中觀論疏 9.32

9.32

「問曰」下，生第二章偈，破空等四句是如來。前問、次答。問有三意：一者上執如來是有，聞論主求有不得，便執無是如來，則是因有起空見。二者諸大小乘人執佛是有，今偏是大乘人執空是佛，如江南尚禪師、北土講智度論者用真如是佛。三者外人執有是佛，聞龍樹上破人法皆空，謂龍樹用空為佛也。答中二偈：初破空等四句是佛、第二偈破常邊等八句是佛。初三句破四家佛義，已如品初述之。應此中說，並云不可說者，凡有二義：一者無此四句，何所說耶？二者此四句是諸見戲論，不可說諸見戲論以之為佛。開善義佛具空有二句，彼云：金剛後心且冥且會，同真如、等法性。今問：既同真如，云何應照？答：至亡彌存。至亡義則冥真，故名為生；彌存義則有，應照稱之為有。今問：至亡與真理一不？答：理然是一。問：彌存時是真理彌存不？答：真理不可彌存，智能彌存耳。今問：真不能彌存、智能彌存，則智與真異，云何同真如耶？又彌存之時非復是真，則出真外。若彌，存與真一者，真亦彌存也。「但以假名說」者，上明四句不可說，今為釋疑。經中所以說有佛者，蓋是無名相中假名相說，如《涅槃》無名強名相說涅槃是佛異名耳。又此中四句不可說，一句可說，如《涅槃經》生生等六句不可說，第七句有因緣故亦互得說。以十法為生作因，是故可說也。長行云「但破相違故以假名說」者，為釋疑故來。若言此中四句並不可說，前何故云以如是義故受空受者空說是空耶？是以釋云：空違於有故，得假空破有，豈有此空？若有此空，即墮諸難。此釋為正意也。又釋：此四句自相違。如有與空義相違，乃至執第三亦有亦無與第四非空非有相違，既是相違則是諸見。今破此四種相違，故假名說佛耳。又釋：執佛是四句，則與佛相違；今破此四句，故假名說佛。「如是正觀思惟」下，生第二偈。第二偈來凡有三意：一為釋前不可說義，以佛是寂滅相故，不可說佛是空有四句。若說佛是空有四句者，此猶是世間常邊等見十四難耳。二者此是舉況。然計此常邊等四句既是邪見，則知計空有等四亦是邪見。三者上破空等四句是佛，今破常等八句是佛。小乘人言佛定無常；大乘言是常住，本迹合論亦常無常；若用中道為佛則非常無常。上四句論佛身、次四句明佛壽。小乘言：佛是無常，盡在一期，名為有邊。大乘人言：佛常住名為無邊，本迹合論亦邊無邊。計中道是佛，壽非邊無邊。《攝論》云「真如遍滿一切法中是無邊，餘法是有邊。」今並破也。問：長行明常邊，既是兩世，何故不說現在四見？答：上空有等四即現在也。

From "Question" below, the verses of the second section arise, refuting that the four tetralemma positions of emptiness and so forth are the Tathāgata. First the question, then the answer. The question has three intentions: First, having previously grasped the Tathāgata as existent, hearing that the treatise master seeks existence and cannot find it, the opponent then grasps non-existence as the Tathāgata; this is an emptiness view arising dependent on existence. Second, the various Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna adherents grasp the Buddha as existent, but now the Mahāyāna adherents specifically grasp emptiness as the Buddha, as with Dhyāna Master Shang of Jiangnan, and those in the northern lands who lecture on the Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa, who take suchness (tathatā) to be the Buddha. Third, the outsider grasps existence as the Buddha, and hearing that Nāgārjuna above refuted both person and phenomena as empty, assumes that Nāgārjuna takes emptiness to be the Buddha. In the answer there are two verses: the first verse refutes that the four propositions of emptiness and so forth are the Buddha, and the second verse refutes that the eight propositions of the eternalist extreme and so forth are the Buddha. The first three lines refute the four schools' definitions of the Buddha, as already recounted at the beginning of the chapter. They ought to be explained here; that they are all stated to be ineffable has two meanings: First, these four propositions do not exist, so what could be said? Second, these four propositions are the prapañca of various views, and one cannot speak of the prapañca of various views as being the Buddha. According to Kaishan's doctrine, the Buddha possesses both propositions of emptiness and existence. He says: In the mind following the vajropamasamādhi, there is both extinction and union, identical with suchness and equal to the dharma-nature. Now I ask: Since it is identical with suchness, how can it respond and illuminate? Answer: Reaching total cessation, it is all the more preserved. In terms of reaching total cessation, it merges with the true, and is thus called cessation; in terms of being all the more preserved, it exists, and responding and illuminating is designated existence. Now I ask: Is reaching total cessation identical with the true principle or not? Answer: In principle, it is of course identical. Question: When it is all the more preserved, is it the true principle that is all the more preserved or not? Answer: The true principle cannot be all the more preserved; it is only wisdom that can be all the more preserved. Now I ask: If the true principle cannot be all the more preserved, but wisdom can be all the more preserved, then wisdom and the true principle are different; how can it be identical with suchness? Furthermore, at the time of being all the more preserved, it is no longer the true principle, and thus falls outside the true principle. If being preserved is identical with the true principle, then the true principle is also all the more preserved. "It is spoken only by provisional designation": above it clarified that the four propositions are ineffable; now this resolves doubt. The reason why the sūtras speak of the Buddha's existence is merely that within the absence of names and characteristics, he is spoken of through provisional names and characteristics, just as the Nirvāṇa [Sūtra] states that within the nameless, one forcibly applies names and characteristics to speak of nirvāṇa as an alternative name for the Buddha. Furthermore, here the four propositions are ineffable, but one proposition can be spoken, just as in the Nirvāṇa Sūtra, six propositions such as "birth of birth" are ineffable, while the seventh proposition, having causes and conditions, can also mutually be spoken, because the ten dharmas serve as the cause for birth; therefore it can be spoken. The prose statement "only to refute mutual contradiction is it spoken by provisional designation" comes to resolve doubt. If it is said that here the four propositions are all ineffable, why did the previous text say: "By such meaning, appropriation is empty and the appropriator is empty; this is stated to be emptiness"? Thus it explains: Because emptiness contradicts existence, one can provisionally use emptiness to refute existence; how could there really be this emptiness? If there were this emptiness, it would fall into various difficulties. This explanation is the primary intention. Another explanation: these four propositions are mutually contradictory among themselves. For example, the meaning of existence contradicts that of emptiness, up to grasping the third proposition of both existence and non-existence contradicting the fourth of neither emptiness nor non-emptiness. Since they are contradictory, they are diverse views. Now, in order to refute these four kinds of contradictions, the Buddha is spoken of only by provisional designation. Another explanation: grasping the Buddha as the four propositions contradicts the Buddha; now, to refute these four propositions, the Buddha is spoken of by provisional designation. From "Reflecting with such correct contemplation" below, the second verse arises. The coming of the second verse has three intentions: First, to explain the previous meaning of ineffability: because the Buddha has the characteristic of quiescent cessation, one cannot state that the Buddha is the four propositions of emptiness and existence. If one states that the Buddha is the four propositions of emptiness and existence, these are still just worldly views such as the fourteen unanswerable questions on permanence and ends. Second, this is an illustrative comparison: since holding these four propositions of permanence and ends is an erroneous view, one knows that holding the four of emptiness and existence is likewise an erroneous view. Third, above it refuted that the four propositions of emptiness and so forth are the Buddha; now it refutes that the eight propositions of permanence and so forth are the Buddha. Hīnayāna adherents say the Buddha is definitely impermanent; Mahāyāna adherents say he is permanent, and when discussing fundamental and traces together, he is both permanent and impermanent; if one takes the middle way as the Buddha, he is neither permanent nor impermanent. The first four propositions discuss the Buddha's body; the next four clarify the Buddha's lifespan. The Hīnayāna says: The Buddha is impermanent and limited to a single lifetime, termed finite. The Mahāyāna adherents say: The Buddha is permanent, termed infinite; discussing fundamental and traces together, he is both finite and infinite. Holding the middle way to be the Buddha, his lifespan is neither finite nor infinite. The Mahāyānasaṃgraha says: "Suchness being all-pervasive throughout all phenomena is infinite; the remaining phenomena are finite." Now both are refuted. Question: The prose explains permanence and ends as pertaining to the two lifetimes [of past and future]; why does it not mention the four views of the present? Answer: The four propositions above of emptiness and existence are the present.