中觀論疏 8.34

8.34

The chapter is divided into two parts: first, the positing; second, the refutation. Within the positing, there are two parts: first, positing that time exists; next, with "superior, middling, inferior, unity, diversity, and so forth," positing that dharmas exist. Question: In the previous chapter the three times were not yet explained; why do the non-Buddhists, in clinging to the existence of the three times, posit superior, middling, and inferior dharmas as well as unity and diversity? Answer: In the previous chapter it was explained that persons of the three vehicles attain benefit; thereupon they cling to the meaning of superior, middling, and inferior. In contrast to the diversity of the three vehicles, the teaching of the One Vehicle was distinguished; hence they further cling to unity and diversity. The *Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā-prajñāpāramitā-sūtra* says: "Within the suchness of all dharmas, not only is there no diversity of three vehicles, but there is also no solitary Bodhisattva Vehicle." Now, desiring to explain that the sūtra teaches neither oneness nor threeness, and to refute the non-Buddhists' fixed clinging to the principle of threeness and oneness, superior, middling, and inferior, as well as unity and diversity, are now clarified. The six verses of the reply are divided into two sections: the first four verses refute [time and dharmas] from the perspective of dependence and non-dependence; the next two verses refute them from the perspective of essence and characteristics. The first section also has two parts: the first three and a half verses refute time from the perspective of dependence and non-dependence; the next half-verse refutes dharmas. The three and a half verses are divided into two: the first three verses [show that] whether depending on the past or not depending on the past, the other two times do not exist; the next half-verse applies this analogously to refute the remaining two times. The three verses are divided into two: the first two verses refute from the perspective of mutual dependence; the next verse refutes from the perspective of non-dependence. The first two verses comprise two parts: the former verse explains that if there is mutual dependence, they must reside within each other; the next verse explains that if they do not reside within each other, they cannot be mutually dependent. The first half of the first verse cites [the opponent's claim], and the second half refutes it. The intent of the refutation is: If a dharma has its own essence, it does not depend on an other as cause; if it exists dependent on an other, then it lacks an essence of its own. If it lacks an essence of its own, it must reside within the other. The prose has four parts: First, citing the opponent's doctrine, which cites the first half of the verse. Second, from "then within the past time" downward, the objection, which cites the second half of the verse. Third, from "why is that" downward, the explanation of the objection. Within the first objection there are five points: (1) explaining that mutual dependence implies mutual containment; (2) explaining that if they reside within each other, they would equally be called the past; (3) that if they are equally called the past, the two times do not exist; (4) that if the two times do not exist, the past also does not exist; (5) explaining that if the past has no cause, then there is no past, because without a future to serve as its cause, there is no past. Mutual dependence between saṃsāra and nirvāṇa is likewise subjected to these five objections. Question: A lamp and its light exist simultaneously, so where the lamp is, light may be found; how can the sequential precedence and succession of the three times serve as an analogy? Answer: Although precedence, succession, and simultaneity are not the same, their mutual causation is no different; hence it is valid to raise this challenge. Fourth, from "therefore what was previously said" downward, concluding the error. The rest of the text is easy to understand. From "if you say that within past time" downward, the second verse is introduced, explaining that if they do not reside within each other, they cannot be dependent. The first half of the verse cites [the claim], and the second half refutes it. The intent of the refutation is: If they do not reside within each other and each has its own essence, why would they depend on each other as cause? Just as in the opponent's doctrine long and short are already established, why must they depend on anything further? From "the question asks: if they do not depend on each other as cause" downward, the third verse is introduced, refuting through non-dependence. Question: What principles do the refutations through dependence and non-dependence refute? Answer: Dependence is the principle of dependent origination; non-dependence is the principle of intrinsic nature. All doctrines do not go beyond these two. Refuting mutual dependence clarifies the middle way of ultimate truth; refuting non-dependence clarifies the middle way of conventional truth. Furthermore, dependence means relative dependence, while non-dependence means absolute independence; just as the eighteen emptinesses are relative emptiness, solitary emptiness is non-dependent emptiness. If so, refuting mutual dependence clarifies the middle way of ultimate truth, while refuting absolute independence clarifies the middle way of neither-ultimate-nor-conventional. In the reply, the first line cites [the opponent's claim], and the lower three lines refute it. The intent of the refutation is: You yourself said above that they exist through mutual dependence and do not exist without dependence; if so, now that they do not depend, the two times do not exist. Yet in positing the doctrine of the three times, one cannot avoid dependence; since passing beyond the present is called the past, if the present does not depend on the past, how could the present exist? "By this principle": the second half-verse applies this analogously to refute the other two times. The previous three verses refuted the existence of the two times from the perspective of depending on the past or not depending on the past; now, taking the future and the present as the starting point, each should likewise have three verses, making nine verses in total. The second half of the second section next refutes dharmas by analogy. The opponent says: A ten-foot piece of wood contains the two principles of long and short; compared to twenty feet it is short, compared to five feet it is long. Now we ask: If it possesses this principle, it has no need for mutual comparison; if it lacks this principle, even with comparison it will not emerge. Moreover, if one must depend on long to know short, one must also depend on comparison for the principles of long and short to exist. If the principle exists of itself, the facts of long and short must also exist of themselves. From "the question asks: just as there are years, months, and days" downward, the second section is introduced, refuting mutually through essence and characteristics. First comes the question, next the answer. Above, through the two approaches of dependence and non-dependence, it was challenged that time does not exist; the opponent has no way to answer, but merely adduces things visible to the eye to question the author of the treatise: If time does not exist, how can there be years, months, and so forth? Now, since years, months, and so forth exist, one should know that time exists. The *Mahāyānasaṃgraha* explains time in terms of five kinds: first, day-time; second, month-time; third, year-time; fourth, transit-time; fifth, twin-time. Differentiated by light and dark, day and night are counted, termed day-time. Differentiated by dark and bright, [a month] is divided into two halves; when the two halves are considered together, the matters of waxing and waning are accomplished, hence there is month-time. Twelve months are divided into three divisions; one division has two seasons, and one season has two months, hence year-time is spoken of. The sun travels from south to north in six months, so six months constitute one transit-time. In five years, five months, and five days there are two intercalations, which are taken as a pair, hence twin-time is spoken of. Next, there is the time of a small kalpa; nineteen small kalpas constitute the time of a medium kalpa; eighty small kalpas constitute the time of a great kalpa; sixty numbers in the Hīnayāna and eighty numbers in the Mahāyāna constitute one asaṃkhyeya. Question: How long is a kṣaṇa (instant)? Answer: The *Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa* says that in one snap of the fingers there are sixty arisings and ceasings. Kang Senghui said: "In one snap of the fingers there are one hundred and ninety transitions." The *Mahāsāṃghika-vinaya* says: "Twenty thoughts are called a blink; twenty blinks are called a finger-snap; twenty finger-snaps are called a lava; twenty lavas are called a muhūrta." The two verses of the reply are divided into two: In the first verse, because the essence of time does not exist, its characteristics do not exist; in the second verse, because the characteristics of time do not exist, time does not exist. The first half explains that time lacks an essence; the second half explains that because the essence is lacking, the characteristics do not exist. If the past still abides, it is then the present and cannot be called the past; if the past does not abide, it loses its own characteristic, and losing its own characteristic it lacks the essence of time, whereupon there is no past. This agrees with the *Śata-śāstra*: "That which is past in the past is not called the past"; the future is also like this. If the future has not yet arrived, it is non-existent, and being non-existent there is no time; if the future already exists, it is the present, and there is also no future. The previous two approaches challenged the non-existence of the past; because the past does not exist, the remaining two times also do not exist. The two approaches challenged the non-existence of the future; because the future does not exist, the remaining two times also do not exist. Furthermore, if the essence of time abides, it would always be a single thought-moment without years or months; since there are no years or months, there is also no single thought-moment. If time does not abide, then thought-moment by thought-moment each perishes, with no continuity whatsoever; how could there be a count of years? You originally accumulated moments to make days, accumulated days to make months, and accumulated months to make years. If one day perishes, there is a posterior without an anterior; how could days be accumulated to make a month? If a day does not perish, there is only a single day, so there is an anterior without a posterior; how again could days be accumulated to make a month? Therefore, neither abiding nor not abiding is admissible. Another doctrine says: Ten kalpas are a single thought-moment; this is due to the power of the Buddha's wisdom. Now we ask: If length and shortness truly exist, how could this be so? If by the Buddha's power length and shortness are brought under mastery, then by the Buddha's power form ought also to be able to become mind. Furthermore, we ask: If time is permanent, that which is permanent lacks the three times; if time is impermanent, arising and ceasing from moment to moment, it also lacks the three times. Moreover, it is commonly said: "The initial moment of ignorance, when the four entrenchment-grounds do not yet exist, is termed the beginning." Since there is not yet a subsequent, how can there be a beginning? If that which has no subsequent is called a beginning, it could also be called an end. Furthermore, if having no subsequent it is called a beginning, it would be an uncaused beginning. Moreover, if without a subsequent there can be a beginning, there should also be an end without a beginning. The first half of the second verse explains that time exists dependent on things, so things are the essence of time; the second half explains that because things do not exist, time does not exist. Just as one knows spring and autumn through things like flowers and fruits, because things like flowers and fruits have been refuted above in various ways, there are no things; and because there are no things, time does not exist. Then it is asked: If time and dharmas are mutually dependent, why do they not serve mutually as essences? It is also asked: If time has no separate essence, the mental consciousness should not be able to apprehend it as an object, nor should it be a dharma-object; yet the mental consciousness does succeed in apprehending it, and it is also a dharma-object. Thus it must have a separate essence; if it lacks an essence, time does not exist. Furthermore, if the present depends on the future, they should reside within each other; if they cannot reside within each other, they cannot be dependent either.