中觀論疏 10.3

10.3

The reason this chapter follows is that a mind with grasping inevitably relies upon and clings to something. The preceding twenty-one chapters established the persons and phenomena of the mundane world; when the author of the treatise sought them and found them baseless, [the opponent] then adduced the supramundane Tathāgata to prove the existence of the mundane. Next, when seeking the supramundane Tathāgata he could not be found, [the opponent] then adduced mundane inversions to prove the existence of the supramundane. In the preceding chapter, when seeking mundane inversions they could not be found, the opponent said: "If so, there should be neither the mundane nor the supramundane at all. Now, since the Four Truths truly exist, there must be both the mundane and the supramundane. Thus the two truths of suffering and origination are the mundane, while the two truths of cessation and the path are called the supramundane; therefore there cannot be an absence of the mundane and supramundane." Now, contemplating the Four Truths as ungraspable accomplishes the earlier meaning of being neither mundane nor supramundane. Since they are neither mundane nor supramundane, they are the middle way; hence, on the basis of the middle, contemplation is aroused, and prapañca is extinguished here.

Second, the opponent says: "Inversions are what the Tathāgata has abandoned, whereas the Four Truths are what the Tathāgata has realized and also what the Tathāgata has taught. The Tathāgata's single span of appearance in the world differed from beginning to end, yet uniformly elucidated the Four Truths. Hence in his initial teaching he turned the Dharma-wheel of the Four Truths, up until the Nirvāṇa [Sūtra] where he taught the joy of the mind. The reason why the Four Truths are elucidated from beginning to end is that the Four Truths are the root of delusion and awakening: if one is deluded about them, the six destinies proliferate in confusion; if one awakens to them, there are the worthy and noble ones of the three vehicles. Therefore, from beginning to end, the Four Truths are elucidated. If so, there cannot be an absence of the mundane and supramundane."

Third, regarding its immediate emergence from the "Chapter on Inversions": inversions are the afflictions capable of deluding, while the Four Truths are the objective realm regarding which one is deluded. Because seeing the Four Truths destroys the four inversions, previously seeking that which can obstruct proved baseless, and now examining that regarding which one is deluded finds it ungraspable; hence this chapter exists.

However, the Four Truths are of two kinds: first, bounded; second, boundless. The suffering fruit of the three realms is called the truth of suffering; the karma and afflictions that induce the suffering of the three realms are called the truth of origination; unconditioned nirvāṇa is called the truth of cessation; that which cures these afflictions is called the truth of the path. These are the bounded.

In explaining the bounded Four Truths, the various Hīnayāna treatise masters differ. The *Vibhāṣā* states: "The Abhidharmikas say: 'The suffering of the five grasping aggregates is called the truth of suffering; contaminated causes are the truth of origination; analytical cessation is the truth of cessation; the trainee and beyond-training [dharmas] are the truth of the path.' The Dārṣṭāntikas say: 'Name-and-form is the truth of suffering; fettering karma is the truth of origination; the cessation of fettering karma is the truth of cessation; calm and insight are the truth of the path.' The Vibhajyavādins say: 'The eight sufferings are suffering and are the truth of suffering; other sufferings, though suffering, are not the truth of suffering. Craving that induces future [existence] is the truth of origination; other cravings and other contaminated dharmas, though origination, are not the truth of origination. The exhaustion of craving for future existence is cessation and is the truth of cessation; the exhaustion of other cravings and other contaminated dharmas is not the truth of exhaustion. The eightfold noble path is the path and is the truth of the path; other trainee dharmas and all beyond-training dharmas are not the truth of the path.'"

Question: Do the Four Truths subsume all dharmas completely or not?

Answer: Space and non-analytical cessation are not subsumed under the Four Truths. The Four Truths are established on the basis of seeking and revulsion: those [two unconditioned dharmas] are not reviled, hence they are not suffering or origination; they are not to be sought, hence they are not cessation or the path. Furthermore, because these two are uncontaminated, they are not suffering or origination; because they are indeterminate, they are not cessation or the path. Again, the Four Truths are established based on cause and effect: those are neither cause nor effect, hence they are not truths.

Question: Why are they called "truths"?

Answer: There are two meanings: first, they are truly suffering; second, they give rise to non-inverted understanding; hence they are called truths.

Question: Why are they called "noble truths"?

Answer: They are understood by noble persons, hence they are called noble truths. Moreover, in the past an ordinary person disputed with a noble person about the truths. The ordinary person said, "There is permanence, pleasure, self, and purity." The noble person said, "There is not." Together they went to the Buddha's place to resolve it. The Buddha said, "It is as the noble person knows." Because the noble person won this truth through dispute, they are called noble truths.

The Abhidharmikas and the *Tattvasiddhi-śāstra* only explain the bounded, yet their meanings differ. The Abhidharmikas explain that suffering pervades the three groups; the *Tattvasiddhi-śāstra* holds it is mind alone. In the *Tattvasiddhi-śāstra*, suffering pervades the contaminated and uncontaminated; for the Abhidharmikas, it is contaminated only. For the Abhidharmikas, origination pervades the three groups; the *Tattvasiddhi-śāstra* takes only karma and afflictions. For the Abhidharmikas, cause and origination have conditions: recompensing what came before is the fruit, producing what comes after is the cause; but only the capacity to produce belongs to origination, whereas what is produced is suffering. In the *Tattvasiddhi-śāstra*, this very capacity to produce is also a suffering retribution—the wrath of a poisonous snake is itself a retributive dharma, called the truth of suffering. The Abhidharmikas take only the cessation of afflictions as the truth of cessation, while the cessation of uncontaminated dharmas is not the truth of cessation; the *Tattvasiddhi-śāstra* explains that the cessation of uncontaminated dharmas is also the truth of cessation. The Abhidharmikas explain that the permanent subduing of the fetters in the preparatory path is non-analytical cessation; the *Tattvasiddhi-śāstra* explains that cessation in the five preparatory stages is also the truth of cessation. The Abhidharmikas explain that all uncontaminated practices are the truth of the path, not taking the semblance [path]; the *Tattvasiddhi-śāstra* explains that both the genuine and semblance are the truth of the path. The Abhidharmikas explain that there is no principle of a dharma being guided; the *Tattvasiddhi-śāstra* explains that there is a mind that is guided.

Next, regarding the boundless Four Truths: the two kinds of birth-and-death are suffering; the five entrenchments are origination; the cessation of the two kinds of birth-and-death and the five entrenchments is cessation; and the genuine understanding that cures the delusion of these five entrenchments is the truth of the path. Furthermore, the bounded and boundless are also termed "with-activity" and "without-activity": after the bounded, there is still activity to be done, just as after the suffering of fragmented [samsāra] there is still the suffering of transformational [samsāra] to be contemplated, hence termed "with-activity"; after the suffering of transformational [samsāra], there is no further suffering to be contemplated, hence termed "without-activity." The remaining three are also like this.

Now, when speaking of "refuting the Four Truths": first, it refutes practitioners of the Mahāyāna who claim that the Four Truths are non-existent; second, it refutes Hīnayāna practitioners who claim that the Four Truths exist intrinsically. These [two groups of] Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna completely subsume all delusions; now, refuting what these two people understand is called refuting the Four Truths. Why is this so? A Mahāyāna person denies the Four Truths, which destroys the Buddha's meaning of the Four Truths; a Hīnayāna person posits intrinsic existence, which likewise destroys the Four Truths. Moreover, there are two kinds of people who destroy the meaning of the Four Truths: first, those who claim that because the author of the treatise clings to emptiness, he destroys the Four Truths; second, those who themselves cling to intrinsic existence and thereby destroy the Four Truths. Both of these are Hīnayāna persons, but because they posit another's refutation and their own establishment, they constitute two kinds. Now refuting these two matters is called refuting the Four Truths.

Furthermore, this reveals that neither of these two people understands the Buddha's meaning of the Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna. The Hīnayāna person does not understand the Buddha's dependently arisen existence and turns it into intrinsic existence; the Mahāyāna person does not understand the Buddha's Mahāyāna emptiness and turns it into perverse emptiness. Having fallen into delusion about both the Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna, they are both confused about the two truths. The author of the treatise, with luminous wisdom abounding within and the breeze of compassion fanning outward, delivers these Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna persons; therefore, he refutes their two delusions and clarifies that there is no such emptiness or existence. Thus it is said that being neither empty nor existent is the middle reality. The "middle reality" means that in reality there is no such existence or non-existence; this then elucidates the Buddha's dependently arisen existence and non-existence, which only then is provisional designation. Because it is provisional designation, there is the middle way. As it says below: "It is also a provisional designation; it is also the middle way." Furthermore, refuting this Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna clarifies that the absence of such Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna is the middle reality, which only then is the dependently arisen provisional designation of Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna. That very provisional designation, through this Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna, enables one to realize that the Path has never been Mahāyāna or Hīnayāna.

Moreover, examining the overall purport of the treatise from beginning to end: from the "Chapter on Causes and Conditions" up to before the "[Chapter on] Four Truths", the opponent clings to existence to challenge the author of the treatise; at the beginning of this chapter, the opponent clings to emptiness to challenge the author of the treatise. Initially clinging to existence to raise objections revealed that the opponent did not recognize emptiness; now clinging to emptiness to raise objections clarifies that the opponent does not recognize existence—which means being deluded about the two truths. It is also that initially he clung to the Hīnayāna to challenge the author of the treatise, whereas now he clings to the Mahāyāna to challenge the author of the treatise, revealing that the opponent recognizes neither the Mahāyāna nor the Hīnayāna. Again, from the beginning onward, clinging to intrinsic existence to challenge the author of the treatise revealed that the opponent did not recognize dependently arisen existence; now clinging to perverse emptiness to challenge the author of the treatise reveals that the opponent does not recognize correct emptiness. The author of the treatise takes pity on such deluded inversions; therefore, he refutes this emptiness and existence, clarifying that in the ultimate sense there is no such emptiness or existence, and subsequently elucidates the emptiness and existence of the two truths of dependent origination.

Furthermore, it reveals that when the opponent previously clung to existence to challenge the author of the treatise, he did not rely on emptiness to challenge, so his objection failed to be an objection; now, clinging to emptiness to challenge the author of the treatise, he grasps the characteristic of emptiness to challenge, so his objection likewise fails to be an objection. Clinging to fixed intrinsic emptiness or existence, an objection fails to be an objection; clinging to fixed intrinsic emptiness or existence, an answer fails to be an answer.

Question: Why is it precisely in this chapter that it is revealed that both the opponent's emptiness and existence refute the Four Truths?

Answer: From the beginning of the treatise onward, there was only the refutation of the mundane alone or the refutation of the supramundane alone; but since the Four Truths comprehensively subsume both the mundane and supramundane and are the great central doctrine of the Buddha-Dharma, it is precisely in this chapter that it is revealed that both the opponent's emptiness and existence refute the Four Truths.

Question: Does the author of the treatise possess the Four Truths or not?

Answer: The author of the treatise has never maintained that there are four, nor has he ever maintained that there are not four, nor that there are both four and not-four, nor neither four nor not-four. Hence the "Chapter on Dharmas" states: "As for the true mark of all dharmas, the movements of the mind and paths of speech are severed."

Question: Since the author of the treatise has never maintained that there are four or not-four, why do the Buddha's sūtras say that there are Four Truths?

Answer: Although they are neither four nor not-four, for the sake of sentient beings he expediently speaks of four and not-four. Hence the verse below states: "The Buddhas rely on the two truths / To teach the Dharma to sentient beings." The *Larger [Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra]* states: "Although sentient beings are ungraspable within the two truths, the bodhisattva abides in the two truths to teach the Dharma to sentient beings." The commentary (*Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa*) explains: "For those attached to existence, he speaks of emptiness; for those attached to emptiness, he speaks of existence." Now it is also like this: for those attached to the existence of the four, he speaks of there not being four; for those attached to the non-existence of the four, he explains that there are Four Truths. When it comes to the ultimate discussion of all dharmas, they have never been four or not-four.