中觀論疏 9.26

9.26

就此一章凡有四品：一破如來、二破顛倒、三破四諦、四破涅槃。破世間則廣，有二十一品；破出世則略。但明四品者，欲明廣略互現。又顯執出世間猶是世間，上既破世間即是破出世竟，故不須廣破。又世為出世本，在本既傾，末則易破，故但有四品。又如來為出世之至人，涅槃是無上之極法，謂人法一雙。顛倒謂所破邪惑，四諦是能破之正教，謂邪正一雙。略明四門則理無不統。又破如來則破人，自下三品則破法，出世雖多，不出人法，總收一切；前世間亦爾，不出人法，總收一切也。即分為二：觀如來一品明出世人空、次三品明出世法空。前世間中直以廣略為二，今約人法分之。人但一品法有多者，人則無二，法有多門。又人空易得，法空難明故也。又四品次第者，前有諸佛出世，故初觀如來。如來所以出世，為破眾生煩惱，故次觀顛倒。顛倒所以得破，由四諦教門，故次觀四諦。雖說四諦，宗歸一滅，故後辨涅槃。具此四門，包含萬義。又如來是出世之人，顛倒是如來所離，四諦是如來所觀，涅槃是如來所證，復是一途次第。又前破如來者，世出世互現也，世間法中前破法後破人，出世法中前觀人後破法。二者外云：如來能說世出世法。既有能說之人，必有所說之法。三近從〈成壞品〉生者，世間是生滅之法，可得云無；如來是不生滅法，應當有也。又內壞結賊、外破魔軍，既有如來則有成壞。四者上品末偈云「求三有不得」，外云：若離三有則是如來，故應有佛也。所言如來者，此品一切義中最為精要。今大小乘人發旨信佛念佛禮佛歸依佛作佛弟子求佛道，若識佛則一切事義成；若不識佛、不求佛，一切事壞，故須精識佛也。據法而言，體如而來，故云如來。約人為論，如諸佛來，名曰如來。就化物辨者，如感而來，故云如來。釋如來不同，一外道、二小乘、三方等。外道計實有我，名曰如來。故論云：我有種種名，人天如來等。小乘略有三說。一犢子部云：清淨五陰和合別有人法，名為如來。二成實師明以假名行人為如來體，或言假別有體有用有名、或言無體無用、或言無體有用。三者阿毘曇明二種如來：一者有漏五陰為生身如來、二者無漏五陰為法身佛。故三僧祇行行、百劫修相好業，後三十四心成佛。在無漏心不為緣縛，出有漏則為緣縛。成論大乘師立五時教佛：初教以五陰身成佛；第二時以種智為佛，與初教佛同壽八十。招提云：「第二時是特尊」。第三時無量劫修行。第四時亦久劫修行，過去過塵沙，未來倍上數。第五時明佛常住、佛無有色，但有一圓智；有總御用，故名為佛，若欲度物則應作色。但釋第五時總有四師：一云如來體是世諦所攝。二釋既云如來，即是真如為佛。故《大品》云「如無去來，如即是佛。」次北土智度論師，佛有三身，法身之佛即是真如，真如體非是佛，以能生佛故，故名為佛。如實相非波若，能生波若，故名波若。報化二身則世諦所攝。故雖有三身，攝唯二諦。四云：佛果靈智非二諦攝，體非虛假故非世諦，不可即空復異真無，是故法身超乎二諦。地論不真宗與數論無異。真宗明於三佛，以不住道為因，故有丈六化佛；以助道為因，十地行滿得於報佛；證道為因，得於法佛。今求此如來並不可得，故云觀如來品。問：若具破一切佛應無佛也。答：外人計佛是於四句，故是破佛；今破如是四句佛，息眾生戲論，乃是識佛耳。又大小乘人雖復異計不同，終言有佛。故淨名呵善吉云：「若須菩提不見佛不聞法乃可取食。」此明善吉有佛可見、有法可聞，名有所得，不堪受食；若能無佛可見則是見佛，無法可聞始是聞法，乃可堪受食。又有所得人，佛是正見、外道為邪見，故起邪正二見。故淨名呵云：「六師是汝之師，乃可取食。」此明若見邪正為二，則七佛成六師，不能受食；若乃邪正不二，體悟六師即是七佛。今此品中正明眾生與佛無有二相，故下偈云「如來所有性即是世間性。」能如是解，乃是識佛。又論破十四種佛，謂空有四句：一計佛是世諦有、二計佛是真諦空、三計佛具為二諦攝、四計佛非空有出二諦外。次四句小乘計佛無常，大乘計佛是常。三三身合論具常無常，四計中道是佛非常無常。次四句計佛壽：一小乘人計佛壽盡一期，為有邊。二大乘計佛壽常，為無邊。三約三身，亦邊亦無邊。四就中道，非邊無邊。此為十二種也。論主具破十二種佛竟，外人謂都無佛，為十三。復破都無，而終謂有佛不可說，為十四。此論破十四邪佛、申正佛，故云觀如來品。問：十四種佛何故被破？答：三義故被破。一者彼互相是非，故自破。二佛非四句、四句非佛，計非佛為佛，故被破。三者佛有體有用，用則適化無方，四句隨物體則非四不四；彼不識用，於用中各執一邊，是故被破也。又異三論師云；此中破如來者，有二釋：一云但遣著心，實不破佛。二云假令破佛者，破外道小乘之佛耳。今明不爾。若但破著心名破佛者，彼終謂有佛，但不許著耳。尋此品四句邪執如來義，此皆要急。今學人不作意思量，玄故不信；細心尋讀向心故著深有利益。所以觀如來者，大小學人為有佛，值佛者言見佛、佛滅後謂不見佛，謂佛正見人、外道是邪見人，作如此分別，並不識佛。今此品勸好觀察，何者是佛、何者非佛？今時人皆云：我是佛弟子，事佛後教化他。若不精識佛，不佛定佛誰？弟子定事誰？為此義故須此品，令學大小乘人實解法相，善通問難。且問：六時禮佛若為禮？多不安心此處也。

Regarding this single section, there are four chapters altogether: first, refuting the Tathāgata; second, refuting error; third, refuting the four truths; fourth, refuting nirvāṇa. The refutation of the worldly is extensive, having twenty-one chapters; the refutation of the transworldly is concise. That it explains only four chapters is because it intends to show how the extensive and the concise mutually reflect each other. Furthermore, it reveals that grasping at the transworldly is still worldly; since the worldly was already refuted above, that is in itself the completion of refuting the transworldly, and therefore extensive refutation is not required. Moreover, the worldly is the root of the transworldly; since the root has collapsed, the branches are easily refuted, and hence there are only four chapters. Again, the Tathāgata is the supreme person of the transworldly, and nirvāṇa is the unsurpassed, ultimate phenomenon; these constitute the pair of person and phenomenon. Error refers to the wrong delusions that are refuted, and the four truths are the correct teachings that are capable of refuting them; these constitute the pair of wrong and right. Briefly explaining these four approaches, there is no principle that is not unified under them. Furthermore, refuting the Tathāgata refutes the person, while the subsequent three chapters refute phenomena. Although transworldly [things] are numerous, they do not exceed person and phenomena, comprehensively subsuming everything; the prior worldly [treatments] were also like this, not exceeding person and phenomena, comprehensively subsuming everything. Thus it is divided into two: the single chapter on examining the Tathāgata explains the emptiness of transworldly persons, and the next three chapters explain the emptiness of transworldly phenomena. In the previous worldly [chapters], the division into two was made directly in terms of the extensive and concise; here it is divided according to person and phenomena. That there is only one chapter on the person while there are several on phenomena is because persons are non-dual, whereas phenomena have multiple gates. Moreover, personal emptiness is easy to realise, while phenomenal emptiness is difficult to clarify. Furthermore, as for the sequence of the four chapters: earlier [it was mentioned that] the Buddhas appear in the world, hence one first examines the Tathāgata. The reason the Tathāgata appears in the world is to refute sentient beings' afflictions, hence one next examines error. The reason error can be refuted is by means of the doctrinal gates of the four truths, hence one next examines the four truths. Although the four truths are taught, their core returns to the single cessation, hence nirvāṇa is treated at the end. Equipped with these four approaches, myriad meanings are encompassed. Again, the Tathāgata is the transworldly person, error is what the Tathāgata is free from, the four truths are what the Tathāgata contemplates, and nirvāṇa is what the Tathāgata realizes; this is another track of sequence. Furthermore, the reason the Tathāgata is refuted first is that the worldly and transworldly mutually reflect each other: among worldly phenomena, phenomena are refuted first and persons are refuted later; among transworldly phenomena, persons are examined first and phenomena are refuted later. Second, the outsider says: 'The Tathāgata is able to teach worldly and transworldly phenomena.' Since there is a person capable of teaching, there must be phenomena that are taught. Third, as arising directly from the 'Examination of Arising and Dissolution' (Sambhava-vibhava-parīkṣā): worldly [phenomena] are phenomena of arising and cessation, and can be said to be non-existent; the Tathāgata is a phenomenon free of arising and cessation, and should certainly exist. Moreover, internally destroying the thief of fetters and externally defeating the army of Māra, since there is a Tathāgata, there is arising and dissolution. Fourth, the closing verse of the preceding chapter says, 'Seeking within the three realms of existence, it cannot be found'; the outsider says, 'If one is free from the three realms of existence, that is the Tathāgata; therefore there must be a Buddha.' As for what is called 'Tathāgata': within this chapter, it is the most essential of all meanings. Now practitioners of the Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna produce the intention to believe in the Buddha, be mindful of the Buddha, pay homage to the Buddha, take refuge in the Buddha, become disciples of the Buddha, and seek the Buddha-path; if they recognise the Buddha, all matters and meanings are accomplished; if they do not recognise the Buddha and do not seek the Buddha, all matters are ruined; therefore one must thoroughly recognise the Buddha. Speaking in terms of phenomena, its substance comes (āgata) in accordance with Suchness (tathā), hence it is called Tathāgata ('Thus-Come'). Speaking in terms of the person, it has come like the Buddhas have come, hence named Tathāgata. Explained in terms of transforming living beings, it comes in accordance with their receptivity, hence it is called Tathāgata. The explanations of the Tathāgata differ: first, the non-Buddhists; second, the Hīnayāna; third, the Vaipulya. The non-Buddhists posit a genuinely existing self, named Tathāgata. Hence the treatise says: 'The self has various names: human, deva, Tathāgata, and so forth.' The Hīnayāna has briefly three explanations. First, the Vātsīputrīyas say: when the pure five aggregates combine, there is a distinct personal entity, which is named Tathāgata. Second, the Tattvasiddhi masters explain that the provisionally named practitioner is the substance of the Tathāgata; some say that the provisional distinctly has substance, function, and name; some say it lacks substance and lacks function; some say it lacks substance but has function. Third, the Abhidharmikas explain two kinds of Tathāgata: first, the contaminated five aggregates constitute the Tathāgata of the birth body; second, the uncontaminated five aggregates constitute the Buddha of the Dharma body. Hence one practices the deeds for three asaṃkhyeya kalpas, cultivates the karma of the marks and signs for a hundred kalpas, and afterwards attains buddhahood in thirty-four mental moments. While in the uncontaminated mind, one is not bound by conditions; emerging into the contaminated, one is bound by conditions. The Mahāyāna masters of the Tattvasiddhi establish the Buddhas of the five periods of teaching: the first teaching takes the body of the five aggregates as having attained buddhahood; the second period takes the knowledge of all aspects as the Buddha, having the same lifespan of eighty years as the Buddha of the first teaching—Zhaoti says: 'The second period is the specially exalted one'; the third period cultivates for immeasurable kalpas; the fourth period also cultivates for long kalpas, passing through dust motes and sands in the past, and doubling that number in the future; the fifth period explains that the Buddha is eternally abiding, that the Buddha has no physical form, but has only a single perfect wisdom; because it has total control and function, it is named Buddha, and if it wishes to liberate living beings, it responds by assuming physical form. Yet in interpreting the fifth period, there are four masters altogether: one says that the substance of the Tathāgata is subsumed under conventional truth. A second explains that since it is called Tathāgata, it is Suchness itself that is the Buddha. Hence the Pañcaviṃśati says: 'Suchness has no going or coming; Suchness is itself the Buddha.' Next, according to the northern masters of the Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa, the Buddha has three bodies: the Buddha of the Dharma body is Suchness itself; the substance of Suchness is not the Buddha, but because it can give birth to the Buddha, it is named Buddha. Just as the true nature of phenomena is not prajñā, but because it can give birth to prajñā, it is named prajñā. The reward and transformation bodies are subsumed under conventional truth. Hence although there are three bodies, they are subsumed only under the two truths. A fourth says: the spiritual wisdom of the Buddha-fruit is not subsumed under the two truths; because its substance is not unreal, it is not conventional truth, yet it cannot be identified with empty [cessation] and is distinct from ultimate non-existence, and therefore the Dharma body transcends the two truths. The inauthentic faction of the Daśabhūmika-śāstra does not differ from the Abhidharma. The authentic faction clarifies three Buddhas: taking the non-abiding path as the cause, there is the sixteen-foot transformation Buddha; taking the auxiliary path as the cause, when the practice of the ten bhūmis is fulfilled, one attains the reward Buddha; taking the realization path as the cause, one attains the Dharma Buddha. Now, seeking this Tathāgata, none can be found, hence it is called 'Examination of the Tathāgata Chapter'. Question: If all Buddhas are completely refuted, there should be no Buddha. Answer: The outsiders posit the Buddha in terms of the four lemmas, hence that is a refutation of the Buddha; now, refuting such a Buddha of the four lemmas puts to rest the prapañca of sentient beings, and this is precisely what recognises the Buddha. Furthermore, although the practitioners of the Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna hold various differing views, in the end they assert that there is a Buddha. Hence the Vimalakīrti rebukes Subhūti, saying: 'Only if Subhūti does not see the Buddha and does not hear the Dharma may you take the food.' This clarifies that Subhūti had a Buddha to be seen and a Dharma to be heard, which is called having an appropriation, making him unfit to receive food; if one is able to have no Buddha to be seen, that is truly seeing the Buddha, and to have no Dharma to be heard, only then is it hearing the Dharma, and only then is one fit to receive food. Moreover, for those who have appropriation, the Buddha is right view and the non-Buddhists are wrong view, and thus they give rise to the two views of wrong and right. Hence the Vimalakīrti rebukes him, saying: 'Only if the six teachers are your teachers may you take the food.' This clarifies that if one sees wrong and right as two, then the seven Buddhas become the six teachers, and one cannot receive food; if wrong and right are non-dual, one realizes that the six teachers are precisely the seven Buddhas. Now in this chapter, it directly clarifies that sentient beings and the Buddha do not have two distinct marks; hence the verse below states: 'Whatever is the nature of the Tathāgata is the nature of the world.' Being able to understand in this way is precisely recognising the Buddha. Furthermore, the treatise refutes fourteen kinds of Buddha, namely the four lemmas of emptiness and existence: first, positing that the Buddha exists as conventional truth; second, positing that the Buddha is empty as ultimate truth; third, positing that the Buddha is fully subsumed by both truths; fourth, positing that the Buddha is neither empty nor existent, transcending the two truths. The next four lemmas: the Hīnayāna posits that the Buddha is impermanent; the Mahāyāna posits that the Buddha is permanent; third, discussing the three bodies together, he is both permanent and impermanent; fourth, positing that the middle way is the Buddha, neither permanent nor impermanent. The next four lemmas posit the Buddha's lifespan: first, the Hīnayāna practitioners posit that the Buddha's lifespan terminates with a single lifetime, being finite; second, the Mahāyāna posits that the Buddha's lifespan is eternal, being infinite; third, regarding the three bodies, it is both finite and infinite; fourth, with respect to the middle way, it is neither finite nor infinite. These make twelve kinds. After the treatise master has completely refuted the twelve kinds of Buddha, the outsider thinks there is no Buddha at all, which is the thirteenth. Refuting that there is no Buddha at all, yet still asserting that there is an ineffable Buddha, makes the fourteenth. This treatise refutes the fourteen false Buddhas and elucidates the correct Buddha, hence it is called 'Examination of the Tathāgata Chapter'. Question: For what reason are the fourteen kinds of Buddha refuted? Answer: They are refuted for three reasons. First, they mutually affirm and negate one another, and so they refute themselves. Second, the Buddha is not the four lemmas, and the four lemmas are not the Buddha; positing what is not the Buddha as the Buddha, they are therefore refuted. Third, the Buddha has substance and function: as for function, it adapts to transform [beings] without fixed forms, responding to beings via the four lemmas; as for substance, it is neither four nor not-four; not recognising function, they each grasp onto one side within function, and for this reason they are refuted. Furthermore, another Sanlun master says: as for refuting the Tathāgata here, there are two explanations: one says it only eliminates the clinging mind, but does not actually refute the Buddha; the second says that even if it refutes the Buddha, it only refutes the Buddha of the non-Buddhists and the Hīnayāna. We now clarify that this is not so. If only eliminating the clinging mind were called refuting the Buddha, they would still maintain that there is a Buddha, merely disallowing clinging. Investigating the meaning of the Tathāgata in the erroneous clingings of the four lemmas in this chapter, these are all vital and urgent. Nowadays, students do not deliberately reflect on this; because it is profound, they do not believe it; if they examine and read it with a fine mind, turning their mind toward it, they will grasp its deep benefit. The reason for examining the Tathāgata is that students of the Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna assume there is a Buddha: those who encounter the Buddha say they see the Buddha, and after the Buddha's extinction they think they do not see the Buddha; they consider the Buddha to be a person of right view and the non-Buddhists to be persons of wrong view—making such discriminations, they do not recognise the Buddha at all. Now this chapter exhorts careful examination of what is the Buddha and what is not the Buddha. People today all say: 'I am a disciple of the Buddha; after serving the Buddha, I teach others.' If one does not thoroughly recognise the Buddha, then if he is not the Buddha, who is definitively the Buddha? Whom does the disciple definitively serve? For this reason this chapter is necessary, to cause students of the Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna to genuinely understand phenomenal marks and be skilled in resolving interrogations and objections. Furthermore, let us ask: when paying homage to the Buddha in the six periods of the day, how does one pay homage? Most do not settle their minds on this point.