中觀論疏 2.10
English (machine translation) 2.10
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2.10
Next, regarding “neither coming nor going away”: the ailments of delusion are infinite and cannot be enumerated in full. The middle ways of conventional truth are also immeasurable and cannot be fully expounded. Now, by further presenting the broad essentials through two approaches, no ailment will go unrefuted, and no middle will remain unrevealed. Although the deluded hear the preceding six negations, they ultimately still claim that an effect definitely exists. Since an effect definitely exists, it must either come from outside or emerge from within; therefore, “neither coming nor going away” is explained next. For instance, those who postulate that the suffering and pleasure of sentient beings and the origination and cessation of the myriad things all come from Maheśvara hold the doctrine of coming from outside. Furthermore, there are non-Buddhists who postulate that the fruits of suffering and pleasure are all created by oneself and experienced by oneself, which is called emerging from within. Furthermore, there are non-Buddhists of prior action, such as the followers of Subhadra, who postulate that the fruits of suffering and pleasure all come from past causes and do not depend on present conditions; this is the doctrine of emerging from within. There are also non-Buddhists who say that the union of male and female produces sentient beings, and that the four great elements assemble together to produce external things, which is called coming from outside. This takes the cause as internal and the conditions as external. Furthermore, the Abhidharma postulates that wood possesses the nature of fire, and that phenomenal fire is produced from nature-fire; this is the doctrine of emerging from within. The *Tattvasiddhi-śāstra* explains that wood has no nature of fire, but is merely produced dependently on conditions; this is the doctrine of coming from outside. If one postulates both an internal nature of fire and reliance on external conditions, then one completely postulates both coming and emerging. Now it is explained that such coming and emerging both destroy the conventional causality; therefore, “neither coming nor going away” is explained next. Question: How does conventional causality involve neither coming nor going away? Answer: Cause and effect through causes and conditions cannot be internal or external; therefore, it is called the middle way. Why is this? The treatise says, “With phenomena born of manifold causes and conditions, because the effect is not biased toward the cause, it is not internal; because it is not biased toward the conditions, it is not external.” The *Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa* says, “Because phenomena do not belong to causes and are not located in conditions.” Because it is not biased toward the two extremes, it is called the middle way. Question: Why speak only of eight things? Answer: The eight things form four pairs. In each and every pair, no ailment is unrefuted and no middle is unrevealed; thus, the meaning lacks nothing. Merely using four pairs to successively refute all postulations and successively clarify the middle way makes the meaning roughly complete; therefore, only eight are spoken of. Next, explaining that the ultimate truth possesses the eight negations to reveal the middle way of the ultimate truth: emptiness-existence is conventional truth, and existence-emptiness is ultimate truth. Since emptiness-existence is conventional truth, conventional truth is provisional origination and provisional cessation. Opposing the provisional origination of conventional truth, the provisional non-origination of ultimate truth is clarified; opposing the provisional cessation of conventional truth, the provisional non-cessation of ultimate truth is clarified. Neither origination nor cessation is the middle way of ultimate truth. Question: How is it known that both truths are free of origination? Answer: The “Buddha-Mother Chapter” of the *Yingluo jing* says: “The two truths are neither one nor two, neither permanent nor annihilated, neither coming nor going away, and neither arising nor ceasing.” Thus we know that the eight negations are fully present in both truths. This treatise explains that both the followers of the Great and Lesser [Vehicles] forfeit both truths: Hīnayāna adheres to existence and rejects emptiness, thereby losing the ultimate truth; Mahāyāna practitioners adhere to emptiness and push aside existence, thereby losing the conventional truth. Taking up these two errors, it still applies the eight negations; thus we know that the eight negations are complete with respect to both truths. Furthermore, Mahāyāna practitioners adhere to ultimate emptiness without having conventional truth; having lost conventional truth, they also lose the supreme truth. Therefore, it is now explained that although there is ultimately no origination, there are two truths. Question: One should simply elucidate the two truths directly; why go so far as to explain that both truths are free of origination? Answer: If one merely explained the two truths of emptiness and existence directly, it might be assumed that one is merely taking up again the emptiness and existence explained by those two followers of the Great and Lesser [Vehicles] and combining them into two truths. In that case, the one-sided ailments would not be refuted, and the middle way would not be revealed. Therefore, it is now explained that both truths are free of origination, thereby refuting both one-sided views and fully revealing the middle way. Why is this? Because the conventional truth is free of origination, intrinsic origination is refuted, and thus the Hīnayāna ailment of adhering to intrinsic existence is eliminated. Because the ultimate truth is free of origination, dependent origination is clearly shown to be precisely non-origination, and thus the Mahāyāna ailment of biased emptiness is pacified. Therefore, we know that the two truths being free of origination completely shatters both ailments. Moreover, because conventional truth is free of intrinsic origination and has dependent provisional origination, conventional truth accomplishes the middle way; because ultimate truth is free of provisional origination and clarifies that dependent origination is provisional non-origination, ultimate truth accomplishes the middle way. Because both middle ways are fully revealed, it is explained that both truths are without origination. Furthermore, formerly they only explained that one truth originates and one truth does not originate; wishing to refute that postulation, it is explained that neither of the two truths has origination. Moreover, explaining that neither of the two truths originates is intended to show that all phenomena are originally and ultimately without origination, causing all sentient beings to awaken to the patience of non-arising; hence it is explained that both truths are free of origination. Why is this? If the mind has origination, it has that which it relies upon; if it has that which it relies upon, it has that by which it is bound; if it has that by which it is bound, it cannot escape birth, aging, illness, death, sorrow, lamentation, pain, and distress, and cannot even attain the two vehicles, much less the Buddha path. If the mind is without origination, it has nothing to rely upon; freed from all bonds, it immediately attains the middle way. Therefore, the fifty-two sages and worthies all distinguish their stages within the contemplation of non-origination: first, having faith that all phenomena are by their fundamental nature devoid of intrinsic nature, they are called the Ten Faiths; gradually subduing the arising mind so that it does not stir up conceptual thoughts is called subduing patience, which refers to the people of the Thirty Minds; because subduing the arising mind so that it does not stir up conceptual thoughts makes non-origination somewhat clear, and accords with the non-origination of all phenomena without falling into origination, it is called compliant patience, which is from the first bhūmi to the sixth bhūmi; when the arising mind and stirring thoughts no longer appear before one, and non-origination appears before one, it is called the patience of non-arising, from the seventh bhūmi to the ninth bhūmi. When the arising mind and stirring thoughts are completely extinguished, and the wondrous understanding of non-origination is distinctly clear, it is called the patience of extinction, which is the tenth bhūmi, equal awakening, and wondrous awakening stages. Because gradations are without gradations, there is only a single contemplation of non-origination; because of gradations without gradations, there are the differences of the fifty-two stages. The reason why all fifty-two stages practice the contemplation of non-origination is truly because the two truths are originally without origination; thus, based on the non-origination of the two truths, they generate the contemplation of non-origination. As the *Nirvāṇa-sūtra* says, “The twelve links of dependent origination neither arise nor cease, and can give rise to contemplative wisdom.” Thus we know that the eight negations are the foundation of the fifty-two sages and worthies. Question: How do the fifty-two sages and worthies all awaken to the non-origination of the two truths? Answer: By comprehending conventional truth, the mind with an appropriation of any intrinsic reality ultimately does not arise; by comprehending ultimate truth, they know that dependent origination is precisely non-origination, and no longer give rise to conceptual thoughts regarding any provisional origination. The ailments of origination, taken together, do not go beyond the provisional and the real; when thoughts no longer stir regarding these two, one awakens to the patience of the non-arising of dharmas, and thus all sages and worthies exist. Question: Conventional truth refutes intrinsic origination and cessation, explaining neither arising nor ceasing. Does ultimate truth refute provisional origination and cessation, explaining neither arising nor ceasing, or not? Answer: The primary intention is not so. Conventional truth refutes real origination and cessation, explaining neither arising nor ceasing. Ultimate truth makes clear that provisional origination is plainly non-origination; hence it is not refuted. Therefore, the sūtra says: “Without destroying provisional designations, the true mark of all phenomena is expounded.” The treatise says: “Phenomena born of causes and conditions—I declare them to be precisely emptiness.” If one were to refute provisional origination and cessation, one would contradict these sūtras and treatises. Question: Why is it that intrinsic origination is refuted to explain non-origination, while provisional origination is precisely non-origination? Answer: All phenomena are ultimately devoid of intrinsic origination, and therefore the five eyes do not see it; it is merely inverted crosswise thinking that calls it existent. Therefore, intrinsic origination must be refuted first, and only then can dependent provisional origination be established as the conventional truth of Buddhas and bodhisattvas. This dependent provisional origination is seen by the Buddha eye; how could one refute the conventional truth of causes and conditions? It is just that dependent origination is precisely the nature of quiescent extinction; therefore, it is called the non-origination of ultimate truth, which is the middle way of ultimate truth. Question: How could the older [masters] say that conventional truth refutes intrinsic origination and ultimate truth refutes provisional origination? Answer: This is spoken with reference to the ailment regarding the provisional. Originally, the provisional was established in opposition to intrinsic nature, but the deluded further decidedly claimed that this provisional exists in principle; thus it became the ailment of provisional origination. Now, this ailment of provisional origination is refuted, which is why it is said that the provisional is refuted; it does not refute the dependent provisional of non-appropriation. Therefore, the two truths both refuting intrinsic nature and the provisional has, in general, two senses: if conventional truth refutes intrinsic nature, it refutes without preserving; if ultimate truth refutes the provisional, it both refutes and preserves—refuting the sentiment capable of delusion, but preserving the provisional that was deludedly grasped; thus it only removes the ailment and does not remove the phenomenon. There are also two approaches: first, there is no phenomenon to be removed, which is refuting the real phenomenon of intrinsic nature; second, only removing the sentiment capable of delusion while not removing the phenomenon deludedly grasped, which is the sense of ultimate truth refuting the provisional. Question: If dependent provisional origination is precisely non-origination and therefore not refuted, then dependent intrinsic origination being precisely non-origination should also not be refuted. Answer: The nature of causes and conditions, like Buddha-nature and Dharma-nature, is still only a provisional sense. What is taken here is an origination with appropriation, which is origination because of intrinsic origination, and cannot be non-origination. Such intrinsic nature is merely refuted and not preserved. Question: What kind of person adheres to provisional origination such that it is said that ultimate truth refutes provisional origination? Answer: There are two kinds of people: first, those of the two truths of non-empty provisional designations; second, those of the two truths of empty provisional designations. It is for these two kinds of people that ultimate truth is explained as refuting the provisional. The person of non-empty provisionality claims that conventional truth is empty of real intrinsic origination, but that provisional origination cannot be emptied. For this person, it is explained that the conventional truth of causes and conditions—provisional origination—is precisely non-origination; where is there any such provisional phenomenon that is non-empty? If there were such a provisional phenomenon that is non-empty, this provisional phenomenon would have to be refuted. Question: Can this very doctrine of non-empty provisional designations also be the present middle way of conventional truth, or not? Answer: There is also this intention. You say that being empty of real intrinsic nature is ultimate truth, and having provisional phenomena is called conventional truth; these two truths are still merely the meaning of the present conventional truth. Since conventional truth is dependent provisional designation and devoid of real intrinsic phenomena, how can one use the emptiness of conventional truth as the emptiness of ultimate truth? Question: Observing the traditional doctrine, it also agrees with what is said now. Conventional truth is the three provisionals, and thus is no longer real intrinsic nature; ultimate truth is the four severances, and thus no longer has the three provisionals. This is also the sense in which the two truths refute the provisional and the real; how does it differ from the present [view]? Answer: The shallow and deep approaches will naturally be fully explained. Although the traditional view says that conventional truth is the three provisionals, when viewed now from [the standpoint of] non-appropriation, it is ultimately an intrinsic nature view, and is refuted by the present conventional truth. Now it is explained that the very arising of a single thought making an understanding of origination is precisely an intrinsic nature view. Why? Since one gives rise to a thought making an understanding of origination, the mind deems that this origination exists, and further gives rise to an arising mind; this is having an appropriation, and therefore it is called intrinsic nature. If, hearing of origination, one says that origination is the origination of cessation and calls it dependent origination, and then forms an understanding of dependent origination, this becomes the ailment of dependent origination. One must refute this dependent origination; therefore, refuting the provisional and the real must be applied meticulously with reference to the contemplative mind—otherwise, it merely reverts to the old doctrine. Second, the person of empty provisionality claims that only when provisional origination is emptied is there non-origination; this is discerning non-origination by destroying origination. In response to this capacity, it is clarified that provisional origination is precisely non-origination, which is called ultimate truth. Question: How is neither arising nor ceasing the middle way of ultimate truth? Answer: By taking existence-emptiness as ultimate truth, it is far removed from origination and cessation, and therefore called middle. Since it is called existence-emptiness, emptiness is not empty of itself, and therefore called provisional, not different from conventional truth. Question: Since you say that emptiness-existence is conventional truth and existence-emptiness is ultimate truth, both truths are dependent provisional designations. When people who receive the teaching hear of existence, they make an understanding of existence, and when they hear of non-existence, they make an understanding of non-existence; thus, both truths become ailments of intrinsic nature. The author of the treatise refutes these two truths of real intrinsic nature and elucidates the two truths of dependent provisional designation; that is, both truths refute intrinsic nature. Why do you say that conventional truth refutes intrinsic nature and ultimate truth refutes the provisional? Answer: When I was twenty-two years old, I consulted my master on this meaning at Shaolong Monastery. The master said: “Speaking comprehensively of refuting the provisional and the real, there are four propositions. What you asked just now is that both truths refute intrinsic nature: conventional truth refutes intrinsic origination, and ultimate truth refutes intrinsic non-origination; therefore, both truths are provisional. Second, both truths refute the provisional: the traditional conventional truth of appropriation was provisional because of the provisional, whereas now it is explained that conventional truth is the non-provisional provisional; therefore, conventional truth refutes the provisional. The dependent non-provisional provisional is the ultimate truth, refuting the traditional provisional; hence it is the provisional ultimate truth.” Question: Others do not explain ultimate truth as provisional; why refute it? Answer: Although their ultimate truth is not provisional, the provisional establishes a name for the ultimate; this provisional designation is a name, and therefore by name, the ultimate can also refute the provisional. Furthermore, masters of the middle and provisional make an understanding of provisionality upon hearing of the provisional; one must also refute this provisional. The master said: “The fault of masters of the middle and provisional is grave; they will never see the Buddha. The reason for making this rebuke is that the provisional was originally spoken in opposition to intrinsic nature to make them awaken completely. Yet they then discarded intrinsic nature and preserved the provisional, deeming it to be definitely correct; their minds had that which they relied upon, and therefore they will never see the Buddha. It should properly be refuted.” Third, conventional truth refutes the provisional, and ultimate truth refutes the real; this directly opposes the traditional doctrine. Traditionally, conventional truth is the three provisionals, and ultimate truth, being the four severances, is not provisional. Therefore, it is now explained that conventional truth refutes this provisional of appropriation, and only then can conventional truth be distinguished as provisional. Question: How is it refuted? Answer: If conventional truth is provisional, what does conventional truth depend on? If it depends on ultimate truth, ultimate truth is not what is depended upon; how could conventional truth be that which depends? Since conventional truth does not depend on ultimate truth, nor does it depend on conventional truth itself, we know that conventional truth does not depend. If conventional truth does not depend, how is it provisional? Now that conventional truth has no such provisional, it is said that conventional truth refutes the provisional. The present conventional truth—existence does not exist of itself, but exists through emptiness—is when conventional truth first becomes provisional. As for ultimate truth refuting the real: the ultimate is not ultimate of itself; it is called conventional-ultimate. If the ultimate is not conventional-ultimate, then the ultimate does not become the ultimate; therefore, the dependent provisional ultimate refutes their real intrinsic ultimate. Fourth, conventional truth refutes the real, and ultimate truth refutes the provisional, as explained previously. Question: Conventional truth refutes the real and conventional truth is provisional; then ultimate truth refuting the provisional should mean that ultimate truth is not provisional. Answer: Ultimate truth refutes provisional origination and cessation; it does not say that ultimate truth refutes all provisionals. Question: Since there are four propositions, why do you now say that conventional truth refutes the real and ultimate truth refutes the provisional? Answer: Speaking comprehensively of the provisional and the real, there are indeed four propositions. Now, wishing to explain that both truths are free of origination, conventional truth is without real origination and ultimate truth is without provisional origination; thus the non-origination of the two truths can be distinguished as different. If one were to say that conventional truth refutes real origination and ultimate truth refutes real non-origination, then refuting origination and then further refuting non-origination would fail to explain the eight negations. For this reason, the two truths cannot both refute the real. If conventional truth refutes provisional origination and ultimate truth refutes provisional non-origination, that too is not explaining the meaning of the eight negations; hence they cannot both refute the provisional. If conventional truth refutes provisional origination and ultimate truth refutes real non-origination, that too does not explain the eight negations. Therefore, among the four approaches, it can only be that conventional truth clarifies the absence of real origination, and ultimate truth discerns the absence of provisional origination. Question: Could it be that ultimate truth also refutes real origination, or not? Answer: Taking the purport of the meaning, it indeed also has it, since postulating a real non-origination, being an appropriation, is still an origination view. However, provisionally following the external opponent's established doctrine, they do not say that ultimate truth is origination; therefore, ultimate truth does not refute origination.
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- 中觀論疏 — Classical Chinese