中觀論疏 9.14

9.14

「問曰且置成壞」下，此生第三體相門破。自上二門並破成壞，外無以通之，故請停成壞，立有法體。世間現見有於物，不應無有成壞，若無成壞寧有物耶？又外謂成壞是生滅兩相，物是色心法體，故舉法體證有於相。答中上半就離相無法門、下半就離法無相門。此破薩婆多、毘婆闍婆提、曇無崛等計法體外別有四相也。若破成實義者，若色義非生義，亦色體非生體；若生義非色義，以色為生體，亦生義非色義，用生為色體。偈為二：上半離相無法，相無法則無；下半離法無相，法無相即無。外人謂離相有法，相雖無、法不無。是以論主明離相無法，相無法即無。若爾，上來求成壞相無，即是無即是無法體，竟不應復問也。長行云「是法應或無或常」者，若離成壞有法則二過：一者都無此法、二設有者則常也。

From "The question says, setting aside coming-to-be and dissolution for now" onward, this gives rise to the third refutation, the gate of entity and characteristics. Since the preceding two gates refuted coming-to-be and dissolution, the opponent had no way to respond, so they requested to suspend coming-to-be and dissolution and establish that entities of phenomena exist. In the world, things are manifestly seen to exist; there should not be an absence of coming-to-be and dissolution; if there were no coming-to-be and dissolution, how could there be things? Furthermore, the opponent thinks that coming-to-be and dissolution are the two characteristics of arising and ceasing, while things are the phenomenal entities of matter and mind; hence they cite the phenomenal entity to prove that the characteristics exist. In the reply, the upper half relies on the gate that apart from characteristics there are no phenomena; the lower half relies on the gate that apart from phenomena there are no characteristics. This refutes the Sarvāstivādins, Vibhajyavādins, Dharmaguptakas, and others who posit that apart from the phenomenal entity there are four distinct characteristics. If refuting the *Tattvasiddhi* position: if the meaning of matter is not the meaning of arising, then the entity of matter is not the entity of arising; if the meaning of arising is not the meaning of matter, taking matter as the entity of arising, then the meaning of arising is not the meaning of matter, using arising as the entity of matter. The verse has two parts: the upper half is that apart from characteristics there are no phenomena, and if characteristics have no phenomena, they do not exist; the lower half is that apart from phenomena there are no characteristics, and if phenomena have no characteristics, they do not exist. The opponent considers that apart from characteristics there are phenomena, so that even though characteristics are absent, phenomena are not absent. Therefore the treatise master explains that apart from characteristics there are no phenomena; and if characteristics have no phenomena, they do not exist. If so, searching for the characteristics of coming-to-be and dissolution hitherto has shown they do not exist, which means there is no phenomenal entity; ultimately they should not ask again. When the prose commentary says "this phenomenon must either not exist or be permanent," it means that if there is a phenomenon apart from coming-to-be and dissolution, there are two errors: first, there is entirely no such phenomenon; second, even if there were, it would be permanent.