the sense that the real dharma ceases, it does not act, but there is an actor on the side of non-cessation of continuity, does the human form still exist or not? If it does not exist, by means of what thing does it transform to become a divine body? If it exists, the human body is still present; how can it become a god? They answer: 'Our human body transforms into a god.' Now we ask: Does one first receive the divine body and only afterward transform the human, or does one first finish transforming the human and afterward receive the divine body? If one has already received the divine body, why need one further transform the human body? If it transforms beforehand, it is no longer a human form; how can you say that from a human body one becomes a divine body?