中觀論疏 2

English (machine translation) 2

Language: English

2.2

Chapter 1: Examination of Causes and Conditions

Beginning with "neither arising nor ceasing", the second part takes up the eight negations again to explain them. Previously, the three vernacular translations were already briefly presented. However, since the eight negations are the great purport of the many sūtras and the central tenet of this treatise, a brief explanation makes them difficult to understand; only an extensive exposition can reveal them. On the second day of the third month in the third year of Renshou, the scholar Zhigai from south of the Yangtze came to the imperial capital and requested to hear an exposition [of this teaching]. I then provided a detailed explanation for him, opening it into ten sections: 1. the section on the general meaning; 2. the section on tracing the origin; 3. the section on benefits and defects; 4. the section on the central tenet; 5. the section on the shallow and the profound; 6. the section on similarities and differences; 7. the section on subsuming dharmas; 8. the section on the sequential order; 9. the section on critical evaluation; 10. the section on new comprehensions.

2.4

The first is the section on the general meaning. The eight negations are the ultimate objective of right contemplation and the core marrow of the vaipulya [sūtras]; they determine whether the Buddha Dharma is biased or correct, and show the root source of gain and loss. If one is deluded about them, the eighty thousand Dharma treasuries are as obscure as walking in the night; if one is awakened to them, the twelve divisions of scripture are like facing the bright daylight. Formerly, I engaged in deep inquiry south of the Yangtze for consecutive years, and before dwelling west of the Yellow River I used them as a mirror for my mind. Although the east and the west were separated by obstacles, there was never any divergence [in this view]; travelling between the south and the north, when did I ever make the journey in vain? I briefly set down my past notes to leave behind for my disciples. How could this be called fathoming the utmost subtleties? It is merely marking out the path of my own mind.

2.5

The second is the section on tracing the origin. Question: The text of this treatise comprises four fascicles and broadly encompasses five hundred verses. Why are the eight negations placed at the treatise's very beginning? Answer: Grasping the intention of the preceding preface was already sufficient to make it clear. For those who did not understand the previous words, I will now explain in detail. The Vimalakīrtinirdeśa states: "The perfection of wisdom is the mother of the bodhisattvas, and expedient means is their father. Of all the leaders, there are none who are not born from these." Thus one knows that prajñā and expedient means are the parents of the Dharma bodies of all Buddhas of the ten directions and the three times. Because all the noble ones are born relying on the two wisdoms, the two wisdoms arise from the two truths, and the two truths are corrected through the eight negations, one therefore knows that the eight negations are the central destination of all teachings and the primal origin of all the noble ones. But those who receive the teachings tend to abandon the root and revere the branches; the four reliances appear in the world to make them discard the branches and return to the root. Therefore the eight negations are highlighted and set at the head of the treatise. Question: Are the eight negations merely the origin of the Buddhas and bodhisattvas, or are they also the origin of the two vehicles, humans, and devas? Answer: Because of the eight negations the two truths are correct; when the two truths are correct, the two wisdoms arise; when the two wisdoms arise, there are Buddhas and bodhisattvas; and because there are Buddhas and bodhisattvas, the teachings for the two vehicles, humans, and devas are expounded. Thus one knows that the eight negations are also the origin of the two vehicles, humans, and devas. As the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā states: "If no bodhisattva appeared in the world, there would be no teaching of the three vehicles, nor would there be the five precepts and ten virtues of the worldly realm." Question: How are the two wisdoms produced from the two truths? Answer: One must thoroughly know the two truths, and then the two wisdoms are first accomplished. Dharma Master Tanying of the region within the Pass states in his Preface to the Madhyamaka-śāstra: "Although this treatise exhausts all dharmas and leaves nothing unsaid, its essential conclusion integrates the two truths. By virtue of the ultimate truth, there is no existence; by virtue of the conventional truth, there is no non-existence. By virtue of the ultimate truth, there is no existence, yet though non-existent, it exists; by virtue of the conventional truth, there is no non-existence, yet though existent, it is non-existent. Though non-existent, it exists, and thus is not obstructed by non-existence; though existent, it is non-existent, and thus does not cling to existence. Not clinging to existence, the attachment to permanence melts like ice; not obstructed by non-existence, the view of annihilation and non-existence is eliminated." Thus one knows that the two truths are free from the two extremes and are termed the middle way. Question: How is it that the ultimate truth, though non-existent, exists, and the conventional truth, though existent, is non-existent? Answer: This is because without destroying provisional designations, real mark is expounded; therefore, while fully apparent, existence is non-existent. Without moving from the true limit, all dharmas are established; therefore, while fully apparent, non-existence exists. That the two truths give rise to the two wisdoms means that through awakening to existence as fully apparent yet non-existent, upāya-prajñā is produced; through understanding non-existence as fully apparent yet existent, prajñā-upāya is produced. Upāya-prajñā is prajñā fully apparent yet being upāya; prajñā-upāya is upāya fully apparent yet being prajñā. Because upāya is fully apparent yet being prajñā, one does not cling to permanence; because prajñā is fully apparent yet being upāya, one is not obstructed by annihilation. Being neither annihilated nor permanent is termed right contemplation. But apart from the two truths, there is no separate middle way: the two truths of dependent origination are themselves called the middle way. Apart from the two wisdoms, there is no separate right contemplation: the two wisdoms of dependent origination are themselves called right contemplation. Therefore, the middle way of the two truths gives rise to the right contemplation of the two wisdoms; because one attains the right contemplation of the two wisdoms and extinguishes all extremes of annihilation and permanence, there are Buddhas and bodhisattvas. Hence the two wisdoms are named the parents of the Dharma body. Question: We already know that the two wisdoms are produced from the two truths, and that all the noble ones are born relying on the two wisdoms. Why is prajñā considered the mother and expedient means considered the father? Answer: The meanings are boundless; I shall briefly explain two points. First, real wisdom is empty and tranquil, sharing its stillness with yin; expedient means is active and functioning, matching the dynamic of yang. Therefore they are correlated with father and mother. Furthermore, ordinary beings cling to existence, while the two vehicles are stuck in emptiness. When prajñā contemplates emptiness, it transcends the ordinary; when upāya engages with existence, it surpasses the noble [of the two vehicles]. Transcending the ordinary is shallow and easy, so its meaning is equated to the mother; surpassing the noble is profound and difficult, so it is compared to the father. Thus Master Kumārajīva, answering the inquiry of Wang Zhiyuan, clarified that prajñā and expedient means do not have two separate substances; they are merely divided into two based on the shallow and the profound, the superior and the inferior. Question: Why do prajñā and upāya not have two substances? Answer: The Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa states: "For example, gold is fashioned into an ingenious object. Apart from gold there is no ingenious object, and apart from the ingenious object there is no gold, yet there are the two meanings of gold and ingenuity: gold is an analogy for prajñā, and ingenuity is an analogy for upāya." Hence one knows that there is only one right contemplation whose meaning is divided into the expedient and the real. Question: In what way is upāya ingenious? Answer: Those of the lower stages in the two vehicles cannot, when illuminating emptiness, immediately perceive existence, and so they lack skilful dexterity. The great beings, although illuminating emptiness, see existence as fully apparent, and this is therefore called ingenious. Question: By what means do bodhisattvas possess this ingenuity? Answer: This skilful dexterity arises from the two truths. Truly, because without moving from the true limit they establish all dharmas, even when entering deep emptiness they are able to engage with existence; therefore they possess this skilful dexterity. Question: If illuminating emptiness while seeing existence fully apparent is called ingenious, illuminating existence while seeing emptiness fully apparent should also be called ingenious; then both would be upāya, so what prajñā would there be? Answer: It is indeed as you ask. Therefore Master Kumārajīva said: "Contemplating emptiness without realizing it [as final], and engaging with existence without clinging to it, are both upāya." This is because they share the same ingenuity. However, although contemplating emptiness without realizing it is upāya, it takes its name from prajñā, suppressing the designation of ingenuity; only engaging with existence without clinging is taken to be named upāya. This explanation agrees with the Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa. The Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa, explaining the 'Parable Chapter', states: "Prajñā enters ultimate emptiness, without any prapañca; upāya comes out of ultimate emptiness, purifying the lands and transforming beings." Sūtras such as the Vimalakīrtinirdeśa and the explication by Sengzhao largely share this meaning.

2.6

Question: If directly contemplating emptiness is prajñā, and not realizing emptiness [as final] is expedient means, then directly illuminating existence should also be named prajñā, and illuminating existence without clinging should be named upāya. Answer: To explain it according to Kumārajīva's intention: although contemplating emptiness without realizing it is upāya, it receives its name from prajñā, suppressing the designation of ingenuity. Likewise, although the meaning of illuminating existence is prajñā, it receives its name from upāya, suppressing the designation of prajñā and taking its name from expedient means. Master Sengzhao precisely applied this intention, saying: "Directly penetrating the characteristics of dharmas is termed wisdom; illuminating emptiness without realizing it [as final] and engaging with existence without clinging to it—these two aspects of ingenuity are termed upāya." Question: Is it also permissible that the meaning of directly illuminating emptiness is named prajñā, while illuminating emptiness without realizing it, illuminating existence, and engaging with existence without clinging—these three aspects—are all upāya? Answer: There is also this meaning. Prajñā directly illuminates the real mark of all dharmas, and is therefore called the substance, and the substance has no duality. Expedient means is the ingenious functioning of prajñā, and the functioning has many facets. First, being able to illuminate emptiness without realizing emptiness [as final]—this is one ingenuity. Next, contemplating emptiness and immediately being able to illuminate existence—this is a second ingenuity. Third, engaging with existence and being able to be free from clinging—this is a third ingenuity. Taken together, these ingenuities are all named expedient means. Therefore, taking gold as the substance, all the various ingenuities upon the gold are named expedient means. Question: This contradicts the previous explanation; how are they to be harmonized? Answer: Illuminating both emptiness and existence together are both called prajñā, and taking both ingenuities together is called expedient means. Thus prajñā fully illuminates emptiness and existence, and expedient means fully possesses the two ingenuities of emptiness and existence. Therefore, taking prajñā as wisdom, wisdom has two illuminations; expedient means does not bear the name of wisdom, so it is only called the two ingenuities. This is explained in terms of the two illuminations and the two ingenuities. If directly illuminating the real mark is named prajñā, and contemplating emptiness without realizing it as well as illuminating existence without clinging are taken as the functioning of prajñā, they are therefore both named expedient means. This is explained in terms of one substance and many facets of functioning. These are merely combining or separating according to the occasion; none of the meanings are contradictory, and different textual passages are all reconciled. Though the three modes are different, they are still of one single meaning. Question: If the Vimalakīrtinirdeśa takes the two wisdoms as the parents of the Dharma body, why does the Yingluo jing take the two truths as the parents? Answer: If the two wisdoms are called the Buddha, and the two wisdoms are produced from the two truths, then the two truths are taken as the parents. If one says that the two wisdoms give birth to the Buddha and thus the two wisdoms are the parents, while the two wisdoms in turn are produced from the two truths, then the two truths are the grandparents. And the two truths are in turn corrected through the eight negations, so the eight negations are the ancestors of the ancestors. Therefore, that the eight negations are the central destination of all teachings and the primal origin of all the noble ones is made clear here.

2.7

The third [section] is the gate of gain and loss. Question: Are the eight negations solely the source of gain for the multitude of noble ones, or are they also the root of loss for the multitude of sentient beings? Answer: Through awakening to the unproduced, there are the noble ones of the three vehicles; through being deluded about the eight negations, there is the turbulent proliferation of the six destinies. Thus the Nirvāṇa [Sūtra] says: "There is a medicine of a single taste, which comes to have six tastes according to the places into which it flows." The medicine of a single taste is the middle way Buddha-nature. The middle way Buddha-nature is neither produced nor destroyed, neither permanent nor annihilated, which is precisely the eight negations. Therefore, we know that losing the eight negations results in the turbulent proliferation of the six destinies. Question: Why is it that losing the eight negations results in the turbulent proliferation of the six destinies? Answer: Because failing to awaken to the eight negations means one does not recognise the two truths; not recognising the two truths means the two wisdoms do not arise; the two wisdoms not arising means there are the afflictions of craving and views; on account of afflictions there is karma; on account of karma there are birth, aging, illness, death, grief, lamentation, suffering, and distress. Therefore, we know that losing the eight negations results in the turbulent proliferation of the six destinies. Question: In all, how many types of persons are there who gain or lose the eight negations? Answer: For now, drawing upon two divisions, each has four types. As for the four types of persons who lose: First, sentient beings of dull faculties who give rise to craving. Second, non-Buddhists of sharp faculties who give rise to views. Third, those very sentient beings of craving and views who redirect their minds to study the Buddha's Hīnayāna teachings, but possessing scant merit and dull faculties, they subsequently incur three losses: (1) gaining the words but missing the intent: hearing the terminology of Hīnayāna preached, they are said to gain the words; yet not understanding that preaching the small points to the great, they hold fast to the pointing finger and forget the moon, hence this is called missing the intent; (2) losing both words and intent: as the Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa scolds Kātyāyana, "These words were not spoken in the Mahāyāna, nor are they contained in the Tripiṭaka; these commentators have simply fabricated this discourse themselves"; (3) obstinately clinging to the Hīnayāna and subsequently disparaging the Vaipulya: like the five hundred sects, who cling to phenomena as having determinate characteristics, unaware that the Buddha's intent was liberation; thus hearing of ultimate emptiness is like a knife wounding their hearts. Fourth, these very Hīnayāna persons who redirect their minds to study the Mahāyāna also incur three losses: (1) gaining the words but missing the intent: hearing "great" preached, they form a conception of greatness and end up with an attained greatness; unaware that it is a provisional designation through causes and conditions, where "small" and "great" are used to express neither-great-nor-small, this is called a loss; (2) losing both words and intent: raising all sorts of dialectical refutations within the Mahāyāna that are neither the meaning of the Tripiṭaka nor contained in the Vaipulya; (3) obstinately clinging to the Mahāyāna and subsequently repudiating the small: as the Saddharmapuṇḍarīkopadeśa, explaining the "Medicinal Herbs" chapter, refutes the error of bodhisattvas, for when bodhisattvas heard that in principle there is only the One and no two vehicles, they subsequently repudiated the small; yet though sprouted from a single earth and moistened by a single rain, the various grasses and trees each have their distinctions; while in principle there is only the great, this does not hinder becoming the small according to conditions; but bodhisattvas subsequently repudiated the small, preserving the real and abandoning the expedient, hence this is called a loss. These four types of persons all fail to awaken to the middle way of the eight negations and do not give rise to right contemplation, thereby incurring these four kinds of loss. Although there are four losses, they combine into three delusions: The first loss involves the illness of perversion, unaware that it is an illness and unaware of any remedy. The next loss involves knowing it to be an illness and seeking a remedy, but taking false medicine, so that not only is the old illness not cured, new illness is further added. The latter two losses involve knowing it to be an illness and seeking a remedy, but lacking expedient means, so that taking the ambrosia turns it into poison, and likewise the old illness is not cured while a new illness further arises. Although there are four losses, they combine into two faults: the first two losses give rise to delusion on their own, while the latter two losses incur illness from studying the teachings. As for the difference between the first two persons: the former has dull faculties and gives rise to craving; the latter has sharp faculties and gives rise to views. Furthermore, the former person has only a single loss, while the latter person further gives rise to losses within loss. Why is this so? Having this body and mind is already called a loss, and further dialectically categorising them into ninety-six kinds of differences makes them stray ever farther from the city and take ever more diverging paths. Hence the Lotus Sūtra compares these two persons to venomous insects and vicious ghosts. Question: The eight negations are fully endowed with the two truths. If Hīnayāna persons know that phenomena arise and thereby attain conventional truth, why do you speak of loss? Answer: Conventional truth is production that is unproduced dependent origination; yet those of the Hīnayāna cling to it as production with intrinsic nature, and therefore they lose the conventional truth. If they even lose the conventional truth, how much more so the ultimate truth? Question: The followers of the Vaipulya study the Mahāyāna and illuminate that all phenomena are neither produced nor destroyed and are ultimately empty; they ought to have attained the eight negations. Why do you speak of loss? Answer: That the eight negations are unproduced is simply that production through causes and conditions is unproduced; it speaks of non-production without destroying production. Yet those of the Vaipulya cling to non-production and lose production; having lost production-as-unproduced, they also lose unproduced-as-production, thereby destroying both of the two truths. Question: For whom precisely did the Tathāgata appear in the world? And when Nāgārjuna subsequently arose, what errors did he further refute? Answer: Speaking generally, the Buddha appeared in the world precisely for all four persons. However, before the Buddha appeared in the world, there were only the first two persons; to refute these two persons, he preached the teaching of the five vehicles. Among these two persons, for those devoid of hearing and practicing unwholesome paths, he brought them to maturity through the wholesome roots of humans and devas; for those with the faculties for the three vehicles, he preached the teachings of the three vehicles. Although Nāgārjuna's appearance in the world was generally for all four persons, this treatise is directly intended for persons of the Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna; hence it elucidates both the Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna teachings, while treating the first two persons secondarily. Moreover, although the Buddha preached the teachings of the five vehicles, his intent lay in the one great causal condition; and although the four reliances elucidated both the Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna teachings, their intent returns to the single ultimate, leading beings to awaken to the middle way and give rise to right contemplation. Next, to clarify the four persons of gain: as previously explained, there are four kinds of persons who contemplate the middle way. The middle way is precisely the meaning of the eight negations as neither produced nor destroyed: contemplating with lower wisdom, one attains the bodhi of a śrāvaka; contemplating with middling wisdom, one attains the bodhi of a pratyekabuddha; contemplating with superior wisdom, one attains the bodhi of a bodhisattva; contemplating with supreme wisdom, one attains the bodhi of a Buddha. Bodhi is called wisdom; it means giving rise to contemplation while in the causal stage, thus constituting the four persons. This treatise combines the four persons into two: the first twenty-five chapters cause contemplation to arise while in the causal stage, attaining the bodhi of Buddhas and bodhisattvas; the latter two chapters cause persons of the two vehicles to give rise to contemplation while in the causal stage, attaining the bodhi of the two vehicles. Therefore, a later chapter says: "Previously having heard the Mahāyāna teachings, one enters the ultimate truth; now one wishes to hear the śrāvaka teachings to enter the ultimate truth." The ultimate truth is precisely the middle way; but awakening has shallowness and depth, just like the three beasts [crossing the river], thus forming four grades. Question: If the three vehicles equally contemplate the middle way and the persons of the three vehicles equally receive the eight negations, why does the sūtra text state: "For śrāvakas he preached the production and destruction of the twelve causal conditions, while for bodhisattvas he preached the twelve as unproduced and undestroyed"? Answer: Broadly explained, there are two kinds of śrāvakas: First, those who attain the emptiness of persons but do not attain the emptiness of phenomena. Because they do not attain the emptiness of phenomena, the twelve characteristics are produced for them; knowing there is no self, they enter the ultimate truth. The great beings (bodhisattvas) fully attain both emptinesses: not only is there no self, there are also no twelve [links], and thus they enter the ultimate truth; therefore, they differ from those of the two vehicles. Second, śrāvakas fully attain both emptinesses, but for the śrāvaka, the twelve exist first, and they must disintegrate them to make them empty before entering the ultimate truth. Bodhisattvas know that the twelve are originally unproduced from the outset and are now also undestroyed, and thus enter the emptiness of the ultimate truth. As the Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa explains the two emptinesses of great and small: the śrāvaka analyzes and disintegrates persons and phenomena, and thus persons and phenomena are empty; the bodhisattva knows that the intrinsic nature of persons and phenomena is inherently empty. Although there is the difference between disintegrating phenomena and intrinsic nature, they equally elucidate the entry into the meaning of emptiness. Because they equally enter the meaning of emptiness, the three vehicles equally enter the ultimate truth. Because of disintegrating phenomena versus not disintegrating phenomena, the śrāvaka is termed the contemplation of production and destruction, while the bodhisattva is termed the contemplation of non-production and non-destruction. Question: For those who equally enter emptiness, is there any difference in the meaning of emptiness or not? Answer: This is fully explained in the Profound Meaning (Xuanyi); now I will explain it briefly in a single phrase. The Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa says: "The two vehicles are called mere emptiness, while bodhisattvas are called unobtainable emptiness. The two vehicles simply abide in emptiness, which is called solitary emptiness; great beings know that emptiness is also empty, which is called unobtainable emptiness." The Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa also says: "The two vehicles attaining the two emptinesses is like the emptiness within a pore; great beings attaining the two emptinesses is like the emptiness of the ten directions."

2.8

Fourth: Section on the True Teaching (zhengzong men).

Question: Earlier you said that the two truths are rectified by the eight negations. Please explain this.

Answer: Because of the eight negations, conventional truth becomes the middle way, and thus the meaning of conventional truth is rectified. Because of the eight negations, ultimate truth becomes the middle way, and thus the meaning of ultimate truth is rectified. Because of the eight negations, the synthesis of the two truths becomes the middle way, and thus the synthesis of the two truths is rectified. Because these three types are rectified, the twelve divisions of the canon, the eighty thousand treasuries of Dharma, and all teachings are rectified. Because all teachings are rectified, correct contemplation arises, all prapañca is extinguished, and one immediately attains the Way. Because this meaning is essential, the eight negations are placed at the beginning; therefore, the author of the treatise, by means of the eight negations, determines the bias or correctness of the Buddha's teachings.

Question: Why is it that when these three are rectified, all are rectified?

Answer: The teachings spoken by all Buddhas of the three times and ten directions are all based on the two truths, for the two truths completely subsume all the Buddha's teachings. Once the two truths are rectified, how could all not be rectified?

Question: Why did the author of the treatise rectify the Buddha's teachings by means of the eight negations?

Answer: Because three types of people, when studying the two truths, all fall into biased and erroneous views. First, those like the five hundred sects cling to fixed, inherent existence; thus conventional truth falls into inherent existence, thereby becoming biased and erroneous. Second, the Fangguang (Vaitulya) cling to fixed, inherent emptiness; thus ultimate truth falls into bias and error. To refute these two biases, he elucidates dependent origination, emptiness, and existence as the two truths, and only then are the two truths rectified. Third, what is practiced in the world also asserts that there are three types of middle way: conventional truth clarifies the middle way of neither permanence nor annihilation; ultimate truth clarifies the middle way of neither arising nor ceasing; and the synthesis of the two truths distinguishes the middle way of neither ultimate nor conventional. Yet when critically examining these three middles, none of them constitutes the middle, and all fall into bias and error. Therefore, now confronting these biases and errors, he clarifies the eight negations, rectifying the two truths into the three types of middle way; thus the three middles attain correctness.

Question: The eight negations are themselves the two truths. Why use the eight negations to rectify the two truths?

Answer: Although the eight negations are themselves the two truths, people merely speak of existence and non-existence as the two truths without mentioning the eight negations; and students receiving the teaching, upon hearing the two extremes of existence and non-existence, fall into annihilation and permanence, and thus do not attain the middle way. If one states that the two truths are neither arising nor ceasing, neither permanent nor annihilated, one immediately realizes that the two truths are precisely the middle way. Therefore, the eight negations are employed to explain and complete the two truths.

Question: How are the eight negations used to explain and complete the middle way of conventional truth so that the meaning of conventional truth is rectified?

Answer: A master's words mostly arise in response to others. The other holds that there is an existence that can exist, and thus there is an emptiness that can be empty. If there is an existence that can exist, it does not exist by relying on emptiness; if there is an emptiness that can be empty, it is not empty by relying on existence. Now, there is no existence that can exist, and thus no emptiness that can be empty. Since there is no existence that can exist, it exists by relying on emptiness; since there is no emptiness that can be empty, it is empty by relying on existence. Therefore, emptiness-existence is conventional truth, and existence-emptiness is ultimate truth. When emptiness-existence is conventional truth, conventional truth is provisionally designated existence through causes and conditions; provisional existence through causes and conditions is provisional arising through causes and conditions and provisional ceasing through causes and conditions. Provisional arising through causes and conditions cannot be a fixed arising; provisional ceasing through causes and conditions cannot be a fixed ceasing. Because it cannot be fixed arising, there is no arising of substantial intrinsic nature; because it cannot be fixed ceasing, there is no ceasing of substantial intrinsic nature. Therefore, neither arising nor ceasing is the middle way of conventional truth.

Question: The master says that provisional arising does not arise, and provisional ceasing does not cease, and that neither arising nor ceasing is called the middle way of conventional truth. This would mean not arising as provisional arising; how does it mean not arising by intrinsic nature?

Answer: When the master says provisional arising does not arise, there are three meanings. First, if clarifying that both truths lack arising, then provisional arising does not arise means only that there is no arising of substantial intrinsic nature, not that there is no provisional arising. Second, provisional arising naturally does not arise; that is, the absence of provisional arising serves as the middle way of conventional truth. This takes the provisionality of ultimate truth as the middle of conventional truth, fully as explained above. Third, it clarifies that this provisional arising is itself non-arising; if one locates non-arising in ultimate truth and arising in conventional truth, these are merely the two views of ultimate and conventional.

Question: If conventional truth lacks substantial arising and ceasing of intrinsic nature, how is it the middle way?

Answer: If conventional truth were substantial arising and ceasing of intrinsic nature, it would fall into bias and error and not constitute the middle way. Because conventional truth is far removed from the bias and error of substantial intrinsic nature, it constitutes the middle way.

Question: Why is substantial arising and ceasing of intrinsic nature called biased and erroneous?

Answer: If arising is fixed arising, then arising is permanent arising; if ceasing is real ceasing, then ceasing becomes annihilating ceasing. Therefore, substantial arising and ceasing of intrinsic nature is precisely biased and erroneous.

Question: Does departure from arising and ceasing of intrinsic nature only establish the middle way of conventional truth, or does it also establish the provisional designation of conventional truth?

Answer: The single clinging to substantial intrinsic nature possesses two aspects: because substantial intrinsic nature is biased, it obstructs the middle way; because of the notion of inherent nature, it obstructs provisional designation. Since the single delusion that obstructs possesses two aspects, the middle and the provisional of conventional truth that are obstructed are also likewise. Because existence does not exist of itself, existence is provisional existence; and because this provisional existence is far removed from the two extremes, it is called the middle way.

Question: If so, what is the difference between the middle and the provisional?

Answer: The treatise states: 'It is also a provisional designation, and also the meaning of the middle way.' Therefore, there are not two different substances; they are distinguished merely according to meaning.

Question: If so, why did the Great Master of Sheshan (Sengquan) say that neither existence nor non-existence is called the middle way, whereas both existence and non-existence are called provisional designation—that substance is called the middle, while function is the provisional? How can they have no difference?

Answer: This was provisionally distinguishing substance and function for the moment; hence substance was called the middle, and function was called the provisional.

Question: Why did the Great Master speak like that?

Answer: The text of the treatise is like this, so the Great Master adopted it. The 'Examination of the Four Truths' chapter states: 'Whatever phenomena arise from causes and conditions, I declare to be emptiness; it is also a provisional designation, and also the meaning of the middle way.' The prose commentary explains: 'Because it is far removed from the two extremes, it is called the middle way; for the sake of sentient beings, it is spoken of as provisional designation. The middle way is the substance, of which existence and non-existence cannot be predicated; function is existence and non-existence, and therefore can be provisionally spoken of.' Thus, taking neither existence nor non-existence as the middle and both existence and non-existence as the provisional is merely one way of discussing it. If one distinguishes the three middles and three provisionals, then the middle and provisional are constantly unified, as will be fully explained later.

Question: What is substantial arising and ceasing of intrinsic nature?

Answer: Briefly, four kinds of views held by people can be clarified: First, what worldly people speak of: merely based on what eyes and ears perceive, the coming together of earth and water gives rise to external things, and the coming together of parents gives rise to internal phenomena. Clinging to the idea that there is definitely an arising of internal and external phenomena is called substantial intrinsic nature. Second, the views of various non-Buddhists who hold that uncaused or falsely caused arising definitely exists; this is also called substantial intrinsic nature. Third, Hīnayāna practitioners who cling to the idea that in the future there definitely exists an arising of intrinsic nature, which comes forth from the future into the present and is therefore called arising; this is also substantial intrinsic nature. Fourth, Mahāyāna practitioners who grasp at attainments: although they say phenomena are provisional, they hold that there is definitely an arising that can arise; that is, arising does not depend on ceasing, so arising forms its own nature. Arising of intrinsic nature of these four types all obstructs the Tathāgata's conventional truth of causes and conditions. When the author of the treatise appeared in the world, he refuted these four kinds of people's clinging to substantial intrinsic nature, and elucidated that conventional truth is provisional designation through causes and conditions; thus conventional truth first became the middle way.

Question: In conventional truth, is the refutation of this substantial arising and ceasing of intrinsic nature the meaning of emptiness of intrinsic nature, or not?

Answer: It is precisely emptiness of intrinsic nature. Because such intrinsic natures are ultimately empty and tranquil, unseen by the five eyes, it is called emptiness of intrinsic nature.

Question: Is it original emptiness of intrinsic nature, or emptiness through the refutation of intrinsic nature?

Answer: It has both meanings. This nature is originally empty and tranquil, not empty because of being refuted; hence it is called original emptiness of intrinsic nature. It is like taking a mirage to be water: water is originally empty of intrinsic nature; if considered from the standpoint of the deluded emotional attachment, it is called clinging to intrinsic nature; when one seeks this clung-to intrinsic nature and it cannot be found, it is called emptiness through refutation of intrinsic nature.

Question: Since it is emptiness of intrinsic nature, why is it called the middle way?

Answer: Because emptiness is free from the two extremes, it is called the middle way.

Question: Can this also clarify the middle way of neither existence nor non-existence, or not?

Answer: Because it is empty of substantial intrinsic nature, it cannot be considered existence; because there is provisional designation through causes and conditions, it cannot be considered non-existence. This combines the middle and the provisional, both being the middle way.

Question: Where does this come from?

Answer: The Nirvāṇa Sūtra says: 'Both existence and non-existence are called the middle way'; this is precisely that matter. Again, the Nirvāṇa says: 'Having no birth-and-death, it cannot be considered existence; having permanence, bliss, self, and purity, it cannot be considered non-existence.' Cases like this are not just one.

Question: Why is this used as the middle way?

Answer: The middle means correct meaning. Clarifying that there is no substantial intrinsic nature while there is provisional designation is only then correct in meaning; hence it is called the middle.

Question: How many kinds of emptiness of intrinsic nature are there?

Answer: Discussing emptiness of intrinsic nature, there are four kinds: First, calculating an empty nature is called emptiness of intrinsic nature; this takes its name from what is clung to. Second, refuting the substantial intrinsic nature of outsiders is called emptiness of intrinsic nature. Third, this clung-to nature is originally empty of itself, called original emptiness of intrinsic nature. Fourth, causes and conditions are originally empty of their own nature, called emptiness of intrinsic nature. This emptiness of intrinsic nature is merely another name for Buddha-nature, prajñā, and true reality. When people of the two vehicles do not see emptiness of intrinsic nature, it is this emptiness of intrinsic nature that they do not see; this takes the fundamental substance as nature, not the nature of clinging to intrinsic nature.

Question: The two truths are both non-arising, both unsaid, both thusness, both severed, both nature, and both empty. What is the difference between nature and emptiness?

Answer: They are still of one meaning. Free from the two arisings of intrinsic nature and provisionality, they are therefore both non-arising. Conventional truth does not speak of arising of intrinsic nature, and ultimate truth does not speak of provisional arising, so they are called both unsaid. The two truths sever both provisional and substantial arisings, so they are called both severed. Severance is precisely thusness, so they are said to be both thusness.

Question: Why clarify the middle way first in terms of neither arising nor ceasing?

Answer: One may provisionally rely on any single gateway in the hope that diverse awakenings will be attained; one should not stubbornly interrogate the reason. Yet if one must trace it out, it is not without profound significance. Although conventional truth encompasses the myriad transformations, cause and effect generating each other is the primary tenet among all doctrines, the foundation for establishing faith. If cause and effect are established, all are established; if cause and effect are ruined, all are ruined. Now, desiring to rectify the meaning of mutual generation of cause and effect in conventional truth, he therefore first discusses the middle way of conventional truth in terms of neither arising nor ceasing.

Question: How do we know that he desires to refute biased and erroneous causes and effects and rectify the causes and effects of conventional truth?

Answer: When Piṅgala explains non-arising, he brings forth nine kinds of cause and effect from Buddhist and non-Buddhist treatise masters, all of which are unestablished; hence we know that he clarifies the middle way of conventional truth in terms of cause and effect.

Question: Why does he not say neither cause nor effect, as in the ten negations of the Nirvāṇa?

Answer: Because he now wishes to rectify the cause and effect of conventional truth by means of non-arising and non-ceasing, he cannot, upon launching the topic, immediately clarify neither cause nor effect.

Question: Since speaking of neither arising nor ceasing is already sufficient, why does he additionally speak of the six matters?

Answer: Those of sharp faculties awaken upon hearing the first, and there is no need for further exposition. Why? Because when conventional truth lacks substantial arising and ceasing of intrinsic nature, no illness is not refuted; and when one understands the arising and ceasing of provisional designations through causes and conditions, no correctness is not revealed; hence there is no need to further speak of the six matters. But for the sake of those of dull faculties who have not yet awakened, it is appropriate to shift the angle and elaborate. Furthermore, faculties and temperaments differ, and receptivity and awakening are not uniform: some do not awaken upon hearing neither arising nor ceasing, yet comprehend upon listening to neither permanence nor annihilation. Therefore, adapting to different conditions, it is fitting to open distinct teachings. For example, in the Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa over thirty bodhisattvas speak on the gateway of non-duality; or again, Dharmodgata Bodhisattva speaks on six hundred myriad kotis of prajñā gateways.

Question: Having understood that different gateways are further expounded, why clarify neither permanence nor annihilation next after neither arising nor ceasing?

Answer: There are briefly three meanings: First, to complete the preceding meaning of conventional truth refuting arising and ceasing of intrinsic nature. The reason conventional truth refutes substantial arising and ceasing of intrinsic nature is precisely because real arising falls into permanence, and real ceasing falls into annihilation; therefore conventional truth refutes real arising and ceasing. Second, to reveal and establish the meaning of the middle way of conventional truth. The reason provisional arising and provisional ceasing of conventional truth is the middle way is precisely because provisional arising is not fixed arising and thus not permanent, and provisional ceasing is not fixed ceasing and thus not annihilated; being neither annihilated nor permanent, it is called the middle way. Hence, adducing neither permanence nor annihilation explains and completes the middle way of conventional truth. Question: Since neither permanence nor annihilation is the middle way, and neither arising nor ceasing is also the middle way, how does one middle way reveal another middle way? Answer: If clarifying the middle way of conventional truth in terms of neither arising nor ceasing, the meaning is not obvious; if clarifying the middle way in terms of neither permanence nor annihilation, the meaning is easily manifested. Why? Because in sūtras and treatises, the middle way is mostly clarified in terms of neither permanence nor annihilation. The 'Lion's Roar' chapter of the Nirvāṇa Sūtra says: 'Sentient beings' arising of views has generally two kinds: first, annihilation; second, permanence. Such two views are not called the middle way; absence of permanence and absence of annihilation is called the middle way.' The 'Examination of Karma' chapter of this treatise states: 'The meaning expounded in this treatise is free from annihilation and permanence.' Because sūtras and treatises mostly clarify the middle way in terms of neither permanence nor annihilation, its meaning is prominent and clear, and its words are easily trusted; hence he adduces neither permanence nor annihilation to explain and complete the middle way. Third, although it was stated above that the mutual generation of cause and effect in conventional truth is provisional arising and ceasing, not real arising and ceasing, this merely avoids the fault of substantial intrinsic nature, but has not yet escaped the error of the effect existing or not existing within the cause. Why? Because since it is called provisional arising, one might claim that because the effect exists in the cause it provisionally arises, or that because the effect does not exist in the cause it provisionally arises. Therefore, now clarifying that the mutual generation of cause and effect of provisional designation cannot be defined as existence or non-existence: If, like the Sāṃkhya, one calculates that because the effect exists in the cause it arises, this is the meaning of permanence. As the Śata-śāstra states: 'When various effects arise, various causes are not lost.' Not lost means permanently existing, unable to be lost or destroyed; hence it is called permanence. The Vaiśeṣika clings to the non-existence of the effect in the cause, which is called annihilation. Because the effect does not exist in the cause, the cause ceases beforehand and the effect arises afterward; hence it is called annihilation. Within the Buddha's Dharma, the Sarvāstivādins clarify that the three times exist; that is, the fundamental nature of the effect resides in the future, comes from the future to the present, and passes from the present into the past. Constantly existing throughout the three times, it is called permanence. The Mahāsāṃghika school's doctrine that two times do not exist holds that non-existence originally now exists, and having existed it returns to non-existence; hence it is annihilation. Now clarifying that cause and effect of causes and conditions cannot be determined as existing or determined as non-existing, it is therefore neither annihilated nor permanent, called the middle way. This is fully expounded in the 'Lion's Roar' chapter of the Nirvāṇa Sūtra.

2.9

Next, to explain "neither identical nor different": although conventional truth is free from real intrinsic production and cessation as well as determined annihilation and permanence, there is still the fear of falling into identity or difference. For example, the Sāṃkhya and the Mahāsāṃghika explain cause and effect as having the same substance, while the Vaiśeṣika and the Sthaviravāda explain cause and effect as having different substances. Identity and difference such as these both undermine the middle way of cause and effect in conventional truth; therefore, "neither identical nor different" is explained next. Question: How are cause and effect in conventional truth neither identical nor different? Answer: The chapter "Examination of Dharmas" states: "Dharmas arisen from various causes and conditions are neither identical with the cause nor different from the cause." Since cause and effect are not the same, having the two senses of agent and object, how could they be identical? Because the cause is named the cause of the effect, and the effect is named the effect of the cause, how could they be different? Therefore, it is termed the middle way.

2.10

Next, regarding “neither coming nor going away”: the ailments of delusion are infinite and cannot be enumerated in full. The middle ways of conventional truth are also immeasurable and cannot be fully expounded. Now, by further presenting the broad essentials through two approaches, no ailment will go unrefuted, and no middle will remain unrevealed. Although the deluded hear the preceding six negations, they ultimately still claim that an effect definitely exists. Since an effect definitely exists, it must either come from outside or emerge from within; therefore, “neither coming nor going away” is explained next. For instance, those who postulate that the suffering and pleasure of sentient beings and the origination and cessation of the myriad things all come from Maheśvara hold the doctrine of coming from outside. Furthermore, there are non-Buddhists who postulate that the fruits of suffering and pleasure are all created by oneself and experienced by oneself, which is called emerging from within. Furthermore, there are non-Buddhists of prior action, such as the followers of Subhadra, who postulate that the fruits of suffering and pleasure all come from past causes and do not depend on present conditions; this is the doctrine of emerging from within. There are also non-Buddhists who say that the union of male and female produces sentient beings, and that the four great elements assemble together to produce external things, which is called coming from outside. This takes the cause as internal and the conditions as external. Furthermore, the Abhidharma postulates that wood possesses the nature of fire, and that phenomenal fire is produced from nature-fire; this is the doctrine of emerging from within. The *Tattvasiddhi-śāstra* explains that wood has no nature of fire, but is merely produced dependently on conditions; this is the doctrine of coming from outside. If one postulates both an internal nature of fire and reliance on external conditions, then one completely postulates both coming and emerging. Now it is explained that such coming and emerging both destroy the conventional causality; therefore, “neither coming nor going away” is explained next. Question: How does conventional causality involve neither coming nor going away? Answer: Cause and effect through causes and conditions cannot be internal or external; therefore, it is called the middle way. Why is this? The treatise says, “With phenomena born of manifold causes and conditions, because the effect is not biased toward the cause, it is not internal; because it is not biased toward the conditions, it is not external.” The *Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa* says, “Because phenomena do not belong to causes and are not located in conditions.” Because it is not biased toward the two extremes, it is called the middle way. Question: Why speak only of eight things? Answer: The eight things form four pairs. In each and every pair, no ailment is unrefuted and no middle is unrevealed; thus, the meaning lacks nothing. Merely using four pairs to successively refute all postulations and successively clarify the middle way makes the meaning roughly complete; therefore, only eight are spoken of. Next, explaining that the ultimate truth possesses the eight negations to reveal the middle way of the ultimate truth: emptiness-existence is conventional truth, and existence-emptiness is ultimate truth. Since emptiness-existence is conventional truth, conventional truth is provisional origination and provisional cessation. Opposing the provisional origination of conventional truth, the provisional non-origination of ultimate truth is clarified; opposing the provisional cessation of conventional truth, the provisional non-cessation of ultimate truth is clarified. Neither origination nor cessation is the middle way of ultimate truth. Question: How is it known that both truths are free of origination? Answer: The “Buddha-Mother Chapter” of the *Yingluo jing* says: “The two truths are neither one nor two, neither permanent nor annihilated, neither coming nor going away, and neither arising nor ceasing.” Thus we know that the eight negations are fully present in both truths. This treatise explains that both the followers of the Great and Lesser [Vehicles] forfeit both truths: Hīnayāna adheres to existence and rejects emptiness, thereby losing the ultimate truth; Mahāyāna practitioners adhere to emptiness and push aside existence, thereby losing the conventional truth. Taking up these two errors, it still applies the eight negations; thus we know that the eight negations are complete with respect to both truths. Furthermore, Mahāyāna practitioners adhere to ultimate emptiness without having conventional truth; having lost conventional truth, they also lose the supreme truth. Therefore, it is now explained that although there is ultimately no origination, there are two truths. Question: One should simply elucidate the two truths directly; why go so far as to explain that both truths are free of origination? Answer: If one merely explained the two truths of emptiness and existence directly, it might be assumed that one is merely taking up again the emptiness and existence explained by those two followers of the Great and Lesser [Vehicles] and combining them into two truths. In that case, the one-sided ailments would not be refuted, and the middle way would not be revealed. Therefore, it is now explained that both truths are free of origination, thereby refuting both one-sided views and fully revealing the middle way. Why is this? Because the conventional truth is free of origination, intrinsic origination is refuted, and thus the Hīnayāna ailment of adhering to intrinsic existence is eliminated. Because the ultimate truth is free of origination, dependent origination is clearly shown to be precisely non-origination, and thus the Mahāyāna ailment of biased emptiness is pacified. Therefore, we know that the two truths being free of origination completely shatters both ailments. Moreover, because conventional truth is free of intrinsic origination and has dependent provisional origination, conventional truth accomplishes the middle way; because ultimate truth is free of provisional origination and clarifies that dependent origination is provisional non-origination, ultimate truth accomplishes the middle way. Because both middle ways are fully revealed, it is explained that both truths are without origination. Furthermore, formerly they only explained that one truth originates and one truth does not originate; wishing to refute that postulation, it is explained that neither of the two truths has origination. Moreover, explaining that neither of the two truths originates is intended to show that all phenomena are originally and ultimately without origination, causing all sentient beings to awaken to the patience of non-arising; hence it is explained that both truths are free of origination. Why is this? If the mind has origination, it has that which it relies upon; if it has that which it relies upon, it has that by which it is bound; if it has that by which it is bound, it cannot escape birth, aging, illness, death, sorrow, lamentation, pain, and distress, and cannot even attain the two vehicles, much less the Buddha path. If the mind is without origination, it has nothing to rely upon; freed from all bonds, it immediately attains the middle way. Therefore, the fifty-two sages and worthies all distinguish their stages within the contemplation of non-origination: first, having faith that all phenomena are by their fundamental nature devoid of intrinsic nature, they are called the Ten Faiths; gradually subduing the arising mind so that it does not stir up conceptual thoughts is called subduing patience, which refers to the people of the Thirty Minds; because subduing the arising mind so that it does not stir up conceptual thoughts makes non-origination somewhat clear, and accords with the non-origination of all phenomena without falling into origination, it is called compliant patience, which is from the first bhūmi to the sixth bhūmi; when the arising mind and stirring thoughts no longer appear before one, and non-origination appears before one, it is called the patience of non-arising, from the seventh bhūmi to the ninth bhūmi. When the arising mind and stirring thoughts are completely extinguished, and the wondrous understanding of non-origination is distinctly clear, it is called the patience of extinction, which is the tenth bhūmi, equal awakening, and wondrous awakening stages. Because gradations are without gradations, there is only a single contemplation of non-origination; because of gradations without gradations, there are the differences of the fifty-two stages. The reason why all fifty-two stages practice the contemplation of non-origination is truly because the two truths are originally without origination; thus, based on the non-origination of the two truths, they generate the contemplation of non-origination. As the *Nirvāṇa-sūtra* says, “The twelve links of dependent origination neither arise nor cease, and can give rise to contemplative wisdom.” Thus we know that the eight negations are the foundation of the fifty-two sages and worthies. Question: How do the fifty-two sages and worthies all awaken to the non-origination of the two truths? Answer: By comprehending conventional truth, the mind with an appropriation of any intrinsic reality ultimately does not arise; by comprehending ultimate truth, they know that dependent origination is precisely non-origination, and no longer give rise to conceptual thoughts regarding any provisional origination. The ailments of origination, taken together, do not go beyond the provisional and the real; when thoughts no longer stir regarding these two, one awakens to the patience of the non-arising of dharmas, and thus all sages and worthies exist. Question: Conventional truth refutes intrinsic origination and cessation, explaining neither arising nor ceasing. Does ultimate truth refute provisional origination and cessation, explaining neither arising nor ceasing, or not? Answer: The primary intention is not so. Conventional truth refutes real origination and cessation, explaining neither arising nor ceasing. Ultimate truth makes clear that provisional origination is plainly non-origination; hence it is not refuted. Therefore, the sūtra says: “Without destroying provisional designations, the true mark of all phenomena is expounded.” The treatise says: “Phenomena born of causes and conditions—I declare them to be precisely emptiness.” If one were to refute provisional origination and cessation, one would contradict these sūtras and treatises. Question: Why is it that intrinsic origination is refuted to explain non-origination, while provisional origination is precisely non-origination? Answer: All phenomena are ultimately devoid of intrinsic origination, and therefore the five eyes do not see it; it is merely inverted crosswise thinking that calls it existent. Therefore, intrinsic origination must be refuted first, and only then can dependent provisional origination be established as the conventional truth of Buddhas and bodhisattvas. This dependent provisional origination is seen by the Buddha eye; how could one refute the conventional truth of causes and conditions? It is just that dependent origination is precisely the nature of quiescent extinction; therefore, it is called the non-origination of ultimate truth, which is the middle way of ultimate truth. Question: How could the older [masters] say that conventional truth refutes intrinsic origination and ultimate truth refutes provisional origination? Answer: This is spoken with reference to the ailment regarding the provisional. Originally, the provisional was established in opposition to intrinsic nature, but the deluded further decidedly claimed that this provisional exists in principle; thus it became the ailment of provisional origination. Now, this ailment of provisional origination is refuted, which is why it is said that the provisional is refuted; it does not refute the dependent provisional of non-appropriation. Therefore, the two truths both refuting intrinsic nature and the provisional has, in general, two senses: if conventional truth refutes intrinsic nature, it refutes without preserving; if ultimate truth refutes the provisional, it both refutes and preserves—refuting the sentiment capable of delusion, but preserving the provisional that was deludedly grasped; thus it only removes the ailment and does not remove the phenomenon. There are also two approaches: first, there is no phenomenon to be removed, which is refuting the real phenomenon of intrinsic nature; second, only removing the sentiment capable of delusion while not removing the phenomenon deludedly grasped, which is the sense of ultimate truth refuting the provisional. Question: If dependent provisional origination is precisely non-origination and therefore not refuted, then dependent intrinsic origination being precisely non-origination should also not be refuted. Answer: The nature of causes and conditions, like Buddha-nature and Dharma-nature, is still only a provisional sense. What is taken here is an origination with appropriation, which is origination because of intrinsic origination, and cannot be non-origination. Such intrinsic nature is merely refuted and not preserved. Question: What kind of person adheres to provisional origination such that it is said that ultimate truth refutes provisional origination? Answer: There are two kinds of people: first, those of the two truths of non-empty provisional designations; second, those of the two truths of empty provisional designations. It is for these two kinds of people that ultimate truth is explained as refuting the provisional. The person of non-empty provisionality claims that conventional truth is empty of real intrinsic origination, but that provisional origination cannot be emptied. For this person, it is explained that the conventional truth of causes and conditions—provisional origination—is precisely non-origination; where is there any such provisional phenomenon that is non-empty? If there were such a provisional phenomenon that is non-empty, this provisional phenomenon would have to be refuted. Question: Can this very doctrine of non-empty provisional designations also be the present middle way of conventional truth, or not? Answer: There is also this intention. You say that being empty of real intrinsic nature is ultimate truth, and having provisional phenomena is called conventional truth; these two truths are still merely the meaning of the present conventional truth. Since conventional truth is dependent provisional designation and devoid of real intrinsic phenomena, how can one use the emptiness of conventional truth as the emptiness of ultimate truth? Question: Observing the traditional doctrine, it also agrees with what is said now. Conventional truth is the three provisionals, and thus is no longer real intrinsic nature; ultimate truth is the four severances, and thus no longer has the three provisionals. This is also the sense in which the two truths refute the provisional and the real; how does it differ from the present [view]? Answer: The shallow and deep approaches will naturally be fully explained. Although the traditional view says that conventional truth is the three provisionals, when viewed now from [the standpoint of] non-appropriation, it is ultimately an intrinsic nature view, and is refuted by the present conventional truth. Now it is explained that the very arising of a single thought making an understanding of origination is precisely an intrinsic nature view. Why? Since one gives rise to a thought making an understanding of origination, the mind deems that this origination exists, and further gives rise to an arising mind; this is having an appropriation, and therefore it is called intrinsic nature. If, hearing of origination, one says that origination is the origination of cessation and calls it dependent origination, and then forms an understanding of dependent origination, this becomes the ailment of dependent origination. One must refute this dependent origination; therefore, refuting the provisional and the real must be applied meticulously with reference to the contemplative mind—otherwise, it merely reverts to the old doctrine. Second, the person of empty provisionality claims that only when provisional origination is emptied is there non-origination; this is discerning non-origination by destroying origination. In response to this capacity, it is clarified that provisional origination is precisely non-origination, which is called ultimate truth. Question: How is neither arising nor ceasing the middle way of ultimate truth? Answer: By taking existence-emptiness as ultimate truth, it is far removed from origination and cessation, and therefore called middle. Since it is called existence-emptiness, emptiness is not empty of itself, and therefore called provisional, not different from conventional truth. Question: Since you say that emptiness-existence is conventional truth and existence-emptiness is ultimate truth, both truths are dependent provisional designations. When people who receive the teaching hear of existence, they make an understanding of existence, and when they hear of non-existence, they make an understanding of non-existence; thus, both truths become ailments of intrinsic nature. The author of the treatise refutes these two truths of real intrinsic nature and elucidates the two truths of dependent provisional designation; that is, both truths refute intrinsic nature. Why do you say that conventional truth refutes intrinsic nature and ultimate truth refutes the provisional? Answer: When I was twenty-two years old, I consulted my master on this meaning at Shaolong Monastery. The master said: “Speaking comprehensively of refuting the provisional and the real, there are four propositions. What you asked just now is that both truths refute intrinsic nature: conventional truth refutes intrinsic origination, and ultimate truth refutes intrinsic non-origination; therefore, both truths are provisional. Second, both truths refute the provisional: the traditional conventional truth of appropriation was provisional because of the provisional, whereas now it is explained that conventional truth is the non-provisional provisional; therefore, conventional truth refutes the provisional. The dependent non-provisional provisional is the ultimate truth, refuting the traditional provisional; hence it is the provisional ultimate truth.” Question: Others do not explain ultimate truth as provisional; why refute it? Answer: Although their ultimate truth is not provisional, the provisional establishes a name for the ultimate; this provisional designation is a name, and therefore by name, the ultimate can also refute the provisional. Furthermore, masters of the middle and provisional make an understanding of provisionality upon hearing of the provisional; one must also refute this provisional. The master said: “The fault of masters of the middle and provisional is grave; they will never see the Buddha. The reason for making this rebuke is that the provisional was originally spoken in opposition to intrinsic nature to make them awaken completely. Yet they then discarded intrinsic nature and preserved the provisional, deeming it to be definitely correct; their minds had that which they relied upon, and therefore they will never see the Buddha. It should properly be refuted.” Third, conventional truth refutes the provisional, and ultimate truth refutes the real; this directly opposes the traditional doctrine. Traditionally, conventional truth is the three provisionals, and ultimate truth, being the four severances, is not provisional. Therefore, it is now explained that conventional truth refutes this provisional of appropriation, and only then can conventional truth be distinguished as provisional. Question: How is it refuted? Answer: If conventional truth is provisional, what does conventional truth depend on? If it depends on ultimate truth, ultimate truth is not what is depended upon; how could conventional truth be that which depends? Since conventional truth does not depend on ultimate truth, nor does it depend on conventional truth itself, we know that conventional truth does not depend. If conventional truth does not depend, how is it provisional? Now that conventional truth has no such provisional, it is said that conventional truth refutes the provisional. The present conventional truth—existence does not exist of itself, but exists through emptiness—is when conventional truth first becomes provisional. As for ultimate truth refuting the real: the ultimate is not ultimate of itself; it is called conventional-ultimate. If the ultimate is not conventional-ultimate, then the ultimate does not become the ultimate; therefore, the dependent provisional ultimate refutes their real intrinsic ultimate. Fourth, conventional truth refutes the real, and ultimate truth refutes the provisional, as explained previously. Question: Conventional truth refutes the real and conventional truth is provisional; then ultimate truth refuting the provisional should mean that ultimate truth is not provisional. Answer: Ultimate truth refutes provisional origination and cessation; it does not say that ultimate truth refutes all provisionals. Question: Since there are four propositions, why do you now say that conventional truth refutes the real and ultimate truth refutes the provisional? Answer: Speaking comprehensively of the provisional and the real, there are indeed four propositions. Now, wishing to explain that both truths are free of origination, conventional truth is without real origination and ultimate truth is without provisional origination; thus the non-origination of the two truths can be distinguished as different. If one were to say that conventional truth refutes real origination and ultimate truth refutes real non-origination, then refuting origination and then further refuting non-origination would fail to explain the eight negations. For this reason, the two truths cannot both refute the real. If conventional truth refutes provisional origination and ultimate truth refutes provisional non-origination, that too is not explaining the meaning of the eight negations; hence they cannot both refute the provisional. If conventional truth refutes provisional origination and ultimate truth refutes real non-origination, that too does not explain the eight negations. Therefore, among the four approaches, it can only be that conventional truth clarifies the absence of real origination, and ultimate truth discerns the absence of provisional origination. Question: Could it be that ultimate truth also refutes real origination, or not? Answer: Taking the purport of the meaning, it indeed also has it, since postulating a real non-origination, being an appropriation, is still an origination view. However, provisionally following the external opponent's established doctrine, they do not say that ultimate truth is origination; therefore, ultimate truth does not refute origination.

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中觀論疏 — Classical Chinese