中觀論疏 9.34

9.34

「如來過戲論」下，品第四章呵責外人。若言佛是二諦攝、或出二諦外，如此等皆是戲論。接上生者，前明如來在世及以滅後並非有無，惑者戲論計於有無。下半出有無之過。興皇大師云：「執如來決定是有無常無常，破法身而過五逆也。」長行云「此如來品中」下，生起第五章，示其如來相。而言「初中後」者，品初破有是如來、中破空等四句是如來、後料簡如來非是都無亦非定有，即結上三章。第四段但是呵責，非是別破，故不結也。偈為二：上半示如來性、下半解釋上半。解如來性同世間性，所以作此說者凡有三義：一者外人品初舉出世證有世間，論主今舉世間以例出世，求世間有無四句既不可得，出世如來亦復例然。二者外人聞上破有無四句並皆非佛，便謂佛出四句之表、居百非之外，是故今明如來之性即是世間之性，非但佛出四句、超於百非，世間亦爾。故《淨名》云「觀身實相，觀佛亦然。」三者從第四章呵責生，前偈既云如來過戲論，外人便謂戲論自是世間，如來便為出世，則起世出世異見。是故今明如來之性即世間性，非但如來超於四句，即此四句本來不四即是如來。是故經云「貪欲即是道，恚癡亦復然。」下半釋上半，明如來與世間同絕四句，故二性無別性，無別性者體也。

From "The Tathāgata transcends prapañca" onward, the fourth section of the chapter rebukes the opponent. If one says that the Buddha is subsumed by the two truths or is outside the two truths, all such [assertions] are prapañca. Connecting to what precedes, previously it was clarified that the Tathāgata while in the world and after extinction is neither existent nor non-existent, yet the deluded engage in prapañca and calculate existence and non-existence. The second half reveals the faults of existence and non-existence. Great Master Xinghuang said: "Clinging to the Tathāgata as definitely existent, non-existent, permanent, or impermanent destroys the Dharmakāya and surpasses the five heinous sins." In the prose commentary, from "In this Tathāgata Chapter" onward, the fifth section is introduced to reveal the characteristics of the Tathāgata. When it says "beginning, middle, and end", at the beginning of the chapter it refuted existence as the Tathāgata, in the middle it refuted the four propositions of emptiness and the like as the Tathāgata, and at the end it examined that the Tathāgata is neither completely non-existent nor determinately existent—this summarizes the preceding three sections. The fourth section is merely a rebuke, not a separate refutation, hence it is not summarized. The verse has two parts: the first half shows the nature of the Tathāgata; the second half explains the first half. It explains that the nature of the Tathāgata is identical to the nature of the world. There are three reasons for making this statement: First, at the beginning of the chapter the opponent cited the transworldly to prove the existence of the worldly; the author of the treatise now cites the worldly to parallel the transworldly: since seeking the four propositions of existence and non-existence in the worldly is impossible, the transworldly Tathāgata is likewise the same. Second, hearing the preceding refutations that the four propositions of existence and non-existence are entirely not the Buddha, the opponent thought that the Buddha is beyond the four propositions and dwells outside the myriad negations; therefore it is now clarified that the nature of the Tathāgata is precisely the nature of the world—not only does the Buddha transcend the four propositions and surpass the myriad negations, but the world does so as well. Hence the Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa says: "Contemplating the true mark of the body, one contemplates the Buddha likewise." Third, it arises from the rebuke in the fourth section: since the previous verse said that the Tathāgata transcends prapañca, the opponent thought that prapañca belongs naturally to the world while the Tathāgata is transworldly, thus producing separate views of the worldly and the transworldly. Therefore it is now clarified that the nature of the Tathāgata is precisely the nature of the world; not only does the Tathāgata transcend the four propositions, but these four propositions are originally non-four, which is precisely the Tathāgata. Hence the sūtra says: "Craving is precisely the Path; anger and delusion are likewise." The second half explains the first half, clarifying that the Tathāgata and the world equally transcend the four propositions; therefore between the two natures there is no different nature, and what is devoid of a different nature is the substance.