中觀論疏 3

English (machine translation) 3

Language: English

3.20 — 4 parts

3.2

Chapter 1: Examination of Causes and Conditions

From "[He] praises the Buddha with these two verses" onward is the second [section], which clearly explains the eight negations. It opens into two parts: first, Piṅgala explains the eight negations; second, Nāgārjuna himself explains the eight negations. Within the first, there are two parts: first, a general explanation of the purport of the two verses; second, a separate explanation of the two verses. The initial question and answer explain the second verse; from "'Unarising' means..." onward explains the first verse. "These two verses" indicates the two verses. "Praises the Buddha and briefly explains the ultimate truth" explains the purport of the two verses. Nāgārjuna placed these two verses at the beginning of the treatise for two reasons: first, to praise the Buddha; second, to clarify the ultimate truth. Praising the Buddha praises the person capable of expounding; clarifying the ultimate truth discusses the Dharma that is expounded. Although the meanings are many, they consist solely of person and Dharma; therefore, he presents these two. Furthermore, praising the Buddha clarifies the function of the teaching; discussing the ultimate truth clarifies the essence of the teaching. The function of the teaching means revealing the correct and refuting the erroneous; the essence of the teaching is the middle way of the eight negations. Furthermore, praising the Buddha clarifies the middle way of the two knowledges; discussing the ultimate truth clarifies the middle way of the two truths. Furthermore, praising the Buddha clarifies the intention of expounding the teaching; discussing the ultimate truth directly clarifies the expounding of the teaching. The two truths and the two knowledges have two kinds of mothers: if the two truths give birth to the two knowledges, then the two truths are the birth mother and the two knowledges are the children. Thus, the "Fo mu pin" (Chapter on the Mother of Buddhas) of the Yingluo jing takes the two truths as the mother. If the two knowledges expound the two truths, then the two knowledges are that which expounds and the two truths are that which is expounded, so the two knowledges are the expounding mother. The Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa, viewing prajñā in relation to the Buddha, possesses two kinds of causes, which are the two mothers: prajñā viewed in relation to the Buddha is able to give birth to the Buddha, so it is the birth mother; the Buddha expounds prajñā, so the Buddha is the expounding mother. Yet these words may be understood separately or conjunctively. If understood conjunctively, both verses praise the Buddha: the first verse praises the Buddha's Dharma-body, and the Dharma-body is the middle way—hence the Nirvāṇa Sūtra takes the middle way to be the Buddha; the subsequent verse praises the Buddha's response-body (saṃbhogakāya/nirmāṇakāya), meaning the response-body is able to expound the teaching for sentient beings. Furthermore, the first single verse clarifies the essence of the two bodies: the Dharma-body is completely free of provisional and real arising and cessation, while the response-body arises without arising and ceases without ceasing, being free of real arising and cessation; thus a single set of eight negations possesses both the true and the response bodies. The subsequent verse praises the Buddha's ability to expound these two bodies for sentient beings, extinguishing all prapañca and causing all sentient beings to attain the Buddha's two bodies. Therefore, both verses praise the Buddha. That both verses are supreme means: in the first verse the Dharma is supreme, in the next verse the person is supreme; in the first verse the essence of the teaching is supreme, in the next verse the function of the teaching is supreme; furthermore, the first verse clarifies that the truth is supreme, and the next verse clarifies that the knowledge is supreme. The primary meaning is: the first verse clarifies the middle way, and the subsequent verse clarifies right contemplation and the sūtras. These all clarify the Buddha's sūtra of the middle contemplation. The Buddha gives rise to contemplation based on the middle [way]; contemplation is articulated in the mind and expounded by the mouth, hence it is called a "sūtra". If understood separately, the first verse directly clarifies the ultimate truth, and the next verse directly clarifies the praise of the Buddha. Question: The first verse fully clarifies the three kinds of middle way; why does it exclusively say that it directly clarifies the ultimate truth? Answer: The three kinds of middle way are all supreme. Because it is the most supreme and unsurpassable, it is called "ultimate" (prathama/paramārtha), and because it is profound and meaningful, it is designated as "truth" (artha). Therefore the verse says "supreme among all preachings", from which we know it does not exclusively refer to the ultimate truth. Furthermore, it is said: although the eight negations fully clarify the two truths, the ultimate truth is the fundamental, and therefore it briefly clarifies the ultimate truth. This is why the beginning of the "Chapter on Examining the Twelve Links of Dependent Origination" states: "Previously, by hearing the Mahāyāna, one entered the ultimate truth; now, one wishes to enter the ultimate truth by hearing the analogy of the grain and hearing the Dharma." Therefore, although the Buddhas preach the Dharma relying on the two truths, their intent lies in the ultimate truth. Furthermore, these eight negations are precisely the ultimate-truth siddhānta, hence called "ultimate". The Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa, in explaining the ultimate-truth siddhānta, cites the eight negations of the Madhyamaka-śāstra; thus we know that the eight negations are the ultimate-truth siddhānta. Question: What kind of dharma is the ultimate-truth siddhānta? Answer: The Southern [masters] say it is the dull, inanimate object of ultimate truth. The Northern regions call it the real mark, which is also an absence of knowledge. Now we clarify that this is not so. The Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa states: "Conditions are one extreme, contemplation is one extreme; cause is one extreme, effect is one extreme; ... and so forth, up to the middle and the biased, the empty and the real, all being two extremes." The ultimate-truth siddhānta is neither condition nor contemplation, neither cause nor effect, and so forth, up to neither empty nor real. Therefore the treatise says: "The path of all words is cut off; the place of mental activity is extinguished." It is only within the absence of names and characteristics that, for the sake of sentient beings, names and characteristics are forcibly spoken; it is designated according to meaning. Because it contrasts with the three siddhāntas, it is called "ultimate truth". In contrast to the biased, it is called the middle; contrasting with the empty, it is the real; that which can give rise to contemplative knowledge is called the object; being that which gives birth to the fruit of contemplative knowledge, it is called the cause. Therefore, "prajñā is a single dharma, yet the Buddha speaks of it with various names." Question: Why is the ultimate-truth siddhānta alone clarified? Answer: The three siddhāntas can be refuted and broken, but the ultimate truth cannot be refuted or broken. Now, wishing to clarify the unsurpassable dharma that is ultimately irrefutable and indestructible, he clarifies the ultimate-truth siddhānta. Furthermore, the ultimate-truth siddhānta is the fundamental: due to the ultimate-truth siddhānta, true contemplation arises, and thus there are the Buddhas of the three periods; because they expound in accordance with reality for sentient beings, there are the twelve divisions of scriptures and the eighty thousand treasuries of Dharma. Now, wishing to lead sentient beings of the final age to abandon the branches and seek the root, he exclusively clarifies the ultimate-truth siddhānta. The Master also said: "This is not the ultimate truth of conventional truth, but the ultimate truth of the middle way. Therefore the Renwang jing says: 'The middle way ultimate truth of the truth of existence and the truth of non-existence.' The reason for clarifying the middle way ultimate truth is: although reciting the eight negations clarifies the two truths, it is to open up the non-dual path. If not for opening up the non-dual path, the Buddhas would never speak of the two paths, because the path has never been ultimate or conventional; hence it is called 'supreme'."

3.4

"Question: Dharmas are limitless..." is the second [part], which separately explains the subsequent verse. The reason we know the initial question and answer explain the subsequent verse is that the answer says: "Briefly, they are refuted by eight matters." Because the eight negations refute the non-eight prapañca, the verse says: "skilfully extinguishes all prapañca." Refuting is extinguishing. This explanation is definitely appropriate to use. Within this first part, the question comes first, followed by the answer. The question arises from the first half of the second verse. Above it says: "Able to expound this dependent origination / and skilfully extinguish all prapañca." The question means: The dharmas of prapañca are limitless, such as the ninety-six non-Buddhist schools and the five hundred treatise masters of the inner teaching; why is it that only expounding eight matters can extinguish them? This question has two meanings altogether: First, using the dharmas to challenge the negations: since dharmas are limitless, the negations should also be so, just as when diseases are numerous, medicines should also be numerous. Second, using the negations to challenge the dharmas: if the negations are only eight, dharmas should also be so. Now, why are dharmas numerous while the negations are few? If dharmas are numerous and the negations are few, then the refutation of errors is not exhaustive and the elucidation of the teaching is incomplete. Furthermore, this question arises because: the Dharma-gates are limitless; why do you take only the eight matters of your understanding to explain all the Mahāyāna sūtras? "Answer: Although dharmas are limitless..." is the second [part], which explains the meaning that dharmas are numerous while [the negations] are not few. Although dharmas are numerous, briefly speaking of eight matters leaves no error unrefuted and no teaching unelucidated. The words "comprehensively refutes" also correspond to the verse's "skilfully extinguishes all prapañca". "All" (sarva) is a name for not-one.

3.5

From "That which is unarisen" downwards is the second [section], which explains the opening stanza—that is, the text explaining the eight negations. This text is introduced for two purposes: first, to explain the general refutation of all phenomena mentioned above. Because there is neither arising nor ceasing, the remaining six items are likewise non-existent; thus, the two negations [of arising and ceasing] comprehensively refute all phenomena, all the more so the eight negations. Second, it is introduced in order to explain the passage on the eight negations itself. In terms of the text, it is explained through two cycles. In the mountains, it was traditionally said: the first cycle explains in terms of the approach of the ultimate truth, and the second cycle explains in terms of the approach of conventional truth. As for why it is explained in terms of the two truths, the Buddhas' preaching of the Dharma always relies on the two truths. Since the eight negations are the Buddha's preaching, they are also the two truths; hence they are explained through the approaches of the two truths. Explaining the ultimate truth first and conventional truth afterwards is because the ultimate truth is the fundamental and conventional truth is the derivative; therefore, it first explains its fundamental aspect and next explains its derivative aspect. Question: How is it known that the former is the ultimate truth and the latter is conventional truth? Answer: The latter says, "because it is directly seen in the world," from which one knows it is conventional truth. Since the latter is conventional truth, one knows that the former is the ultimate truth. At the place of the great scholar Dharma Master Dao'an in the mountains, I heard this when I was nineteen years old. That master said: "The former [cycle], on the ultimate truth, borrows arising to reveal non-arising; therefore it adduces the arising [posited by] the various treatise masters to elucidate non-arising. The subsequent [cycle], on conventional truth, borrows non-arising to reveal arising; therefore it says below that the myriad things are unarisen. Adducing that the myriad things are unarisen is intended to reveal and establish dependent arising." Question: Above it was said that the ultimate truth refutes provisional arising, while the conventional truth refutes real arising. If so, then the former refutation of the arising posited by the various debate-masters should be a refutation of provisional arising, and only the latter would be a refutation of real arising. Answer: In the ultimate truth, both provisional and real are cut off, and it completely refutes both kinds of arising; the various treatise masters establish both provisional and real. Therefore, refuting the arising posited by the various treatise masters is precisely elucidating the middle way of ultimate truth. Since the beginning refutes both provisional and real, while the subsequent only refutes the real, there is also no error. The master also said: "The arising posited by the various treatise masters is, in relation to the Tathāgata, precisely the ultimate truth. As the sūtra says: 'All conventional truths, in relation to the Tathāgata, are precisely the ultimate truth.'" Furthermore, both cycles explaining the eight negations equally refute the inverted, fixed attachments of all persons with appropriation, and equally elucidate the Buddha's middle way of the two truths. It is only that the first cycle explains in general, formulating four pairs of explanations for people of the three faculties; whereas the second cycle takes a specific, presently visible matter to explain it—this is why they differ. Furthermore, the first cycle explains directly, whereas the second cycle explains by verification. Explaining by verification means: when outsiders hear the initial explanation of non-arising, they do not have faith and accept it; therefore it adduces a matter right before one's eyes to reveal and explain it, so it is an explanation by verification. Furthermore, the first cycle directly elucidates that phenomena are unarisen right as they are, whereas the subsequent cycle elucidates that they are originally unarisen. Therefore, the later text relies on the beginning of the kalpa to elucidate non-arising, as well as non-coming, [non-going,] and so forth. A scholar at Xinghuang said: The first cycle refutes the real arising of the various treatise masters to elucidate non-arising, explaining in terms of the approach of conventional truth; only in the subsequent cycle can one produce the provisional from intrinsic nature, and by quieting the provisional elucidate the ultimate truth, which is why the latter explains in terms of the approach of the ultimate truth. In the first [cycle], it formulates four pairs of explanations, which constitute four distinct parts. The first pair comprises two parts: first, properly explaining non-arising and non-ceasing; second, explaining the subsumption of phenomena. In the first text there are two parts: first, explaining non-arising; second, using it as a model to elucidate non-ceasing. Explaining non-arising has two parts: first, stating the topic heading of non-arising; second, explaining the topic heading. "That which is unarisen" marks the topic heading. From "the various treatise masters" downwards is the second part, explaining the topic heading. In the text there are two parts: first, explaining arising; second, explaining non-arising. Explaining arising has two parts: first, generally stating what the various treatise masters posit; second, separately presenting their nine positions. Question: This treatise refutes deluded interpretations of the Mahāyāna, and Mahāyāna practitioners also receive the eight negations; why then elucidate their positing of arising? Answer: Although they claim to study the Mahāyāna, they merely form fixed understandings of the two truths, claiming that conventional truth naturally possesses arising and ultimate truth naturally lacks arising. The Buddha merely taught that that which arises is unarisen, yet they claim that arising is distinct from non-arising; therefore they must be refuted. When persons with appropriation elucidate arising and non-arising, in comparison with the meaning of non-appropriation, both are entirely arising; therefore arising is refuted. Furthermore, persons with appropriation do not know the arising of non-arising, and so their formulation of the meaning of conventional arising cannot be established; therefore we now refute arising. Furthermore, Hīnayāna treatise masters cling to phenomena as definitely having arising and do not believe in Mahāyāna non-arising, which obstructs the non-arising of the eight negations; now, wishing to refute the Hīnayāna obstruction and elucidate the non-arising of the eight negations, we therefore refute arising. Once the affliction of arising is removed, non-arising does not remain either; therefore the five propositions are left without anything to rely upon. Question: Now, in elucidating the Buddha's middle way of the two truths of the eight negations, how does refuting the arising posited by the various treatise masters clarify the middle way of the ultimate truth? Answer: This may be viewed from two perspectives. If viewed in terms of the Buddha's middle way of the two truths, it clarifies that dependent arising is precisely non-arising, and is therefore called the middle way of the ultimate truth; this reveals that non-arising does not exist distinct from arising—that which arises is itself unarisen, and is therefore called non-arisen. If viewed in terms of refuting the affliction of being deluded about the teaching, it refutes the arising posited by the various treatise masters as unsustainable, non-arising naturally belongs to the opponent, and only then can one clarify that dependent arising is precisely non-arising, which is called the ultimate truth. The master also said: "The Buddha merely refutes the arbitrary positing of arising by sentient beings, and therefore calls it non-arising, which is itself called the ultimate truth. Apart from this arising, where else could there be an ultimate truth? The treatise master now merely elucidates the Buddha's teaching refuting arising, and therefore elucidates the ultimate truth." It is also said: because of refuting errors, he elucidates the teaching; it can also be that precisely elucidating this refutation is what is called elucidating the teaching. Question: How many kinds of delusion do the various treatise masters have? Answer: The various treatise masters do not know the non-arising of arising, and are therefore deluded about the ultimate truth; nor do they know the arising of non-arising, and are therefore deluded about conventional truth. Question: What is the difference between the various treatise masters listed here and the previous eight errors? Answer: The previous eight errors are what the non-Buddhists posited and were refuted by the Buddha; the present treatise masters are Buddhist scholars and are refuted by Nāgārjuna.

3.6

"Some claim that cause and effect are one, while some claim that cause and effect are different" is the second part, separately listing the nine positions. Although this text principally refutes internal delusions, it now fully elucidates what is established by both internal and external [traditions], because this treatise principally refutes internal [Buddhist errors] and secondarily refutes external [non-Buddhist errors]. Sāṃkhyas claim that cause and effect are of one substance; Vaiśeṣikas cling to cause and effect having different substances; Ulūka elucidates that they are both one and different—"both one" still belongs to oneness, and "both different" still belongs to difference; Nirgranthaputras elucidate that they are neither one nor different—"neither one" still belongs to difference, and "neither different" still belongs to oneness. Therefore, by only listing two schools here, all four attachments are fully included. Within the Buddhadharma, the two fundamental traditions are: first, the Mahāsāṃghika, which holds that cause and effect are one, so the seed transforms into the sprout and youth changes into old age; second, the Sthaviravāda, which clarifies that there is no transformation, so the seed ceases before and the sprout arises after, youth ceases before and old age arises after, which is the doctrine that cause and effect are different. The Abhidharma agrees with the Sthaviravāda view, while the Tattvasiddhi agrees with the Mahāsāṃghika attachment. "Some claim that the effect exists within the cause, while some claim that the effect does not exist within the cause": the Sāṃkhyas elucidate oneness, and oneness still implies existence; the Vaiśeṣikas clarify difference, and difference still implies non-existence. The Sthaviras clarify existence in the two periods of time [past and future], which is the effect existing within the cause; the Mahāsāṃghikas clarify non-existence in the two periods of time, which is the effect not existing within the cause. The Abhidharma agrees with the Sthaviras, and the Tattvasiddhi agrees with the Mahāsāṃghikas. If one says that the Tattvasiddhi does not agree with the existence and non-existence of the two periods of time, this meaning is incorrect. The text of the Tattvasiddhi-śāstra only has two chapters on the existence and non-existence of the two periods of time; therefore we know that its refutation of existence and establishment of non-existence agrees with the Mahāsāṃghika doctrine. "Some claim that it arises from its own nature, from another, or from both": Question: Since there is arising from both in addition to self and other, why is this not also the case for oneness/difference and existence/non-existence? Answer: The intent is manifested through complementary phrasing. The non-Buddhists posit that primordial nature (prakṛti) can produce sentient beings, and when sentient beings cease, they return back to primordial nature; primordial nature is the nature of the world. This is sentient beings being reproduced from the category of sentient beings, and external objects are also like this. Within the Buddhadharma, just as the Abhidharma derives gross elements from essential elements, and the Tattvasiddhi derives phenomenal elements from principle elements, both are of the meaning of arising from intrinsic nature. As for arising from another, the Dvādaśamukha-śāstra says: "There are non-Buddhists who claim: 'I myself made the suffering of the five aggregates,' which is called self-arising; or they say: 'Maheśvara made it,' which is called arising from another." Those of the Abhidharma establish the cause and effect of the acting cause (kāraṇa-hetu): when one phenomenon arises, myriad phenomena do not obstruct it; when myriad phenomena arise, one phenomenon does not obstruct them; this is also the meaning of arising from another. The Tattvasiddhi says: "Habituation to inert objects produces intelligent awareness," which is also arising from another. Furthermore, the doctrine of existence in the two periods of time holds that there is the nature of the effect, which is arising from its own nature. Non-existence in the two periods of time holds that there is no nature of the effect and it relies entirely on conditions, which is the meaning of arising from another. As for arising from both, the non-Buddhist Nirgrantha posits that before heaven, earth, and the myriad things existed, there was a man and a woman, who through conjunction produced sentient beings. The abhidharmikas say: the eight marks support each other and arise together, mutually generating one another in turn. The Tattvasiddhi says: the conjunction of the four subtle atoms makes a pillar, and the conjunction of the five aggregates makes a person. These are all the meaning of arising from both. "Some claim that there is arising or that there is no arising": Some say: this still summarizes the above seven positions. Although the seven positions are different, they do not go beyond existence and non-existence; hence they are summarized here. We now say this is not so. This text states "some claim," which indicates separate positions, not a summary of the above. Another explanation says: "existence" is having a cause, and "non-existence" is being without a cause; since the various positions are numerous and cannot be cited exhaustively, it ultimately demarcates them by having a cause and being without a cause. We also disagree with this explanation; the refutation is as before. We now clarify that there can be two meanings: First, the above seven positions elucidate the substance of phenomena, whereas these two attachments clarify the characteristic of arising. For instance, the Sarvāstivādins and the Vibhajyavādins posit that apart from the substance of phenomena, there is a separate characteristic of arising, and therefore say "there is arising." As for "no arising," the Mahāsāṃghikas and the Dharmaguptakas elucidate that apart from the substance of phenomena, there is no separate characteristic of arising, and therefore say "no arising." Furthermore, those who hold that "there is arising" posit that the characteristic of arising is conditioned, like the abhidharmikas; those who hold that "there is no arising" posit that the characteristic of arising is unconditioned, like the Vibhajyavādins. Second, the above elucidated the existence and non-existence of the effect; now it elucidates the existence and non-existence of the cause. Some claim that the cause is an existing phenomenon, taking existence as the cause capable of producing phenomena; [or that] the cause is a non-existent phenomenon, taking non-existence as the cause capable of producing phenomena. Therefore this differs from having a cause and being without a cause. "Being without a cause" means having no cause whatsoever; here it clarifies taking non-existence as the cause. Question: Whose doctrine is this? Answer: Both internal and external teachings have these attachments. Among the non-Buddhists there are two masters: for example, the water-consuming non-Buddhists posit that water can produce all the myriad things, which is arising from existence; the mouth-strength non-Buddhists posit that great space can produce the four great elements, the four great elements can produce medicinal herbs, and medicinal herbs can produce sentient beings, which is arising from non-existence. Within the Buddhadharma there are also these positions: for example, Dharma Master Chen posited that phenomena are originally non-existent, and from non-existence existence arises, which is [arising from] non-existence. The Dilun masters posit an originally existent Buddha-nature, from which can be produced the contrary and accordant functions of the myriad things, which they call arising from existence. Another explanation: taking conventional truth as the substance and ultimate truth as the meaning is "arising from existence"; taking ultimate truth as the substance and conventional truth as the meaning is "arising from non-existence."

3.7

Regarding "Explanations such as these concerning the characteristics of arising are all incorrect": this is the second [section], explaining the meaning of "non-". This further divides into three parts: first, a general rejection; second, pointing ahead; third, concluding the meaning of "non-". The general rejection has three points: First, to clarify that in discussing non-arising, arising is vividly present yet there is no arising, and likewise non-arising is vividly present yet there is arising. Since outsiders understand neither that arising is non-arising, how could they understand that non-arising is arising? Therefore, their conception of arising is not established. Second, since outsiders do not understand that non-arising is arising, they upside-downly and arbitrarily impute that there is a real arising of intrinsic nature; yet even within conventional truth there is no such arising, hence it says "incorrect". Third, these nine theories contradict one another: for instance, those positing oneness refute the thesis of difference, and those positing difference refute oneness; thus we know oneness and difference are both false and vain, and therefore none of them are established. Question: The Buddha refuted the eight theories of arising to elucidate non-arising, and Nāgārjuna refutes the nine theories to likewise clarify non-arising; how do they differ from the Buddha? Answer: The sūtras say, "When the four reliances appear in the world, one should know they are like the Buddha." Because they equally awaken to non-arising, there is no difference. But in distinguishing master and disciple there is a difference: the Buddha spoke non-arising, whereas the author of the treatise elucidates non-arising; hence they differ.

3.8

Regarding "This matter will be explained extensively later": this is the second [part], pointing ahead to the refutation, which constitutes the explanation of the meaning of non-arising. Taken comprehensively, all twenty-five chapters elucidate non-arising. How do we know this is so? Refuting the "Chapter on the Three Characteristics", it says, "Seeking the characteristic of arising is impossible, hence it is called non-arising." Next, refuting abide and perish, it says, "One should know that abiding phenomena are precisely non-arising, and the meaning of perishing is likewise." Thus we know that seeking any phenomenon is impossible, which means that all phenomena are without arising. If spoken of specifically: the three theories of self, other, and both point to Nāgārjuna's verse explaining the eight negations for their refutation; "an effect existing or not existing in the cause" points to the verse on the four conditions for refutation; the oneness or difference of cause and effect points to the "Chapter on Cause and Effect" for refutation; and the existence or non-existence of arising points to the "Chapter on the Three Characteristics" for refutation.

3.9

Regarding "The characteristic of arising is definitively unfindable": this is the third [part], concluding the meaning of "non-". Within the two truths, an arising of real nature is definitively non-existent, hence it says "definitively unfindable". Question: Why is such a characteristic of arising unfindable? Answer: Now, we shall temporarily resort to proximate matters to illuminate the profound purport. Here we briefly refute the nine schools. If cause and effect were one, then cause would self-produce cause and effect would self-produce effect; uncooked rice would self-produce uncooked rice, and cooked rice would self-produce cooked rice. If they were different, uncooked rice and cooked rice do not possess two separate substances, so how could they be different? If cooked rice were different from uncooked rice yet cooked rice arose from uncooked rice, cooked rice is also different from soil, so it ought to arise from soil. If uncooked rice is different from cooked rice and produces cooked rice, soil is also different from cooked rice, so why does it not produce cooked rice? If cooked rice already existed within uncooked rice, then within cooked rice there would already exist impure food and impure things. If within uncooked rice there were no cooked rice, then although one uses uncooked rice, in the end it would not become cooked rice. Furthermore, if uncooked rice lacked cooked rice yet produced cooked rice, it also lacks clothing, so why does it not produce clothing? If cooked rice arose back from its own substance, then it would not arise from uncooked rice. If uncooked rice is other than cooked rice and cooked rice arises from uncooked rice, yet within uncooked rice there is no substance of cooked rice, relative to what is it "other"? If cooked rice arose from the substance of cooked rice and also arose from uncooked rice, then both would have faults. If one says that cooked rice arises from original non-existence, that would be transforming non-existence into existence. If one takes existence as the cause and it arises from existence, then from what does that existent cause arise? Therefore, the nine theories are definitively unestablished. Question: The outsider says there is definitively arising, which is the view of arising. The author of the treatise says there is definitively non-arising, which should be the view of non-arising. Answer: In the bosom of the author of the treatise there has never been arising or non-arising; it is only because the outsider asserts a definitive existence that, seeking that definitive existence and finding nothing, he merely says "definitively non-arising".

3.10

Regarding "non-perishing": this is the second [section], refuting perishing. If by analogy with the above, one should also bring forth the various treatise masters' various imputations of the characteristics of perishing, which are no different from the nine schools. But since the meaning of arising has already been brought out, there is no need for burdensome words. The intent of this text is not to refute perishing separately, but merely to clarify that because arising is absent, there is precisely non-perishing. There are three points in all: First, refutation through mutual dependence: because arising exists, perishing exists; because arising is absent, perishing is absent. Second, when there is arising, the function of perishing has not yet occurred; if the meaning of arising is negated, there is no arising that could perish. Third, by taking arising to analogize perishing: since imputing arising where there is no arising is false, imputing perishing where there is no perishing is likewise the same.

3.11

Regarding "Because there is neither arising nor perishing, the remaining six matters are also non-existent" and following: this is the second [section], clarifying the subsumption of phenomena. Subsuming phenomena does not mean refuting the six matters separately, but merely clarifying that because there is no arising, there are no six. Thus subsuming the six within non-arising is entirely to reveal the meaning of non-arising. Why clarify the meaning of non-arising? To reveal that the eight negations leave no phenomenon unexhausted and no speech incomplete. Merely clarifying the single phrase "non-arising" already leaves no phenomenon unexhausted and no speech incomplete, how much more so fully clarifying the eight negations? That is to say, it explains the general refutation of all phenomena above. Question: Why is it that without arising and perishing there are no six matters? Answer: For two reasons. First, arising and perishing are conditioned; since conditioned phenomena are absent, unconditioned phenomena are also absent. Because conditioned and unconditioned are absent, all phenomena are ultimately empty. Second, cause and effect mutually generating is conventional truth; because conventional truth is absent, ultimate truth is also absent; because the two truths are absent, the two knowledges are also absent; therefore, all phenomena being empty, there are no six matters.

3.12

Regarding "Question: Non-arising and non-perishing already generally refute all phenomena": this is the second [section], explaining non-permanence and non-annihilation. First comes the question, then the answer. The question has four points. "Non-arising and non-perishing already generally refute all phenomena": this refers back to the preceding. "Why speak further of the six matters?": this asks about what follows. The previous question doubted that [the negations] were too few; the present question doubts that they are too many. In the previous question, seeing that what was refuted was not plenty, one resented that what refutes was too little; that is, seeing many diseases, one doubted there was too little medicine. In the present question, seeing that the treatise master says the remaining six are absent because of non-arising and non-perishing, one sees that a little medicine can cure many diseases, and suspects the negations are too many. If so, the previous question and answer clarified that the negations are not few, and this question and answer clarifies that the negations are not many; this is speaking with the middle balance. Second, challenging the former by means of the latter: now it is clarified that non-arising and non-perishing are already sufficient, yet one further speaks of the six; then although the former eight matters were sufficient, one ought to have spoken further. If because the former eight matters were sufficient one did not speak further, now that the two matters are sufficient, one should not speak further of the six. Third, if one says non-arising and non-perishing are sufficient, one should not speak further of the six matters; if one speaks further of the six, then the six matters are not non-existent. Fourth, censuring the preceding explanation: was the meaning of non-arising established above or unestablished? If established, one should not speak further; if unestablished, then phenomena are not non-arising. Regarding "Answer: It is to establish non-arising and non-perishing": this answer clarifies that non-arising and non-perishing are truly sufficient in meaning, and speaking further of the six is merely to establish the meaning of non-arising and non-perishing. The remaining three challenges can be understood in thought and need not be answered. In the text there are two parts: first, indicating that it is "to establish"; next, explaining "to establish". Indicating that it is to establish is spoken in terms of phenomena: non-arising already subsumes all phenomena, hence the bodhisattva only attains anutpattika-dharma-kṣānti and in truth there is no need to speak of the six; speaking further of the six is spoken only for the sake of persons.

3.13

Regarding "Some do not accept non-arising and non-perishing": this is the second [part], explaining the meaning of "to establish". The author of the treatise refuted the arising and perishing of phenomena to clarify non-arising and non-perishing; outsiders, hearing this, are unwilling to accept it. The author of the treatise refuted the annihilation and permanence of phenomena to clarify non-annihilation and non-permanence; outsiders, hearing this, then give rise to faith. To establish this person's faith in non-arising, he therefore speaks of the six. Why is this? They think phenomena involve causes perishing and effects arising; hearing non-arising and non-perishing spoken, it destroys their cause and effect, leading to the wrong view of an icchantika, hence they do not accept it. If they hear that because causes perish there is non-permanence, and because effects continue there is non-annihilation, cause and effect are not lost, and therefore they give rise to faith. This person believes non-arising and non-perishing are different from non-annihilation and non-permanence, and therefore forms this imputation. Question: What kind of person forms this imputation? Answer: There are two kinds of people who form this imputation: First, Sāṃkhya, Vaiśeṣika, down to the Nirgrantha, who establish the meaning of cause and effect; hearing non-arising and non-perishing spoken, they think there are no longer causes and effects, hence they do not accept it. If one says that cause and effect continue in succession without annihilation and without permanence, then cause and effect are not lost, so they give rise to faith. Second, it is precisely the nine kinds of treatise masters above and the meanings of the five hundred schools; the Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa says, "When the five hundred schools hear of ultimate emptiness, it is like a sword piercing their hearts." Ultimate emptiness is precisely non-arising and non-perishing, hence they do not accept it. If they hear of cause and effect as non-permanent and non-annihilated, they therefore give rise to faith. All those who attained the emptiness of sentient beings but did not attain the emptiness of phenomena formed this attachment. Master Tanying, relating Kumārajīva's words, also made this explanation. He said, "Under non-arising there is no phenomenon to rely upon; under non-permanence the substance of phenomena still remains. Hence accepting non-arising is difficult, but believing non-permanence is easy." One must only provide this one explanation. If there are other interpretations, they do not follow the meaning of the text, but are merely human opinions speculating and deducing on their own. Regarding "If one deeply investigates, non-permanence and non-annihilation are precisely non-arising and non-perishing": the preceding clause brings out the outsider's assumption of difference. You think non-arising and non-perishing are different from non-permanence and non-annihilation, and therefore believe the one and do not believe the other. Now, non-permanence is precisely non-arising; since you believe non-permanence, you ought to believe non-arising; if you do not believe non-arising, neither do you believe non-permanence. There are three parts: first, stating the identity; second, explaining the identity; third, concluding the identity. Why say "deeply investigates"? It clarifies that the reason the outsider thinks they are different is that he does not deeply investigate; if he deeply investigates them, he will know they are not different. Regarding "Why? If a phenomenon were real, it should not be non-existent": next is explaining the identity. This explanation intends to clarify that what is negated does not differ, so what negates has no distinction. The initial phrase matches perishing with annihilation. If a phenomenon were real, it could not be made non-existent; but if it was previously existent and subsequently non-existent, one should know this is annihilation. Previously existent and now non-existent is annihilation; previously existent and now non-existent is perishing. If annihilation is perishing, one should know non-annihilation is precisely non-perishing. Regarding "If it previously had intrinsic nature": this matches arising with permanence. If it previously had a nature of arising, one should know this arising is precisely permanence; hence we know non-permanence is precisely non-arising. Here, "substance" is taken as "nature"; as it says below, "intrinsic nature is precisely intrinsic substance".

3.14

Regarding "Therefore it speaks of non-permanence and non-annihilation" and following: this is the third [part], concluding the identity. Question: Why does this text give this explanation? Answer: Discussing its general purport: because phenomena are [held to be] real, one falls into annihilation and permanence; and because they are [held to be] real, one falls into arising and perishing. Because they are not real, there is non-annihilation and non-permanence; because they are not real, what arising and perishing could there be? Thus we know they are identical. Question: How are arising and perishing identical to annihilation and permanence? Answer: If discussing annihilation and permanence in a combined sense: the spirit not perishing and receiving a subsequent body is permanence; the spirit perishing and not receiving a subsequent body is annihilation; this is merely annihilation and permanence in the Hīnayāna. Now, in the Mahāyāna, the moment a single thought of grasping with attainment arises, one falls into annihilation and permanence; the moment one says there is arising, that is permanence; the moment one says there is perishing, that is annihilation. As the Vajracchedikā Prajñāpāramitā says, "If one grasps the mark of a person, one attaches to self, person, and sentient being." Not only does grasping the mark of a person attach to self, person, and sentient being; if one gives rise to a thought grasping the mark of a phenomenon, one attaches to self and person. Because the disciples of the Buddha shun attaching to a self, he brings this forth to illuminate it.

3.15

From "Although some, having heard the fourfold refutation of all phenomena" below, [the commentary] explains the third pair: neither identity nor difference. Question: For what reason does Piṅgala explain them in four pairs? Answer: Examining Piṅgala's intention, he initially refutes the thesis-masters' [notion of] arising to clarify non-arising, showing that non-arising refutes all phenomena completely. Yet subsequently he further sets forth three pairs of phenomena for the sake of trainees of three different faculties—superior, middling, and inferior: those of superior faculties, hearing of neither arising nor ceasing, do not awaken to non-arising, but upon hearing of neither annihilation nor permanence they finally awaken to non-arising; those of middling faculties, hearing of neither annihilation nor permanence, do not awaken to non-arising, but upon hearing of neither identity nor difference they finally awaken to non-arising; those of inferior faculties, hearing of all six kinds, do not awaken at all, but upon hearing that all phenomena fundamentally have no coming and no going out they finally awaken to non-arising. Therefore we know that the first pair directly reveals non-arising; refuting errors is already comprehensive, and manifesting the Way is fully accomplished, but only for the sake of persons of three faculties are the remaining six negations stated. Regarding the first passage, there are two parts: "Although some, having heard the fourfold refutation of phenomena" recapitulates the prior refutation; "they still establish all phenomena by means of the four gates" establishes the subsequent position. This clarifies that, refusing to accept the prior fourfold refutation, they establish the subsequent four phenomena. "This too is not so" is the treatise master's second part, replying. Furthermore, four phrases are unfolded: First is the general negation. There are overall two meanings: First, to clarify that although they now establish the latter four, they have already leaked into the prior four gates, and therefore should not be established. Second, since the prior four are false, it is verified that the latter four are likewise not real. "If they were identical, there would be no condition; if they were different, there would be no continuation" is the second part, a brief refutation. It explains the preceding general negation. If cause and effect were identical, then the effect would not exist owing to the cause, nor would the cause exist owing to the effect. "Condition" (yuán) means the sense of causal reason (yuányóu). Furthermore, since cause and effect would be identical, there would only be the effect with no distinct cause; hence it says, "if they were identical, there would be no condition." "Condition" is just "cause." As for "if different, there would be no continuation": if the sprout is different from the grain seed yet the sprout continues the grain, then the sprout is also different from a tree and should likewise continue the tree. Furthermore, if cause and effect were different, then at the time of the cause there would not yet be an effect, so there would be that which is continued, but no continuer. When the effect exists, the cause exists no more, so there would be a continuer, but nothing that is continued. However, just as with difference there is no continuation, with identity there is likewise no continuation; just as with identity there is no condition, with difference there is likewise no condition. If the grain is different from the sprout, how could it be the condition for the sprout? If it were, since a tree is different from the sprout, it should also be the condition for the sprout. The Tattvasiddhi masters say: "Provisional existence is identical to the real; there is also [the sense that it] is different from the real." Now I ask: Do the four subtle particles constitute a pillar that is identical to the real, or do they constitute a pillar that is different from the real? If they constitute a pillar that is identical to the real, it is just the real; what cause and effect mutually constituting each other is there? If they constitute a pillar that is different from the real, the real and the pillar are separate from each other; how could they mutually constitute each other? "[This] will be refuted in various ways later" is the third part, pointing to later chapters. Refutations of identity and difference are found everywhere in the text; refutations of continuation appear in the Chapters on Action (Karma) and on the Already-Per-formed. "Therefore, it is further said: neither identity nor difference" is the fourth part, the general conclusion.

3.16

From "Although some, having heard the sixfold refutation of all phenomena" below, [the commentary] explains the fourth pair. Here he merely indicates their establishment without setting forth a refutation because, first, by analogy with the above it can be known; second, the "Chapter on Going and Coming" is close at hand and its text is easy to see, so there is no need to trouble to refute it. Question: In [discussing] coming and going out, why does he not cite immediate things and instead clarify the root? Answer: This has a profound purport. The preceding six negations did not fail to address manifest things, yet the deluded did not accept them. Now, wishing to exhaust their root as having no place whatsoever of coming and no place whatsoever of going out, one should therefore know that there is no arising or ceasing, nor identity or difference. Question: In refuting coming and going out, why does he merely clarify the positions established by non-Buddhists? Answer: This treatise primarily refutes the internal [Buddhists] and secondarily refutes external [non-Buddhists]. Because it primarily refutes the internal, the first three pairs refute them extensively; because it secondarily refutes the external, the last pair refutes them briefly. Moreover, this is a refutation by pointing out their equivalence. The Tattvasiddhi masters have the doctrine of flowing out and returning; the Dilun masters have [the doctrines of] the coming that deviates from the true to give rise to delusion, and the going that quells delusion to return to the true. Coming and going such as these are entirely the same as non-Buddhists; now enumerating the non-Buddhists is just refuting the internal. Question: How does one refute their doctrine? Answer: If you had sentient beings who had formerly attained Buddhahood, one could speak of arriving at the original place. Now, since there has not yet been one who attained Buddhahood, how can one speak of returning to the original place? They explain: Sentient beings originally possess Buddha-nature and originally possess the tathāgatagarbha, which serves as the support and foundation for saṃsāra; now, because they sever afflictions they attain Buddhahood, and therefore it is returning to the original place. Now I ask: Does Buddha-nature itself become Buddha, or do sentient beings become Buddha? If you say that sentient beings become Buddha, as the sūtra says, "The deer king of the past was myself"—did the deer arrive at Buddhahood, or did it not arrive? If it arrived, the Buddha is still the deer; if it did not arrive at Buddhahood, the deer ceased previously, so who becomes Buddha? If Buddha-nature itself becomes Buddha, sentient beings should not attain Buddhahood. Question: The sūtras also say, "From the root of non-abiding all phenomena are established"; if, through fully awakening, one returns to non-abiding, or even if inversion arises from emptiness, and through fully awakening one returns to the original purity—how is this different from non-Buddhists? Answer: If one definitively forms this interpretation, it is indeed no different from non-Buddhists. But now we clarify that coming has no place from which it comes, and going has no place to which it arrives; it is merely coming without coming and going without going, never having had two marks.

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中觀論疏 — Classical Chinese