中觀論疏 10

English (machine translation) 10

Language: English

The reason this chapter follows is that a mind with grasping inevitably relies upon and clings to something. The preceding twenty-one chapters established the persons and phenomena of the mundane world; when the author of the treatise sought them and found them baseless, [the opponent] then adduced the supramundane Tathāgata to prove the existence of the mundane. Next, when seeking the supramundane Tathāgata he could not be found, [the opponent] then adduced mundane inversions to prove the existence of the supramundane. In the preceding chapter, when seeking mundane inversions they could not be found, the opponent said: "If so, there should be neither the mundane nor the supramundane at all. Now, since the Four Truths truly exist, there must be both the mundane and the supramundane. Thus the two truths of suffering and origination are the mundane, while the two truths of cessation and the path are called the supramundane; therefore there cannot be an absence of the mundane and supramundane." Now, contemplating the Four Truths as ungraspable accomplishes the earlier meaning of being neither mundane nor supramundane. Since they are neither mundane nor supramundane, they are the middle way; hence, on the basis of the middle, contemplation is aroused, and prapañca is extinguished here.

Second, the opponent says: "Inversions are what the Tathāgata has abandoned, whereas the Four Truths are what the Tathāgata has realized and also what the Tathāgata has taught. The Tathāgata's single span of appearance in the world differed from beginning to end, yet uniformly elucidated the Four Truths. Hence in his initial teaching he turned the Dharma-wheel of the Four Truths, up until the Nirvāṇa [Sūtra] where he taught the joy of the mind. The reason why the Four Truths are elucidated from beginning to end is that the Four Truths are the root of delusion and awakening: if one is deluded about them, the six destinies proliferate in confusion; if one awakens to them, there are the worthy and noble ones of the three vehicles. Therefore, from beginning to end, the Four Truths are elucidated. If so, there cannot be an absence of the mundane and supramundane."

Third, regarding its immediate emergence from the "Chapter on Inversions": inversions are the afflictions capable of deluding, while the Four Truths are the objective realm regarding which one is deluded. Because seeing the Four Truths destroys the four inversions, previously seeking that which can obstruct proved baseless, and now examining that regarding which one is deluded finds it ungraspable; hence this chapter exists.

However, the Four Truths are of two kinds: first, bounded; second, boundless. The suffering fruit of the three realms is called the truth of suffering; the karma and afflictions that induce the suffering of the three realms are called the truth of origination; unconditioned nirvāṇa is called the truth of cessation; that which cures these afflictions is called the truth of the path. These are the bounded.

In explaining the bounded Four Truths, the various Hīnayāna treatise masters differ. The *Vibhāṣā* states: "The Abhidharmikas say: 'The suffering of the five grasping aggregates is called the truth of suffering; contaminated causes are the truth of origination; analytical cessation is the truth of cessation; the trainee and beyond-training [dharmas] are the truth of the path.' The Dārṣṭāntikas say: 'Name-and-form is the truth of suffering; fettering karma is the truth of origination; the cessation of fettering karma is the truth of cessation; calm and insight are the truth of the path.' The Vibhajyavādins say: 'The eight sufferings are suffering and are the truth of suffering; other sufferings, though suffering, are not the truth of suffering. Craving that induces future [existence] is the truth of origination; other cravings and other contaminated dharmas, though origination, are not the truth of origination. The exhaustion of craving for future existence is cessation and is the truth of cessation; the exhaustion of other cravings and other contaminated dharmas is not the truth of exhaustion. The eightfold noble path is the path and is the truth of the path; other trainee dharmas and all beyond-training dharmas are not the truth of the path.'"

Question: Do the Four Truths subsume all dharmas completely or not?

Answer: Space and non-analytical cessation are not subsumed under the Four Truths. The Four Truths are established on the basis of seeking and revulsion: those [two unconditioned dharmas] are not reviled, hence they are not suffering or origination; they are not to be sought, hence they are not cessation or the path. Furthermore, because these two are uncontaminated, they are not suffering or origination; because they are indeterminate, they are not cessation or the path. Again, the Four Truths are established based on cause and effect: those are neither cause nor effect, hence they are not truths.

Question: Why are they called "truths"?

Answer: There are two meanings: first, they are truly suffering; second, they give rise to non-inverted understanding; hence they are called truths.

Question: Why are they called "noble truths"?

Answer: They are understood by noble persons, hence they are called noble truths. Moreover, in the past an ordinary person disputed with a noble person about the truths. The ordinary person said, "There is permanence, pleasure, self, and purity." The noble person said, "There is not." Together they went to the Buddha's place to resolve it. The Buddha said, "It is as the noble person knows." Because the noble person won this truth through dispute, they are called noble truths.

The Abhidharmikas and the *Tattvasiddhi-śāstra* only explain the bounded, yet their meanings differ. The Abhidharmikas explain that suffering pervades the three groups; the *Tattvasiddhi-śāstra* holds it is mind alone. In the *Tattvasiddhi-śāstra*, suffering pervades the contaminated and uncontaminated; for the Abhidharmikas, it is contaminated only. For the Abhidharmikas, origination pervades the three groups; the *Tattvasiddhi-śāstra* takes only karma and afflictions. For the Abhidharmikas, cause and origination have conditions: recompensing what came before is the fruit, producing what comes after is the cause; but only the capacity to produce belongs to origination, whereas what is produced is suffering. In the *Tattvasiddhi-śāstra*, this very capacity to produce is also a suffering retribution—the wrath of a poisonous snake is itself a retributive dharma, called the truth of suffering. The Abhidharmikas take only the cessation of afflictions as the truth of cessation, while the cessation of uncontaminated dharmas is not the truth of cessation; the *Tattvasiddhi-śāstra* explains that the cessation of uncontaminated dharmas is also the truth of cessation. The Abhidharmikas explain that the permanent subduing of the fetters in the preparatory path is non-analytical cessation; the *Tattvasiddhi-śāstra* explains that cessation in the five preparatory stages is also the truth of cessation. The Abhidharmikas explain that all uncontaminated practices are the truth of the path, not taking the semblance [path]; the *Tattvasiddhi-śāstra* explains that both the genuine and semblance are the truth of the path. The Abhidharmikas explain that there is no principle of a dharma being guided; the *Tattvasiddhi-śāstra* explains that there is a mind that is guided.

Next, regarding the boundless Four Truths: the two kinds of birth-and-death are suffering; the five entrenchments are origination; the cessation of the two kinds of birth-and-death and the five entrenchments is cessation; and the genuine understanding that cures the delusion of these five entrenchments is the truth of the path. Furthermore, the bounded and boundless are also termed "with-activity" and "without-activity": after the bounded, there is still activity to be done, just as after the suffering of fragmented [samsāra] there is still the suffering of transformational [samsāra] to be contemplated, hence termed "with-activity"; after the suffering of transformational [samsāra], there is no further suffering to be contemplated, hence termed "without-activity." The remaining three are also like this.

Now, when speaking of "refuting the Four Truths": first, it refutes practitioners of the Mahāyāna who claim that the Four Truths are non-existent; second, it refutes Hīnayāna practitioners who claim that the Four Truths exist intrinsically. These [two groups of] Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna completely subsume all delusions; now, refuting what these two people understand is called refuting the Four Truths. Why is this so? A Mahāyāna person denies the Four Truths, which destroys the Buddha's meaning of the Four Truths; a Hīnayāna person posits intrinsic existence, which likewise destroys the Four Truths. Moreover, there are two kinds of people who destroy the meaning of the Four Truths: first, those who claim that because the author of the treatise clings to emptiness, he destroys the Four Truths; second, those who themselves cling to intrinsic existence and thereby destroy the Four Truths. Both of these are Hīnayāna persons, but because they posit another's refutation and their own establishment, they constitute two kinds. Now refuting these two matters is called refuting the Four Truths.

Furthermore, this reveals that neither of these two people understands the Buddha's meaning of the Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna. The Hīnayāna person does not understand the Buddha's dependently arisen existence and turns it into intrinsic existence; the Mahāyāna person does not understand the Buddha's Mahāyāna emptiness and turns it into perverse emptiness. Having fallen into delusion about both the Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna, they are both confused about the two truths. The author of the treatise, with luminous wisdom abounding within and the breeze of compassion fanning outward, delivers these Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna persons; therefore, he refutes their two delusions and clarifies that there is no such emptiness or existence. Thus it is said that being neither empty nor existent is the middle reality. The "middle reality" means that in reality there is no such existence or non-existence; this then elucidates the Buddha's dependently arisen existence and non-existence, which only then is provisional designation. Because it is provisional designation, there is the middle way. As it says below: "It is also a provisional designation; it is also the middle way." Furthermore, refuting this Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna clarifies that the absence of such Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna is the middle reality, which only then is the dependently arisen provisional designation of Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna. That very provisional designation, through this Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna, enables one to realize that the Path has never been Mahāyāna or Hīnayāna.

Moreover, examining the overall purport of the treatise from beginning to end: from the "Chapter on Causes and Conditions" up to before the "[Chapter on] Four Truths", the opponent clings to existence to challenge the author of the treatise; at the beginning of this chapter, the opponent clings to emptiness to challenge the author of the treatise. Initially clinging to existence to raise objections revealed that the opponent did not recognize emptiness; now clinging to emptiness to raise objections clarifies that the opponent does not recognize existence—which means being deluded about the two truths. It is also that initially he clung to the Hīnayāna to challenge the author of the treatise, whereas now he clings to the Mahāyāna to challenge the author of the treatise, revealing that the opponent recognizes neither the Mahāyāna nor the Hīnayāna. Again, from the beginning onward, clinging to intrinsic existence to challenge the author of the treatise revealed that the opponent did not recognize dependently arisen existence; now clinging to perverse emptiness to challenge the author of the treatise reveals that the opponent does not recognize correct emptiness. The author of the treatise takes pity on such deluded inversions; therefore, he refutes this emptiness and existence, clarifying that in the ultimate sense there is no such emptiness or existence, and subsequently elucidates the emptiness and existence of the two truths of dependent origination.

Furthermore, it reveals that when the opponent previously clung to existence to challenge the author of the treatise, he did not rely on emptiness to challenge, so his objection failed to be an objection; now, clinging to emptiness to challenge the author of the treatise, he grasps the characteristic of emptiness to challenge, so his objection likewise fails to be an objection. Clinging to fixed intrinsic emptiness or existence, an objection fails to be an objection; clinging to fixed intrinsic emptiness or existence, an answer fails to be an answer.

Question: Why is it precisely in this chapter that it is revealed that both the opponent's emptiness and existence refute the Four Truths?

Answer: From the beginning of the treatise onward, there was only the refutation of the mundane alone or the refutation of the supramundane alone; but since the Four Truths comprehensively subsume both the mundane and supramundane and are the great central doctrine of the Buddha-Dharma, it is precisely in this chapter that it is revealed that both the opponent's emptiness and existence refute the Four Truths.

Question: Does the author of the treatise possess the Four Truths or not?

Answer: The author of the treatise has never maintained that there are four, nor has he ever maintained that there are not four, nor that there are both four and not-four, nor neither four nor not-four. Hence the "Chapter on Dharmas" states: "As for the true mark of all dharmas, the movements of the mind and paths of speech are severed."

Question: Since the author of the treatise has never maintained that there are four or not-four, why do the Buddha's sūtras say that there are Four Truths?

Answer: Although they are neither four nor not-four, for the sake of sentient beings he expediently speaks of four and not-four. Hence the verse below states: "The Buddhas rely on the two truths / To teach the Dharma to sentient beings." The *Larger [Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra]* states: "Although sentient beings are ungraspable within the two truths, the bodhisattva abides in the two truths to teach the Dharma to sentient beings." The commentary (*Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa*) explains: "For those attached to existence, he speaks of emptiness; for those attached to emptiness, he speaks of existence." Now it is also like this: for those attached to the existence of the four, he speaks of there not being four; for those attached to the non-existence of the four, he explains that there are Four Truths. When it comes to the ultimate discussion of all dharmas, they have never been four or not-four.

10.4

The chapter opens into two parts: first, the opponent faults the author of the treatise for grasping emptiness as their common [standpoint]; second, the author of the treatise refutes the opponent's grasping existence as their common [standpoint]. This means using the opponent to refute nihilistic views and put an end to the annihilationist mindset of those who grasp the teachings; and relying on the author of the treatise to refute existence and eliminate the eternalist view of ordinary reckonings. Since the four truths are the grand tenet of the Buddha-Dharma and fully encompass worldly and supramundane dharmas, this chapter takes them up to refute annihilationist and eternalist views, reveal the middle way, and cause contemplation to arise based on the middle [path]. Within the opponent's faulting of the author of the treatise, it is again divided into two: first, prose; second, verses. The prose can have two senses: first, the genesis showing how it follows upon the 'Chapter on Errors' to lead to the 'Chapter on the Four Truths'; second, the intention to fault the author's [assertion of] emptiness, hence first establishing the meaning of having the four truths. As for the verses, they are divided into two: first, faulting the author of the treatise with having no four truths, no Three Jewels, and no supramundane dharmas; second, faulting the author of the treatise with having no cause and effect, no sin and merit, and no worldly dharmas. The first also has two parts: the first half-line repeats the author's grasping of emptiness; from 'If so, then there are no...' onward, the second raises faults against the author of the treatise. This is again divided into two distinctions: first, explaining that there are no four truths; next, explaining that there are no Three Jewels. Because there is no arising, there is no suffering or accumulation, for suffering is what is arisen, and accumulation is what can bring it to arise. Because there is no cessation, there is no cessation or path; the path truth can extinguish, extinguishing up to the cessation truth, and since there is no cessation, how could there be cessation or path? From 'Because there are no four truths...' onward, the second explains that there are no Three Jewels. This is again divided into two distinctions: first, separately explaining that there are no Three Jewels; next, a half-line summarizing that the three do not exist. Separately explaining that the three do not exist constitutes three distinct sections. Within the absence of the Sangha jewel, it is again divided into two: the first two verses separately explain that there is no Sangha; the following half-verse summarizes that there is no Sangha. The two verses are two: the first verse explains that there are no four practices; the next verse discerns that there are no directions and fruits; the text is quite plain to see. Furthermore, the first verse means there are no objects of the four truths; the next verse means there is no cognition of the four truths. From the third verse onward, it explains the absence of the Sangha jewel; this interpretation is good and ought to be followed. Later, when the author of the treatise returns the faults to the opponent, he also makes this distinction. From 'The dharma of emptiness destroys cause and effect...' onward, the second faults the author of the treatise for grasping emptiness and losing cause and effect, sin and merit. Question: Previously, it was already explained that the absence of the four truths and Three Jewels universally destroys worldly and supramundane cause and effect; why is it explained again now? Answer: There are altogether three meanings. First, what was explained previously was that a person who grasps emptiness has neither the four truths nor the Three Jewels spoken when the Buddha went to the Deer Park, through to the teaching at the Twin Trees; now it explains that there is no cause and effect, sin and merit of humans and devas spoken for Trapuṣa and others when the Buddha first attained the Way; hence a person who grasps emptiness completely destroys the teachings of the five vehicles. Second, what was explained above was the absence of internal dharmas' cause and effect, sin and merit; now it explains the absence of external dharmas' cause and effect, sin and merit, namely worldly benevolence, righteousness, propriety, wisdom, and so forth. Third, what was explained above was the absence of the objective realm of sin and merit; now it explains that there are no Three Jewels of sin and merit. The four truths are the objective realm of sin and merit: having faith in them engenders merit; slandering them incurs sin. In the reply, there are thirty-four verses, broadly divided into three: the first thirteen lines explain that the opponent is confused about emptiness; from 'As for what you said above about the faults in the dharma of emptiness...' onward, the second refutes the opponent's attachment to existence; from 'If there were no emptiness...' onward, the third two lines are an admonition and exhortation, admonishing them to abandon emptiness of fixed nature and exhorting them to study dependent origination.

10.5

Regarding the first, there are again two parts: first, explaining that the opponent is confused about emptiness and arbitrarily raises perverse challenges; from 'You claim that I am attached to emptiness...' onward, second, explaining that the author of the treatise has awakened to emptiness and therefore is without fault. Each of the two chapters has four sections. The four of the first chapter: first, explaining that the opponent fails to understand three dharmas and arbitrarily raises doubts and challenges; second, explaining that the opponent does not recognize two dharmas and so arbitrarily raises perverse challenges; third, recounting that the opponent fails to understand one dharma and so arbitrarily raises perverse challenges; fourth, that through failing to understand the above three approaches, they cling rigidly to the single dharma of a fixed nature, obstructing the Buddha from being able to expound the Mahāyāna earlier. Question: Why recount that the opponent does not know the three dharmas? Answer: Whenever one wishes to answer an opponent's question, one must distinguish what is a legitimate question from what is not. Here, recounting that the opponent fails to understand the three dharmas and arbitrarily raises doubtful questions shows that it does not constitute a valid question, and this is itself answering the question. In first explaining their ignorance of the three dharmas: first, they do not know emptiness; although Hīnayāna practitioners realize the emptiness of persons, they cling to dharmas as existing and do not know the emptiness of original nature. Second, 'causes and conditions of emptiness' refers to the intention behind speaking of emptiness. The Buddha spoke of emptiness in order to cure the sickness of existence; if one goes on to be attached to emptiness, the Buddha will not transform them. Third, the 'meaning of emptiness' is that the opponent does not understand how to situate this emptiness; the Buddha spoke of the ultimate truth as empty, but did not say that the conventional truth is also empty; you should not, upon hearing of emptiness, claim that cause and effect, sin and merit are lost. Hence the 'Chapter on Causes and Conditions' says: 'If all is utterly empty, how can there be retribution for sin and merit, etc.? If so, then there would be no two truths.' Furthermore, the meaning of emptiness is that emptiness is spoken of in order to clarify non-emptiness; hence it says below: 'emptiness is also empty.' Because you cling rigidly and grasp the marks of emptiness, you do not know the meaning of emptiness.

10.6

From "The Buddhas rely on the two truths" downward is the second [section], which explains that because the outsider does not understand the two dharmas, he therefore raises perverse objections. Because he does not know that while being [phenomenally] manifest, it is nonexistent, he therefore does not know the ultimate truth; because he does not know that though nonexistent, it is [phenomenally] manifest as existent, he therefore does not recognise the conventional truth; thus he raised the perverse objections above. Question: At what point does the outsider lose the two truths? Answer: From the beginning of the treatise up to before the [Chapter on the] Four Truths, he clings to all phenomena as having real intrinsic nature and does not believe in ultimate emptiness; therefore, he does not know the ultimate truth. From the "Chapter on the Four Truths", he clings to ultimate emptiness and asserts that there are no Three Jewels or Four Truths; thus he fails to recognise conventional truth. Furthermore, the exposition of the two truths serves to explain and substantiate the aforementioned three dharmas: What was previously called "not knowing emptiness" means not knowing the intrinsic emptiness of the ultimate truth; "causes and conditions of emptiness" means that the Buddhas abide in the two truths to expound the Dharma for sentient beings, preaching emptiness for those attached to existence and preaching existence for those attached to emptiness; "the meaning of emptiness" is precisely the ultimate truth's emptiness, not the conventional truth's emptiness. Furthermore, as for introducing the two truths: the outsider attaches to emptiness and loses conventional truth; having lost conventional truth, he also loses the ultimate truth, as set forth in the "Chapter on Causes and Conditions". Now, in response to the outsider's lack of the two truths, [the treatise] clarifies that there are two truths; this is why the present text expounds the two truths. Furthermore, expounding the two truths is the author of the treatise clearing himself of fault: "I possess the doctrine of the two truths: in the ultimate truth, it is empty and devoid of the Three Jewels; in conventional truth, there are the Three Jewels. If you object in terms of the ultimate truth, that merely establishes my position; if you object in terms of the conventional truth, in my conventional truth the Three Jewels exist—how then can you raise the objection that there are no Three Jewels?" Furthermore, the intention of expounding the two truths is that the preceding explanations of emptiness meant the absence of the causes, conditions, and other phenomena seen by you—hence we said they are absent; it does not mean the absence of the two truths of dependent origination in the Buddha-Dharma. Furthermore, this chapter clarifies the Four Truths, and the two truths belong to the same category of truths; hence the two truths are clarified. The three verses are divided into three distinct parts: The first verse clarifies that the author of the treatise recognises that the Buddha preaches the Dharma relying on the two truths, and is therefore free from the aforementioned fault; the second verse clarifies that because the outsider does not recognise the two truths, he errs in both emptiness and existence; the third verse explains and resolves doubts and objections. The first half-verse directly clarifies preaching the Dharma relying on the two truths; the second half-verse lists the names of the two truths. Question: Why is it said that the Buddha preaches the Dharma relying on the two truths? Answer: Preaching the Dharma relying on conventional truth, the Three Jewels and the Four Truths are manifestly not lost; hence there is none of the aforementioned fault, which reveals that the outsider raises faults arbitrarily because he does not know conventional truth. Because the Dharma is expounded relying on the ultimate truth, my previous clarification of the emptiness of all things reveals that the outsider, clinging to phenomena as having intrinsic nature, loses the ultimate truth. Question: Why is it called "relying on the two truths"? Answer: What is understood by ordinary beings and by noble ones—emptiness and existence—are both real [to them]; therefore, they are called two truths. Preaching in reliance on these two realities, what is preached is in each case real; therefore, it is said to "preach relying on the two truths". Question: What are the two "truths-with-respect-to"? What are the truths of teaching? Answer: That which is relied upon is the two "truths-with-respect-to". Because they are real with respect to both ordinary beings and noble ones, they are called the two "truths-with-respect-to". They are also called "truths with respect to the two": that is, form has never been empty or existent; with respect to the two understandings, each is real, and thus they are called the two "truths-with-respect-to". The Śata-śāstra cites the jujube and crabapple, which relative to a melon are both not false; the Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa cites the ring finger, which relative to the index finger is real. That which relies is the truth of teaching: the Buddha relies on these two truths to preach the Dharma for living beings, all of which are sincere and true words; therefore, it is called real. Question: Is there a distinction in that which relies? Answer: Preaching relying on the ultimate truth is a true preaching; preaching relying on the conventional is an expedient preaching according with what is appropriate. Question: Preaching [the vehicles of] humans, gods, and the two vehicles is expedient preaching; now when preaching the persons and phenomena of the Mahāyāna, why is preaching relying on the conventional entirely expedient? Answer: The true character [of phenomena] is ineffable—only that is genuine reality; all verbal expressions whatsoever are expedient. Question: As for the two "truths-with-respect-to", are they errors or attainments? Answer: At first glance, both are attainments: because it is real with respect to the ordinary person, it is an attainment for the ordinary person; because it is real with respect to the noble one, it is called an attainment for the noble one. If ordinary beings and noble ones are compared with each other, then the ordinary person errs and the noble one attains. Question: Could it be that both ordinary beings and noble ones err? Answer: If one says that a single form has never been empty or existent, and that emptiness and existence arise from two subjective sentiments, then ordinary beings and noble ones both err. The present text is a general adjudication of ordinary beings and noble ones; hence it treats the ordinary person as erring and the noble one as attaining. Furthermore, there are three positions: First, only erring and not attaining, which refers to the perspective of the ordinary person. Second, only attaining and not erring, which refers to the perspective of the Buddha. As the Nirvāṇa [Sūtra] says: "All conventional truths, with respect to the Tathāgata, are precisely the ultimate truth." Third, both attaining and erring: that is, the noble ones of the two vehicles, compared with ordinary beings, attain, but compared with the Great Beings (bodhisattvas), they err. In lectures on this text there are many divergent theories; be careful not to believe them, and take the prose [commentary] as correct. The second half-verse clarifies the names of the two truths. Now, conventional [reality] is called a "truth" because this is real with respect to conventional people; hence it is called conventional truth. Do not believe other people's words on this either. The ultimate truth, on the other hand, possesses two realities: First, its substance is the true character of all phenomena; hence it is named real. Second, with respect to the noble person's complete comprehension, there is an understanding of reality; this is also real. Conventional [truth]'s substance is not real; it is only real with respect to ordinary beings. Hence, the meaning of "real" in the two truths differs. Question: Is the conventional real only with respect to sentiment, or does it also possess a real substance of phenomena? Answer: Within the conventional, cause and effect also exist without disparity; hence it is called real. But relative to the ultimate truth, they are all false suppositions, entirely unreal. Moreover, that the second verse demonstrates gain and loss means that because the outsider does not recognise the two truths of emptiness and existence, he loses the three benefits—namely, benefit for oneself, benefit for others, and mutual benefit. Because the author of the treatise recognises the two truths, he possesses all three benefits: by understanding the ultimate truth, prajñā is generated; by comprehending the conventional, expedient means are generated; and possessing prajñā and expedient means generates the Buddhas of the three times. Thus the Vimalakīrtinirdeśa says: "Wisdom is the mother of the bodhisattva, and expedient means is the father; of all leaders of the assembly, there are none who are not born from these." One's own awakening to the two truths is called benefit for oneself; causing others to understand is called benefit for others; both understanding is mutual benefit. Furthermore, understanding the ultimate truth gives rise to real wisdom, which is benefit for oneself; understanding the conventional gives rise to expedient means, which is benefit for others; fully comprehending both is mutual benefit. Question: In the prose explaining conventional truth, why is intrinsic emptiness adduced? Answer: It aims to explain and establish the meaning of "with respect to": clarifying that according to principle, it is truly empty of intrinsic nature, but with respect to the ordinary person it is considered existent; hence it is called a truth. Furthermore, it aims to discern that existence is due to emptiness; hence in explaining existence, it adduces emptiness. Below, in explaining the ultimate truth, it also adduces existence to explain emptiness. The wise and noble comprehend that the inversions of the six destinies are intrinsically empty by nature; therefore, with respect to the noble one, it is real and is a truth. From "If one says that all phenomena are unarisen" downward is the third [section], clarifying the mutual support of the two truths. Relative to the Śata-śāstra, it comes to resolve a doubt. The outsider says: "The ultimate truth possesses two realities: first, principle is the true character, hence named real; second, with respect to the noble person, one attains understanding in accord with reality, hence named real. Possessing these two realities, it can be a truth. Furthermore, the Buddha can rely on it to preach the Dharma, because the Buddhas of the three times and the ten directions all wish to lead people to attain real benefit. The conventional possesses two aspects and is therefore not real: first, it is not a real object; second, it is not a real understanding. How can it be called a truth? And why would the Buddha preach the Dharma relying on it?" Question: Where in the text do the two realities of the ultimate truth appear? Answer: The earlier text says, "with respect to the noble one, it is real"—this is the reality of understanding. The present text says, "that all phenomena are fundamentally unarisen is the ultimate truth"—this is the reality of the object. Since the ultimate truth has two realities, the two non-realities of the conventional truth can be known. The first half of the verse directly answers the question. Although conventional truth has two non-realities, one must rely on conventional truth as an expedient means to reveal the ultimate truth. Just as according to principle there are not three [vehicles], yet one must rely on the three as an expedient means to awaken to the One [Vehicle]. Question: How is the conventional truth an expedient means? Answer: All speech is conventional; by relying on conventional speech, wordlessness is attained. Hence, speaking of the wordless is conventional, while the wordless that is spoken of is the ultimate truth. Question: How many kinds of speech are there? Answer: There are two kinds of speech. First, speaking words within the conventional, such as 'vase', 'cloth', and the like, which also indicate the wordless Way of the ultimate truth. Thus the Nirvāṇa [Sūtra] says: "Wishing to lead sentient beings to deeply recognise the ultimate truth, we therefore proclaim the conventional truth." Second, using words to speak of the wordless: that is, establishing a name for the ultimate truth, naming it 'ultimate truth'. Relying on these words, one wishes to reveal the wordless; if one did not speak of the wordless, how would sentient beings recognise that principle is wordless? Question: Between these two speeches, which speech is used here? Answer: The latter meaning is the correct one. If one answers according to the Śata-śāstra, although conventional truth possesses the two non-realities, it is real with respect to the ordinary person; hence it is called a truth. If according to the present text this verse is introduced, [the opponent implies:] "I already know that the conventional is the truth of the ordinary person; one should only establish the truth of the noble, so why is it necessary to establish the conventional truth of the ordinary?" Question: How does this differ from the old interpretation? Answer: The old is Nāgārjuna's meaning—how can you ask how it differs from the old? Question: Others also give this explanation; how does it differ? Answer: One must know that although the conventional truth is spoken, it has never uttered a word; although the true [truth] is wordless, its teaching fills the Dharma realm. As for the second half-verse saying, "Without attaining the ultimate truth, one does not attain nirvāṇa", there are also various interpretations. Now we clarify that by seeing the ultimate truth, prajñā is generated; eradicating all afflictions, one attains nirvāṇa with remainder; shedding the retribution body, one attains nirvāṇa without remainder. Question: How does nirvāṇa differ from the ultimate truth? Answer: I dare not believe people's arrogant talk. The "Chapter on Nirvāṇa" says: "It is also named Suchness, Dharma-nature, the limit of reality, and nirvāṇa." Thus we know that nirvāṇa is merely an alternative name for the ultimate truth. It is simply named ultimate truth in contrast to the conventional, and named nirvāṇa in contrast to saṃsāra.

10.7

From "If one cannot properly contemplate emptiness" downward is the third [section], clarifying that people with acquisition do not understand the single dharma and arbitrarily generate faults. The single dharma refers to the emptiness of the single true character. Because they do not skillfully comprehend emptiness, they fall of themselves into the view that there are no Three Jewels or Four Truths; thus they are harmed by the view of emptiness—it is not that the doctrine of emptiness destroys the Three Jewels and Four Truths. Therefore, the fault lies with the outsider; the error is not Nāgārjuna's. Thus a sūtra says: "Better to give rise to a view of the self than to grasp emptiness wrongly; one does not fall into the evil destinies through the view of the self."

10.8

From "The World-Honoured One, knowing this dharma" downward is the fourth verse, clarifying that people with acquisition do not skillfully comprehend the preceding three approaches, and therefore hindered the Tathāgata when he first attained enlightenment so that he could not preach the Mahāyāna teaching of non-acquisition early on. The preceding texts described the outsider hindering the bodhisattva from preaching the teaching of non-acquisition; now it describes the outsider hindering the Buddha from preaching the teaching of non-acquisition. Furthermore, connecting to the preceding context as it arises: above, it explained that if incantations are difficult to perform, it is better not to do them; now, if the characteristics of dharmas are difficult to explain, it is better not to explain them. The first half-verse directly clarifies that the meaning of emptiness is extremely profound, as the Lotus [Sūtra] says: "The wisdom I have attained is subtle and supreme." The Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā also says: "When I first attained Buddhahood, I constantly delighted in silence and did not delight in preaching the Dharma." The second half-verse clarifies that sentient beings have dull faculties, hindering the Buddha from preaching the Mahāyāna early on. It is also as the Lotus [Sūtra] says: "Sentient beings' faculties are dull; clinging to pleasure, they are blinded by delusion. How could beings such as these ever be saved?" Some say that this treatise only comments on the Prajñā[pāramitā] and does not comment on the Lotus [Sūtra]; this is simply because they have not read the treatise.

10.9

From "You say that I am attached to emptiness" onward, secondly, the author of the treatise realizes emptiness and frees himself from fault. The seven verses are also divided into four: first, explaining that the meaning of emptiness has no flaw; second, explaining that the meaning of emptiness constitutes an attainment; third, briefly pointing out that existence has faults; fourth, citing a sūtra to prove that emptiness constitutes an attainment. The first part also has two [subdivisions]: first, explaining that emptiness has no flaw; second, explaining that emptiness constitutes an attainment. The first half of the first verse repeats [the opponent's objection], and the second half directly frees [the author] from fault. If it were the emptiness of wrong view, this would indeed have fault; if it were the mere emptiness of the two vehicles, this too would have fault. Now this is the emptiness of non-attainment, where emptiness does not abide in emptiness, and therefore both emptiness and existence are abandoned; thus there is no flaw. Furthermore, it is explaining emptiness without destroying phenomena; therefore there is no fault. The first half of the second verse explains that because of emptiness all dharmas are established, revealing that the author of the treatise is without fault; the second half explains that without the meaning of emptiness nothing is established, revealing that the outsider has a flaw. Question: How is it that because of emptiness all things are established? Answer: In the previous verse, emptiness is also empty, which means neither empty nor existent; now it is explained that being neither empty nor existent, emptiness and existence can be established, hence it is said that all things are established. Furthermore, because of the emptiness of the ultimate truth, there is the conventional truth; thus the two truths are established, and then all things are established. If there were no emptiness, then the ultimate truth would not be established, and the conventional truth would also not be established, so that everything would be destroyed. Moreover, that all things are established because there is emptiness means that due to the ultimate emptiness, prajñā is generated; due to prajñā, afflictions are severed and there are the Buddhas of the three periods of time; and due to the Buddhas, all conventional and supermundane teachings are preached. Therefore the prose says: "Both the conventional and supermundane are established."

10.10

From "You now have faults of your own" onward, thirdly, briefly explaining that clinging to existence is a fault. The three verses comprise two [parts]: the first verse explains that the outsider has faults without being aware of them himself, and turns them back upon the author of the treatise; the second two verses briefly point out the outsider's faults to make the outsider aware of them. The first half of the first verse is an exposition of the doctrine; the second half is an exposition by analogy. The analogy says: A man riding a horse forgets the horse he himself is riding, and claims another person is riding his horse. The outsider himself has such faults as lacking the Three Jewels and the four truths, but without being aware of it, claims that others have the flaw of lacking sin and merit. From "If you see dharmas" onward, the second two verses explain that clinging to existence is a fault. This has two [parts]: the first verse briefly explains the fault of lacking causes and conditions. If you see dharmas as possessing self-nature, then they would not need to depend on conditions or rely on causes, and thus you destroy causes and conditions; destroying causes and conditions destroys emptiness, and destroying emptiness destroys the two truths and the middle way. The second [verse] explains the previous verse, extensively clarifying that there are three kinds of faults: first, destroying cause and effect; second, destroying persons and dharmas—these two destroy the substance; the second half destroys the characteristics.

10.11

From "Dharmas arisen from conditions" onward, fourthly, citing a sūtra as proof. This shows that the aforementioned determined nature of those who have attainments has faults, and shows that the non-attainment emptiness of the author of the treatise has no flaws. The two verses comprise two [parts]: the first verse explains that dharmas arisen from conditions are free from the faults of annihilation and permanence; the second verse subsumes dharmas, showing that the outsider's determined existence is a flaw. There are many ways of explaining this one verse; now several points will be briefly stated: First, explaining it in terms of refuting errors and gradual abandonment. "Dharmas that are produced by causes and conditions" is for the sake of refuting intrinsic nature, temporarily speaking of causes and conditions; this is the first turn of meaning. "I say are just emptiness": confused people again think that while there is no intrinsic existence, there are causes and conditions; therefore it is now explained that what is produced by causes and conditions is simply non-existent—when was what is produced by causes and conditions ever existent? This is the second turn. "And are also provisional designations": the confused again say that since it is empty, they take it to mean non-existence. Therefore it is now explained that emptiness itself is provisional. Why is this so? The Tattvasiddhi masters explain that the emptiness of the ultimate truth is not provisional; therefore now, turning it back on them, emptiness itself is just provisional, which critiques the mind that clings to emptiness. They then say: If so, this is the mutual identity of the two truths—the former existence is emptiness, and the present emptiness is existence; it is merely the meaning of the two truths of emptiness and existence. Therefore it is now explained that this is just the middle way; when was it ever the two truths? Borrowing the middle to critique the two, when the two are gone, the non-dual is also abandoned, and one instantly awakens. Next, directly explaining according to the correct meaning of causes and conditions: as for the phrase "dharmas produced by causes and conditions", the sūtras explain causes and conditions as sometimes separate and sometimes combined; they are all termed "cause", just like Buddha-nature; they are all termed "condition", just like the four conditions; they are also both cause and condition, as in the twelve links of dependent origination. For instance, looking from ignorance toward volitional formations, its substance is not yet existent, yet it is delineated by ignorance: by virtue of direct proximity it is the cause; when volitional formations arise and look toward ignorance, [they say,] "I am not entirely non-existent, but merely arise relying on you," so ignorance is the condition. Therefore ignorance is both cause and condition. Now it is explained that in accordance with the separation and combination of conditions, the meaning is not fixed. As for "dharmas produced": for the Sarvāstivādins, what is produced by the six causes and four conditions is a real dharma; for the Tattvasiddhi, they are produced by three causes and four conditions. "This is just emptiness": because what is produced involves the producer and the produced, and the producer and produced do not exist in themselves; if the produced does not exist in itself, then it is not produced; therefore the produced is empty. "And are also provisional designations": because the empty produced is not produced of itself, it is not produced; because the produced emptiness is not empty of itself, it is not empty; not knowing what to call it, it is called a provisional designation to speak of the empty produced. A provisional designation speaks of the produced emptiness; this empty produced and produced emptiness are both merely spoken of by provisional designations in the midst of the signless to guide sentient beings. Question: Why speak of the empty produced and the produced emptiness by provisional designations? Answer: It is intended to cause one, through the empty produced, to realize the non-produced, and through the produced emptiness, to realize the non-empty; hence it is said, "It is also the meaning of the middle way." Because the empty produced is not produced and the produced emptiness is not empty, it is just the middle way. Next, explaining in terms of the meaning of the middle and provisional: "Dharmas that are produced by causes and conditions"—this restates the conventional truth. "I say are just emptiness"—this explains the ultimate truth. "And are also provisional designations"—this explains that the above two truths are both provisional. Since it says "dharmas produced by conditions, I say are just emptiness," this is existence being clearly empty, so emptiness is not empty of itself, and is called provisional emptiness. Emptiness is clearly existent, so existence is not existent of itself, and is called provisional existence. "It is also the meaning of the middle way": speaking of emptiness and existence as provisional designations is to express the middle way, explaining that provisional existence does not abide in existence, so existence is not existent, and provisional emptiness does not abide in emptiness, so emptiness is not empty; being neither empty nor existent is just the middle way. Next, explaining according to the prose in terms of the meaning of the "three identities": "Dharmas produced by causes and conditions"—people of both the Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna alike know that dharmas are produced from causes and conditions. From "I say are just emptiness" onward, secondly, it explains that causes and conditions have the meaning of the "three identities". People of the Hīnayāna who have attainments, upon hearing of dharmas produced by causes and conditions, only know that they are existent, and do not recognize that causes and conditions are characterized by the three identities. Now it is shown that dharmas arisen from causes and conditions are characterized by the three identities: first, dharmas arisen from causes and conditions are ultimate emptiness. Why is this? If they had intrinsic nature, they would not depend on causes and conditions; since they are produced from causes and conditions, they lack intrinsic nature, and therefore are empty. "And are also provisional designations" shows the second identity, explaining that dharmas arisen from causes and conditions are also provisional designations. Why are they called provisional? Previously it was explained that dharmas arisen from causes and conditions, I say, are empty; yet since causes and conditions are fundamentally non-existent, they are now also not empty; being neither empty nor existent, not knowing what to call them, they are provisionally designated as existent and also provisionally designated as empty. "It is also the meaning of the middle way" shows the third identity, explaining that dharmas arisen from causes and conditions are also the middle way. Dharmas arisen from causes and conditions have no intrinsic nature and are therefore empty, so they are not existent; since they are not existent, they are also not empty; being neither existent nor empty, it is called the middle way. However, people of the Hīnayāna do not know the three identities, and thus have three flaws, namely lacking emptiness, lacking the provisional, and lacking the middle. If one clings to an intrinsic nature in dharmas, one also does not recognize causes and conditions, and thus has four flaws. The first half of the second verse subsumes dharmas. Fearing that the outsider would not believe in causes and conditions and would claim that there is intrinsic nature within conditions, it therefore explains the subsumption of dharmas. The second half concludes the three identities. Since there has never been a single dharma that is not produced from causes and conditions, there has also never been a single dharma that is not empty, not provisional, and not the middle; here they are merely briefly cited. Question: What sūtra verse is the author of the treatise citing? Answer: It was spoken by the Buddha himself in the Hastikakṣya-sūtra, hence the phrase "I say are just emptiness".

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中觀論疏 — Classical Chinese