中觀論疏 9.27

9.27

大分為二：一問、二答。初長行立云：佛於九道中尊，故名世尊。於法自在，名為法王。知一切法，名一切智。初句明人，次句辨境，次句明有也。若有於佛則有世間，若言無佛則墮邪見。「答曰」下，初長行總生起破意。若有應取者，論主不答其有無。若答有無，即受外屈。又佛非有無，若答有無，即破佛也。但問覓外人之言有：汝既言有佛者，許汝取佛。求汝有不可得，汝何所取耶？就偈本開為五章：初破有是佛。「問曰汝謂受空受者空」下，次破空是佛。「若如是破如來」下，第三料簡空有俱非佛所以。「如來過戲論」下，第四呵責外人。後長行云「此如來品中」下，第五略示佛相。所以有此五章者，大小乘人並言有佛，故初破有。若計有是佛，乃是有見，何名佛耶？又求有不可得，以何為佛？外人既聞有非是佛，便謂空應是佛，故次破空。若見空是佛，乃是空見，何名為佛？又求空不得，以何為佛？外云：若空有俱非佛者，應都無佛；不爾，終應有佛。是故第三料簡明，若言無佛是麁邪見，若言終有是細邪見。自上已來破病既周，故次呵責之。佛實非空有，若執空有是佛者則是戲論，破於慧眼，不能見佛。三門破病、一門呵責，破邪已圓，故第五略示佛相。欲識佛者，世間是也。初又三：一破人是佛。「又所受五陰」下，二破法是佛。「以如是義故」下，三總結人法。人法皆空，呵外人謬謂人法。所以初破人次破法者，凡有二義：一者佛是人名故先破人，破人既竟執法為佛，故次破法。二者生法二空難易次第，生空易得故前破人，法空難得故後破法。破人中開為四門：初明佛與陰不一不異門。「問曰如是義」下，第二佛與陰不自不他門。「若不因五陰」下，第三佛與陰非先非後門。「若於一異中」下，第四總結佛不可得。此之四門可得通破內外大小乘執；就別而言，初破外道佛、次破小乘佛、三破大乘佛。從外至內前小後大，即淺深次第也。既破此三，則通除眾執，故後總結也。初偈五求破，通破內外大小，遂文次第且破外道也。問：今破佛，云何乃作五求破耶？答：外人長行立義，佛是一切智人。計佛是我，此猶是我見耳。上品既五求我不可得，今還五求佛也。又外人初立佛是我，復是有，遂作有無以難論主，若言有佛則同我義，若言無佛則墮邪見。論主避其有無，而捉得外人二義：一捉得其明佛是有、二捉得其明佛是人。汝即明佛是人，必與陰一異，故就五求門破也。又欲申經，《楞伽經》有〈法身品〉，發旨即明如來法身與五陰不可論一異。今偈可具二義：一者五求破邪佛；二明如來法身非此五句，即申正佛也。若破佛法義者，若佛與陰一，本迹應一，見迹應見本。亦本迹應俱常俱無常，若有常無常是則不一。若離陰有佛，人法則竝，便不相成；本迹亦爾。「如來中有陰」者，言如來大、陰身小，如法身大、應身小，餘並易知。長行為五：一牒，初文是也。「為五陰」下，第二定。「是事不然」下，第三非。「五陰非是如來」下，第四破，即為五別。就初文有三，謂標、釋、結。初標。「何以故」下，第二釋也。釋即陰中有二過：一者陰既生滅，佛亦生滅。既是無常生滅，誰持功德智慧耶？又念念生滅，五眼不能見、三達不能知，如〈五陰品〉說。若是無常，則眼耳等相不能分別。「又受者」下，次人法亂過。既人法一，喚人應得法、喚法應得人，故是亂也。「是故」下，第三結也。釋第二句亦三，謂標、釋、結。釋中有二：一明佛有常過者，小乘人謂佛是假名行人，故是無常。今明是常，所以為過。又假令言佛是常住，以今望之亦是過也，以常是一邊、無常是一邊，乃是邊見眾生，何名為佛？「又眼等根不能見知」者，佛若是常，則同太虛。《涅槃經》云「常法無知，如來有知。」是故非常。前明佛常墮邊見，今明佛無知墮無明過也。若謂佛常則不能知見，以常非色非心，非心故不能知、非色故眼不能見。佛既是常，常則凝然，不能用眼等諸根見知也。下三句一一中皆有標、釋、結也。釋中皆以異故有常等過。「如是五種」下，第五總結，即釋偈第四句。

This is broadly divided into two parts: first, the question; second, the answer. The initial prose sets up the proposition: The Buddha is supreme among the nine paths, and hence is called the World-Honoured One. He is sovereign regarding dharmas, and hence is called the King of Dharma. He knows all dharmas, and hence is called the Omniscient One. The first clause explains the person; the second clause explains the sphere [of mastery]; the third clause explains existence. If there is a Buddha, then there is the world; if one says there is no Buddha, one falls into wrong views. Under "Answer:", the initial prose generally raises the intent of the refutation. If there were [an existent], it ought to be apprehended, but the treatise master does not answer in terms of existence or non-existence. If he were to answer in terms of existence or non-existence, he would yield to the opponent. Moreover, the Buddha is neither existent nor non-existent; if one answers in terms of existence or non-existence, that would be destroying the Buddha. He merely questions and seeks out the opponent's assertion of existence: Since you say there is a Buddha, we allow you to grasp the Buddha. But when seeking your existent, it cannot be found; what is it that you grasp? Within the verses, it is divided into five sections: first, refuting that existence is the Buddha; under "Question: You say the appropriation is empty and the appropriator is empty", second, refuting that emptiness is the Buddha; under "If one refutes the Tathāgata like this", third, evaluating why both emptiness and existence are not the Buddha; under "The Tathāgata transcends prapañca", fourth, reprimanding the opponent; under the subsequent prose saying "Within this Examination of the Tathāgata", fifth, briefly indicating the characteristics of the Buddha. Why are there these five sections? Followers of both Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna assert that there is a Buddha; therefore, existence is refuted first. If one conceives of existence as the Buddha, that is merely the view of existence; how could it be called the Buddha? Moreover, when seeking existence it cannot be found; by virtue of what could it be the Buddha? The opponent, hearing that existence is not the Buddha, then supposes that emptiness must be the Buddha; therefore, emptiness is refuted next. If one sees emptiness as the Buddha, that is merely the view of emptiness; how could it be called the Buddha? Moreover, when seeking emptiness it cannot be found; by virtue of what could it be the Buddha? The opponent says: If both emptiness and existence are not the Buddha, there should be no Buddha at all; otherwise, there must ultimately be a Buddha. Therefore, the third evaluation explains: to say there is no Buddha is a coarse wrong view; to say there is ultimately a Buddha is a subtle wrong view. As the refutation of errors from the above has been thorough, reprimand follows next. The Buddha in truth is neither empty nor existent; if one grasps emptiness or existence as the Buddha, that is prapañca, which ruins the eye of wisdom and prevents one from seeing the Buddha. Three approaches refute the errors and one approach reprimands; the refutation of the heterodox being complete, the fifth briefly indicates the characteristics of the Buddha. If one wishes to know the Buddha, the world is it. The first section also has three parts: first, refuting that the person is the Buddha; under "Moreover, the five aggregates that are appropriated", second, refuting that dharmas are the Buddha; under "By reason of such meaning", third, summarizing both person and dharmas. Person and dharmas are both empty; he reprimands the opponent for mistakenly conceiving person and dharmas. Why does he first refute the person and then refute dharmas? There are generally two reasons: First, 'Buddha' is the name of a person, so the person is refuted first; after refuting the person, [the opponent] clings to dharmas as the Buddha, so dharmas are refuted next. Second, the two emptinesses of living beings and dharmas have a sequence of difficulty: the emptiness of living beings is easy to attain, so the person is refuted first; the emptiness of dharmas is difficult to comprehend, so dharmas are refuted later. Within the refutation of the person, it is divided into four approaches: first, the approach showing that the Buddha and the aggregates are neither identical nor different; under "Question: Such meaning", second, the approach showing that the Buddha and the aggregates are neither self nor other; under "If not dependent on the five aggregates", third, the approach showing that the Buddha and the aggregates are neither prior nor posterior; under "If within identity and difference", fourth, summarizing that the Buddha cannot be found. These four approaches can universally refute the attachments of both heterodox and Buddhist, Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna. Speaking specifically: the first refutes the heterodox Buddha, the next refutes the Hīnayāna Buddha, and the third refutes the Mahāyāna Buddha. Moving from outer to inner, earlier Hīnayāna and later Mahāyāna, this is the sequence from shallow to deep. Having refuted these three, all attachments are universally eliminated, hence the final summary. The first verse's refutation through fivefold seeking universally refutes outer, inner, great, and small, and following the sequence of the text, it temporarily refutes the heterodox. Question: Now when refuting the Buddha, why undertake a refutation through fivefold seeking? Answer: In the prose, the opponent sets up the proposition that the Buddha is an omniscient person. Conceiving the Buddha as a self is still merely the view of self. Since in the previous chapter the self could not be found through fivefold seeking, now the Buddha is likewise sought in five ways. Moreover, the opponent initially posited that the Buddha is a self and also an existent, and proceeded to use existence and non-existence to challenge the treatise master: if you say there is a Buddha, that agrees with my position; if you say there is no Buddha, you fall into wrong views. The treatise master avoided their existence and non-existence, and seized upon two propositions of the opponent: first, seizing upon his statement that the Buddha is an existent; second, seizing upon his statement that the Buddha is a person. Since you explain that the Buddha is a person, he must be identical to or different from the aggregates; therefore, he is refuted through the approach of fivefold seeking. Furthermore, to elucidate the sūtras: the Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra has a 'Dharmakāya Chapter', whose fundamental teaching explains that the Tathāgata's dharmakāya and the five aggregates cannot be spoken of as identical or different. The present verse can contain two meanings: first, the fivefold seeking refutes the false Buddha; second, it shows that the Tathāgata's dharmakāya is not these five propositions, which elucidates the true Buddha. In refuting the opponent's doctrine: If the Buddha and the aggregates are identical, the fundamental and the trace should be identical; seeing the trace, one should see the fundamental. Also, the fundamental and the trace should be both permanent or both impermanent; if one is permanent and one is impermanent, they are not identical. If the Buddha exists apart from the aggregates, the person and the dharmas would stand side by side, and thus could not constitute each other; the fundamental and the trace are likewise. 'There are aggregates within the Tathāgata' means the Tathāgata is great and the aggregate-body is small, just as the dharmakāya is great and the response-body is small; the rest are all easy to understand. The prose has five parts: first, citing the proposition, which is the opening text; under 'Are the five aggregates', second, questioning; under 'This is not so', third, negating; under 'The five aggregates are not the Tathāgata', fourth, refuting, which comprises five distinctions. In the first part, there are three: the statement, the explanation, and the conclusion. First is the statement; under 'Why is this?', second is the explanation. In the explanation, there are two faults regarding the aggregates: first, since the aggregates arise and cease, the Buddha would also arise and cease. If he were impermanent, arising and ceasing, who would uphold merits and wisdom? Moreover, arising and ceasing moment to moment, the five eyes could not see him and the three masteries could not know him, as explained in the 'Examination of the Five Aggregates'. If he were impermanent, then characteristics such as the eye and ear could not be distinguished. Under 'Moreover, the appropriator', next is the fault of confusing person and dharma: since person and dharma would be identical, calling for the person one should get the dharma, and calling for the dharma one should get the person; hence it is a confusion. Under 'Therefore', third is the conclusion. The explanation of the second line also has three parts: statement, explanation, and conclusion. In the explanation, there are two points: First, explaining the fault of the Buddha being permanent: Hīnayāna followers hold that the Buddha is a provisionally designated practitioner, and therefore impermanent. Now it is shown that being permanent is also a fault. Furthermore, even if one were to say that the Buddha is permanently abiding, looking at it from the present perspective this is also a fault, because permanence is one extreme and impermanence is another extreme; this is merely an ordinary being of extreme views, so how could he be called a Buddha? Regarding 'Moreover, sense organs such as the eye cannot see or know him': If the Buddha were permanent, he would be the same as empty space. The Nirvāṇa Sūtra says: 'Permanent dharmas are without cognition; the Tathāgata possesses cognition.' Therefore, he is not permanent. The former showed that a permanent Buddha falls into extreme views; the latter shows that an unknowing Buddha falls into the fault of ignorance. If one considers the Buddha permanent, he cannot know or see, because what is permanent is neither form nor mind: not being mind, it cannot know; not being form, the eye cannot see it. Since the Buddha would be permanent, being permanent he would be rigidly fixed, unable to see or know using the sense organs such as the eye. In each of the subsequent three lines, there are a statement, explanation, and conclusion. In the explanations, it is always because of difference that the faults of permanence and so forth arise. Under 'Such five kinds', fifth is the general conclusion, which explains the fourth line of the verse.