中觀論疏 8.34

8.34

品開為二：一立、二破。立中為二：初立有時；「上中下一異等」，次立有法。問：上品未明三世，外人執有三世，何因緣故立上中下法及一異耶？答：上明三乘人得益，即執上中下義。對三乘之異，辨一乘之法，故復執一異。《大品》云「諸法如中非但無有三乘異，亦無獨一菩薩乘。」今欲釋經無一無三，破外人定執有三一之理，故今明上中下及一異也。答中六偈，分為二章：初四偈就待不待門破、次兩偈就體相門破。初又二：前三偈半就待不待門破時、次半偈破法。三偈半為二：初三偈就待過去不待過去無有二時、次半偈例破餘二時。三偈為二：初二偈就相待門破、次一偈就不待門破。初二偈即二：前偈明相待則在、次偈明不相在則不相待。初偈上半牒、下半破。破意云：法有自體，不假因他；因他而有，則無自體。若無自體，則在他中。長行為四：一牒外義，則牒偈上半。「即過去時中」下，第二難，牒偈下半。「何以故」下，第三釋難。就初難中有五：一明相待即相在、二明若相在即同名過去、第三若同名過去無有二時、第四若無二時亦無過去、第五明過去無因則無過去，以無未來可因故無過去。如是生死涅槃相待，亦作此中五難。問：燈明一時可得燈處有明，三世前後何得為類？答：雖復前後一時不同，而相因無異，故得作此責也。「是故前說」下，第四結非。餘文易知。「若謂過去時中」下，生第二偈，明不相在則不得待。偈上半牒、下半破。破意云：若不相在而各自有體，何假相因？如他義長短已成，何須更待？「問曰若不相因」下，生第三偈，不相待破。問：待不待破何義？答：待是因緣義，不待是自性義，一切義不出斯二。破相待明第一義中道，破不待明世諦中道。又待是相待，不待是絕待義，如十八空是相待空，獨空為不待空。若爾，破相待明第一義中道，破絕待明非真非俗中道也。答中，上句牒、下三句破。破意云：汝上自言相待故有、不待則無，若爾，今既不待，則無二時。然立三世義，不得不待，以過現而去名為過去，現若不待過，云何有現耶？「如是義故」，第二半偈，例破二時。前三偈就待過去不待過去門破無二時，今還捉未來現在為端，亦應各有三偈，合有九偈也。下半第二章次例破其法。他云：一丈木有長短二理，形二丈則短、形五尺則長。今問：以有此理則不須相形，若無此理雖形不出。又若須長方知有短，亦應須形方有長短理。理若自有者，長短事亦自有也。「問曰如有歲月日」下，生第二就體相互相破。前問、次答。上待不待二門責無有時，外無以答，但舉眼現見事以問論主：若無時者，云何有歲月等耶？今既有歲月等，當知有時。《攝論》約五種明時：一日時、二月時、三年時、四行時、五雙時。以明暗為異，故以日夜為數，名為日時。有黑白之異，故分為兩半，兩半合論則虧盈事成，故有月時。十二月分為三分，一分有兩時，一時有二月，故說年時。日則六月從南行至北，故以六月為一行時。五年五月五日有兩潤，以為一雙，故說雙時。次有一小劫時，十九小劫為中劫時，八十小劫為一大劫時，小乘六十數、大乘八十數，為一僧祇也。問：幾許為一須臾時？答：《智度論》一彈指六十生滅。康僧會云：「一彈指有一百九十轉。」《僧祇律》云「二十念名一眴，二十眴名一彈指，二十彈指名一羅頗，二十羅頗名一須臾。」答中兩偈為二：初偈時體無故相無、第二偈時相無故時無也。上半明時無體、下半明體無故相無。若過去猶住則是現在，不名過去；過去若不住，失自相，失自相則無時體，便無過去。同《百論》過去過去者不名為過去，未來亦爾。若未來未有則是無，無則無時；若未來已有則是現在，亦無未來。前二門責無過去，過去無故，餘二時亦無。二門責無未來，未來無故，餘二時亦無。又時體若住則常是一念，無有歲月，既無歲月，亦無一念；時若不住，則念念各滅，並無相續，何有歲數？汝本積時成日、積日成月、積月為歲，若一日滅則有後無前，云何積日成月？日若不滅，則唯有一日，則有前無後，復何得積日成月？故住不住並不可也。他義云：十劫為一念，此是佛智力爾。今問：實有長短，云何得爾？若以佛力令短長自在，亦應以佛力故色得為心。又問：時若是常，常無三世；時無常念念生滅，亦無三世。又常言：無明初念未有四住地，以名為初。既未有後，何得有初？若未有後名初，亦可名為後。又若無後名初，則是自然初。又若無後有初，亦應無初有後。第二偈上半明因物有時，則物為時體；下半明物無故時無。如因華菓等物知春秋時，華菓等物上來種種破故無物，無物故時無也。爾問：時法互相待，何不互為體？又問：時無別體，意識緣應不得，亦應非是法塵；而意識緣之遂得，又是法塵。則應是別體也，若無體則無時。又現在若待未來則應相在，若不可在，亦不可待也。

The chapter is divided into two parts: first, the positing; second, the refutation. Within the positing, there are two parts: first, positing that time exists; next, with "superior, middling, inferior, unity, diversity, and so forth," positing that dharmas exist. Question: In the previous chapter the three times were not yet explained; why do the non-Buddhists, in clinging to the existence of the three times, posit superior, middling, and inferior dharmas as well as unity and diversity? Answer: In the previous chapter it was explained that persons of the three vehicles attain benefit; thereupon they cling to the meaning of superior, middling, and inferior. In contrast to the diversity of the three vehicles, the teaching of the One Vehicle was distinguished; hence they further cling to unity and diversity. The *Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā-prajñāpāramitā-sūtra* says: "Within the suchness of all dharmas, not only is there no diversity of three vehicles, but there is also no solitary Bodhisattva Vehicle." Now, desiring to explain that the sūtra teaches neither oneness nor threeness, and to refute the non-Buddhists' fixed clinging to the principle of threeness and oneness, superior, middling, and inferior, as well as unity and diversity, are now clarified. The six verses of the reply are divided into two sections: the first four verses refute [time and dharmas] from the perspective of dependence and non-dependence; the next two verses refute them from the perspective of essence and characteristics. The first section also has two parts: the first three and a half verses refute time from the perspective of dependence and non-dependence; the next half-verse refutes dharmas. The three and a half verses are divided into two: the first three verses [show that] whether depending on the past or not depending on the past, the other two times do not exist; the next half-verse applies this analogously to refute the remaining two times. The three verses are divided into two: the first two verses refute from the perspective of mutual dependence; the next verse refutes from the perspective of non-dependence. The first two verses comprise two parts: the former verse explains that if there is mutual dependence, they must reside within each other; the next verse explains that if they do not reside within each other, they cannot be mutually dependent. The first half of the first verse cites [the opponent's claim], and the second half refutes it. The intent of the refutation is: If a dharma has its own essence, it does not depend on an other as cause; if it exists dependent on an other, then it lacks an essence of its own. If it lacks an essence of its own, it must reside within the other. The prose has four parts: First, citing the opponent's doctrine, which cites the first half of the verse. Second, from "then within the past time" downward, the objection, which cites the second half of the verse. Third, from "why is that" downward, the explanation of the objection. Within the first objection there are five points: (1) explaining that mutual dependence implies mutual containment; (2) explaining that if they reside within each other, they would equally be called the past; (3) that if they are equally called the past, the two times do not exist; (4) that if the two times do not exist, the past also does not exist; (5) explaining that if the past has no cause, then there is no past, because without a future to serve as its cause, there is no past. Mutual dependence between saṃsāra and nirvāṇa is likewise subjected to these five objections. Question: A lamp and its light exist simultaneously, so where the lamp is, light may be found; how can the sequential precedence and succession of the three times serve as an analogy? Answer: Although precedence, succession, and simultaneity are not the same, their mutual causation is no different; hence it is valid to raise this challenge. Fourth, from "therefore what was previously said" downward, concluding the error. The rest of the text is easy to understand. From "if you say that within past time" downward, the second verse is introduced, explaining that if they do not reside within each other, they cannot be dependent. The first half of the verse cites [the claim], and the second half refutes it. The intent of the refutation is: If they do not reside within each other and each has its own essence, why would they depend on each other as cause? Just as in the opponent's doctrine long and short are already established, why must they depend on anything further? From "the question asks: if they do not depend on each other as cause" downward, the third verse is introduced, refuting through non-dependence. Question: What principles do the refutations through dependence and non-dependence refute? Answer: Dependence is the principle of dependent origination; non-dependence is the principle of intrinsic nature. All doctrines do not go beyond these two. Refuting mutual dependence clarifies the middle way of ultimate truth; refuting non-dependence clarifies the middle way of conventional truth. Furthermore, dependence means relative dependence, while non-dependence means absolute independence; just as the eighteen emptinesses are relative emptiness, solitary emptiness is non-dependent emptiness. If so, refuting mutual dependence clarifies the middle way of ultimate truth, while refuting absolute independence clarifies the middle way of neither-ultimate-nor-conventional. In the reply, the first line cites [the opponent's claim], and the lower three lines refute it. The intent of the refutation is: You yourself said above that they exist through mutual dependence and do not exist without dependence; if so, now that they do not depend, the two times do not exist. Yet in positing the doctrine of the three times, one cannot avoid dependence; since passing beyond the present is called the past, if the present does not depend on the past, how could the present exist? "By this principle": the second half-verse applies this analogously to refute the other two times. The previous three verses refuted the existence of the two times from the perspective of depending on the past or not depending on the past; now, taking the future and the present as the starting point, each should likewise have three verses, making nine verses in total. The second half of the second section next refutes dharmas by analogy. The opponent says: A ten-foot piece of wood contains the two principles of long and short; compared to twenty feet it is short, compared to five feet it is long. Now we ask: If it possesses this principle, it has no need for mutual comparison; if it lacks this principle, even with comparison it will not emerge. Moreover, if one must depend on long to know short, one must also depend on comparison for the principles of long and short to exist. If the principle exists of itself, the facts of long and short must also exist of themselves. From "the question asks: just as there are years, months, and days" downward, the second section is introduced, refuting mutually through essence and characteristics. First comes the question, next the answer. Above, through the two approaches of dependence and non-dependence, it was challenged that time does not exist; the opponent has no way to answer, but merely adduces things visible to the eye to question the author of the treatise: If time does not exist, how can there be years, months, and so forth? Now, since years, months, and so forth exist, one should know that time exists. The *Mahāyānasaṃgraha* explains time in terms of five kinds: first, day-time; second, month-time; third, year-time; fourth, transit-time; fifth, twin-time. Differentiated by light and dark, day and night are counted, termed day-time. Differentiated by dark and bright, [a month] is divided into two halves; when the two halves are considered together, the matters of waxing and waning are accomplished, hence there is month-time. Twelve months are divided into three divisions; one division has two seasons, and one season has two months, hence year-time is spoken of. The sun travels from south to north in six months, so six months constitute one transit-time. In five years, five months, and five days there are two intercalations, which are taken as a pair, hence twin-time is spoken of. Next, there is the time of a small kalpa; nineteen small kalpas constitute the time of a medium kalpa; eighty small kalpas constitute the time of a great kalpa; sixty numbers in the Hīnayāna and eighty numbers in the Mahāyāna constitute one asaṃkhyeya. Question: How long is a kṣaṇa (instant)? Answer: The *Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa* says that in one snap of the fingers there are sixty arisings and ceasings. Kang Senghui said: "In one snap of the fingers there are one hundred and ninety transitions." The *Mahāsāṃghika-vinaya* says: "Twenty thoughts are called a blink; twenty blinks are called a finger-snap; twenty finger-snaps are called a lava; twenty lavas are called a muhūrta." The two verses of the reply are divided into two: In the first verse, because the essence of time does not exist, its characteristics do not exist; in the second verse, because the characteristics of time do not exist, time does not exist. The first half explains that time lacks an essence; the second half explains that because the essence is lacking, the characteristics do not exist. If the past still abides, it is then the present and cannot be called the past; if the past does not abide, it loses its own characteristic, and losing its own characteristic it lacks the essence of time, whereupon there is no past. This agrees with the *Śata-śāstra*: "That which is past in the past is not called the past"; the future is also like this. If the future has not yet arrived, it is non-existent, and being non-existent there is no time; if the future already exists, it is the present, and there is also no future. The previous two approaches challenged the non-existence of the past; because the past does not exist, the remaining two times also do not exist. The two approaches challenged the non-existence of the future; because the future does not exist, the remaining two times also do not exist. Furthermore, if the essence of time abides, it would always be a single thought-moment without years or months; since there are no years or months, there is also no single thought-moment. If time does not abide, then thought-moment by thought-moment each perishes, with no continuity whatsoever; how could there be a count of years? You originally accumulated moments to make days, accumulated days to make months, and accumulated months to make years. If one day perishes, there is a posterior without an anterior; how could days be accumulated to make a month? If a day does not perish, there is only a single day, so there is an anterior without a posterior; how again could days be accumulated to make a month? Therefore, neither abiding nor not abiding is admissible. Another doctrine says: Ten kalpas are a single thought-moment; this is due to the power of the Buddha's wisdom. Now we ask: If length and shortness truly exist, how could this be so? If by the Buddha's power length and shortness are brought under mastery, then by the Buddha's power form ought also to be able to become mind. Furthermore, we ask: If time is permanent, that which is permanent lacks the three times; if time is impermanent, arising and ceasing from moment to moment, it also lacks the three times. Moreover, it is commonly said: "The initial moment of ignorance, when the four entrenchment-grounds do not yet exist, is termed the beginning." Since there is not yet a subsequent, how can there be a beginning? If that which has no subsequent is called a beginning, it could also be called an end. Furthermore, if having no subsequent it is called a beginning, it would be an uncaused beginning. Moreover, if without a subsequent there can be a beginning, there should also be an end without a beginning. The first half of the second verse explains that time exists dependent on things, so things are the essence of time; the second half explains that because things do not exist, time does not exist. Just as one knows spring and autumn through things like flowers and fruits, because things like flowers and fruits have been refuted above in various ways, there are no things; and because there are no things, time does not exist. Then it is asked: If time and dharmas are mutually dependent, why do they not serve mutually as essences? It is also asked: If time has no separate essence, the mental consciousness should not be able to apprehend it as an object, nor should it be a dharma-object; yet the mental consciousness does succeed in apprehending it, and it is also a dharma-object. Thus it must have a separate essence; if it lacks an essence, time does not exist. Furthermore, if the present depends on the future, they should reside within each other; if they cannot reside within each other, they cannot be dependent either.