中觀論疏 9.19

9.19

「若有所受法」者，第七斷常門破。所以有此破來者，凡有二義：一近從〈破生滅〉起，上明道理實無生滅，若決定執有生滅則墮斷常。二者破世間法既將究竟，故領其大要，明內外大小一切有得之徒，凡計有一豪法則墮斷常，若墮斷常則是眾見根本，若有於見則便有愛，愛見因緣故有業苦不得解脫，是故不應於法起斷常見。又起斷常，障中道、不發正觀，愛見戲論何由滅耶？四偈為三：初破、次救、後兩偈破救。初偈上半明有所得人受著諸法、下半明所受之法墮於斷常。上半序其能見之心、下半明其所計之法。如有見外道則是常見，無見外道則是斷見。三世有部則是常見，二世無部則是斷見。學大乘者斷除二死、滅於五住名為斷見，有常住果起名為常見。乃至《地論》斷除妄想名為斷見，有真如法身則是常見。又云不有心而已，有則相續至佛，則是常見；煩惱會真有斷期，則是斷見。又謂心不可朽滅是常見，草木一化便盡則是斷見。又云煩惱成就未得治道已來決定是有，則是常見；得治道斷之，名為斷見。聞熏習不滅則常，滅則斷見。「問曰」下，第二救義。上半總唱不墮斷常、下半舉因果相續釋非斷常。然中道難識，犢子亦說不即不離，方廣亦說不生不滅，魔亦說無有菩提及以涅槃。今外人一往明不斷常，不見龍樹論者言是至妙中道，以龍樹論觀之乃是用斷常作中道，實非中道也。長行釋上半云「信受分別」者，論主前云受著之受，外云信受之受。「如經說」者，外引經證不懼龍樹破之。然不斷不常可就三義解釋：一者就法明不斷常，如實法滅故不常、相續故不斷。二就人明不斷常，如〈業品〉云「而於本作者，不一亦不異。」三人法合論不斷常，如此中引經云「五陰空無我故不斷，罪福不失故不常。」故《淨名》云「無我無造無受者，善惡之業不敗亡」也。「何以故」下，釋下半也。「答曰」下，第三破救。二偈即二：初偈偏就斷滅破、第二偈具作斷常破。前偈二：上半牒、下半破。破意云：因若不滅，果則不生；若言果生，是則因滅。如實有此物滅之，則此法永滅不復更生，豈非斷耶？《攝論》明梨耶是果報無記，能持無始來一切種子。今問：前念梨耶滅更生、為不復生耶？若更生則常，是一念法經無量生則唯有一念耳；若不生者則是斷滅。又問：梨耶持種子，梨耶既滅則種子亦滅，誰生果耶？此不可通。第二偈上半就常門破。外人謂法有生滅，是故不常；今求法生滅不得，豈非常耶？以住自性故常，有無即是生滅；既無有無，故無生滅也。下半云涅槃永滅相續，豈非大斷滅耶？汝亦實有生死可滅，寧非斷耶？問：何故就涅槃破其成斷見耶？答：有二義。一者是顯外人解是惑，故計涅槃成於斷見；二者欲顯一切法皆是斷常，為釋前偈以斷常攝法故也。此通破內外大小諸涅槃義。生死若斷名為斷見，涅槃是常即名常見。長行云「隨有瓶時無失壞相，無瓶時亦無失壞相」者，如當穀種有時正是有故無壞，穀種無時無所有故無壞。既無壞，云何有成？故云生滅相待也。

Regarding "If there is an apprehended entity": this is the seventh refutation, via the approach of annihilation and permanence. There are two reasons for this refutation coming here: First, locally, it arises from [the chapter] "Refuting Arising and Ceasing." Above it was explained that in true principle there is really no arising or ceasing; if one determinately grasps that there is arising and ceasing, one falls into annihilation and permanence. Second, because the refutation of worldly phenomena is about to be completed, [Nāgārjuna] therefore takes hold of its major essentials, making clear that for all those with acquisition among both internal and external, Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna, whenever they conceive of even a single strand of phenomenon, they fall into annihilation and permanence. If they fall into annihilation and permanence, this is the root of all views; if one has views, then there is craving; through the causes and conditions of craving and views, there is karmic suffering and one does not attain liberation. Therefore, one should not give rise to views of annihilation and permanence with regard to phenomena. Furthermore, giving rise to annihilation and permanence obstructs the middle way and fails to produce right contemplation; how could craving, views, and prapañca ever be eliminated? The four verses comprise three [parts]: first, the refutation; next, the rescue; and the final two verses refute the rescue. The first half of the first verse clarifies that people with acquisition receive and adhere to phenomena; the second half clarifies that the received phenomena fall into annihilation and permanence. The first half describes the perceiving mind; the second half clarifies the conceived phenomena. For instance, non-Buddhists who hold the view of existence represent eternalism, whereas non-Buddhists who hold the view of non-existence represent annihilationism. The school that posits the existence of the three periods of time represents eternalism, whereas the school that posits the non-existence of two periods of time represents annihilationism. For those who study the Mahāyāna, severing the two kinds of death and eliminating the five bondages is called annihilationism, while the arising of the permanently abiding fruit is called eternalism. Further, according to the Dilun school, severing false discrimination is called annihilationism, while possessing the dharmakāya of true suchness is eternalism. It is also said that if one does not have a mind, that is all; but if one has it, its continuity up to Buddhahood is eternalism; and that afflictions having a definite time of severance when meeting the real is annihilationism. Moreover, supposing that the mind cannot perish is eternalism, while grass and trees being completely ended after a single transformation is annihilationism. It is also said that afflictions being actualized and definitely existing before attaining the path of remedy is eternalism; and severing them upon attaining the path of remedy is called annihilationism. Hearing-perfuming not being destroyed is permanence; if destroyed, it is annihilationism. In "The opponent asks" and below: this is the second [part], the rescue. The first half generally proclaims that one does not fall into annihilation and permanence; the second half cites the continuity of cause and effect to explain why it is neither annihilation nor permanence. However, the middle way is difficult to discern: the Vātsīputrīyas also speak of neither identical nor distinct, the Fangguang also speak of neither arising nor ceasing, and Māra also speaks of there being neither bodhi nor nirvāṇa. Here, the outsider at the outset explains non-annihilation and non-permanence, not seeing that in Nāgārjuna's treatise it is said to be the most wondrous middle way; viewing it through Nāgārjuna's treatise, they are merely taking annihilation and permanence to be the middle way, which is truly not the middle way. The prose explains the first half by saying "faithfully accepts and discriminates": the author of the treatise previously spoke of "acceptance" in the sense of receiving and adhering, whereas the outsider speaks of "acceptance" in the sense of faithful acceptance. In "As the sūtra states": the outsider cites the authority of a sūtra, not fearing Nāgārjuna's refutation. Now, neither annihilation nor permanence can be explained in terms of three meanings: First, explaining non-annihilation and non-permanence in terms of phenomena: as real phenomena cease, there is no permanence; because there is continuity, there is no annihilation. Second, explaining non-annihilation and non-permanence in terms of persons: as the "Karma Chapter" says, "Yet with respect to the original agent, it is neither identical nor different." Third, discussing non-annihilation and non-permanence by combining persons and phenomena: as in the citation of the sūtra here, "Because the five aggregates are empty and without self, there is no annihilation; because sin and merit are not lost, there is no permanence." Hence the Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa says, "There is no self, no maker, and no experiencer, yet wholesome and unwholesome karma are not destroyed." In "Why is that?" and below: this explains the second half. In "Answer:" and below: this is the third [part], refuting the rescue. The two verses comprise two [points]: the first verse refutes specifically with regard to annihilation; the second verse thoroughly engages in [the refutation of] both annihilation and permanence. The former verse has two parts: the first half reiterates, and the second half refutes. The refuting intent says: If the cause does not cease, the effect does not arise; if one says the effect arises, then the cause ceases. If such a thing really exists and ceases, then this phenomenon ceases forever and does not arise again; how is this not annihilation? The She lun explains that the ālaya[-vijñāna] is retribution and indeterminate, able to hold all seeds from beginningless time. Now we ask: does the ālaya of the preceding thought-moment arise again after ceasing, or does it not arise again? If it arises again, then it is permanent, meaning a single moment's phenomenon passes through immeasurable rebirths and is yet only a single thought-moment; if it does not arise, then it is annihilation. Furthermore, we ask: the ālaya holds seeds; since the ālaya has ceased, the seeds also cease, so what gives rise to the effect? This is untenable. The first half of the second verse refutes via the approach of permanence. The outsider considers phenomena to have arising and ceasing, and therefore not to be permanent; now, searching for the arising and ceasing of phenomena, they cannot be found—how are they not permanent? Because it abides in its intrinsic nature, it is permanent; existence and non-existence are precisely arising and ceasing; since there is neither existence nor non-existence, there is no arising or ceasing. The second half states that nirvāṇa's eternal cessation of continuity—how is it not a great annihilation? You also have real saṃsāra that can be ceased; how is that not annihilation? Question: Why does he refute their falling into annihilationism specifically with respect to nirvāṇa? Answer: There are two meanings. First, it reveals that the outsider's understanding is delusion, so their conception of nirvāṇa results in annihilationism; second, it intends to reveal that all phenomena are annihilation and permanence, in order to explain the previous verse's subsumption of phenomena under annihilation and permanence. This universally refutes all interpretations of nirvāṇa across both internal and external, Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna. If saṃsāra is severed, it is called the view of annihilation; if nirvāṇa is permanent, it is called the view of permanence. The prose says, "While a pot exists, there is no characteristic of destruction, and when there is no pot, there is also no characteristic of destruction": just as when a grain seed exists, precisely because it is existent there is no destruction, and when the grain seed does not exist, because there is nothing at all there is no destruction. Since there is no destruction, how can there be formation? Hence it is said that arising and ceasing are mutually dependent.