中觀論疏 9.20

9.20

「復次若初有滅者」下，第八三世門破。問：何以知此是三世門破？答：下結云「三世中求有相續不可得也」。所以最後破三有相續者，凡有四義：一者接上。外救云因果相續不斷不常，故今破之。二者二十一品破世間人法終此章，世間即是三有，是故破於三有。三者大小乘人見有三有之生，並欲滅於三有。論主云，若見三有生滅，則不能滅於三有；悟三有本自不生、今亦不滅，方能滅三有耳。又毘曇明四有：本有、死有、中有、生有。又二生死為二有，謂分段與變易。又七生死為七有。今並求如此有不可得耳。如此生死本不生、今無所滅，得離七生死；見有七生死生滅者，不離七生死也。故破三有也。四者欲顯論主二十一品破世間法意。所以破世間法，為令眾生知世間畢竟空，悟三有無所有，得離三有也。四偈即四：初滅不滅破、第二一時二有破、三生死一有破、四總結破。初偈上半云初有若滅，後有無因。下半初有不滅則一時有二，初有若滅滅則是無，誰生後？初有不滅則礙後有，後有云何得起？「問曰」下，生第二偈。問中初非上二破；「但滅時生」下，正立己宗。答中上半牒、下半破。破意云：若初有滅時是後有生時者，則二有一時。汝言滅時生，則生滅同時，生有非死有，是則一時有二。若一時無二有，則一滅一生，非滅時生也。「問曰」下，生第三救。問中前非二破；「但現見」下，外人無以理答，以答不出前後一時，故但云眼見。眼見者，此人若死，彼處即生。答中上半牒、下半破。破意云：汝欲令滅時無二有者，則生死是一有，是為一陰亦生亦死；若死非即生，還有二有。一時中有生死二陰，此死陰有生陰。第四偈結破。上半牒前破門，從欲生色則欲前色後，無色亦爾。下半呵外計有，以外人無有計有，故三有不斷；若悟有非有，故能滅三有，即顯論主破三有意也。

From "Furthermore, if the initial existence ceases" below: this is the eighth refutation, via the approach of the three periods of time. Question: How is it known that this is a refutation via the approach of the three periods of time? Answer: Below it concludes, "Seeking continuity of existence within the three periods of time is impossible." There are four reasons for refuting the continuity of the three existences at the very end: First, to continue from above. The outsider's rescue said that the continuity of cause and effect is neither annihilation nor permanence, hence this is now refuted. Second, the twenty-one chapters refuting worldly persons and phenomena conclude with this section; the worldly realm is precisely the three existences, and therefore the three existences are refuted. Third, Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna practitioners see the arising of the three existences, and both wish to extinguish the three existences. The author of the treatise states that if one sees the arising and ceasing of the three existences, one cannot extinguish the three existences; only when one realizes that the three existences are originally unarisen and currently unceasing can one extinguish the three existences. Furthermore, the Abhidharma explains four existences: prior existence, death existence, intermediate existence, and birth existence. Also, the two kinds of saṃsāra constitute two existences, namely portioned [existence] and transformational [existence]. Also, the seven kinds of saṃsāra constitute seven existences. Now, seeking such existences, they are all unfindable. When such saṃsāra is originally unarisen and currently unceasing, one is able to be free from the seven kinds of saṃsāra; those who see the arising and ceasing of the seven kinds of saṃsāra are not freed from the seven kinds of saṃsāra. Therefore the three existences are refuted. Fourth, to reveal the author's intention in refuting worldly phenomena across the twenty-one chapters. The reason for refuting worldly phenomena is to cause sentient beings to know that the worldly realm is ultimately empty, to realize that the three existences do not exist, and to attain freedom from the three existences. The four verses comprise four [points]: first, refutation through ceasing and non-ceasing; second, refutation through two existences at one time; third, refutation through saṃsāra as a single existence; fourth, general conclusion refuting it. The first half of the first verse states that if the initial existence ceases, the subsequent existence has no cause. The second half states that if the initial existence does not cease, then there are two [existences] at one time; if the initial existence ceases, cessation is non-existence, so what produces the subsequent [existence]? If the initial existence does not cease, it obstructs the subsequent existence; how could the subsequent existence arise? In "The opponent asks" and below: this gives rise to the second verse. In the question, the first [part] denies the above two refutations; from "It is only when it ceases that it arises" below, he correctly establishes his own tenet. In the answer, the first half reiterates and the second half refutes. The refuting intent says: If the time when the initial existence ceases is the time when the subsequent existence arises, then the two existences exist at the same time. You say it arises at the time of cessation, then arising and ceasing are simultaneous; birth existence is not death existence, which means there are two at one time. If there are not two existences at one time, then one ceases and the other arises, and it is not arising at the time of cessation. In "The opponent asks" and below: this gives rise to the third rescue. In the question, the first [part] denies the two refutations; from "Yet it is directly seen" below, the outsider has no rational reply, and because his reply cannot escape [the dilemmas of] prior and posterior or simultaneous, he merely says it is seen with the eyes. "Seen with the eyes" means that if this person dies, he is immediately born in that place. In the answer, the first half reiterates and the second half refutes. The refuting intent says: If you wish to make it so that there are not two existences at the time of cessation, then life and death constitute a single existence, which means a single aggregate is both born and dies; if dying is not immediately being born, then there are still two existences. In one time there are the two aggregates of birth and death, and this dying aggregate possesses a birth aggregate. The fourth verse concludes the refutation. The first half reiterates the previous refutational approaches: arising in the form realm from the desire realm means desire is prior and form is posterior, and the formless realm is also like this. The second half rebukes the outsider for conceiving of existence: because the outsider conceives of existence where there is none, the three existences do not cease; if one realizes that existence is non-existence, one can extinguish the three existences, which reveals the author's intention in refuting the three existences.