中觀論疏 9.33

9.33

「問曰若如是破」下，第三章料簡如來，前問、次答。問曰：若空有四句並非佛者，應當無佛。外人云：佛若非世諦有則是真諦無，若非二諦便出二諦外非有非無，既具破此四句，應當無佛，則龍樹是邪見闡提。又夫論有佛，不出小乘無常、大乘常住，若無此大小之佛亦是邪見。答中二偈：初明如來現在非是有無、第二偈明如來滅後亦非有無。初偈上半破無。若大邪見人乃言無佛，我非邪見故不說無。又汝前執四句有佛名為有見，求汝四句有佛不得，汝謂無佛，汝便墮邪見。下半明如來非有。外人既聞邪見者執無佛，則正見者應有佛，是故今明執佛是無名重邪見、執佛是有謂輕邪見。長行前釋上半，為二：前明二種邪見。「是故若言無如來」下，次釋偈文。又初列二種邪見章門；從「破世間樂」者下，釋二章門。前釋麁邪見；「破涅槃道者」下，釋細邪見。此中明麁邪見起惡滅善，故世出世俱失；細邪見起善滅惡，得世間樂而破於涅槃。行道坐禪講說之人，宜常應以此文在意，勿一形苦節而破於涅槃。「是故若言無如來者」下，第二正釋偈上半文；「若言有如來」下，釋下半也。「如是性空中」，第二明如來滅度非是有無。上半正明如來是性空。性空者，體性畢竟清淨，橫絕萬非、竪超四句也，是故不可作有無思惟。《波若．實際品》云「前際亦性空，中際亦性空，後際亦性空。常性空，無不性空時。」故如來在世及滅後常畢竟清淨，汝云何於性空中思惟佛是有無耶？故言「思惟則不可」。又諸法性常內外並冥、緣觀俱寂，猶不容思惟，何況起有無諸見，故云思惟則不可。又此偈是舉本況末。佛本來絕四句，況滅後是四句，故不可作四句思惟。問：今此品正明如來法身，云何乃言性空耶？答：《大品》云「性空名諸佛道」，故知是法身異名，亦名寂滅實相及以法身也。問：今何故作性空耶？答：惑者聞上來破，謂遣着耳，而終有如來。是故今云如來從本來畢竟清淨，故名性空也。問：《成論．二世有無品》云「如來在世不攝有無」，與今何異？答：生法二空有二種，一小乘二空、二大乘二空。有無不攝亦有二種，一小乘四句不攝、二大乘有無不攝。即以此破開善義，佛不攝有無，何得言二諦攝耶？彼答云：非是自性之有、非是數滅之無，此有無不攝佛耳。今明蓋是以義判文，非就文釋義。問：若爾，莊嚴明佛不攝有無，與今文何異？答：上已破非有無竟，不應更復問也。又《智度論》云「非有無名愚癡論」，豈以愚癡為佛？《大品》云「佛及弟子知法性外更無有法。」若佛出真諦外，如此之人非是於佛亦非弟子，妄想之心作此釋也。又《楞伽》及此論明法界、法性、如、實際、涅槃是異名，云何言佛出涅槃外、佛出真諦外耶？下半正呵外人，於如來滅後分別有無。問：惑者何故於如來滅後分別有無？答：眾生見佛滅度，無復有佛，故種種推斥。小乘人言：佛灰身滅智，同於太虛，是故無佛。大乘人言：法身常住，是故有佛。初亦是上座部義，後是僧祇所立。

From "Question: If it is refuted like this" onward, the third section examines the Tathāgata, consisting first of a question and next of an answer. The question says: If the four propositions of emptiness and existence are entirely not the Buddha, then there should be no Buddha. The opponent says: If the Buddha is not existent in conventional truth, then he is non-existent in ultimate truth; if he is not in the two truths, then he is outside the two truths, neither existent nor non-existent. Since you have fully refuted these four propositions, there should be no Buddha, and thus Nāgārjuna is an icchantika of wrong view. Furthermore, when speaking of the existence of a Buddha, it does not go beyond the impermanence of the Hīnayāna and the permanence of the Mahāyāna; if there is no such Hīnayāna or Mahāyāna Buddha, this too is wrong view. In the answer there are two verses: the first verse clarifies that the Tathāgata in the present is neither existent nor non-existent; the second verse clarifies that the Tathāgata after extinction is likewise neither existent nor non-existent. The first half of the first verse refutes non-existence. Only a person of great wrong view would say there is no Buddha; because I do not hold wrong view, I do not say he is non-existent. Furthermore, your prior attachment to a Buddha in the four propositions was called the view of existence; seeking your Buddha of the four propositions and not finding him, you claim there is no Buddha, and you thereby fall into wrong view. The second half clarifies that the Tathāgata is not existent. When the opponent heard that one of wrong view clings to the non-existence of a Buddha, [he thought] one of right view should hold that there is a Buddha; therefore it is now clarified that clinging to the Buddha as non-existent is called coarse wrong view, while clinging to the Buddha as existent is called subtle wrong view. In the prose commentary, it first explains the first half of the verse, divided into two: first it clarifies the two kinds of wrong view; from "Therefore if one says there is no Tathāgata" onward, it next explains the lines of the verse. Furthermore, it first sets out the headings for the two kinds of wrong view; from "Destroys worldly happiness" onward, it explains the two headings. First it explains coarse wrong view; from "Destroys the path to nirvāṇa" onward, it explains subtle wrong view. Here it clarifies that coarse wrong view produces evil and destroys good, so that both worldly and transworldly [benefits] are lost; subtle wrong view produces good and destroys evil, obtaining worldly happiness but destroying nirvāṇa. Those who practice the path, sit in meditation, or give expositions should constantly keep this passage in mind, and not, through a lifetime of austere discipline, destroy nirvāṇa. From "Therefore if one says there is no Tathāgata" onward, it secondly directly explains the first half of the verse; from "If one says there is a Tathāgata" onward, it explains the second half. Under "In such emptiness of intrinsic nature", the second [verse] clarifies that the Tathāgata's extinction is neither existent nor non-existent. The first half directly clarifies that the Tathāgata is empty of intrinsic nature. As for emptiness of intrinsic nature, the essential nature is ultimately pure, horizontally cutting off the myriad negations and vertically transcending the four propositions; therefore one cannot conceptualize it in terms of existence or non-existence. The "Reality Chapter" of the Prajñā [Sūtra] says: "The prior limit is also empty of intrinsic nature, the middle limit is also empty of intrinsic nature, and the subsequent limit is also empty of intrinsic nature. It is always empty of intrinsic nature; there is no time when it is not empty of intrinsic nature." Therefore, while the Tathāgata is in the world and after his extinction, he is always ultimately pure. How could you conceptualize whether the Buddha is existent or non-existent within the emptiness of intrinsic nature? Hence it says: "To conceptualize [it] is not permissible." Furthermore, the nature of all dharmas is always such that the internal and external are both obscure, and condition and contemplation are both tranquil; it does not even admit of conceptualization, much less the arising of views of existence and non-existence. Hence it says that conceptualization is not permissible. Moreover, this verse uses the origin to illustrate the end: the Buddha originally transcends the four propositions, so how much more could he be the four propositions after extinction? Therefore one cannot conceptualize him in terms of the four propositions. Question: This chapter directly clarifies the Tathāgata's Dharmakāya; why does it speak of emptiness of intrinsic nature? Answer: The Pañcaviṃśati states, "Emptiness of intrinsic nature is called the path of all Buddhas"; thus we know it is a different name for the Dharmakāya, and is also called the tranquil true mark as well as the Dharmakāya. Question: Why is it now called emptiness of intrinsic nature? Answer: The deluded, hearing the preceding refutations, thought that [Nāgārjuna] was merely dispensing with attachments, but that in the end there is a Tathāgata. Therefore it is now stated that the Tathāgata is from the beginning ultimately pure, and is therefore called empty of intrinsic nature. Question: The "Existence and Non-existence in the Two Times Chapter" of the Tattvasiddhi-śāstra states: "The Tathāgata in the world is not subsumed by existence or non-existence." How does that differ from the present text? Answer: There are two kinds of the two emptinesses of persons and dharmas: first, the two emptinesses of the Hīnayāna; second, the two emptinesses of the Mahāyāna. Not being subsumed by existence or non-existence also has two kinds: first, not being subsumed by the four propositions in the Hīnayāna; second, not being subsumed by existence and non-existence in the Mahāyāna. One can use this precisely to refute the doctrine of Kaishan: if the Buddha is not subsumed by existence or non-existence, how could one say he is subsumed by the two truths? He answered: "It is not the existence of intrinsic nature, nor is it the non-existence of analytical cessation; it is these forms of existence and non-existence that do not subsume the Buddha." We now clarify that this is merely deciding the meaning to interpret the text, not interpreting the meaning according to the text. Question: If so, Zhuangyan clarified that the Buddha is not subsumed by existence or non-existence; how does that differ from the present text? Answer: Above, the position of "neither existence nor non-existence" has already been refuted; one should not ask again. Furthermore, the Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa says: "'Neither existence nor non-existence' is called foolish discourse." How could foolishness be taken as the Buddha? The Pañcaviṃśati says: "The Buddha and his disciples know that outside the Dharma-nature there is no other dharma." If the Buddha were outside the ultimate truth, such a person would not be a Buddha nor a disciple, but makes this explanation with a deluded mind. Furthermore, the Laṅkāvatāra and this treatise clarify that the Dharma-realm, Dharma-nature, suchness, the limit of reality, and nirvāṇa are different names; how could one say that the Buddha is outside of nirvāṇa, or that the Buddha is outside of the ultimate truth? The second half directly rebukes the opponent for discriminating existence and non-existence after the Tathāgata's extinction. Question: Why do the deluded discriminate existence and non-existence after the Tathāgata's extinction? Answer: Sentient beings see the Buddha enter extinction and think there is no longer a Buddha, hence they deduce and dispute in various ways. Hīnayāna adherents say: "The Buddha reduced his body to ashes and extinguished his cognition, becoming identical to empty space; therefore there is no Buddha." Mahāyāna adherents say: "The Dharmakāya is eternally abiding; therefore there is a Buddha." The former is also the doctrine of the Sthaviravāda, and the latter is established by the Mahāsāṃghika.