中觀論疏 9.39

9.39

「問曰經說」下，第二次破顛倒，前立、次破。立中有三：初立倒不倒法；「有顛倒故」下，第二立起顛倒之人。立起前四倒是凡夫人，起後四倒是二乘人。既有能起之人，必有所起之倒。「何以言都無」下，第三呵論主。問：何故但立前四倒、不立後四耶？答：一以前例後、二者此中所立正是小乘人義。小乘人但計前四是倒，後四為不倒，故但立前四。問：若爾，此品稱破顛倒，但應破前四倒、不破後倒。答：就文實爾，但破前倒，以前例後故亦破後倒。又此品名破顛倒者，明外人倒與不倒皆成顛倒。所以然者，外謂無常見常名為顛倒，無常見無常名不顛倒。今明無此倒與不倒，故知倒與不倒皆是顛倒也。昔倒與不倒既並是倒，今倒不倒亦並是倒，故成十六倒也。又計生死常、無常、亦常無常、非常非無常，四句皆倒。我樂淨亦四，則生死有十六倒。佛地亦十六，合三十二倒。一句中皆有想心見，計之可知。問：小乘人亦破四倒，與今何異？答小乘明所計倒法是無，能計之心為有。今明能計同所計，所計既無，能計亦爾，是故異也。「答曰」下，九偈三門：初四偈性空門破倒不倒；次三偈就三時門破倒不倒；後兩偈實不實門破倒不倒。初是空門、次是有門、後是依名門。就初四偈即四：第一偈破倒、次破不倒、第三破著、第四總結破。初偈上半牒、下半破。性空門者，即是實相異名。實相法中絕於四句，寧有常法名為倒耶？此即是就道理明無也。又有二種小乘人：一不信法空小乘人，言有顛倒體；二析法空小乘人，不知顛倒本性空。今破二小乘人申大乘義，故明顛倒本性空。又令前二小乘人迴小入大，故明本性空也。第二偈亦上半牒、下半破。第三偈所以破著者，前兩偈上半並云。於無常著常、無常著無常，此則是由著故有倒不倒耳，空中無有此倒不倒也。外人便云：既由著有倒不倒，便應有著，故復破之。又外謂論主實有無常，但遣人著心，故破無常耳。是故今明都無有著，何所遣耶？又前破倒不倒，此是破末煩惱。著是取相，取相是根本煩惱，故次破本也。偈為三：上半牒外義、第三句破、第四句呵責。「可著」是常無常境，「著」是取相煩惱，「著者」是起著之人，「所用著法」是諸根也。長行指〈如來品〉中寂滅相中無常無常等四偈也。「若無有著法」下，第四偈結破。就偈為二：初三句結上三章、第四句呵責。「若無有著法」，逐近結第三章。言邪是顛倒，結第一章。言正不顛倒，結第二章也。

From "Question: The sūtras state..." onward is the second [section], refuting inversions; first establishing and then refuting. In establishing them there are three parts: first establishing inverted and non-inverted phenomena; from "Because there are inversions..." onward is the second, establishing persons who generate inversions. Those established who generate the former four inversions are ordinary persons; those who generate the latter four inversions are the people of the two vehicles. Since there are persons capable of generating them, there must be inversions that are generated. From "Why do you say there are none at all?" onward is the third, scolding the treatise master. Question: Why are only the former four inversions established and not the latter four? Answer: First, because the former exemplifies the latter; second, what is established here is precisely the doctrine of Hīnayāna practitioners. Hīnayāna practitioners only posit the former four as inversions and the latter four as non-inversions; hence they establish only the former four. Question: If so, this chapter is called 'Refuting Inversions'; it should only refute the former four inversions and not refute the latter inversions. Answer: In terms of the text, it is indeed so—it only refutes the former inversions, but because the former exemplifies the latter, it also refutes the latter inversions. Furthermore, that this chapter is called 'Refuting Inversions' clarifies that for non-Buddhists, both inversion and non-inversion turn out to be inversions. Why is this? Non-Buddhists take seeing permanence in the impermanent to be an inversion, and seeing impermanence in the impermanent to be non-inversion. Now it is shown that there is neither this inversion nor non-inversion; thus we know that inversion and non-inversion are both inversions. Since the former inversion and non-inversion were both inversions, and present inversion and non-inversion are likewise both inversions, they form sixteen inversions. Furthermore, conceptualizing saṃsāra as permanent, impermanent, both permanent and impermanent, and neither permanent nor impermanent—all four propositions are inversions. Self, pleasure, and purity are likewise four each, so saṃsāra has sixteen inversions. The Buddha-ground also has sixteen, together making thirty-two inversions. In each proposition there are [inversions of] perception, mind, and view; by calculating them one may know this. Question: Hīnayāna practitioners also refute the four inversions; how does this differ from the present [view]? Answer: Hīnayāna clarifies that the inverted phenomena conceptualized are non-existent, but the mind capable of conceptualizing is existent. Now it is shown that what is capable of conceptualizing is identical to what is conceptualized; since what is conceptualized is already non-existent, that which is capable of conceptualizing is likewise so; therefore they differ. From "Answer:" onward, there are nine verses in three approaches: the first four verses refute inversion and non-inversion through the approach of the emptiness of intrinsic nature; the next three verses refute inversion and non-inversion through the approach of the three periods of time; the final two verses refute inversion and non-inversion through the approach of real and unreal. The first is the approach of emptiness; the second is the approach of existence; the third is the approach of reliance on nominal designation. In the first four verses there are four [points]: the first verse refutes inversion; the next refutes non-inversion; the third refutes attachment; the fourth summarizes and refutes. The first half of the first verse cites [the opponent's claim], and the second half refutes it. The approach of the emptiness of intrinsic nature is another name for the true mark. In the phenomena of the true mark, the four propositions are cut off; how could there be a permanent phenomenon called an inversion? This clarifies non-existence in terms of the principle. Furthermore, there are two kinds of Hīnayāna practitioners: first, Hīnayāna practitioners who do not believe in the emptiness of phenomena and say that inversions have an ontological substance; second, Hīnayāna practitioners who analyze the emptiness of phenomena and do not know that inversions are fundamentally empty in their intrinsic nature. Now both Hīnayāna practitioners are refuted in order to elucidate the Mahāyāna doctrine; hence it is shown that inversions are fundamentally empty in their intrinsic nature. Furthermore, it causes the former two Hīnayāna practitioners to turn from the small and enter the Great; hence it shows that their intrinsic nature is fundamentally empty. The second verse likewise has the first half citing and the second half refuting. As for why the third verse refutes attachment, the first halves of the preceding two verses both say: regarding the impermanent, attaching to permanence, and regarding the impermanent, attaching to impermanence. This is because there are inversion and non-inversion only due to attachment; within emptiness there is neither this inversion nor non-inversion. The opponent then says: Since inversion and non-inversion exist due to attachment, there must be attachment; therefore it is refuted again. Furthermore, the opponent thinks that the treatise master [holds that] impermanence really exists and merely dispels the mind of human attachment, and for this reason refutes impermanence. Therefore it is now clarified that there is no attachment whatsoever; what could there be to dispel? Furthermore, the previous refutation of inversion and non-inversion was a refutation of derivative afflictions. Attachment is grasping marks, and grasping marks is the fundamental affliction; hence the root is refuted next. The verse has three parts: the first half cites the opponent's doctrine, the third line refutes it, and the fourth line scolds. 'Object of attachment' is the realm of permanence and impermanence; 'attachment' is the affliction of grasping marks; 'the one who attaches' is the person who generates attachment; 'the phenomena used to attach' are the various sense faculties. The prose refers to the four verses in the 'Tathāgata Chapter' regarding impermanence, non-impermanence, etc., in the mark of quiescence. From "If there are no phenomena of attachment..." onward, the fourth verse concludes the refutation. In the verse there are two parts: the first three lines conclude the preceding three sections; the fourth line scolds. 'If there are no phenomena of attachment' concludes the third section immediately preceding it. The statement that error is inversion concludes the first section. The statement that correctness is non-inversion concludes the second section.