中觀論疏 9.28

9.28

「問曰」下，第二不自不他門。破五陰和合有如來，則破小乘計人是如來。前問、次答。問有二意：一者領前。「而五陰和合」下，第二立有。即是犢子計五陰和合別有我法，四大和合別有眼法，但如來在第五不可說藏中。五藏者，三世及無為並不可說也，故不受上五求破。又是成實假有體用等二師義也。答有三偈為三：初半偈破自、次二偈破他、後半偈雙結破自他。初句牒犢子及假有體用家、次句正破。既言假陰而有，則無自體；若有自體，何須假陰？又問？五陰中本有如來，故假陰耶？為本無佛假陰和合有耶？若本有佛，何須假陰？若本無者，雖復假陰，終無有佛。若本無佛假陰有者，亦無非佛，何不陰合生非佛耶；又陰中無佛、非陰亦無，若爾，陰與非陰俱應成佛、俱應不成。若陰成佛非陰不成佛者，亦應非陰成佛而陰不成。下半偈第二章合兩偈破他。所以須二偈者，既言五陰和合有如來，必是犢子及有假體家。《俱舍論》出犢子義，有人體而因五陰，如有火體而因於薪。此即是因他義，故須廣破他。兩偈為三：初半偈奪破、次一偈縱破、三半偈相待破。初奪破者，謂奪他人也。人既無自性，則陰他亦無自性。無自性則無他，而佛何所因耶？二者待佛之自故有陰他，既無佛自，陰是誰他？故亦無他。猶無有他，豈得因他生耶？第二偈縱破，為二：上半正破、下半結破。初句縱因他，如犢子等因陰有人、因薪有火也。第二句正破，既因他則無人自體，既無人自體故名無我也。下半結破。無佛者，為釋疑故來。今品破如來，云何乃破我耶？是故今明我是如來異名，既無有我即無如來。故常云：以御用釋人，則凡聖皆有；以仁義釋人，唯在人道。又欲顯外人計我為如來，猶是我執見耳。第三偈，上半承前無自故無他；下半是第三章，總結無有自他故無如來。

Under "Question:", second is the approach of neither self nor other. Refuting that the Tathāgata exists from the combination of the five aggregates refutes the Hīnayāna conception that a person is the Tathāgata. First is the question, next the answer. The question has two intents: first, summarizing what came before; under "Yet through the combination of the five aggregates", second, positing existence. This is the Vātsīputrīya conception that based on the combination of the five aggregates there is a distinct dharma of self, and based on the combination of the four great elements there is a distinct dharma of the eye, but the Tathāgata is within the fifth ineffable repository. The five repositories are the three times, the unconditioned, and the ineffable; therefore, they do not accept the refutation by the fivefold seeking above. Moreover, this is the doctrine of the two masters of the Tattvasiddhi, who hold provisional existence as substance and function. The answer consists of three verses in three parts: the first half-verse refutes self; the next two verses refute other; the latter half-verse jointly concludes by refuting both self and other. The first line cites the Vātsīputrīyas and the masters holding provisional existence as substance and function; the next line directly refutes it. Since they say he exists by relying on the aggregates, he lacks an intrinsic substance; if he had an intrinsic substance, why rely on the aggregates? Furthermore, we ask: Is there originally a Tathāgata within the five aggregates, so that he relies on the aggregates? Or is there originally no Buddha, and he exists through the combination relying on the aggregates? If there were originally a Buddha, why rely on the aggregates? If there were originally none, then even though relying on the aggregates, there would ultimately be no Buddha. If there were originally no Buddha and he exists relying on the aggregates, there is also no non-Buddha; why does the combination of aggregates not produce a non-Buddha? Moreover, there is no Buddha within the aggregates, nor is there one in non-aggregates; if so, aggregates and non-aggregates should both constitute a Buddha, or both should fail to do so. If aggregates constitute a Buddha while non-aggregates do not, non-aggregates should also constitute a Buddha while aggregates do not. The lower half-verse is the second section, which combines two verses to refute other. Why are two verses needed? Since they say the Tathāgata exists from the combination of the five aggregates, this must be the Vātsīputrīyas and those holding a provisional substance. The Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya presents the Vātsīputrīya position: there is a substance of the person which depends on the five aggregates, just as there is a substance of fire which depends on fuel. This is the doctrine of depending on other, so it is necessary to broadly refute other. The two verses comprise three parts: the first half-verse is a direct refutation by negation; the next verse is a concessive refutation; the third half-verse is a refutation through mutual dependence. First, the refutation by negation negates the other person: since the person lacks intrinsic nature, the other, which is the aggregates, also lacks intrinsic nature. Lacking intrinsic nature, there is no other; on what then could the Buddha depend? Second, depending on the Buddha's self, there is the aggregates' other; since there is no self of the Buddha, whose other are the aggregates? Therefore, there is also no other. When there is not even an other, how could he arise depending on another? The second verse is a concessive refutation, with two parts: the upper half directly refutes, and the lower half concludes the refutation. The first line concedes depending on another, like the Vātsīputrīyas who hold that depending on aggregates there is a person, and depending on fuel there is fire. The second line directly refutes: since he depends on another, he lacks an intrinsic substance of a person; since he lacks an intrinsic substance of a person, it is called 'non-self'. The lower half concludes the refutation. 'There is no Buddha' appears in order to resolve doubt: in the present chapter refuting the Tathāgata, why does it instead refute the self? Therefore, it is now explained that 'self' is an alternate name for the Tathāgata; since there is no self, there is no Tathāgata. Thus it is commonly said: if one explains 'person' in terms of being employed and directed, both ordinary beings and sages possess it; if one explains 'person' in terms of benevolence and righteousness, it pertains only to the human realm. Furthermore, he wishes to show that the opponent's conception of the self as the Tathāgata is still merely the view of clinging to a self. In the third verse, the upper half follows from the preceding: because there is no self, there is no other; the lower half is the third section, which summarizes that because there is neither self nor other, there is no Tathāgata.