中觀論疏 9.40

9.40

「有倒不生倒」下，第二三時門破。上來就性空門無倒不倒，今就有法中亦無倒不倒，故空之與有二處求倒畢竟無從。又前是奪破，今是縱開。三偈二章：初二偈就三時門破倒生義，次一偈破倒不生義。破倒生即是破倒，破倒不生破於不倒，故上性空門破倒不倒。今三時門亦破倒不倒。又生無生並皆破，則知生無生皆倒，倒是無而謂有。正道未曾生無生，而計生無生，故並皆是倒也。初二偈為兩：一行半正破、次半行呵責。初又二：一偈就已未二門明法與人無有倒義、次半偈明倒時亦無人法兩倒。若將此文望〈去來品〉則有五句，謂法三人二。法三者，已去、未去、去時。人二者，去者不、去者。將此五破倒人倒法，亦有五也。然此得作已未，復得是有無。有無者，本有顛倒，不須復生。本無不可生。已未者，已倒，倒事已息。未倒，則未起於倒也。上半有無門破法倒不生、下半已未門破人倒不生也。以此問迷悟義，為迷者迷、為悟者迷？若迷者迷，則是迷迷。又若爾，應悟者悟，非是迷者悟耳。今迷者既悟，亦應悟者而迷。若悟者迷、佛悟者應起迷，不可答也。文並易見。「諸顛倒不生」下，第二破倒無生。若遠而為言，通從上空有二門求倒不得，外人便謂倒是無生。若就別，但從上三世門中求倒生不得，便謂無生，故復破之。上半破倒法不生、下半破倒人不生。一師明生滅、無生滅二種煩惱，以生滅是虛妄為客煩惱，無生滅是根本舊煩惱，故上來破生滅煩惱，今破無生煩惱。又前借無生破生，生是病、無生是藥，但外人執無生藥復成病，故須破之。又前破倒生滅，破凡夫二乘人，以凡夫謂倒生，二乘言倒滅。今破倒不生，破大乘人，大乘人言倒不生故。今此三人並皆改迷，悉入大乘得成佛也。上破無生法，即破無生境及無生智；下破無生行人。如《大品》云「不見菩薩、不見波若乃是行波若。」今亦爾也。

From "If inverted, one does not produce inversion..." onward is the second refutation through the approach of the three periods of time. Previously, through the approach of the emptiness of intrinsic nature, there was neither inversion nor non-inversion; now, within existent phenomena, there is also neither inversion nor non-inversion; thus in both loci of emptiness and existence, seeking inversion is ultimately without avenue. Furthermore, the former was a direct refutation, while the present is a provisional concession. Three verses comprise two sections: the first two verses refute the meaning of the arising of inversion through the approach of the three periods of time; the next one verse refutes the meaning of the non-arising of inversion. Refuting the arising of inversion is precisely refuting inversion; refuting the non-arising of inversion refutes non-inversion; hence above, the approach of the emptiness of intrinsic nature refuted inversion and non-inversion. Now the approach of the three periods of time likewise refutes inversion and non-inversion. Furthermore, when both arising and non-arising are refuted, one knows that arising and non-arising are both inversions—inversion is non-existent yet posited as existent. The right path has never been arising or non-arising, yet one conceptualizes arising and non-arising; hence they are both inversions. The first two verses form two parts: one line and a half is the actual refutation; the next half-line is scolding. The first has two parts again: one verse clarifies through the two approaches of the already and the not-yet that neither phenomenon nor person has the meaning of inversion; the next half-verse clarifies that at the time of inversion there are also neither of the two inversions of person and phenomenon. If this text is compared to the 'Chapter on Going and Coming', there are five propositions, namely three of phenomena and two of persons. The three of phenomena are: already gone, not-yet gone, and currently going. The two of persons are: goer and non-goer. Applying these five to refute the person of inversion and the phenomena of inversion, there are likewise five. However, these can be made into the already and the not-yet, and can also be made into existence and non-existence. As for existence and non-existence: if there is fundamentally inversion, it does not need to arise again; if fundamentally non-existent, it cannot arise. As for the already and the not-yet: if already inverted, the affair of inversion has already ceased; if not-yet inverted, it has not yet generated inversion. The first half uses the approach of existence and non-existence to refute the non-arising of inverted phenomena; the second half uses the approach of the already and the not-yet to refute the non-arising of the inverted person. If one queries the meaning of delusion and awakening through this: does the deluded one become deluded, or does the awakened one become deluded? If the deluded one becomes deluded, that is delusion upon delusion. Moreover, if so, the awakened one should awaken, not the deluded one awaken. Now since the deluded one awakens, the awakened one should also become deluded. If the awakened one becomes deluded, the Buddha who is awakened should generate delusion; it cannot be answered. The text is all easy to see. From "All inversions do not arise..." onward is the second, refuting the non-arising of inversion. If speaking broadly, seeking inversion generally through the above two approaches of emptiness and existence is unattainable, and the opponent then thinks that inversion is non-arising. If speaking specifically, merely because seeking the arising of inversion within the above approach of the three times is unattainable, they then think it is non-arising; hence it is refuted again. The first half refutes the non-arising of inverted phenomena; the second half refutes the non-arising of the inverted person. One master explains two kinds of afflictions: arising-and-perishing and non-arising-and-perishing, taking arising-and-perishing as false, adventitious afflictions, and non-arising-and-perishing as fundamental, ancient afflictions; hence previously arising-and-perishing afflictions were refuted, and now non-arising afflictions are refuted. Furthermore, previously non-arising was borrowed to refute arising—arising is the illness, and non-arising is the medicine; but when the opponent grasps the medicine of non-arising, it turns back into an illness; hence it must be refuted. Furthermore, the previous refutation of the arising and perishing of inversion refuted ordinary persons and the people of the two vehicles, because ordinary persons say inversion arises and the two vehicles say inversion perishes. Now refuting the non-arising of inversion refutes Mahāyāna practitioners, because Mahāyāna practitioners say inversion does not arise. Now all three kinds of persons alter their delusion, entirely entering the Great Vehicle and attaining Buddhahood. Above, refuting non-arisen phenomena refutes the non-arisen realm and non-arisen wisdom; below, it refutes practitioners of non-arising. As the *Pañcaviṃśati* says: "Not seeing a bodhisattva and not seeing prajñā is precisely practicing prajñā." The present is likewise so.