中觀論疏 9.31

9.31

「又所受五陰」下，自上已來破人是如來竟，今第二次破法是如來。但此文來有近遠。遠者，上四門借法破人竟，今次借人破法，即破假無體用家及數人謂有漏五陰是生身如來、無漏五陰是法身如來。次近來者，此中五偈相逐，今重敘之。初二偈明無能受人；次一偈明所受非受；次一偈更舉一異及五求，重責受中無人；後一偈以自他門重檢無所受法。以五偈相逐，故青目一處釋之。諸講論師不熟詳之，故種種異說。就偈為二：上半明無自性、下半明無他性。此中自性他性可有二義：一者以所受法為自性，能受人為他性，明五陰不得自有，亦不由人而有。二者就五陰法自論自他也。「以如是義故」下，第三結破人法。上半結空、下半呵有。「以如是義故」者，結上三門，謂不一不異、不自不他、不前不後，三義求人法不得。又上求三種人法：一外道、二小乘、三大乘，皆不可得。下半呵有。汝云何以空為受、以空為如來？

From "Furthermore, the appropriated five aggregates" below: down to this point, the refutation of the person being the Tathāgata is concluded; now, second, it refutes phenomena being the Tathāgata. However, the connection of this text has both a distant and an immediate link. The distant link: above, the four gates concluded borrowing phenomena to refute the person; now, next, it borrows the person to refute phenomena, which refutes the school of provisional existence without entity and function, as well as the Sarvāstivādins who hold that the defiled five aggregates are the birth-body Tathāgata and the uncontaminated five aggregates are the dharmakāya Tathāgata. Next, the immediate link: the five verses here follow one another in sequence, and are now restated. The first two verses clarify that there is no person capable of appropriating; the next verse clarifies that the appropriated is not an appropriation; the next verse further adduces identity and difference as well as the five searches to demand again that there is no person within appropriation; the final verse uses the gate of self and other to re-examine that there are no appropriated phenomena. Because the five verses follow one another, Piṅgala explained them in a single place. The various lecturing masters did not examine this thoroughly, and so produced various disparate explanations. As for the verse, it has two parts: the first half clarifies the absence of intrinsic nature, and the second half clarifies the absence of other-nature. Here, intrinsic nature and other-nature can have two meanings: First, taking the appropriated phenomena as intrinsic nature and the appropriating person as other-nature, it clarifies that the five aggregates cannot exist by themselves, nor do they exist by virtue of a person. Second, self and other are discussed solely with respect to the phenomena of the five aggregates themselves. From "By such meaning" below is the third part, concluding the refutation of person and phenomena. The first half concludes emptiness, and the second half reproves [the assertion of] existence. "By such meaning" concludes the above three gates—namely, not identical and not different, neither self nor other, neither prior nor posterior—through which three meanings person and phenomena cannot be found when sought. Moreover, above, three kinds of person and phenomena were sought—first, non-Buddhist; second, Hīnayāna; third, Mahāyāna—and none could be found. The second half reproves existence: How can you take emptiness as appropriation, and take emptiness as the Tathāgata?